PLJ 2018 Lahore
Present: Abid Aziz Sheikh, Shams Mehmood Mirza and
Shahid Karim, JJ.
Shahid Karim, JJ.
CITY SCHOOL PRIVATE LIMITED--Petitioner
versus
GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 29724 of 2015, decided on 5.4.2018.
Constitution of Pakistan
----Arts. 9, 14, 18, 25-A, 37(b) 38(d)--Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulations Ordinance, 1984 and Rules, 1984, R. 7-A--Amendment--Restructions were imposed--Fee increased for any academic year for not more than 5% and 8% retrospective effect--Question of--Whether amendment regarding fixation and determination fee of private schools which as claimed by Government is ensure not to allow commercialization, profiteering and expatition--Right to education--The right to life and dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education--Principles of policy--Right to education is also guaranteed under Arts. 37(b) & 38(d)--Principles of policy not justiciable but cannot be isolated from fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution--After 18th Amendment in Constitution the right of education has been made an independent fundamental right under Art. 25-A of the Constitution--The Ordinance of 1984 and Rules of 1984 were promulgated to register and regulate private educational institutions. The Ordinance of 1984 was amended through Ordinance 2015 whereby the impugned Section 7-A was inserted in Ordinance of 1984 and inter alia maximum limit of 5% for increase in fee was prescribed. The said Ordinance of 2015 was converted into Act of 2016. The provision of Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984 was further amended through Act of 2017 and maximum limit was increased to 8%--Plain reading of Article 18 of the Constitution shows that citizen has right to enter upon lawful occupation or profession or conduct a lawful trade or business subject to qualifications or conditions through regulations. These restrictions under Article 18 are of four kinds. Firstly the State can through law prescribe qualifications; secondly the trade or profession may be regulated by a licensing system; thirdly trade, commerce or industry may be regulated in the interest of free competition therein and fourthly, a citizen may be excluded completely or partially from carrying out a trade, business, industry or services, where State wants to carry it out itself. [P. 663, 664 & 666] A, B & C
----Ss. 7 & 7-A--Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Rules, 1984, R. 12(ii)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 18--The word ‘Qualification’--Defined--A quality, which is legally necessary to render a person eligible to fill an office or to perform any public duty or function means qualification--Section 7-A of the Ordinance, 1984 shows that a mechanism has been provided for fixation of the fee by educational institution including maximum limit to which fee can be increased--The mechanism of fixation of reasonable fee through S. 7-A of the Ordinance is also a part of registration requirements u/S. 7 of the Ordinance, 1984 and Rule 12 of the Rules, 1984--Certain registration requirements may also amount to ‘qualifications’. [Pp. 666 & 667] D & E
Arshad Mahmood v. Government of Punjab PLD 2005 SC 193 ref.
----Ss. 3, 4, 6, 7 & 9--Constitution of Pakistan Art. 18--‘Licence’--Defined--As per Blacks’ Law Dict. Licence is a permit from Government to carry on some trade etc.--No educational institution shall run unless it is registered under Ordinance, 1984--It can safely be concluded that private schools are being regulated under licensing system. [P. 667, 668 & 669] F, G & H
Ghulam Zameer vs. Khondar PLD 1965 Dacca 156 & Cornelius in East and West Steam Shipping Company case PLD 1958 SC 41, ref.
Constitution of Pakistan
----Art. 18--Expression ‘reasonable restriction’s is not specifically mentioned as in Art. 19 (6) of Indian Constitution--However word ‘Regulation’ in Art. 18 has been construed that regulation shall be reasonable--Word ‘Regulation’ defined--Right of profession and trade under Art. 18 of constitution is not an absolute right and is always subject to reasonable restriction prescribed by law in a system of licensing--Competent authority is at liberty to regulate profession and trade and said form of regulation shall only be unconstitutional if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrable irrelevant to policy--A reasonable restriction is always considered to be within framework of fundamental right--Law may regulate mode of carrying on business, there is no bar to exercise lawful trade but interest of community should be guarded as a public policy.
[Pp. 670, 674 & 675] I, J & K
Arshad Mahmood v. Government of Punjab PLD 2005 SC 193, Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44, Al-Reham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Ministry of Religious, Hajj, Zakat and Ushr through Secretary and others 2011 SCMR 1621, Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 57, Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1997 SC 582, Administrator, Market Committee Kasur and 3 others vs. Muhammad Sharif and others 1994 SCMR 1048, Watan Party and another vs. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 997, Shahabuddin and another vs. Pakistan PLD 1957 (W.P.) Kar. 854, ref.
----S. 7-A--Reasonable--Duration and extension Restriction--Fundamental Rights of Restrictions--Interest of General Public--There are no abstract standards or general pattern of reasonableness, Court has to bear in mind that nature of rights infringed through such restrictions should be proportionate to urgency of evil sought to be remedied by said restriction--Question--Impugned Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984 is reasonable or not--An act of parliament is not open to challenge on grounds of reasonableness and reasonableness is available to challenge validity of subordinate legislation such as rules or regulation or act of executive but this general rule doesn’t apply where under constitution, a right conferred is subject to reasonableness restriction imposed by law in public interest etc.--Perusal of clause (v) of repealed Ordinance, 1962--Section 7 of Ordinance, 1984 Rule 12(ii) of Rules, 1984 shows that fees to be charged by educational institutions was always regulated by authority even prior to impugned Section 7-A of Ordinance, 1984--Therefore it can’t be argued that under Article 18 of Constitution, fixation of reasonable fee by educational institutions can’t be regulated through Section 7-A of Ordinance, 1984.[Pp. 682, 683 & 684] L, M & N
Pakistan Broadcasters Association vs. Pakistan Media Regulatory Authority PLD 2016 SC 692, Papnasam Labour Union vs. Madura Coats Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 196, Mohammad Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1970 SC 93, Narendra Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1960 SC 430, Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Commercial Tax Officer 2005 1 SC 625, AIR 1982 SC 33, AIR 1954 SC 220, (1986) 3 SCC 20; AIR 1961 SC 448 & AIR 1952 SC 115, ref.
State’s Regulatory System--
----Mechanism for unaided private schools--Principles--Pakistani and Indian Courts.
Monini Jai vs. State of Karnataka 1992 3 SCC 666, Unni Krishnan, J.P. vs. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645, TMA Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481, Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697, P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537, Society for Unaided Private School of Rajasthan vs. Union of India 2012 AIR SC 3445, Modern School vs. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 2236, Anti-Corruption and Crime Investigation Cell vs. State of Punjab Modern Dental College India Medical Association vs. Union of India and others AIR 2011 SC 2365; Charutar Arogya Mandal v. State of Gujarat AIR 2011 (SCW) 2475; Rohilkhand Medical College and Hospital, Bareilly v. Medical Council of India
Constitution of Pakistan
----Art. 25--Equal Protection of Law--Sec. 7-A Sub-Sec. (1) of Ordinance, 1984 classifies private schools charging more than Rs. 4000 and other private schools hence discriminatory--Validity--This argument has no substance--Equal protection of law under Art. 25 of constitution doesn’t envisage that every citizen is to be treated alike in all circumstances but it contemplates that persons similarly stated or similarly placed are to be treated alike--Reasonable classification is permissible on basis of intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are group together from those who have been left out. [P. 698] O
----Cls. (1) & (5)--Principle of proportionality--Restriction on fundamental right can only be upheld if it is established that it seeks to impose reasonable restriction in interest of public at large and a less drastic restriction will not have ensued interest of general public--This is a principle of proportionality which if violated will automatically render condition as unreasonable restriction--Applicability of principle of proportionality on sub-clause (1) & (5) of Section 7-A of Ordinance--Rationale for capping of fee to 5% and 8% and not more than previous academic year, is to prevent profiteering by educational institutions--This extreme restriction across board on every educational institution, regardless of its costs, expenses and actual profit is absolutely unproportionate and unreasonable--Onus of proving to satisfaction of Court that restriction is reasonable lies upon state--Further where legislative enactment abridges any of fundamental right enumerated in constitution, it could be struck down by Court.
[Pp. 701, 702 & 703] P, Q, R
Constitution of Pakistan
----Arts. 23 & 24--Right to property--Ordinance, 1984 Sub-Clause (1) & (5) of Sec. 7-A--It is not reasonable to impose Cap of 5% or 8% or total bar on increase more than previous academic year across board, on all private educational institutions by simply disregarding inflation and costs incurred by those institutions--Cap on gross income without taking into account inflation and actual cost will amount to take away right of property under Art. 23 and 24 of constitution. [P. 703] S
Constitution of Pakistan
----Art. 25-A--Right to Education--Responsibility of State to provide free education to children between age 5-16 but unaided private educational institutions are not bound to provide completely free education to all students under Art. 25-A of Constitution. [P. 706] T
Legislative Judgment--
----Concept--Explained--Impugned legislation of freezing maximum fee amounts to legislative judgment--Validity--Such fixation is not an enactment of legislature in domain of judiciary, because no judgment render or to be rendered by any Court is under dispute and no presumption is associated with petitioner--Further no power of any Court has been usurped by impugned legislation and petitioner’s right to have recourse to Court of law remains available. [P. 707] U
Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan Punjab vs. Naseer Ahmad Khan 2001 CLC 1422, Government of Punjab v. Naseer Ahmed Khan 2010 SCMR 431, Nat. Industrial Coop Credit Corp. v. Province of Punjab PLD 1992 Lah. 462, distinguished.
