Showing posts with label Rent Attorney. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rent Attorney. Show all posts

Monday, 23 November 2015

Personal Bonafide Need - Islamabad Rent Law Judgment

PLJ 2012 Islamabad 161
Present: Riaz Ahmad Khan, J.
SAEED AHMED--Petitioner
versus
Mrs. REHANA ZAHID and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 1008 of 2010, decided on 21.2.2012.
Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001--
----S. 17(4-A)--Ejectment petition--Personal bonafide need--Expiry of lease agreement--Ejectment can be passed, if landlord require premises for occupation of any member of the family--If premises was not occupied by landlord or any member of family within six months, then tenant will have right to apply to rent controller for an order, directing landlord to restore possession of premises building to tenant--Mere statement of landlord regarding personal bonafide need is sufficient for passing an order of ejectment--Rent agreement between parties had expired and same had not been extended, so tenant was liable to vacate suit premises.    [P. 163] A & B
Mr. Nazir Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed Bilal, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.
Date of hearing: 13.2.2012.
Judgment
This judgment is directed to dispose of W.P. No. 1008 of 2010.
2.  Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is tenant under the Respondent No. 1/landlord in House No. 2, First Floor, Street No. 31, Sector G-6/1-3, Islamabad. The respondent/landlord filed ejectment petition against the petitioner, on the grounds of personal bonafide need as well as expiry of lease agreement. As according to the respondent/ landlord, her mother-in-law is a `cancer patient' and needs treatment at CMH Rawalpindi. She being resident of Wah Canttbrings her mother-in-law frequently to Islamabad and that causes a lot of inconvenience to her as well as her mother-in-law. For that purpose, the respondent/ landlord needs demise premises for the personal bonafide need. The learned Rent Controller vide order dated 11-9-2008 dismissed the ejectment petition. The respondent/landlord filed appeal against the said order, which was accepted by the Addl. District Judge, Islamabad vide judgment dated 15-1-2010 and the petitioner/tenant was directed to hand over vacant possession of the demise premises to the landlord within 60-days of the order. Feeling aggrieved of the said order, the present writ petition was filed.
3.  Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent/landlord had earlier filed ejectment petition on the same grounds and was withdrawn and thereafter second petition was filed. It was further submitted that since at the time of earlier withdrawal, permission for filing fresh petition was not sought, therefore, second petition was not competent. It was admitted that the lease agreement had expired, but the same was orally extended.
4.  Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned Rent Controller while dismissing the ejectment petition had erred in holding that probably the respondent/landlord was a cancer patient, whereas, infact not the respondent/landlord, rather her mother-in-law was cancer patient. This fact was appreciated by the learned lower appellate Court. The teamed counsel further submitted that since the premises in dispute is required in good faith for a personal need, therefore, the order of learned lower appellate Court is required to be maintained. Regarding the earlier ejectment petition, the learned counsel submitted that though the earlier petition was withdrawn, however, no order on merits was passed. It was further submitted that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the rent proceedings, but eve otherwise, principle of resjudicata was not applicable in this case, as no order on merits was passed.
5.  I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record.
6.  Admitted position in the present case is that the landlord/respondent had earlier filed an ejectment petition, which was afterwards withdrawn. However, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct that the second ejectment petition is not competent on the ground that permission for filing fresh petition was not sought from the Rent Controller. Infact, provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are not applicable to the procedure before the Rent Controller. However, under Section 20 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 there is restriction on the second application, so for the sake of convenience, Section 20 ibid is reproduced herein below:
"20. Decision which have become final not to be re-opened.--The Controller shall summarily reject any application under sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) of Section 17 which raises substantially the same issue as has been, finally decided in any former proceedings under this Ordinance unless new grounds or circumstances have arisen after the final decision in such proceedings."
In the present case, the earlier ejectment petition was not decided by the Rent Controller and there was no final decision. In these circumstances, the second ejectmentpetition could be filed.
7.  The main ground of the landlord is personal bonafide need and U/S 17 (4-A) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 the ejectment can be passed, if the landlord require premises for the occupation of any member of his or her family. This section is to be read with sub-section (6) of Section 17 ibid, which provides that if the premises is not occupied by the landlord himself/herself or any member of his/her family, within six months, then the tenant will have a right to apply to the Rent Controller for an order, directing the landlord to restore the possession of the premises/building to the tenant.
8.  Since, in law rights of the tenant have been safe guarded, so mere statement of the landlord regarding personal bonafide need is sufficient for passing an order ofejectment. In present case, the need as expressed by the landlord is genuine, that she needs the house for the occupation of her mother-in-law, who is patient of cancer and needs constant treatment at Rawalpindi/Islamabad.
9.  It is also admitted that rent agreement between the parties has expired and the same has not been extended, so on this score too, the tenant is liable to vacate the suit premises.
10.  In the above said circumstances, finding no force in this writ petition, the same is accordingly dismissed.
(R.A.)  Petition dismissed

Tuesday, 2 June 2015

Judgment on Jurisdiction of Rent Controller

2012 S C M R 248
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Present: Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, C.J., Khilji Arif Hussain and Tariq Parvez, JJ
JAVED KHAN ABBASI---Petitioner
Versus
ZUBAIR ASLAM and others---Respondents
Civil Petition No.1430 of 2011, decided on 17th October, 2011.
(On appeal from the judgment dated 8-7-2011 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabadpassed in W.P. No.2346 of 2008).
(a) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)---
----Ss. 1(2), 2(k) & 17---SRO No. 83(RE)/02 dated 19-7-2002---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Ejectment petition---Default in payment of rent by tenant, ground of---Ejectment order passed by Rent Controller was upheld in appeal and constitutional petition by Appellate Court and High Court respectively---Tenant's plea was that ejectment petition filed on 29-1-2003 was not entertainable by Rent Controller as jurisdiction to decide same vested in him subsequently through notification dated 29-6-2004 issued under S. 1(2) of Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Federal Government for the purposes of Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 had specified urban areas by S.R.O. No. 83(RE)/02, dated 19-7-2002 issued under S.2(k) thereof and had extended thereto jurisdiction of Rent Controller through notification dated 29-6-2004 issued under S.1(2) thereof---Demised premises was situated within such specified urban area---Rent Controller had decided ejectment petition after having acquired jurisdictionduringitspendencythroughsuchnotificationdated 29-6-2004---­Supreme Court dismissed petition for leave to appeal in circumstances.
Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187 The State v. Muhammad Jamil and Muhammad Alam v. The State; Managing Director Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. v. Syed Najmul Hassan Naqvi 2005 SCMR 89 rel.
(b) Jurisdiction---
----Tribunal/court lacking jurisdiction to entertain a lis at time of its institution could decide the same subsequently, if acquired jurisdiction during its pendency---Principles.
Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187 and Managing Director Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. v. Syed Najmul Hassan Naqvi 2005 SCMR 89 rel.
(c) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)---
----Ss. 2-J(ii) & 17---Ejectment petition---Denial of relationship of landlord and tenant by respondent on ground that after death of his father, his brother remained in possession of suit premises---Validity---Suit premises was rented out to father of respondent---Notice of ejectment petition was served upon respondent at suit premises--- Respondent's brother had not come forward to protect his possession over suit premises by claiming to be its tenant---According to S. 2-J(ii) of Islamabad Urban RentRestriction Ordinance, 2001, after death of a tenant, his legal heir(s) actually remaining in possession/occupation of premises would become statutory tenants thereof---Evidence available on record showed that respondent was in possession of demised premises---Petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court was dismissed.
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondents
Date of hearing: 17th October, 2011.
JUDGMENT
KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN, J.---The petitioner, seeks leave of the Court, aggrieved by the judgment passed by Islamabad High Court,IslamabadinWritPetitionNo.2346of2008wherebylearned SingleJudgeoftheIslamabadHighCourtdismissedthepetitionandmaintainedtheorderspassedbytheRentControlleraswellas by appellate Court.
2. Brieffactsto decide the petition are that respondents Nos.1 and2filedejectmentpetitionagainstthepetitionerinrespectof Shop No.5, Block No.3, Sector F-6/1, Class-III Shopping Center, Farooqia Market, Islamabad on the ground that the petitioner has committed default in payment of rent despite repeated demand and request made by the respondents. The petitioner in his written statement denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and raised preliminary objection about the maintainability of the rent case under Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ordinance').
3. After framing the issues and recording the evidence, Rent Controller, vide judgment dated 31-7-2007 accepted the ejectment petition filed by the respondents.The petitioner filed appeal against the said judgment under section 21 of the Ordinance, which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Islamabad vide his judgment dated 16-9-2008. The orders passed by the Rent Controller as well as by the appellate Court were impugned through writ petition before the Islamabad High Court,which too was dismissed vide the impugned judgment dated 8-7-2011, hence this petition for leave to appeal.
4. Sardar Muhammad Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner, vehemently contended that the Rent Controller was competent to entertain and try the ejectment petition only after 24-6-2004 when the Notification under section 1(2) of the Ordinance was issued, whereas the rent application was filed on 29-1-2003 on which date Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not in occupation of the premises in question,which has been occupied by one Khalid and as such the petitioner is not liable to pay the rent, if any,due in respect of the premises in question.
5. We have taken into consideration arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the available record. From perusal of the record, it appears that respondents have filed ejectment application against the petitioner under the Ordinance,on 29-1-2003. Section 1(2) of the Ordinance defines that the Ordinance shall extend to such urban area of Islamabad Capital Territory and apply to such buildings and rented lands as the Federal Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, specify. Section 2(K) of the Ordinance, defined urban area means such area or areas of the Islamabad Capital Territory as the Federal Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, specify.
6. By S.R.O. No. 83(RE)/02, dated 19-7-2002 in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (k) of section 2 of the Ordinance, the Federal Government specified the urban areas for the purpose of the Ordinance.
7. It is not disputed by the petitioner that the premises in question is situated within the area mentioned in the table for the purpose of the Ordinance. By another Ordinance dated 29-6-2004, in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 1 of the Ordinance, the Federal Government directed that the said Ordinance shall extend to the urban areas specified by Notification dated 19th July, 2002 and apply to all residential and commercial buildings and rented lands situated in the said urban area.