Constitution of Pakistan
----Art. 10-A--Due process of law--Punjab Private Educational Institution (Promotion and Regulation) Ordinance, 1984, S. 7-A--So, legislation was not required to give hearing to petitioners before passing of impugned Section 7A of Ordinance, 1984--However, ex-post facto hearing mechanism should have been provided to determine if fee beyond 5% or 8% is justified or not--This requirement is further entrenched in law after insertion of Article 10-A of Constitution, which makes due process as fundamental right--In light of above discussion, we are of view that though legislation was not required to give hearing to petitioners before passing of impugned provision of Section 7-A, however, ex post facto hearing mechanism should have been provided to determine if fee beyond 5% or 8% is justified or not--This requirement is further entrenched in law after insertion of Article 10-A of Constitution, which makes due process as fundamental right--It is well settled law that even vested rights can be taken away by express words and necessary intendment by legislature. [P. 709] V & W
Fauji Foundation and another vs. Shamim ur
----S. 7-A--Constitution, 1973--Art. 128--Section 7-A of Ordinance, 1984 could only be amended through Act of Parliament and not through Ordinance--Validity--Ordinance has no basis--After Ordinance, 2015--Section 7-A was inserted through Act of 2016 and finally through Act of 2017--Under Article 128 of constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Governor exercised legislative power and not merely executive power. [P. 709] X
Fauji Foundation and another vs. Shamim ur
Constitution of Pakistan
----Art. 3--Elimination of exploitation--Regulatory measures for fixing fees--Article 3 enjoins upon state duty to eliminate exploitation and this also provides a raison d’eter for regulation of Education sector and puts paid to argument that GOP must not intervene in regulatory measures of fixing fees on this basis--It is constitutional duty of GOP to balance mandate of Article 3 with rights of petitions to conduct an economic activity. [P. 718] Y
Mrs. Asma Jahangir, M/s. Shahid Hamid, Miss Aysha Hamid, Khawaja Haris, Faisal Hussain Naqvi, Khawaja Ahmad Hosain, Shezad Atta Elahi, Dr. Khalid Ranjha, Asad Ullah Saddiqui, Muhammad Haroon Mumtaz, Hassan Makhdoom, Tafazzul Rizvi, Raza Kazim, Zaki Rehman, Ch. Muhammad Usman, Shezada Mazher, Ali Raza, Ijaz Mehmood Ch., Mian Muhammad Kashif, Ch. Hassan Murtaza Mann, Azam Nazeer Tarar, Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom, Hasnain Ali Ramzan, Fawad Malik Awan, Syed Anwar-ul-Haq Gillani, Miss Asma Inam, Asim Hafeez, Rana Nadeem Sabir, Syed Ahmad Hassan Shah, Barrister Muhammad Umar Riaz, Mashhood Hussain, Moazzam Salim, M. Anwar Ch. and Hashim Raza Shamsi Advocates for Petitioners (School).
M/s. A. K. Dogar, Syed Shahab Qutab, Waqas Meer, Muhammad Javed Arshad, Muhammad Azhar Siddique, Liaqat Ali Butt, Muhammad Zaheer Butt, Fayyaz Ahmad Mehr and Zubair Ahmad Chaudhry,Advocates for Petitioners (Students/Parents).
Mr. Muhammad Shan Gull, Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr. Obaid Ullah, Advocate and Rai Ashfaq Ahmad Kharal, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents (Government).
Dates of hearing: 14.03.2016, 15.06.2016, 26.02.2018, 27.02.2018, 28.02.2018, 05.03.2018, 06.03.2018, 07.03.2018, 12.03.2018, 13.03.2018, 14.03.2018 and 15.03.2018.
Judgment
Abid Aziz Sheikh, J.--This judgment will decide instant writ petition as well as writ petitions detail of which is given in appendix-A and appendix-B. In all these writ petitions, there is communality of issue relating to school fee being charged by unaided private educational institutions in Province of Punjab
2. Brief facts are that in Province of Punjab, Private educational institutions are regulated through Ordinance 1984 and Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Rules, 1984 (Rules of 1984). The said Ordinance 1984 was amended and Section 7-A was inserted. Under Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984, certain restrictions are imposed on private educational institutions including capping of increase in fee for any academic year for not more than 5% (under Ordinance 2015 and Act of 2016) and finally 8% (under Act of 2017), charged in preceding academic year. Some of the private schools being aggrieved of Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 have filed these constitutional petitions, whereas some of the students through their parents also filed petitions for directing the private schools to charge the fee in terms of Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 (detail of petitions by students/parents are appendix B).
3. Ms. Asma Jahangir, Advocate for private schools argued that Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 is violative of Article 18 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution). Submits that the petitioners have right to carry out their business of private schools and the State at best in order to promote free competition could regulate business through licence in a reasonable manner. She submits that Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 has gone beyond the licensing system and is actually controlling the business of the petitioner in arbitrary manner. Submits that under article 18 of the Constitution, only reasonable restrictions can be imposed but impugned legislation is not only unreasonable but also amounts to deprive the petitioners of their business. She placed reliance on Arshad Mahmood v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2005 SC 193), Pakcom v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 44), Khawaja Imran Ahmed vs. Noor Ahmed (1992 SCMR 1152), Messrs Murree Brewerey Company Limited D.G (Excise and Taxation) (1991 MLD 267), Landirenozo vs. Federation of Pakistan (2013 PTD 658), Al Raham Travels and Tours v. Ministry of Religious Affairs (2011 SCMR 1621), Elahi Cotton Mills vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582), Administrator, Market Committee vs Muhammad Sharif etc (1994 SCMR 1048), Northern Bottling vs. Federation of Pakistan (2015 PTD 231), K.B. Threads vs. Zila Nazim Lahore (PLD 2004 Lah. 376), Shahabuddin vs. Pakistan etc (PLD 1957 Kar. 854). Further submitted that through impugned amendment, private business of the petitioner schools have virtually been nationalized, as now the regulator will make policy and business decisions regarding educational institutions of the petitioners. She submitted that impugned legislation has also been given retrospective effect which is not permissible under law. Learned counsel submitted that provision of Section 7-A of the Ordinance particularly its subSection 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 being ultra vires of the constitution and violation of fundamental rights of petitioners are liable to be declared unconstitutional. Learned counsel further argued that under Article 25-A of the Constitution, it is the duty of State to provide free and compulsory education to all children of age 5 to 16 and unaided private educational institutions are not obliged to provide free education. Submits that imparting quality education is like trade and business which is not only protected under article 18 of the Constitution but private institutions also have right to give excellent education to children between age of 5 to 16 year against reasonable fee. Reliance is placed on Petition regarding miserable conditions of schools (2014 SCMR 396), Human Rights Case No. 19360-P/2012 (2013 SCMR 54), Fiaquat Hussain vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 224), Syed Nazeer Agha vs. Government of Balochistan (PLD 2014 Bal. 86). She further submitted that private schools have raised fee in proportionate to inflation and increase of salaries and there is no exploitation or forming of cartel. Submitted that parents of students have no locus standi against increase of fee because providing quality education against reasonable fee does not violates fundamental rights, if there is no profiteering or exploitation on part of the petitioners. Submitted that in any other case, the respondents have remedy before Competition Commission of Pakistan or Consumer Courts. She further submitted that parents have also right to seek free education for their children from Government schools if so desired.
4. Mrs. Asma Jahangir Advocate unfortunately passed away during course of these proceedings. Her above arguments are adopted by her co-counsel Mr. Shezad Atta Elahi Advocate who in addition submitted that under Article 18 of the Constitution, the condition can be imposed only in the interest of free competition or through licensing system and finally it must be reasonable. He submits that through impugned legislation, the discretion of the regulatory authority has been fettered to allow increase in fee more than 8%, even if educational institution duly justify such increase. He, therefore, concluded that impugned legislation is not sustainable and further it is also violative of Article 3 of the Constitution, as it exploits the educational institutions.
5. Mr. Shahid Hamid Advocate for private schools argued that the impugned provisions of Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984, are prima facie violative of fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 23 and 24 of the Constitution as the petitioners are being compulsorily restrained/deprived of their right to income/property through charging fees for services provided by them, without any compensation on account of such compulsory restraint/deprivation. Submitted that the parents who place their children in schools operated by petitioners, do so knowing fully well two things: first, the level of fees at the time of entry and second, that these fees will, on average increase by 12 to 14% each year based on the historical pattern of the previous years. Further submitted that they willingly entered into this contractual relationship and respondents cannot lawfully interfere in this contractual relationship. Argued that under Section 7A(1) of the Ordinance, all private schools charging fees of less than Rs.4,000/- per month per student have been exempted from the maximum cap on fees. Submits that these schools are almost 96-98% of all private schools. Argued that the petitioners do not grudge the exemption given to these schools but it bears mention that the parents of students studying in such schools are self-evidently much less well-off than parents of students studying in petitioners” schools. Submits that in other words the well-to-do parents are sought to be protected as against those much less well-off parents. Argued that this is not only discriminatory in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, as there is no perceivable logic to the cut-off of Rs.4,000/- but it also reflects social priorities. Argued that why protection for the well-to-do and not for the less well-off when the Secretary Schools (respondent), in written statement describe them, as “teaching shops”. Added that petitioners had already collected fees for the months of August and September 2015, before the respondents notified/enacted Ordinance of 2015, which prescribed that for academic year 2015-16, the petitioners could not charge any fee higher than the fees charged for that class during the academic year 2014-15. Argued that neither the Ordinance 2015 nor the Act, 2016 had any provision giving them retrospective effect. Argued that consequently the petitioners are entitled to retain the fees already realized by them prior to the notification/enactment of the aforesaid Ordinance of 2015 and Act of 2016. Reliance is placed on Zila Council Jhang vs. Daewoo Corporation (2001 SCMR 1012) and Chief Land Commissioner vs. Ghulam Hyder Shah (1988 SCMR 715).