In the case of Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal, (PLD 1969 SC 187), it was held that:--
"The principle has been admirably put by Crawford in his Book on Construction o fStatutes,1940 Edition, page 581, as follows:-
"As a general rule, legislation which relates solely to procedure or to legal remedies will not be subject to the rule that statutes should not be given retroactive operation. Similarly, the presumption against retrospective construction is inapplicable. In other words, such statutes constitute an exception to the rule pertaining to statutes generally. Therefore, in the absence of a contrary legislative intention, statutes pertaining solely to procedure or legal remedy may affect a right of action no matter whether it came into existence prior to, or after the enactment of the statute. Similarly, they may be held applicable to proceedings pending or subsequently commenced. In any event, they will, at least, presumptively apply to accrued and pending as well as to future actions."
This principle has also been fully adopted by this Court in the casesof The State v. Muhammad Jamil and Muhammad Alam v. The State
"The next question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to what are matters of procedure. It is obvious that matters relating to the remedy, the mode of trial, the manner of taking evidence and forms of action are all matters relating to procedure. Crawford too takes the view that questions relating to jurisdiction over a cause of action, venue, parties pleadings and rules of evidence also pertain to procedure, provided the burden of proof is not shifted. Thus a statute purporting to transfer jurisdiction over certain causes of action may operate retroactively. This is what is meant by saying that a change of forum by a law is retrospective being a matter of procedure only. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that if in this process any existing rights are affected or the giving of retroactive operation cause inconvenience or injustice, then the Courts will not even in the case of a procedural statute, favour an interpretation giving retrospective effect to the statute. On the otherhand,ifthenewproceduralstatuteisofsucha character that its retroactive application will tend to promote justice without any consequential embarrassment or detriment to any of the parties concerned, the Courts would favourably incline towards giving effect to such procedural statutes retroactively."
In the case of Managing Director, Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. v. Syed Najmul Hassan Naqvi, (2005 SCMR 89), it was held that:--
"Quiteananomaloussituationwoulditbethaton theonehandandattheinitialstage,byseriousomission, the timelyreturnof appealisavoidedandthecauseofactionisallowedtomatureduringpendencyand, on the other hand, at the fag end of proceedings, it is dismissed on the ground that the initial submission was premature. Such volte face if taken by the Tribunal cannot be endorsed under any canon of justice. The fact remains that premature matters are not bad but simply premature and must be retuned. Failure to do so debars the Tribunal to subsequently jeopardize the rights and bona fide claims of the appellants. We, therefore, conclude that aprematureappealbeforetheTribunalrequires tobe returned at the very first instance. If this course of action is not adhered to, the Tribunal subsequently, cannot damage the appellant on grounds of prematurity of appeal when the same had become mature during the pendency allowed by the Tribunal itself. The Tribunal, in the instant case, has rightly declined to dismiss the appeal on this score and moreover, this objection was not taken before the Tribunal either, by filing any concise statement."
8. From perusal of the record, it appears that the table appendix to Notification dated 19th July,2002 leaves no manner of doubt that the property is situated in an area which is specified in the said Notification to be urban area for the purpose of the Ordinance and that the Rent Controller who took cognizance of the matter was appointed in terms of section 7 of the Ordinance. Even if, we accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Ordinance in respect of the urban property became effective on the date of Notification issued under section 1(2) of the Ordinance i.e. 29-6-2004, the Rent Controller decided the ejectment petition after he acquired the jurisdiction. No prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, by deciding the ejectment application by the Rent Controller after he acquired the jurisdiction during the pendency of petition.
9. As regards the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not in possession of the premises in question, from the record, it appears that the premises was let out to the deceased father of the petitioner and the petitioner along with legal heirs of the deceased inherited the right of tenant. The petitioner alleged that after the death of his father namely Barkhurdar Khan his brother Khalid is in possession of the shop as a tenant. It appears that though the notice was served upon the petitioner on the premises in question, the said Khalid did not come forward to protect his possession, claiming that he is the tenant in occupation of the premises in question exclusively.
10. Section 2J(ii) of the Ordinance provided that on account of death of the tenant only members of his family who continued to be in possession or occupation of the building,rented land, can be termed as a tenant and not of the legal heirs of the tenant, who are not in possession of the premises, as only legal heirs who are actually in possession or occupation of the premises after the death of tenant became statutory tenant.
11. The Rent Controller as well as the Courts below,on the basis of evidence on record came to the conclusion that the petitioner is in possession of the premises in question and passed the ejectment orders.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the impugned judgment is eminently reasonable and proceeds on cogent grounds. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any legal infirmity in the impugned judgment, which could justify interference.
The listed petition is, therefore, dismissed being without merit and leave to appeal is refused.
S.A.K./J-11/SCLeave refused.

Judgment on Ejectment of Tenant

2013 C L C 963
[Islamabad]
Before Iqbal Hameed-ur-Rahman, C.J.
ZHANGE GUOGEN----Petitioner
Versus
Mst. JAHANZEBA BEGUM and others----Respondents
Writ Petition No.1728 of 2009, heard on 16th March, 2011.
Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance (IV of 2001)---
----Ss.10, 11 & 17---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment of tenant---Wilful default---Penalty, non-payment of---Increase in rent---RentController and Lower Appellate Court passed eviction order mainly on the ground that according to terms of agreement, tenant failed to pay fine to landlady for delay in payment of rent and also did not pay increased rent---Plea raised by landlady was that tenant had not paid increased rent which stood automatically enhanced after 3 years of tenancy at the rate of 25% as provided under section 10 of Islamabad Rent RestrictionOrdinance, 2001---Validity---Condition of payment of Rs.500/- per day was penalty and it could not be considered as additional rent---Such penalty was specifically prohibited by section 11 of Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, and agreement to that extent was void ab initio---Landlady did not show any notice issued to tenant requiring him to pay statutory rent nor any application had been moved to strike off the defence of tenant, therefore, statutory ground could not be pressed into service---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction set aside eviction orders passed by RentController and Lower Appellate Court resultantly ejectment application was dismissed---Petition was allowed in circumstances.
Muhammad Yousuf v. Abdullah PLD 1980 SC 298; Inayat Ullah v. Zahoor ud Din 1987 SCMR 1313; Muhammad Shaban v. Judge Family Court and another 2003 YLR 2708; Sarfraz Ahmad Khan v. District Judge, Multan and 2 others 2003 CLC 44; Sikandar Hayat v. Hasina Sheikh PLD 2010 SC 19; M.Y. Khan v. M.M. Aslam and 2 others 1974 SCMR 196; Muhammad Tariq v. Sardar Khan and 9 others 1998 CLC 1054; Black's Law Dictionary; Advanced Law Lexicon Dictionary by P. Ramanatha Aiyar; Muhammad Arshad Khokhar v. Mrs. Zohra Khanum and others 2010 SCMR 1071; Messrs Habib Bank Limited v. Naseer Ahmed 1998 MLD 1765; National Development Finance Corporation, Shahrah-e-Quaid-e-Azam, Lahore v. Shaikh Naseem-ud-Din and 4 others PLD 1997 SC 564 and Ch. Mussarat Ahmad v. Ch. Fazal Ahmed 2004 YLR 2905ref.
Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Barrister Natalya Kamal and Barrister Sajeel Sheryar for Petitioner.
Mian Abdul Rauf and Rana M. Irshad Khan for Respondent No.1.
Date of hearing: 16th March, 2011.
JUDGMENT
IQBAL HAMEED-UR-RAHMAN, C.J.--- This constitutional petition has been directed against the order dated 24-9-2008, passed by learned Rent Controller, Islamabad; whereby ejectment petition filed by respondent No.1 was accepted and order dated 17-2-2009 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad, whereby appeal filed by the present petitioner was dismissed.
2.The facts forming background of this constitutional petition, in brief, are that respondent No.1 is owner of shop-cum-Flat No.18, Block No.12-B, Jinnah Super Market, Shalimar 7 (shop measuring 23 x 27 and Flat consisting of three rooms with one kitchen and one bath) Islamabad, whereas the present petitioner is tenant in the above said premises. Respondent No.1 filed ejectment petition under section 17 of theIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance,2001 on the grounds of default in payment ofrent, violation of lease agreement and personal need etc.
3.The present petitioner/tenant opposed the petition tooth and nail by filing written reply. The learned Rent Controller settled as many as 9 issues to resolve the controversy, which are as follows:---
ISSUES.
(1)Whether the respondent is rent defaulter from the month of October, 2007 till today and is liable to be evicted? OPA
(2)Whether the respondent has violated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement dated 1-4-2005, if so its effect? OPA
(3)Whether the respondent has changed the construction structure of the demised premises without the permission of the petitioner? OPA
(4)Whether the respondent is liable to be ejected from the suit premises on the ground mentioned in the ejectment petition? OPA
(5)Whether the petition has been moved by unauthorized person by making forged signature of the petitioner? OPR
(6)Whether the petition is premature because the period of rent agreement has not been expired? OPR
(7)Whether the petition has been moved with mala fide intention just to blackmail and pressurized the respondent? OPR
(8)Whether the petition is false, frivolous and vexatious and respondent is entitled to special costs? OPR
(9)Relief.
4.The learned Rent Controller after recording the evidence of both the parties accepted the ejectment petition directing the present petitioner to vacate the demised premises within a period of 30 days. Feeling dissatisfied with the order of learned Rent Controller,Islamabad the present petitioner preferred an appeal, and the learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad after hearing both the parties dismissed the same on 17-2-2009, hence the present constitutional petition.