6. Mr. Faisal Hussain Naqvi, Advocate for the petitioner schools argued that impugned provisions of Section 7-A of the Ordinance are unreasonable, unconstitutional and against the fundamental rights of the petitioner. He stressed four grounds to assail the impugned provision. Firstly that the provision is violative of Article 18 of the Constitution, secondly the provision amounts to legislative judgment and also violative of separation of power and right of fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution, thirdly the provision is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution, not because it is discriminatory but because the legislature has failed to discriminate the petitioner and fourthly, that it is violative of Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution, which is not only confined to right of property but where by imposing conditions, the value and utility of property is reduced, it also amounts to violation of right of property. Regarding first ground, he submits that the word “lawful trade” used in Article 18 has been discussed in various judgments of Indian Supreme Court, in State of Bombay vs. RMD Chamarbaugwala (AIR 1957 SC 699), it was held that gambling is not a lawful trade. Similarly in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka (1995) 1 SC 574, it was held that the right to practice a profession or trade does not mean a practice of profession or carrying out trade which is inherently vicious, pernicious and is condemned by all civil societies, however, in Action Committee, Un-Aided Private Schools vs. Director of Education, Delhi and others (2009) 10 SCC 1), it was held that education is a lawful trade. He submits that once it is established that education is a lawful trade, the next question is whether any capping can be done on the fee structure as was done in the impugned provision. He referred the various judgments of Indian Supreme Court including Monini Jai vs. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666, Unni Krishnan, J.P. vs. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645, TMA Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481, Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697, Modern School vs. Union of Indian (AIR 2004 SC 2236) and P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537, to argue that the question whether school fee can be regulated by Government institutions was subject matter of various petitions before Supreme Court in India and after chequered history of judgments, the final consensus reached in P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra supra that there can be no profiteering and capitation of fee but reasonable fee can be charged and there will be minimal regulatory control and autonomy be given to unaided schools. He submits that applying the same principle, the capping of fee amounts to violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 18 of the Constitution. On the issue of legislative judgment, he referred the reply filed by the respondents where it was stated that impugned legislation was passed because petitioners were engaged in profiteering and capitation. He submits that the profiteering as defined in various dictionaries is a crime and without giving any opportunity to the petitioners to explain their position, the legislature could not issue the impugned provision, which amounts to legislative judgment against the petitioners. He submits that even the opportunity of ex-post-facto hearing is not brought in the impugned provision. He placed reliance on judgments Dr. Mubshar Hassan vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265, 370), Naseer Ahmed Khan vs. Government of Punjab (PLD 1980 Lahore 684, 694), Government of Punjab vs. Naseer Ahmed Khan (2001 CLC 1422, 1426), Government of Punjab vs. Naseer Ahmed Khan (2010 SCMR 431), National Industrial Co-operative Credit Corporation vs. Province of Punjab (PLD 1992 Lah. 462, 491-92) and Province of Punjab vs. National Industrial Co-operation Credit Corporation (2000 SCMR 567, 598) to argue that judicial functions are to be performed by judiciary and not by the legislation and therefore, the impugned provision being legislative judgment is not sustainable under law. Finally be concluded that impugned legislation is discriminatory and also violate right of property.
7. Khawaja Ahmad Hosain, Advocate for private schools argued that impugned provisions are ultra vires of the Constitution as Government has no jurisdiction to interfere in the business of the petitioner in a free market. Submits that Government can only interfere if schools have created monopoly or there are allegations of collusion or cartel. Submits that in absence of any such allegation, provisions are not sustainable being violative of Article 18 and 25 of the Constitution. He adds that impugned provision of Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 is only regarding increase of fee of existing schools but there is no restriction of fixation of fee by a new school, therefore, this provision being irrational is not sustainable.
8. Khawaja Haris Advocate for private schools argued that education is an occupation, therefore, no doubt it is subject to qualification under Article 18 of the Constitution. He however submits that such qualification or restrictions can only be reasonable. Submits that restriction of capping the increase in fee through impugned legislation is un-reasonable restriction, therefore, violative of Article 18 of the Constitution. He submits that in imposing restriction on increase of fee, the balance must be drawn between right of the educational institution on increase of fee and right of the students and their parents against exploitation or profiteering of fee. He placed reliance on judgment passed by the Islamabad High Court in Educational Services (Pvt.) Limited and 4 others vs. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 2016 Islamabad 141).
9. Dr. Khalid Ranjha Advocate argued that impugned Section 7-A of Ordinance of 1984 was inserted through Ordinance of 2015 which is not a valid legislation and amendment could only be made through Act of the Parliament.
10. Mr. Asad Ullah Saddiqui, Advocate for the petitioner schools argued that impugned legislation amounts to exercise the delegation of power by authority without giving procedure, yard stick and parameters for such delegated power. Submits that such un-explained and un-structural powers are not sustainable. Reliance is placed on Khawaja Muhammad Safdar, M.P.A, Lahore vs. Province of West Pakistan etc. (PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 718). He further submits that main purpose of impugned legislation is to put the petitioners out of business, hence violation of article 18 of the Constitution. Adds that impugned legislation has not only denied livelihood of the petitioner but also its employees because their salaries and other benefits cannot be increased due to unreasonable restrictions, therefore, impugned legislation is violation of article 9 of the Constitution. He submits that legislation is discriminatory because in none of the other private professions including hospitals, private tuition centers etc., such restriction has not been imposed. He submits that under Article 4 of the Constitution, every citizen has the right to be dealt in accordance with law whereas impugned legislation is clearly discriminatory which is against the fundamental rights of the petitioners.
11. Mr. Muhammad Haroon Mumtaz, Advocate for schools argued that no doubt the provincial legislation can regulate the fee structure, however, it cannot impose maximum limit on the increase of fee as said power falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament under Article 253(1-A) of the Constitution. He submits that increase of fee falls within the definition of property which is not confined to immovable property but also the right to enjoy the benefit of said property. In this regard he also referred to the definition of property in Article 260 of the Constitution and also “property” definition in Black’s Law Dictionary. Argued that impugned Section 7-A infringes right of property of petitioners. He placed reliance on Messrs X.E.N. Shahpur Division (LJC) Quarry Sub-Division Sargodha vs. The Collector Sales Tax (Appeals) Collectorate of Customs Federal Excise and Sales Tax Faisalabad and others (2016 SCMR 1030), Malik Gul Hassan and Co. vs. Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Health, Islamabad and 9 others (1995 CLC 1662), Federation of Pakistan and others vs. Shaukat Ali Mian and others (PLD 1999 SC 1026) and Tilla Muhammad and another vs. Government of North-West Frontier Province through Secretary, Law Department and another (1986 CLD 1429).
12. Mr. Hassan Makhdoom, Advocate for private schools argued that the impugned levy is discriminatory and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution because schools who are charging fee less than Rs.4,000/- have been totally excluded from the purview of the impugned legislation. He adds that impugned legislation is violative of Article 18 of the Constitution and placed reliance on Arshad Mehmood and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Transport Civil Secretariat, Lahore
13. Mr. Tafazzul Rizvi Advocate argued that impugned Section 7-A of the Ordinance of 1984 amounts to unreasonable restriction on fundamental rights of the private schools, therefore, not sustainable under Article 18 of the Constitution. Mr. Zubair Ahmad Chaudhry, Advocate adopted the aforesaid arguments of the petitioner schools.
14. Mr. A. K. Dogar, Advocate (in C.M. No. 10/2015 in W.P. No. 29724/2015) argued that under Article 25-A of the Constitution, all children in age of 5-15 years have fundamental right to get free education. Submits that this fundamental right is not only enforceable against Government Institutions but also against Private Parties and Institutions. Reliance is placed on Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and 2 others vs. Government of Pakistan Pakistan through Secretary, Planning and Development Division, Islamabad Pakistan
15. Syed Shahab Qutab, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent parents (in W.P. No. 830822/2015), defended the impugned legislation. He submits that running of educational institution being a “trade” can be regulated by the State through a licensing system under Article 18 of the Constitution. He referred to the definition of “trade” explained in K.G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre Gujranwala vs. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others (PLD 1976 Lahore 1097) and also referred to various clauses of Ordinance 1984, where conditions for registration have been prescribed. He argued that the requirement of registration of school under the Ordinance amounts to issuance of licence, therefore, the State could regulate the private institutions as well as their registration. He submits that the impugned legislation is not a legislative judgment as it does not interfere in the quasi-judicial power of the executive who will determine whether increase in fee is justified or not. He further argued that the impugned legislation is neither discriminatory nor it amounts to deprive the petitioner from their right of property. Submits that Article 25-A of the Constitution regarding State obligation does not entitle the petitioner’s to charge the excess fee for failure on part of State to perform its obligations. He argued that impugned legislation is permissible under Article 18 of the Constitution. He elaborates that under first part of Article 18, qualification can be prescribed for occupation and profession whereas under second part of Article 18, regulation can be framed under licensing system. He submits that running of education institution being an occupation, conditions for registration under the Ordinance 1984 and Rules of 1984 are qualifications as held by august Supreme Court in Arshad Mahmood case supra. He submits that the running of education institution being also a trade and business and requirements u/Ss. 3, 7, 8 and 9 of the Ordinance for the registration of schools and their monitoring amounts to licensing system, therefore, regulations in form of impugned legislation is also permissible under second part of Article 18 of the Constitution. In this regard reliance is placed on Messrs D.S. Textile Mills Limited vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2016 Lahore 355), Messrs East West Steam Shipping Company vs. Pakistan etc. (PLD 1958 SC 41) and Judgment passed by Sindh High Court in case titled “Beacons House School System vs. Province of Sindh”, C.P.D. No. 5812/2015. He finally concluded that these conditions/restrictions being reasonable are valid and legal.
16. Mr. Waqas Meer, Advocate while appearing on behalf of respondents/parents argued that fundamental right under Article 18 of the Constitution is not an absolute right but subject to qualifications and regulations being relating to economics of the State. He submits that heavy burden lies on part of the petitioner to establish that regulations under Article 18 destroy their other fundamental rights including right of property. He submits that there are many laws which provide controlling of prices including prices of commodities but same were never declared unconstitutional merely because it regulates the right of occupation or trade. He submits that law can only be struck down if it is unconstitutional and not merely because it regulates profession and trade which amount to imposing certain restrictions on the business. He placed reliance on Pakcom Limited and others vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2011 SC 44) and All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others vs. Federation of Pakistan
17. Mr. Muhammad Javed Arshad, Advocate also appearing for parents (in W.P. No. 29724/2015) argued that the regulation can be prescribed to control working of private schools including their fee structure. He placed reliance on International College of Commerce vs. University of Punjab (PLD 2004 Lahore 335) and Rahim Yar Khan College of Education through Principal and another vs. Islamia University of Bahawalpur through Vice-Chancellor and 3 others (1996 SCMR 341).
18. Mr. Azhar Siddique Advocate on behalf of respondent parents argued that maximum fee was lawfully capped to restrain private schools from profiteering and exploiting the parents. He further argued that in order to declare the impugned provision confiscatory, the petitioners are bound to show that they have actually suffered loss due to capping of fee.