5.The learned counsel for the present petitioner has urged variety of arguments and contended that the ejectment petition was filed on the ground of default in payment ofrent for the months of September and October, 2007, but from the record it is proved that no default in payment of rent was committed by the present petitioner; as prior to the filing of ejectment petition, a legal notice was served upon the tenant/present petitioner, wherein allegation of non-deposit of rent was mentioned for the months of November and December, 2007 and when the said legal notice was confronted to the sole witness i.e. attorney of respondent No.1, who appeared in the witness box as AW-1 admitted that there was no default, in spite of the same a ground of default was carved out by the learned Rent Controller, which is against the law and settled norms of justice; that the petitioner diligently and responsibly made repeated attempts to submitrent to respondent No.1 through various modes: that the material floating on the surface of the record speaks volume about the mala fide of respondent No.1; that the rent of October, 2007 was sent to respondent No.1 through money orders but the landlady refused to accept the same; further another attempt was made by the present petitioner to tender the rent by sending a cheque through T.C.S (Exh.R-3), but the same also could not be delivered and the same was produced before the Court and the Court itself opened envelope as is evident vide order dated 30-7-2009; that again for payment ofrent for the month of November, 2007 money orders were sent to respondent No.1, but the same were also not accepted; that during proceedings of the instant Writ Petition, he (petitioner's counsel) wrote a letter to the post-office and then C.M No.2557/2009 was filed on 11-6-2009 and after consent of learned counsel for respondent No.1 record of money orders were brought on record, which prove that sincere efforts were made by the petitioner and the proof of the same is evident from the Post Office record and 44 money orders were sent to pay the rent for the said months, the same is on account that Post Office does not accept a money order in excess of amount of Rs.10,000/-; that hectic efforts were made by the present petitioner to tender the rent for the months of October and November first by sending money orders and then by sending cheque through T.C.S and then the present petitioner was constrained to file an application before learned Rent Controller for deposit of rent and the learned Rent Controller wrongly observed the same as a first attempt to deposit the rent and thereafter the present petitioner had been depositing the rent in the court; that if the present petitioner had sent a fictitious cheque, then he could have been prosecuted under section 489-F, P.P.C., which entails punishment of 3 years; that the learned Rent Controller observed that the present petitioner did not try to tender the rent for the months of October and November seriously within a period of 45 days as stipulated in the agreement and that the present petitioner did not comply with the condition of payment of Rs.500/- as penalty contemplated in the lease agreement; that except the issues of default and violation of lease agreement, the remaining issues were decided in favour of present petitioner by the learned Rent Controller; that section 17 of the Islamabad RentRestriction Ordinance, 2001 does not provide any penalty as a ground for eviction of a tenant and to the contrary sections 11 and 12 ibid prohibit imposition of any fine or premium and penalty to be charged for the grant of renewal or continuance of a tenancy and in this regard learned counsel has relied upon the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Abdullah (PLD 1980 Supreme Court 298).
6.It is further added that the alleged violation of the terms and conditions, of the lease agreement is also not made out in this case; that the learned Rent Controller has acted contrary to sections 11 and 12 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 by treating payment of Rs.500/- per day compensation as part of rent and has not considered the sending money orders and cheque through T.C.S which had been opened by herself in the Court, which is absolutely without lawful authority and inconsistent with the settled principles of law determined by the Superior Courts of the country; that although a defaulter deserves no sympathy of law, but justice and equity does not allow the Court to carve out a ground of default. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the case of Inayat Ullah v. Zahoor ud Din (1987 SCMR 1313).
7.Learned counsel for the present petitioner further argued that in order to support the ejectment application Dr. Kamran Khan appeared as sole witness as special attorney of respondent No.1 which has not been authenticated by the Notary Public rather the same was attested by Oath Commissioner, who was only authorized to administer oath of affidavits, therefore the same is without lawful authority and of no legal effect and in this regard he has relied upon the case of Muhammad Shaban v. Judge Family Court and another (2003 YLR 2708, Lahore), wherein it has been held that:---
"Document of affidavit without certificate of the Oath Commissioner certifying that its contents were deposed before him on oath or solemn affirmation and the executant of the said document was either known to him or was identified before him by a person who was known to him, could not be deemed as affidavit and thus had no evidentiary value and could be ignored."
Reliance is further placed on the case of Sarfraz Ahmad Khan v. District Judge, Multan and 2 others (2003 CLC 44, Lahore). Hence, he urges that the power of attorney does not confer any right on the attorney to appear and make statement on behalf of respondent No.1.
8.It is further argued that there is no other evidence on record on behalf of respondent No.1 except the bald statement of AW-1; that, the learned Rent Controller clubbed three issues and failed to give the findings on each issue separately which is against the law.
9.Learned counsel for the present petitioner further added that the judgment of learned Additional District Judge is based on surmises and conjectures; that both the learned courts below are labouring under the impression that sections 11 and 12 of theIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 is absolutely redundant which expressly prohibits payment of any fine, premium, penalty or compensation; that the orders of both the courts below are absolutely without lawful authority, without jurisdiction, against the law, contrary to the facts proved on record, and result of non-reading and misreading of evidence, therefore, the same deserve to be set aside and the application for ejectment filed by respondent No.1 be dismissed, further the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge shows that no independent analysis was made, as such also merits set aside. While concluding his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is a foreigner and holds the Courts of Pakistan in high esteemed and prays for dispensation of justice to him.
10.Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 argued that the present petition is not maintainable on multiple grounds; that the present petitioner is a rent defaulter, which stands proved on record. He invited attention of the Court towards the order dated 28-11-2007 passed by the learned Rent Controller on the application of present petitioner for deposit of rent whereby it was directed that monthly rent be deposited till the 15th of each month at his risk and costs. The present petitioner deposited rent for one year w.e.f. 1-10-2007 to 1-10-2008 on the same day i.e. 28-11-2007. Thereafter,rent was deposited on 27-10-2008 for next 6 months. The present petitioner was required to deposit the rent for October,2008till15-10-2008,butthesamehasbeendepositedon 27-10-2008 i.e after 12, days of stipulated period as directed in order dated 28-11-2007 and there is no explanation to that effect; that the present petitioner has concealed this fact from the Court and deliberately did not tender the receipts of payment of rent and, therefore, the present petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands, hence he is not entitled to discretionary relief under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and this default was committed during the pendency of appeal; that first lease agreement was executed on 1-4-2005 for a period of 4 years; first year's rent was paid in advance; that there was an increase of 5% for remaining three years. The learned counsel after reading clause 5(e) of lease agreement contends that in case of tenant failure to pay the advance rentwithin ten days of its due date, he was to pay Rs.500/- per day additionally to the landlady commencing from the first day till all the dues including the additional amount so levied is cleared, which has not been paid; that it is not a penalty clause but one of the terms of the tenancy agreement and the same may be termed as additional rentwhich forms part of rent due; that sections 11 and 12 of the Islamabad Rent RestrictionOrdinance, 2001 are not applicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the same relates to renewal or continuance of a tenancy.