19. Mr. Shan Gull, Additional Advocate General while appearing on behalf of respondent Provincial Government argued that in September 2015, lot of hue and cry was made by the parents through demonstrations and media publications against the exorbitant increases of fee by private schools. Submits that number of complaints were also filed by these parents and matter was also taken up by this Court in W.P. No. 14965/2014. Submits that in consequence of these agitations and complaints by parents, the issue regarding increase of fee by private educational institutions was taken up by the provincial legislation and Ordinance of 2015 was passed, where beside regulating the fee increase, the maximum limit of 5% was also added through Section 7-A in the Ordinance of 1984, which was ultimately converted into Act of 2016. Submits that subsequently Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984, was further amended through Act of 2017 where private schools were allowed to increase fee up to 5%, however maximum limit was prescribed at 8%. Submits that in addition, the private schools were also bifurcated in two categories i.e. schools charging fee less than Rs.4000/- and the other charging more than Rs.4,000/- and Section 7-A was only made applicable to schools charging fee more than Rs.4,000/- per month. Submits that this exercise was done after reviewing the increase of fee by private schools from year 2008-2015 and comparing it with the inflation rate during this period which proved that most of the schools were involved in profiteering. The learned counsel argued that right of profession, occupation and trade under Article 18 of the Constitution is neither an absolute right nor same is fundamental right, therefore, the State could impose total prohibition on this right in view of law laid down by august Supreme Court in Government of Pakistan vs. Zameer Ahmad Khan (PLD 1975 SC 667). Submits that in the light of law settled by august Supreme Court in Zameer Ahmad Khan case supra, the provincial legislation was within its right to declare that increase of fee for more than 8% in a particular year is forbidden by law. Submits that Article 18 of the Constitution, only protects lawful trade and occupation and once the charging of fee more than 8% is declared unlawful, there is no protection to said increase under Article 18 of the Constitution. He submits that Arshad Mahmood case supra where it is held that there can be no absolute prohibition or ban in any field is distinguishable.
20. Learned Additional Advocate General refer to provision of sections, 3, 5, 7-A, 8, 9 and 11 of the Ordinance 1984 and rules 11 and 12 of the Rules of 1984 to submit that the registration requirements are not only qualifications under Article 18 of the Constitution but the schools are also governed under the licensing system through the above provisions, therefore, the qualifications and conditions can be prescribed under Article 18 for fixation of fee by the un-aided private educational institutions. He further argued that the impugned legislation provided a two tear system of price fixation which is permissible under the law as already held by the Sindh High Court in case titled “Beacons House School System vs. Province of Sindh” C.P. D. No. 5812/2015 supra. He next argued that the Ordinance of 2015 was promulgated in September 2015 and had expressly given it retrospective effect regarding the fee deposited in August 2015 which is permissible under the law. He submits that normally the legislative provisions are to be applied prospectively, however, there is no bar on the legislation to pass law with retrospective effect expressly. He placed reliance on Messrs Haider Automobile Ltd. vs. Pakistan (PLD 1969 SC 623) and Molasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (1993 SCMR 1905).
21. He next argued that there is no discrimination between petitioner schools and the schools which are charging fee less than Rs.4,000/- as well as Aitchison College Lahore. He submits that these schools are not equal to petitioner schools, therefore, there is no question of discrimination. Adds that legislation in its wisdom can make reasonable classification. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that on number of occasions, the maximum limit imposed by the legislation has been upheld by this Court. He in this regard has placed reliance on Messrs Shaheen Cotton Mills, Lahore and another vs. Federation of Pakistan , Ministry of Commerce through Secretary and another (PLD 2011 Lahore 120). Learned counsel further submits that right through capping of fee can be restricted where it has adverse impact on the welfare of public at large. He next argued that price fixation is a legislative function and can be imposed to save the public interest. He argued that the impugned legislation does not affect the right of property of the petitioner and in any case, the petitioners have to prove that the impugned legislation is confiscatory or expropriatory. He next argued that the impugned levy is neither legislative judgment nor on this ground, impugned levy can be struck down. He finally argued that detailed mechanism is available with the department to fix fee beyond 5%, therefore, impugned levy is reasonable and justified.
22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record within their able assistance.
23. In present time while parents increasingly sending their children to private schools for better education but they are also simultaneously affected by the increasing cost of living and education fee every year. Private schools charge fees based on demand and increasing it regularly for multiple reasons. This has created a situation whereby parents want their children to be educated in a private school, but cannot afford it, hence have sought the help of the government to control the price of the services offered by private schools. It is in this context, that Government has started promulgating and implementing laws to fix the maximum tuition fees that can be charged by private schools. Impugned law can be understood as a reaction from the provincial legislation to public demand, complaints from parents and the media publicity about some private schools charging exorbitant fees.
24. The right to education is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part II, Chapter 1 of the Constitution. The right to education flows directly from right to life. The right to life and dignity of an individual under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The right to education is also guaranteed under Article 37(b) and 38(d) which though principle of policy and not justiciable but cannot be isolated from fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. After 18th Amendment in the Constitution, the right of education has been made an independent fundamental right under Article 25-A of the Constitution. Without right of education under Articles 9, 14, 25-A, 37(b) and 38(d) of the Constitution, in reality the fundamental rights under the Constitution shall remain beyond reach of large majority which will be illiterate. Thus every citizen has a right to education and State is under an obligation to establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its obligation through State owned or State recognized private educational institutions. However, when the State grants recognition to the private institution, it creates an agency through these institutions to fulfill its obligations under the Constitution. Therefore, it is the State responsibility to see that any private educational institutions which have been set up with Government permission are not involved in profiteering, capitation or exploiting the parents. The State has also a responsibility to ensure that these educational institutions must function to the best advantage of all the citizens and not confine to only richer section of the society by increasing fees exorbitantly. This State responsibility can be fulfilled by providing registration requirements or through regulations under law.
25. Apparently with this back ground, the Ordinance of 1984 and Rules of 1984 were promulgated to register and regulate private educational institutions. The Ordinance of 1984 was amended through Ordinance 2015 whereby the impugned Section 7-A was inserted in Ordinance of 1984 and inter aliamaximum limit of 5% for increase in fee was prescribed. The said Ordinance of 2015 was converted into Act of 2016. The provision of Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984 was further amended through Act of 2017 and maximum limit was increased to 8%. The current provision of Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 as amended through Act of 2017 is reproduced hereunder:--
“7-A. Fees, etc.–(1) Subject to this section, a school charging fee at the rate of four thousand rupees per month or above shall not charge the fee at a rate higher than five percent of the fee charged for the class during the previous academic year but this limitation shall not apply to a school charging monthly fee from a class of students at the rate which is less than four thousand rupees per month inclusive of the increase in the fee.
(2) If there is reasonable justification for increase in the existing fee at a rate higher than five percent under sub-section (1), the Incharge may, at least three months before the commencement of the next academic year, apply to the Registering Authority incorporating justification.
(3) The application shall contain reasons and justification for the proposed increase and all the requisite documents or evidence in support of the application shall be annexed with the application.
(4) The Incharge shall provide such other information or documents to the Registering Authority as may be necessary for the disposal of the application.
(5) The Registering Authority may, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the Incharge and after recording reasons, reject the application for increase in the fee of the school or allow reasonable increase in the fee not exceeding eight per cent of the fee charged for the class during the previous academic year.
(6) 13[* * * ** * * * * * * *]
(7) The Registering Authority shall, within thirty days from the receipt of the application for increase in the fee, take appropriate decision and inform the applicant of the decision taken.
(8) The admission fee or the security shall not exceed the amount equal to the tuition fee payable by the student for a month.
(9) The word ‘fee’ in this section means admission fee, tuition fee, security, laboratory fee, library fee or any other fee or amount charged by an institution from a student.
(10) An institution shall not require the parents to purchase textbooks, uniform or other material from a particular shop or provider.
26. The question require determination is that whether the above enactment in issue regarding fixation or determination of fees of private educational institutions which as claimed by Government is to ensure not to allow commercialization, profiteering and exploitation, does run foul of any provision of the Constitution. In this regard with undisputed right of State to regulate lawful trade and lawful professions or occupations, the moot issue is whether impugned enactment is permissible under Article 18 of the Constitution.
Scope of Article 18 of the Constitution.
27. For convenience, Article 18 of the Constitution is reproduced hereunder:--
“18. Subject to such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law, every citizen shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business:--
Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent—
(a) the regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system; or
(b) the regulation of trade, commerce or industry in the interest of free competition therein; or
(c) the carrying on, by the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, or by a corporation controlled by any such Government, of any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons.?
Plain reading of Article 18 of the Constitution shows that citizen has right to enter upon lawful occupation or profession or conduct a lawful trade or business subject to qualifications or conditions through regulations. These restrictions under Article 18 are of four kinds. Firstly the State can through law prescribe qualifications; secondly the trade or profession may be regulated by a licensing system; thirdly trade, commerce or industry may be regulated in the interest of free competition therein and fourthly, a citizen may be excluded completely or partially from carrying out a trade, business, industry or services, where State wants to carry it out itself. The question whether running of educational institution is a profession, occupation or trade, came up for discussion in number of cases. The Indian Supreme Court in cases reported as P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Mahrashtra (2005 (5) SCC 537) and Model Dental College vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2009 SC 2432) held that running of an educational institution for charity or for profit fall within the definition of “occupation”. This position is also not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner schools.
28. The honourable Supreme Court in Arshad Mahmood case supra (PLD 2005 SC 193), while interpreting first part of Article 18 of the Constitution held that word “qualification” used in Article 18 relates to lawful profession or “occupation” and not to conduct any lawful trade or business. The relevant extract from the Judgment is reproduced here under:--
“But in our opinion, in Article 18 of the Constitution, word “qualification” has been used to confer a right upon a citizen to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation and not to conduct any lawful trade or business.”