11.Learned counsel for respondent No.1 after reading section 10 ibid strenuously urged that said provision of law provides that rent shall stand automatically increased at the end of every three years of its tenancy i.e. twenty-five per cent of the rent already being paid by the tenant and thus the provisions of said section had been violated by the petitioner by not increasing the rent and thus the petitioner is deemed to beadefaulteronthisgroundalso.Inthisregardhehasrelied upon the case of Sikandar Hayat v. Hasina Sheikh (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 19).
12.It is further argued that the constitutional jurisdiction under Article of 199 of the Constitution can only be invoked when there is a jurisdictional defect and the evidence cannot be re-assessed in constitutional jurisdiction; that there are concurrent findings of both the courts below which cannot be disturbed by this court in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution; that special power of attorney was duly executed in accordance with law, even otherwise, this ground was not taken by the petitioner at the time of filing of appeal before the learned Appellate Court, therefore, the same stands admitted; that documents are to be proved in accordance with law, coming from proper custody in evidence through a witness either in the statement of private individual, and if the same is in proper custody through summoned witnesses and the same cannot be produced through statement of counsel without oath; that the documents produced by the petitioner are neither original nor attested and it is not the stage of evidence where document can be filed and considered in evidence. Both the learned Courts below passed the impugned orders after considering and evaluating the evidence. The findings are in order; that the petitioner has not deposited the rent after statutory increase of 25% and by the dent of above submissions, it is prayed that the petition may be dismissed.
13.In rebuttal the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that citations were referred to before the learned Rent Controller, but the same were ignored which is a violation of dictums of Superior Courts. That the alleged delay in tendering rent is not a ground either in the ejectment petition or at any other forum i.e. learned Appellate Court; that at present the rights of the parties are to be determined which accrued at the time of filing of lis, which is settled principle of law and jurisprudence; that subsequent events unless expressly assailed or brought to the notice of Court do not become subject-matter of the controversy; that statutory increase shall be applicable from 1st of April, 2012, even otherwise, respondent No.1 has not submitted any application questioning the default in payment of rent accrued due to statutory increase; that the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has argued beyond the scope of eviction petition; that if the present petitioner has done any thing, respondent No.1 may file fresh eviction petition; that the concurrent findings have been recorded against the law and facts; that the documents brought on record are receipts of money orders which are in possession of Post Office and the same has been done after the consent of learned counsel for respondent No.1, therefore they are estopped to raise objection to the same at this stage.
14.I have heard the arguments and perused the material made available on the file.
15.The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as that of respondent No.1 have been taken into account by this court in a very conscious manner. Both the Courts below have decided the matter basically on the ground of default. The learned Tribunal as well as Appellate Court decided the ejectment petition and appeal of petitioner after holding the petitioner to be a defaulter mainly on the ground that lease agreement dated 1-4-2005 contains a specific clause whereby Rs.500/- per day is to be paid in case of default in payment of rent. It is an admitted fact that default had been alleged by respondent No.1 in her legal notice to be that of November and December, 2007, but while filing ejectment petition she has stated that the petitioner committed default for the months of September and October, 2007. As such, there is a clear contradiction in the contention of respondent No.1 regarding default in payment of rent. The only witness of respondent No.1 is Dr. Kamran Khan, who appeared as AW-1 as her attorney. He in his cross-examination admitted that the tenant is mentioned as defaulter w.e.f. 1st October, 2007 in the ejectment petition. In the next sentence he further admitted that in the legal notice sent on behalf of respondent No.1/landlady default is mentioned to be that of November/December, 2007. The moot points involved are whether the petitioner is rent defaulter and he has violated the terms of agreement. The agreement is admitted between the parties. Respondent No.1 in her ejectment petition vide para (a) of grounds alleged that the tenant/respondent is rent defaulter from the month of October, 2007 till to date and is liable to pay Rs.500/- per day as compensation. The petitioner in his written reply vide para No.3 of facts asserted that firstly he tendered the rent to landlady but she refused to receive the same, therefore he sent the rent through cheque through courier but she refused to receive the same. Then he sent money orders but again she refused. When efforts of the petitioner did not yield any fruit then he was constrained to file application for deposit of rent and thereafter on the order of learned Rent Controller he deposited the rent. From above, it is apparent that the intention of the petitioner from very beginning was that he tried his level best to pay the rent since October, 2007. In order to prove his contention, the present petitioner got examined his attorney Waheed Ahmed, who appeared in the witness box as RW.1 and submitted his affidavit, wherein the same facts regarding payment of rent have been narrated. The petitioner produced the receipt of courier along with envelope before the court and vide order dated 30-7-2008, the envelope was opened in the court, wherein cheque valuing Rs.5,02,700/- dated 31-10-2007 was found. All these facts are sufficient to prove that the petitioner had tried his level best to pay the rent due after 1-7-2007. Although, the rent for the months of October and November, 2007 or for 6 months advance has not been paid within the agreed period as per lease agreement, but from the record it is crystal clear that circumstances were absolutely beyond the control of the petitioner. The receipts of money orders have been placed on record in the instant writ petition which also substantiate the contention of petitioner that he seriously and bonafidely attempted to pay the rent to the landlady. As regards the contention of learned counsel for respondent No.1 that the said receipts/documents cannot be considered at this stage, record transpires that during pendency of this Writ Petition, the petitioner moved C.M. No.2557 of 2009 on11-6-2009, seeking permission to place on record letter from the DirectorofAccounts,PostOfficetotheChiefPostmaster,PostMall F-7, Islamabad dated 22nd April, 2009, money order receipts dated 25-10-2007 (total Number, 22) and money receipts dated 8-11-2007 (total number 22). On 24-6-2009, Rana M. Irshad Khan, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.1 raised no objection for the acceptance of this civil miscellaneous, therefore, said C.M. was accepted and it was observed that attached documents will be considered as pert of the writ petition. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has laid much emphasis that the same documents cannot be taken into consideration at this stage, but I am unable to see eye to eye with him inasmuch as in the case of M.Y. Khan v. M.M. Aslam and 2 others (1974 SCMR 196) it was held that there is no bar to the High Court taking evidence or even additional evidence at the writ stage.