The educational institutions being admittedly an “occupation”, the “qualifications” under Article 18 can indeed be prescribed for these institutions by the State. In Arshad Mahmood case supra, honourable Supreme Court while defining “qualification” held that “as per ordinary meaning of “qualification”, a quality, which is legally necessary to render a person eligible to fill an office or to perform any public duty or function like a qualified voter, who meets the residence, age and registration requirements etc.” Plain reading of impugned Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 ibid shows that a mechanism has been provided for fixation of the fee by educational institution including maximum limit to which fee can be increased. Charging of reasonable fee being already a condition for registration u/S. 7 of the Ordinance 1984 read with Rule 12(ii) of the Rules of 1984, the mechanism of fixation of reasonable fee through impugned Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 is also a part of registration requirements prescribed u/S. 7 of the Ordinance of 1984 and Rule 12 of the Rules of 1984. Indeed certain registration requirements may also amount to “qualifications”, however, we need not to dilate upon this question any further because it is respondent Government’s own case that impugned Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984, is to regulate trade under the licensing system.
29. We have considered this stance of the respondent Government and have noted that under Article 18 of the Constitution, the State can regulate trade or profession by a licensing system. The ordinary meaning of word “licence” as contained in Black’s Law Dictionary is “permit from Government to carry on some trade etc.” The definition and general nature of licence as stated in 33rd Volume of American Jurisprudence is “to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do”. In Ghulam Zameer vs. Khondar (PLD 1965 Dacca 156) the Court held that uniformity of rules and norms of conditions applicable to every case is the gist of the implication of expression “licence”. Further held that those who answer the conditions so laid down are entitled to obtain the said licence.
30. Justice Cornelius in East and West Steam Shipping Company case (PLD 1958 SC 41) held that licence in the relevant aspect mean an arrangement by way of regulation, applicable to a complex whole. It was held that it would provide for rules applicable uniformly. The relevant observation by honourable Supreme Court in M/s. East and West Steam Shipping Company case supra is reproduced hereunder:--
“A system, in my opinion, would in the relevant respect mean an arrangement by way of regulation, applicable to a complex whole namely the trade of shipping in general. It would provide for rules applicable uniformly, subject to suitable classification, in relation to the entire trade of shipping. Again, it is inherent in the use of the expression “licensing system” that the actions of the State in respect of the trade should be in the nature of permissions granted to do certain acts provided certain conditions are satisfied; it goes entirely beyond the meaning of the expression “licensing” to interpret it as a check upon even the primary processes involved in the trade which is being licenced. A simple meaning of the expression “licence” in the sense relevant to this discussion is that contained in the Concise Oxford
“permit from Government etc., to marry, print something, preach, carry on some trade (especially that in alcoholic liquor), etc.”
While it is true that upon this interpretation, no person can enter a trade, which is subject to licensing, unless he possesses a licence, yet it seems to me, speaking with respect, that there is a danger of fallacy involved in treating a licence as if it were a reversed prohibition. For the grant of the Fundamental Right of freedom to conduct lawful trades in itself connotes that there is advantage to be gained by granting such a liberty to individual citizens, not only because it tends to produce profit and a livelihood for such citizens, but also because it is to the advantage of the community in general. Therefore, I feel no hesitation in expressing the opinion that the power given to the State to regulate a trade by a licensing system is one which is to be exercised, not for the curtailment of trade or for restricting the initiative and liberty of action which persons engaged in trade must necessarily be allowed, if they are too make their livelihood under conditions of free enterprise, but for the advancement of the trade and its better organization, for the mutual benefit of those engaged in it as well as the community at large, I decline to allow that the systematic domination by the State of every action which a ship owner might wish to take in relation to his ship for the purpose of its profitable employment, can possibly fall within the meaning of the expression “regulation by a licensing system” occurring in the first proviso to Article 12.”
31. The perusal of Sections 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 of Ordinance 1984 shows that no educational institution shall run unless it is registered under Ordinance 1984. Under Section 6 of the Ordinance 1984, application for registration is to be filed by the institution whereas Section 7 of the Ordinance requires that conditions of registration are to be complied with, as prescribed under the Rules of 1984. Under Section 9 of the Ordinance 1984, registration can be cancelled for failure to comply with the provision of Ordinance 1984 or Rules 1984. The above provision of Ordinance 1984 and Rules 1984 show that an arrangement has been made for running of private schools by way of an Ordinance and Rules applicable uniformly. Therefore, in view of definition of license discussed above, law settled in Ghulam Zameer and East and West Steam Shipping Company case ibid, it can safely be concluded that private schools are being regulated under licensing system.
32. The Division Bench of Sindh High Court in case titled “Beacons House School System vs. Province of Sindh”, (C.P.D. No. 5812/2015) also in similar circumstances held that private schools are regulated under a licensing system. The relevant observation is reproduced hereunder:
“In our view, when the 2001 Ordinance and the 2005 Rules are considered, they set up a regulatory regime for schools (and of course other educational institutions as well) that is in the nature of a licensing system within the meaning of the second condition imposable under Article 18. The schools are required to be registered under the 2001 Ordinance, which is subject to periodic renewal. No school can function as such unless registered. The statute imposes a monitoring and inspection regime. The registration can be cancelled (or not renewed) if the school contravenes any of the provisions of the statute or rules made thereunder, or any term or condition of the registration is violated, or any order passed or instruction given by the registering authority is not complied with. Reports have to be submitted annually. These and a host of other provisions easily establish that the schools are being regulated under a licensing system.”
33. The Sindh High Court in Judgment referred above also held that running of educational institution falls within the definition of “trade” which includes business. The relevant observations are re-produced hereunder:--
“Before proceeding further, we pause to make a general point. Schools obviously impart education and a teacher at a school is clearly undertaking a vocation or profession. The institutionalized provision of schooling is an important and indeed a noble endeavor. Teachers are highly revered in most cultures, and rightly so. But the school itself, at least to the extent here relevant, can also be a business. We must emphasize that there is no opprobrium to a school being run as a business. There should be no stigma if an educational institution is so organized or operated. It is perfectly lawful to do so. Furthermore, the running of a school as a business should not be confused with the making of profits. Many schools that are run on a non-profit basis do make a profit, i.e., their receipts exceed the expenses. It is simply that such profits are not distributed but are (usually as a mandatory condition of the school’s constitutive documents) ploughed back into the institution. However, there is nothing wrong with running a school with the intent of making (i.e., distributing) a profit. It must be remembered that we are here concerned with the Constitution and the law. While the State, in setting up a regulatory regime under a licensing system in terms of the second condition is entitled to take into account a host of factors and tailor its system accordingly, it must be recognized that we are concerned with a fundamental right that is being subjected to a restriction. We proceed accordingly.”
34. The running of educational institution being a business which is covered under definition of “trade” can indeed be regulated by a licensing system. The host of provisions of the Ordinance of 1984 and Rules of 1984, discussed above leave no manner of doubt that schools are being regulated under licensing system.
Regulations to be Reasonable.
35. No doubt the State can regulate the trade or profession by a licensing system, however, honourable Supreme Court repeatedly held that these regulations must be reasonable. There is distinction between Article 18 of Pakistani Constitution and Article 19(6) of the Indian Constitution. In Article 18, the word “reasonable restriction” is not specifically mentioned as in Article 19(6) of the Indian Constitution. However, word “regulation” in Article 18 has been construed that regulation shall be reasonable. In this regard the august Supreme Court in Arshad Mahmood case (PLD 2005 SC 193), held as under:--
“It is well settled that the right of trade/business or profession under Article 18 of the Constitution is not an absolute right but so long a trade or business is lawful a citizen who is eligible to conduct the same cannot be deprived from undertaking the same, subject to law which regulates it accordingly. The word “regulation”, as used in Article 18 of Constitution has been interpreted by the Courts of our country keeping in view the provisions of Article 19(1)(g)(6) of the Indian Constitution.
It is to be noted that our Constitution stands in sharp contrast to the corresponding provisions of Indian Constitution. A comparison of Article 18 of the Constitution and Article 19(1)(g)(6) of the Indian Constitution manifestly makes it clear that in later Constitution, words “lawful” and “regulation” are conspicuously omitted but while defining the word “regulation”, our Courts have followed the interpretation of Indian Supreme Court of expression “reasonable restriction”, while dealing with the concept of “free trade/business etc.” under Article 18 of the Constitution, despite the distinction noted herein above. In this behalf, reference may be made to Administrator Market Committee, Kasur, etc. vs. Muhammad Sharif (1994 SCMR 1048).
Whereas in Black’s Law Dictionary, the word ‘regulation’ has been defined as follows:--
“Regulation.---The act of regulating; a rule of order prescribed for management or government; a regulating principle; a precept. Rule of order prescribed by superior or competent authority relating to action of those under its control. Regulation is rule or order having force of law issued by executive authority of government.
Perusal of above definition persuades us to hold that there cannot be denial of the Government’s authority to regulate a lawful business or trade, but question would arise whether under the garb of such authority, the Government can prohibit or prevent running of such a business or trade. To find out the answer to this question, reference may be made to the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Toranto vs. Virgo (1896 AC 88, 93), where Lord Davey while discussing a statutory power conferred on a Municipal Council to make bye- laws for regulating and governing a trade made the following observation;--
“No doubt the regulation and governance of a trade may involve the imposition of restrictions on this exercise……….Where such restrictions are in the opinion of the public authority necessary to prevent a nuisance or for the maintenance of order. But their lordships think that there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or government of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed.”
In Article 18 of the Constitution, word “qualification” has been used to confer a right upon a citizen to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation and not to conduct any lawful trade or business.
Argument of learned counsel for respondents is that competent authority can regulate any trade or profession by a licensing system. There may be no cavil but this clause has to be read conjunctively with proviso (b) of Article 18 of the Constitution, according to which an element of free competition to regulate a trade, commerce or industry has been introduced because if competition in the trade is discouraged, it would negate the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution, which deals with the elimination of all forms of exploitation and if due to non-competition, franchise is granted on specified routes, it would tantamount to monopolize the trade/business of transport, as held in the case of Harman Singh v. R.T.A. Calcutta Region. (AIR 1954 SC 190).
As observed herein above, Constitution is a living document which portrays the aspirations and genius of the people and aims at creating progress, peace, welfare, amity among the citizens, therefore, while interpreting its different Articles particularly relating to the fundamental rights of the citizens, approach of the Courts should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather than rigid. As such, following this principle and also keeping in view other provisions of the Constitution, which deals with the principles of State policy, we are inclined to hold that if the definition of word “regulation” as laid down in the judgments cited herein above, is applied to hold that under licensing system, unless the business is unlawful or indecency is involved therein, the legislature can enact laws, which will promote a free competition in the fields of trade, commerce and industry. At any those should not be arbitrary or excessive in nature, barring a majority of persons to enjoy such trade.”
36. Same view was expressed by the august Supreme Court in Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan
“The interpretation of Article 18 has been made variously and the judicial consensus seems to be that the “right of freedom of trade, business or professions guaranteed by Art. 18 of the Constitution is not absolute, as it can be subjected to reasonable restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Such right is therefore, not unfettered. The regulation of any trade or profession by a system of licensing empowers the Legislature as well as the authorities concerned to impose restrictions on the exercise of the right. They must, however, be reasonable and bear true relation to ‘trade’ or profession and for purposes of promoting general welfare. Even in those countries where the right to enter upon a trade or profession is not expressly subjected to conditions similar to this Article, it was eventually found that the State has, in the exercise of its police power, the authority to subject the right to a system of licensing, i.e. to permit a citizen to carry on the trade or profession only if he satisfies the terms and conditions imposed by the prescribed authority for the purposes of promoting general welfare.”
(emphasis supplied).
37. In Al-Reham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Ministry of Religious, Hajj, Zakat and Ushr through Secretary and others (2011 SCMR 1621), honourable Supreme Court held that Constitution protects the fundamental rights of every citizen to join any lawful profession or occupation and to conduct any lawful business. Further held that in the proviso of said Article, the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, or by a corporation controlled by any Government, can carry out any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion complete or partial of other persons. In the case of Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 57), it was held that “the general words cannot be construed in isolation, but the same are to be construed in the context in which they are employed. Therefore, held that exclusion provided in clause (c) of Article 18 of the Constitution is only to the extent of trade, business, industry or service controlled by the Federal Government or Provincial Government or by a corporation, controlled by any such Government.
38. In Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and others (PLD 1997 SC 582), it is held that any legislation whereby either the prices of marketable commodities are fixed in such a way as to bring them below the cost of production and thereby make it impossible for a citizen to carry on his business or tax is imposed in such a way so as to result in acquiring property of those on whom the incidence of taxation fell, then such legislation would be violative of the fundamental rights to carry on business and to hold property as guaranteed in the Constitution. In Administrator, Market Committee Kasur and 3 others vs. Muhammad Sharif and others (1994 SCMR 1048), it is held that Licensing System is itself a restrain on the trade, but the Constitution empowers the Government to impose reasonable restrictions.
39. In Watan Party and another vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 997), honourable Supreme Court held as under:--
“This clearly envisages that the State can by law ban a profession, occupation, trade or business by declaring it to be unlawful which in common parlance means anything forbidden by law, prostitution, trafficking in women, gambling, trade in narcotics or dangerous drugs are common place instances of unlawful profession or trade. These are inherently dangerous to public health or welfare. Therefore, on the wording of Article 18 of the Constitution, the right to enter upon a profession or occupation or to conduct trade or business can hardly be described to be a Constitutional or Fundamental Right when such right may be denied by law. In this respect our Constitution stands in sharp contrast with the corresponding provisions of the Indian Constitution which omits the use of word “lawful” in the relevant provision.
The same principle was enunciated by this Court in the case of Arshad Mehmood (Supra). This Court observed that the Government has the authority to regulate a lawful business or trade. Reasonable restriction, however, does not mean prohibition or prevention completely. Article 24(1) of the Constitution envisages that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law.”
In Shahabuddin and another vs. Pakistan (PLD 1957 (W.P.) Kar. 854), Sindh High Court held that:--
The first part of the Article relations to prescription of qualifications to enter upon a profession or occupation and has no application to this case because no qualifications have been prescribed for entering upon the occupation of the petitioners. The petitioners therefore, have a right under the Constitution to conduct their trade freely, subject to the regulation of their trade, if any by a licensing system. There must be a licensing system for regulating their trade.
Regulation is different from control. The word ‘control’ only means dominance of a superior authority. The meaning of the word does not necessarily imply a purpose other than the subjection of the subordinate. It is not so with the expression ‘regulation’ because regulation is not a antithesis orderliness with an objection in view.”
40. The crux of the above judgments is that right of profession and trade under Article 18 of the Constitution is not an absolute right and is always subject to reasonable restrictions prescribed by law in a system of licensing. The competent authority is at liberty to regulate profession and trade and said form of regulation shall only be unconstitutional if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy, hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty and right of property. Reasonable restrictions authorized by the Constitution do not negate the Constitutional rights of a citizen to do business unhindered without any condition. A reasonable restriction is always considered to be within the frame work of the fundamental right. Law may regulate the mode of carrying on business, there is no bar to exercise the lawful trade but the interest of community should be guarded as a public policy. A right to do business does not guarantee a trader an uncontrolled privilege. There should be no doubt that requirement of registration/licence from person desiring to carry on any occupation, trade or business is a restriction on the right to carry on the occupation, trade or business and its validity is liable to be questioned and tested. Therefore the requiring of registration/licence would be valid only if it reasonable in the interest of the general public.
Test of Reasonableness.
41. Now the next question is that what is the test of reasonableness to determine if any particular restriction such as impugned Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 is reasonable or not. The august Supreme Court in Pakistan Broadcasters Association vs. Pakistan Media Regulatory Authority (PLD 2016 SC 692) defined the expression “reasonable restriction” as under:--
“It is certainly not easy to define “reasonableness” with precision. It is neither possible nor advisable to prescribe any abstract standard of universal application of reasonableness. However, factors such as the nature of the right infringed, duration and extent of the restriction, the causes and circumstances promoting the restriction, and the manner as well as the purpose for which the restrictions are imposed are to be considered. The extent of the malice sought to be prevented and/or remedied, and the disproportion of the restriction may also be examined in the context of reasonableness or otherwise of the imposition. It needs to be kept in mind that “reasonable”implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of course that reason dictates. For an action to be qualified as reasonable, it must also be just right and fair, and should neither be arbitrary nor fanciful or oppressive.”
42. The august Supreme Court in Arshad Mahmood case supra observed that our Courts followed the interpretation of expression “reasonable restriction” form Indian case law, therefore, it will be useful to also examine the test of reasonableness discussed in following Indian judgments:--
(i) In Papnasam Labour Union vs. Madura Coats Ltd. (AIR 1952 SC 196), the Court held as under:--
“That both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.”
(ii) In Mohammad Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1970 AIR SC 93), the Court held that:--
“The impugned notification-, though technically within the competence of the State Government, directly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g), and may be upheld only if it be established that it seeks to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public and a less drastic restriction will not be ensure the interest of the general public. The Court must in considering the validity of the impugned law imposing a prohibition on the carrying on of a business or profession, attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict in the citizen’s freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public, the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic restraint, and in the absence of exceptional situations such as the prevalence of a state of emergency-national or local- or the necessity to maintain essential supplies, or the necessity to stop activities inherently dangerous, the existence of a machinery to satisfy the administrative authority that no case for imposing the restriction is made out or that a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved. The sentiments of a section of the people may be hurt by permitting slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises maintained by a local authority. But a prohibition imposed on the exercise of a fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if is imposed not in (1)[160]2 S.C.R. 375, the interest of the general public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of the people whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.”
(iii) In Narendra Kumar v. Union of India (AIR 1960 SC 430), the Court held that:--
“It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word “restriction” to be sufficiently wide to save laws “inconsistent” with Article 19(1), or “taking away the rights” conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the word “restriction” to include cases of “prohibition” also. The contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot therefore be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when, as in the present case, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court.
In applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has to consider the question in the background of the facts and circumstances under which the order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the ratio of the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general public. It will also be necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint caused by the law is more than was necessary in the interests of the general public.”
(iv) In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. Commercial Tax Officer (2005 1 SC 625), the Court held that:--
“Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interest of the general public and not from the stand point of the interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. A restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly. In determining whether there is any unfairness involved the nature of the right alleged to have taken infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the relevant time enter into judicial verdict, the reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined with the respect to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. Canalisation of a particular business in favour of even a specified individual is reasonable where the interests of the country are concerned or where the business affects the economy of the country.”
(v) In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1982 AIR (SC) 33), the Court held that:--
“The real, question at issue is whether or not the seizure of wheat was with the authority of law. The fundamental right to carry on trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) or the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse under Article 301 of the Constitution, has its own limitations. The liberty of an individual to do as he pleases is not absolute. It must yield to the common good. Absolute or unrestricted individual rights do not and cannot exist in any modern State. There is no protection of the rights themselves unless there is a measure of control and regulation of the rights of each individual in the interests of all. Whenever such a conflict comes before the Court, it is its duty to harmonise the exercise of the competing rights. The Court must balance the individual’s rights of freedom of trade under Article 19 (1) (g) and the freedom, of inter-State trade and commerce under Article 301 as against the national interest. Such a limitation is inherent in the exercise of those rights.”
(vi) In Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner (1954 AIR (SC) 220), the Court held that:--
“It was not disputed that in order to determine the reasonableness of the restriction regard must be had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in that trade. It is obvious that these factors must differ from trade to trade and no hard and fast rules concerning all trades can be laid down. It can also not be denied that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal or immoral or injurious to the health and welfare of the public.
Laws prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous goods or trafficking in women cannot beheld to be illegal as enacting a prohibition and not a mere regulation. The nature of the business is, therefore, an important element in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions. The right of every citizen to pursue any lawful trade or business is obviously subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, order and morals of the community. Some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit, some by the odours they engender, and some by the dangers accompanying them, require regulations as to the locality in which they may be conducted. Some, by the dangerous character of the articles used, manufactured or sold, Require also special qualifications in the parties permitted to use, manufacture or sell them.”