16.Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has stressed that rent for the month of October, 2008 should have been deposited till 15-10-2008 as per order of learned RentController, but the same was deposited on 27-10-2008 i.e. after delay of 12 days and the petitioner is also defaulter on this score. To resolve the controversy, a glance over the previous rate of rent, payment and increase of 5% of rent is necessary. Undisputedly, lease agreement was executed on 1-4-2005 and the rate of rent was fixed at Rs.75,000/-, which was for first one year and thereafter the same was to be increased @5% per year for the remaining three years. The detail and increase of rentis as follows:---
Period
Rent
1-4-2005 to 31-3-2006
Rs.75,000/- Per Month
1-4-2006 to 31-3-2007
Rs.78,750/- Per Month
1-4-2007 to 31-3-2008
Rs.82,687.5 Per Month
1-4-2008 to 31-3-2009
Rs.86,821.87 Per Month
It has come on record that the petitioner has paid the rent till 30-9-2007 to respondent No.l. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner deposited an amount of Rs.11,05,000/- as per order of learned Rent Controlleron28-11-2007.Thereafter,hehasdepositedtherentof6 months on 27-10-2008. In the challan form dated 28-11-2007 through which the petitioner deposited the rent of Rs.11,05,000/-, it is mentioned that the same is being paid for the period 1-10-2007 to 1-10-2008. The contention of petitioner as mentioned in para No.5 of Facts of writ petitionisthatduetoclericalmistakethedatewasmentionedas 1-10-2008 instead of 31-10-2008. Whether it was so, the same can easily be ascertained by reckoning the monthly rent. The rate of rent for the period 1-10-2007 to 31-3-2008 was Rs.82,687.5 per month which comes toRs.4,96,125/-for6months.Therateofrentfrom1-4-2008to 30-9-2008 @ Rs.86,821/87 which becomes Rs.5,20,931.22 and thus the total rent w.e.f. 1-10-2007 to 30.09.2008 (for 12 months) comes to Rs.10,17,056.22 and when the rent of October, 2008 @ Rs.86,821.87 is included it becomes Rs.11,03,878.09; whereas the petitioner has deposited an amount of Rs.11,05,000/-. In this way it is crystal clear that he has not only deposited the rent w.e.f. 1-10-2007 to 31-10-2008 (for 13 months) but he has deposited an amount of Rs.1122/- in excess. As far as mentioning of date is concerned the above calculation proves that it was just a clerical mistake. It is settled law that clerical or bona fide mistake should not be allowed to come in the way of substantial justice. Hence the petitioner cannot be held to be defaulter of rent for the month of October, 2008. The objection raised by learned counsel for respondent No.1 holds no water and has not been substantiate from the record.
17.Under the law mere non-payment of rent is not default unless the same is proved to be wilful. In the case of Muhammad Tariq v. Sardar Khan and 9 others (1998 CLC 1054 Lahore) it has been held as under:---
"Mere non-payment of rent would not ipso facto result in eviction of tenant unless default was proved to be wilful."
The word "wilful" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary in the following manner:---
"Voluntary and intentional but not necessarily malicious."
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon Dictionary defines "Wilful Default" as under:---
"Wilful default in the payment of rent means that the default was intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of its consequences.
It is further elaborated that if the default has occasioned on account of ignorance accident or compulsion or circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, it cannot be termed as wilful default."