(vii) In Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad vs. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai (1986) 3 SCC 20, the Court held that:--
“When the validity of a law placing restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right in Article 19(1)(g) is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State. If the law requires that an act which is inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to the public interest, health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to the community shall be done under a permit or a licence of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no person may claim a licence or a permit to do that act as of right. Where the law providing for grant of a licence or permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by rules or principles, express or implied, and exercisable in consonance with the rules of natural justice, it will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however, power is entrusted to an administrative agency to grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion the law ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). Imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or prohibition. But when the exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited, the burden of proving that a total ban on the exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the interest of general public lies heavily upon the State. In this background of legal position the appellants have to establish that the restriction put on the fundamental right of the respondents to carry on their trade or business in beef was a reasonable one. The Court must in considering the validity of the impugned law imposing prohibition on the carrying on of a business or a profession attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby an the larger public interest sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict the citizen’s freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public, the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic restraint, and in the absence of exceptional situations such as the prevalence of a state of emergency, national or local, or the necessity to maintain necessary supplies or the necessity to stop activities inherently dangerous, the existence of a machinery to satisfy the administrative authority that a case for imposing restriction is made out or a less drastic restriction may ensure the objection intended to be achieved.”
(viii) In Abdul Hakim Quraishi and others vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1961 SC 448), the Court held that:--
“The phrase ‘reasonable restriction’ connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word ‘reasonable’ implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.”
(ix) In Mohammad Yasin vs. Town Area Committee, Jalalabad and another (AIR 1952 SC 115), the Court held that:--
“Under Article 19(1)(g) the citizen has the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business which right under that clause is apparently to be unfettered. The only restriction to this unfettered right is the authority of the State to make a law relating to the carrying on of such occupation, trade or business as mentioned in Clause (6) of that article as amended by the constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, If, therefore, the licence fee cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law no question of its reasonableness can arise, for, an illegal impost must at all times be an unreasonable restriction and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) and such infringement can properly be made the subject-matter of a challenge under art 32 of the Constitution.”
43. The test of reasonableness settled in above case law is that Court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions but also the circumstances and the manner in which they are imposed. There are no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness, Court has to bear in mind that the nature of the rights infringed through such restriction should be proportionate to the urgency of the evil sought to be remedied by said restriction. The restriction on fundamental right can only be upheld if it is established that it seeks to impose reasonable restriction in the interest of general public and a less drastic restriction will not have ensured the interest of the general public.
44. Under Article 18 of the Constitution, the restrictions imposed are not only required to be imposed by law but the said restrictions must also be reasonable as held in Arshad Mahmood case supra.Generally speaking the validity of primarily legislation such as Act of the Parliament is not open to challenge on the grounds of reasonableness and reasonableness is available to challenge the validity of subordinate legislation such as rules or regulation or act of the executive but this general rule does not apply where under the Constitution, a right conferred is subject to reasonableness restriction imposed by law in the public interest etc. Indeed under Article 18 of the Constitution, a restriction can be imposed through a licensing system on profession and trade in the collective interest of society and general public.
45. No doubt the fundamental rights are sacred and cannot be transgressed, however, fundamental rights have no real meaning if the State itself has in danger or disorganized, because a disorganized State will not be in a position to guarantee the rights of citizens. Therefore, the State has to maintain equilibrium between interest of the individual and the need to impose reasonable limits on the enjoyment of those rights in the interest of collective good of the society. It is here that Court is called upon to hold the balance between public interest and reasonableness of restriction imposed by law which encroached upon the right and in case the Court finds that legislation has transgressed reasonable limits envisaged by the Constitution, it will not hesitate to strike it down as ultra vires.
46. We now apply the above test of reasonableness to the impugned Section 7-A of the Ordinance 1984 which regulate fee structure of unaided private schools, to examine if this enactment infringes any of the fundamental rights. In Pakistan , the registration and regulation of private educational institutions including their fee structure, is not a new phenomenon. Previously the Punjab Educational (Control of unrecognized Private Institutions) Act, 1953 (Act of 1953) was promulgated on 25.01.1954, which inter aliaprovided that all unrecognized private institutions shall apply for registration in prescribed manner under the Act. The said law further provided that if any person runs an unrecognized private educational institution without its registration under the Act of 1953, he will be guilty of an offence punishable on conviction with fine. The Act of 1953 was repealed and through the West Pakistan Registration of un-recognized Educational Institutions Ordinance, 1962 (Ordinance of 1962), the registering authority was required to ensure that unrecognized private educational institution, fulfilled the conditions specified in the schedule to the Ordinance of 1962. Clause (v) of the Schedule to the Ordinance of 1962 relates to the rates of tuition fee and subscription which is reproduced hereunder:--
“(v) that the rates of tuition fees and subscriptions charged are not in excess of the scales prescribed or approved by the Department; and”
The Ordinance of 1962 was also repealed and finally the Ordinance of 1984 was promulgated. The said Ordinance of 1984 was applicable to all privately managed colleges, schools or institutions notified as such by Government. Section 7 of the Ordinance 1984 relates to conditions of registration including payment of fee. For convenience, said Section 7 is reproduced hereunder:--
“7. Conditions of Registration.–An institution shall comply with such conditions of registration including payment of fees as may be prescribed.”
Under Section 13 of Ordinance of 1984, the Rules of 1984 were framed. Rule 12 deals with the conditions for registration including charging of fees and other charges by the institutions. Sub rule (ii) of rule 12 provides that fees and other charges shall not be fixed or raised beyond reasonable limits. For ready reference, sub-rule (ii) of rule 12 is reproduced hereunder:--
“(ii) The fees and other charges levied, shall not be fixed or raised beyond reasonable limits.”
47. The perusal of clause (v) of repealed Ordinance 1962, Section 7 of the Ordinance 1984 and rule 12(ii) of Rules of 1984 shows that fees to be charged by educational institutions was always regulated by the authority even prior to impugned Section 7-A of Ordinance 1984. It is also admitted position that Section 7 of the Ordinance 1984 and rule 12(ii) of the Rules of 1984 are not under challenge. Therefore, it cannot be argued that under Article 18 of the Constitution, the fixation of reasonable fee by educational institutions cannot be regulated through Section 7-A of the Ordinance of 1984. The Article 18 of the Constitution is in many ways unique. It boxed in simultaneously fundamental rights and also authorizes State to prescribe qualifications and conditions for exercise of those fundamental rights. The right of profession, occupation, trade and business relates to economy of the country, therefore, through this Article, state retained powers to regulate economic matters. The regulation of fee structure of un-aided schools fall within exceptions provided for under Article 18 of the Constitution.
48. However, while imposing fee regulation, balance must be drawn between cost of fee and quality of education. While consumers are always seeking lower costs in any economy and the welfare state in its attempts to help the consumer reduces costs at the expense of the producers. This reduction of price may be seen as a positive impact by the consumers in the short-term but in the long-run the effects may be disastrous. Because when producers see no chance of increasing prices they end up cutting costs, hence unable to function efficiently and also lose incentive to perform better. The regulation of fees therefore if applied arbitrary will have the unintended consequence of lowering the standards of private schools.
49. The hard reality that emerges is that private educational institutions are a necessity in the present day context. It is not possible to do without them because the Government is in no position to meet the demand which call for substantial outlays. While education is one of the most important functions of the State it has no monopoly therein and therefore, private educational institutions have a role to play. No doubt, we have entered into an era of liberalization of economy and in such an economy, private players are undoubtedly given much more freedom in economic activities including profession, business, occupation etc. as these are not normal forte of the State and the State should have minimal role therein. However, it is to be borne in mind that the occupation of education cannot be treated at par with other economic activities. In this field, State cannot remain a mute spectator and has to necessarily step in to prevent possible exploitation, profiteering and commercialization by the private sector through regulatory regime as well by providing Regulations under the relevant statutes.
Judicial Precedents from Pakistan and Indian Jurisdiction on Regulatory Mechanism by State on un-aided Private Schools and Law settled therein.
50. The regulatory mechanism by State of un-aided private schools remained a subject of discussion in various judgments before Indian and Pakistani Courts. Some of these cases and law settled in these judgments which will be beneficial for matter under discussion are as under:--
(i) In Mohni Jain v. State of Karnataka
“The “right to education” is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The State is under a constitutional mandate to provide educational institutions at all levels for the benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must function to the best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire education cannot be confined to the richer section of the society.”
(ii) In Unni Krishnan vs. State of A.P. (1993) 1 Supreme Court cases 645), Court held that:--
“so far as unaided institutions are concerned, it is obvious that they cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as is charged in Government institutions. If they do so voluntarily, it is perfectly welcome but they cannot be compelled to do so, for the simple reason that they have to meet the cost of imparting education from their own resources—and the main source, apart from donations/charities, if any, can only be the fees collected from the students. It is here that the concepts of ‘self-financing educational institutions’ and ‘cost based educational institutions’ come in. This situation presents several difficult problems. How does one determine the ‘cost of education’ and how and by whom can it be regulated? The cost of education may vary, even within the same faculty, from institution to institution. The facilities provided, equipment, infrastructure, standard and quality of education obtaining may vary from institution to institution.
The obligations created by Article 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitution can be discharged by the State either by establishing institutions of its own or by aiding, recognizing and/or granting affiliation to private educational institutions and merely recognition or affiliation is granted it may not be insisted that the private educational institution shall charge only that fee as is charged for similar courses in governmental institutions. The private educational institutions have to and are entitled to charge a higher fee, not exceeding the ceiling fixed in that behalf. The admission of students and the charging of fee in these private educational institutions shall be governed by the scheme evolved herein.”
(iii) In T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors vs. State of Karnatake
“An educational institution is established for the purpose of imparting education of the type made available by the institution. Different courses of study are usually taught by teachers who have to be recruited as per qualifications that may be prescribed. It is no secret that better working conditions will attract better teachers. More amenities will ensure that better students seek admission to that institution. One cannot lose sight of the fact that providing good amenities to the students in the form of competent teaching faculty and other infrastructure costs money. It has, therefore, to be left to the institution, if it chooses not to seek any aid from the government, to determine the scale of fee that it can charge from the students. One also cannot lose sight of the fact that we live in a competitive world today, where professional education is in demand. We have been given to understand that a large number of professional and other institutions have been started by private parties who do not seek any government aid. In a sense, a prospective student has various options open to him/her where, therefore, normally economic forces have a role to play. The decision on the fee to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institution that does not seek or is not dependent upon any funds from the government.