As narrated above, the petitioner has tried his level best to pay the rent, therefore, there is no element of negligence on his part. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the case of Inayat Ullah v. Zahoor-ud-Din and another (1987 SCMR 1313), wherein it was laid down as under:---
"In cross-examination he admits that the rent of two months was sent to him by the appellants though money-order and the same was returned by him as refused and unpaid. However, he has not uttered a single word about the alleged willful and deliberate default. This shows that the respondent deliberately created difficulties in the way of appellants by not accepting the rent in the hope that some omission or slip on the part of the appellants may enable him to carve out a ground for their eviction. On the other hand, the appellants fully realized the situation and being conscious of their liability continued to pay rent properly. The conduct of the appellants indicates no element of negligence on their part. As soon as the respondent refused to receive therent, the appellants reasonably adopted the alternate prescribed mode of tendering therent by way of depositing it with the Rent Controller consistently. The learned RentController as well as the learned Appellate Authority failed to notice this aspect of the case and decided the matter in issue against the appellants arbitrarily without any cogent evidence on the file."
Further in the case of Muhammad Arshad Khokhar v. Mrs. Zohra Khanum and others (2010 SCMR 1071), the apex Court laid down as under:---
"Late deposit of rent on a few occasions during all such long occasions would be inconsequential, moreso when tenant every time had been depositing rent in lump sum for three months.-- Tenant had not committed default in payment of rent in circumstances. Ejectment petition was dismissed."
For what has been discussed above, the delay in deposit of rent cannot be termed as wilful default.
18.As regards the violation of clause 5 (e and f) of lease agreement is concerned, I have focused my attention to this aspect. To elucidate and comprehend the proposition the same are re-produced as under:---
(e)The lessee shall pay every six months rent in advance within ten days from the day it becomes due. In case of lessee's failure to pay the advance rent within ten days of its due date, he shall have to pay Rs.500/- per day additionally to the lessor commencing from the first day till he clears all the dues including the additional amount so levied.
(f)Further in the event of failure of the part of the lessee to pay the rent (including other dues) within 45 days from its becoming due the lessor reserves the right to cancel this agreement and ask the lessee to vacate the premises of the shop-cum-flat with immediate effect. The lessee shall have no objection to it.
19.The learned Rent Controller held that the petitioner failed to pay the rent at the due date, subsequently he paid the rent but did not pay the amount of penalty i.e. Rs.500/- per day. Section 11 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 clearly prohibits the imposition of penalty which reads as under:---
"11.Landlord not to claim in excess of fair rent.--- The landlord shall not claim or receive any premium or other like sum in addition by fair rent or any rent in excess of such fairrent and any agreement for payment of any sum in addition to rent in excess of such fair rent shall be void. "
KeepinginviewtheaboveprovisionoflawIhavenohesitation toholdthatconditionofpaymentofRs.500/-perdayisa penalty and it cannot be considered by stretch of imagination as additionalrent,whichhasbeenspecificallyprohibitedbysection 11ibidandthustheagreementtothisextentisvoidabinitio.In this regard I am also fortified by the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Abdullah, (PLD 1980 Supreme Court 298), wherein it has been held as under:---
"Ordinance VI of 1959 having expressly prohibited landlord from raising anything in excess of fair rent and having specified grounds of eviction of tenants, both such stipulations, held, illegal and not enforceable."
Moreover, in the case of Messrs Habib Bank Limited v. Naseer Ahmed (1998 MLD 1765, Peshawar) it was held that:---
"Covenant violative of law would have no legal effect... Terms of lease agreement which were contrary to provisions of Cantonments RentRestriction Act, 1963 were of no consequences as no estoppels could be against statute."
20.Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has also urged that the petitioner has not paid the increased rent which stood automatically enhanced after 3 years of tenancy @ 25% as provided under section 10 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001. Neither the learned counsel has shown any notice issued to the petitioner requiring him to pay the said statutory rent nor any application has been moved to strike off the defence of tenant. Therefore, statutory ground cannot be pressed into service. Moreover, in the case of National Development Finance Corporation, Shahrah-e-Quaid-e-Azam, Lahore v. Shaikh Naseem-ud-Din and 4 others (PLD 1997 SUPREME COURT 564), it was held as under:---
"Nothing was brought on record to suggest that landlord in consequence of statutory increase in rate of rent sent any notice of such increase to tenant. Finding of High Court that tenant had become defaulter by mere non-payment of rent according to enhanced rate, was not warranted. Default in payment of rent to justify ejectment of tenant was not proved in circumstances."
Hence, both the learned Tribunal as well as Appellate Court had wrongly declared the petitioner defaulter, the ground of default is held to be carved out by the courts below. The petitioner cannot be considered to be a wilful defaulter and as such concurrentfindings of both the courts below are liable to be set aside and in this regard reliance is placed on the case of Ch. Mussarat Ahmad v. Ch. Fazal Ahmed (2004 YLR 2905 Lahore), wherein it has been held as under:---
"Plea that concurrent findings of facts rendered by Courts below, were not amenable to extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court, was not a hard and fast rule. When facts were admitted and matter of controversy was related to the question of interpretation of law or if concurrent findings of facts were based upon misreading, non-reading of evidence, ignorance of material facts/documents, sanctity attached to such concurrent findings of fact would evaporate in the air and High Court would have full powers and complete and ample jurisdiction to examine and check validity of such concurrent findings of fact and to pass an appropriate order according to the interest of justice."
21.In view of above perspective, the instant petition is accepted and both the impugned orders dated 24-9-2008 passed by learned Rent Controller and dated 17-2-2009 passed by learned Additional District Judge Islamabad are set aside and the ejectment petition filed by respondent No.1 would be deemed to be dismissed.
MH/30/Isl.allowed

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