We, however, wish to emphasize one point, and that is that inasmuch as the occupation of education is, in a sense, regarded as charitable, the government can provide regulations that will ensure excellence in education, while forbidding the charging of capitation fee and profiteering by the institution. Since the object of setting up an educational institution is not required for the purpose of fulfilling that object. To put it differently, in the establishment of an educational institution, the object should not be to make a profit, inasmuch as education is essentially charitable in nature. There can, however, be a reasonable revenue surplus, which may be generated by the educational institution for the purpose of development of education and expansion of the institution.”
(iv) In Islamic Academy of Education And vs. State of Karnataka And others, (2003) 6 SCC 697), Supreme Court of India held that:--
“so far as the first question is concerned, in our view the majority judgment is very clear. There can be no fixing of a rigid fee structure by the government. Each institute must have the freedom to fix its own free structure taking into consideration the need to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. They must also be able to generate surplus which must be used for the betterment and growth of that educational institution. In paragraph 56 of the judgment, it has been categorically laid down that the decision on the fees to be charged must necessarily be left to the private educational institutions that do not seek and which are not dependent upon any funds from the Government. Each institute will be entitled to have its own fee structure. The fee structure for each institute must be fixed keeping in mind the infrastructure and facilities available, the investments made, salaries paid to the teachers and staff, future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution etc. Of course there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot be charged. It thus needs to be emphasized that as per
the majority judgment imparting of education is essentially charitable in nature. Thus the surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the benefit/use
of that educational institution, profits/surplus cannot
be diverted for any other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal gain or for any other business or enterprise.”
the majority judgment imparting of education is essentially charitable in nature. Thus the surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the benefit/use
of that educational institution, profits/surplus cannot
be diverted for any other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal gain or for any other business or enterprise.”
(v) In P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537), it was held that:--
“To set up a reasonable fee structure is also a component of “the right to establish and administer an institution” within the meaning of Article 30(1) institution is free to devise its own fee structure subject to the limitation that there can be no profiteering and no capitation fee can be charged directly or indirectly, or in any form …………… …………………………………………..
Capitation fee cannot be permitted to be charge and no seat can be permitted to be appropriated by payment of capitation fee. “Profession” has to be distinguished from “business” or a mere “occupation”. While in business, and to a certain extent in occupation, there is also profit motive, profession is primarily a service to society wherein earning is secondary or incidental. A student who gets a professional degree by payment of capitation fee, once qualified as a professional, is likely to aim more at earning rather than serving and that becomes a bane to society. The charging of capitation fee by unaided minority and non-minority institutions for professional courses is just not permissible. Similarly, profiteering is also not permissible. Despite the legal position, this Court cannot shut its eyes to the hard realities of commercialization of education and evil practices being adopted by many institutions to earn large amounts for their private or selfish ends. If capitation fee and profiteering is to be checked, the method of admission has to be regulated so that the admissions are based on merit and transparency and the students are not exploited. It is permissible to regulate admission and fee structure for achieving the purpose just stated.
(vi) In case of Society for Unaided Private School of Rajasthan vs. Union of India (2012 AIR SC
“Indeed by, virtue of Section 12(2) read with Section 2(n)(iv), private unaided school would be entitled to be reimbursed with the expenditure incurred by it in providing free expenditure incurred by it in providing free and compulsory education to children belonging to the above category to the extent of per child expenditure incurred by the State in a school specified in Section 2(n)(i) or the actual amount charged from the child, whichever is less. Such a restriction is in the interest of the general public. It is also a reasonable restriction. Such measures address two aspects, viz., upholding the fundamental right of the private management to establish an unaided educational institution of their choice and, at the same time, securing the interests of the children in the locality, in particular, those who may not be able to pursue education due to inability to pay fees or charges of the private unaided schools.
Primarily responsibility for children’s rights, therefore, lies with the State and the State has to be respect, protect State and the State has to respect, protect and fulfill children’s rights and has also got a duty to regulate the private institutions that care for children, to protect children from economic exploitation, hazardous work and to ensure human treatment of children. Non- State actors exercising the State functions like establishing and running private educational institutions are also expected to respect and protect the rights of the child, but they are, not expected to surrender their rights constitutionally guaranteed.
(vii) In Modern School vs. Union of India (AIR 2004 SC 2236), held that:--
“The first point for determination is—whether the Director of Education has the authority to regulate the fees of unaided schools?
At the outset, before analyzing the provisions of 1973 Act, we may state that it is now well settled by catena of decisions of this Court that in the matter of determination of the fee structure the unaided educational institutions exercises a great autonomy as, they, like any other citizen carrying on an occupation are entitled to a reasonable surplus for development of education and expansion of the institution. Such institutions, it has been held, have to plan their investment and expenditure so as to generate profit. What is, however, prohibited is commercialization of education. However, in none of the earlier cases, this Court has defined the concept of reasonable surplus, profit, income and yield, which are the terms used in the various provisions of 1973 Act.”
(viii) In Anti-Corruption and Crime Investigation Cell vs. State of Punjab
“Fee charges should be commensurate with the facilities provided by the institution. Fees should normally be charged under the heads prescribed by the Department of Education of the State/U.T. for schools for different categories. No capitation fee or voluntary donations for gaining admission in the school or for any other purpose should be charged/collected in the name of the school. In case of such malpractices, the Board may take drastic action leading to disaffiliation of the school.”
(ix) In Modern Dental College
“In modern times, all over the world, education is big business. On account of consumerism, the students all over the world are restless. That schools in private sector which charge fees may be charitable provided they are not run as profit-making ventures. That educational charity must be established for the benefit of the public rather than for the benefit of the individuals. That while individuals may derive benefits from an educational charity, the main purpose of the charity must be for the benefit of the public.”
(x) In Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2009 SC 2432), it was held that:--
“In para 91 of Inamdar’s case (supra), it has been observed:
“The right to establish an educational institution, for charity or for profit, being an occupation, is protected by Articles 19(1)(g) of the Constitution....”
Thus, it is clear that the right to establish and run an educational institution is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Of course under Article 19(6) of the Constitution, reasonable restrictions can be placed on such a fundamental right, and hence we have to examine whether such restriction are reasonable or not.”
(xi) In Father Thomas Shingare Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2002 SC 463), the Court held that:--
“It is a question of fact in each case whether the limit imposed by the Government regarding approved fees would hamper the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution in so far as they apply to any unaided educational institution established and administered by the minorities. If the legislature feels that the nefarious practice of misusing school administration for making huge profit by collecting exorbitant sums from parents by calling such sums either as fees or donations, should be curbed, the legislature would be within its powers to enact measures for that purpose. Similarly, if the management of an educational institution collects money from persons as quid pro quo for giving them appointments on the teaching or non- teaching staff of such institution, the legislature would be acting within the ambit of its authority by bringing measures to arrest such unethical practices. Such pursuits are detestable whether done by minorities or majorities. No minority can legitimately claim immunity to carry on such practices under the cover of Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The protection envisaged therein is not for shielding such commercialized activities intended to reap rich dividends by holding education as a facade.”
(xii) In India Medical Association vs. Union of India
“The Delhi Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee And Other Measures to Ensure Equity And Excellence) Act, 2007 (Delhi Act 80 of 2007) or any provisions thereof do not suffer from any constitutional infirmities. The validity of the Delhi
(xii) In Charutar Arogya Mandal v. State of Gujarat (AIR 2011 (SCW) 2475), the Court while discussing case law on the subject held that:--
“In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (8) SCC 481, this Court declared that every institution is free to devise its own fee structure subject to the limitations that there can be no capitation fee or profiteering, directly or indirectly. This Court also clarified that charging of fees in a manner that a reasonable surplus is left to meet the cost of expansion and augmentation of facilitates, would not amount to profiteering. In Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka
(xiv) In Rohilkhand Medical College and Hospital, Bareilly v. Medical Council of India
“We think, this is an apt occasion to ponder over whether we have achieved the desired goals, eloquently highlighted by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others 2003(2) S.C.T. 385: (2002) 8 SCC 481 and P.A. Inamdar and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2005(3) S.C.T. 697: (2005) 6 SCC 537. TMA Pai Foundation case (supra) has stated that there is nothing wrong if the entrance test being held by self-financial institutions or by a group of institutions but the entrance test they conduct should satisfy the triple test of being fair, transparent and not exploitative. TMA Pai Foundation (supra) and Inamdar (supra) repeatedly stated that the object of establishing an educational institution is not to make profit and imparting education is charitable in nature. Court has repeatedly said that the common entrance test conducted by private educational institutions must be one enjoined to ensure the fulfillment of twin object of transparency and merits and no capitation fee be charged and there should not be profiteering. Facts, however, give contrary picture. In Inamdar, this Court, in categorical terms, has declared that no capitation fee be permitted to be charged and no seat can be permitted to be appropriated by payment of capitation fee.”
(xv) In Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016 AIR (SC) 2601), Court held that for fixing the fee structure, following considerations are to be kept in mind:--
(a) the infrastructure and facilities available;
(b) investment made, salaries paid to teachers and staff;
(c) future plans for expansion and/or betterment of institution subject to two restrictions, viz. non-profiteering and non-charging of capitation fees.”
(xvi) In M/s. Pushpagiri Medical Society vs. State of Kerala
“The other question is regarding the fee structure. In terms of the decision in Islamic Academy’s case, the Government of Kerala appointed a Committee headed by Justice R. T. Thomas, a former Judge of this Court. The said Committee has fixed the fee at Rs.1.13 lakh as the maximum annual fee to be collected from each student of the private self-financing medical colleges.”
51. In Pakistan , Courts have also discussed the extent of authority of State to regulate private institutions as under:--
(I). In Educational Services (Pvt.) Limited and 4 others vs. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 2016 Islamabad 141), Islamabad High Court after discussing Indian case law held as under:
“In light of the above judgments and relevant provisions of the Act, the following principles are deduced:--
i. PEIRA has the authority to fix the fee but the same cannot be done in arbitrary manner without calling for record of expenses and examination of requirements of individual Private
For more, you can consult omara.khan789@gmail.com or call +923123450006
No comments:
Post a Comment