Showing posts with label Civil Law Expert. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Civil Law Expert. Show all posts

Friday, 25 March 2016

Formal Preliminary Decree is mandatory at times


PLJ 2014 Lahore 981
Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, J.
versus
C.R. No. 356 of 2013, heard on 2.12.2013.
----S. 115, O. VII, R. 11 & O. XVI--Suit for partition--Rejection of plaint--Order of synonymous to preliminary decree was passed--Contesting and consenting written statements were filed--Property was gifted to all sons in equal shares--Admission on behalf of parties with regard to joint property--Formal preliminary decree was not prepared--Validity--There is no need to record the evidence as it is admitted between the parties that property was joint one and parties to the suit were owner of the property in equal share and virtually passed a preliminary decree--Such fact has been admitted in the written statement and trial Court mentioned in the impugned order that gift deed is available on the file which is an admitted document between the parties and when it has been pleaded by the parties that each party was joint owner to the extent of 1/3 in the suit property, therefore, trial Court dismissing the application under Order VII Rule 11 as well as Order XVI of the CPC passed a preliminary decree--For invoking jurisdiction of High Court under Section 115 of the CPC the petitioner is under obligation to point out any illegality, infirmity or material irregularity in the impugned order passed by trial Court but no such flaw has been shown by petitioner--Order passed by trial Court was in accordance with law.    [P. 983] A, B & C
Mr. Haris Azmat, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Waqar-ul-Hassan Butt, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.
Mr. Abdul Rehman Khalil, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
Date of hearing: 2.12.2013.
Judgment
Through this civil revision, petitioner who is Defendant No. 1 in a partition suit has challenged the order dated 31.01.2013 passed by learned Civil Judge Is Class, Lahore, who has not only dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint but also passed an order synonymous to a preliminary decree. The application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was filed on the ground that list of witnesses has not been filed in accordance with Order XVI of the CPC.
2.  When the instant civil revision was entertained, learned counsel for the petitioner on 12.02.2013 made a statement that he will not press this petition to the extent of dismissal of application for rejection of plaint. Today learned counsel has argued that not only the application for rejection of plaint was dismissed but also virtually a preliminary decree was passed; that when the issues were framed and without recording of evidence the order impugned, whereby a preliminary decree has been passed, therefore the order is not sustainable under the law. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgments "2004 MLD 293 (Abdul Wahab and others vs. Ghulam Muhammad), 1982 SCMR 816 (Ali Muhammad vs. Muhammad Hayat and others) and 2011 YLR 3073 (Mst. Jannat and others vs. Mst. Maqsood and others)" to argue that after framing of issues without recording evidence the preliminary decree could not have been passed.
3.  On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has resisted the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and argues that there is absolutely no any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order which is not revisable by this Court; that when there was an admitted position, therefore the Court was competent to pass a preliminary decree at any stage and same has rightly been passed. Learned counsel admits that formal preliminary decree has not been prepared which can be ordered to the learned trial Court for preparation of the same.
4.  I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and also gone through the case law as well as the impugned order passed by learned trial Court and the pleadings of parties appended with this civil revision.
5.  The suit for partition was filed by the plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 on 24.11.2011. The plaintiff is one of the sons of late Justice (Retired) Karam Elahi Chauhan, whereas Defendants No. 1 and 2 are his brothers. Defendant No. 1 who is petitioner before this Court has filed  contesting  written  statement,  whereas  Defendant  No. 2 has filed consenting written statement. Learned trial Court framed the issues on 05.12.2012 and invited the parties to produce their evidence. The petitioner who is Defendant No. 1 in the trial Court moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order XVI and Section 151 of the CPC. It seems that at the time of hearing the arguments on the application learned trial Court scrutinized the pleadings as well as the record of case and while rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 and Order XVI of the CPC, came to the conclusion that there is no need to record the evidence as it is admitted between the parties that property is joint one and parties to the suit are owner of the property in equal share and virtually passed a preliminary decree. I have noticed that the claim of plaintiff that on the basis of registered gift deed No. 4651 dated 08.02.1979 the suit property was gifted by their father to all the three sons in equal shares, who are party to the suit. This fact has been admitted in the written statement and the learned trial Court mentioned in the impugned order that gift deed is available on the file which is an admitted document between the parties and when it has been pleaded by the parties that each party is joint owner to the extent of 1/3 in the suit property, therefore learned trial Court vide impugned order dated 31.01.2013 after dismissing the application under Order VII Rule 11 as well as Order XVI of the CPC passed a preliminary decree. In this view of the matter, the case law referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case. For invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the CPC the petitioner is under obligation to point out any illegality, infirmity or material irregularity in the impugned order passed by learned trial Court but no such flaw has been shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The order passed by the learned trial Court is in accordance with law.
6.  As the Court has scrutinized the matter and there is an admission on behalf of the parties with regard to joint property, therefore preliminary decree has rightly been passed. The only defect visible in the proceedings is that a formal preliminary decree has not been prepared. In this view of the matter, while dismissing this civil revision learned trial Court is directed to prepare a formal preliminary decree, so that a defect in the proceedings be cured. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Copy of this order be sent immediately to the learned trial Court for guidance.

Saturday, 19 March 2016

Contents of Plaint are important for Rejection of Plaint


PLJ 2009 Karachi 205
Present: Gulzar Ahmed, J.
Messrs SUNLEY DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED through Authorised Officer, Karachi--Plaintiff
versus
Messrs MUMAIR ASSOCIATES through Attorney
and others--Defendants
Suit No. 9 and C.Ms. Nos.53 and 2790 of 2008, decided on 31.12.2008.
Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908)--
----Art. 113--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11--Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12--Suit for specific performance of contract--Limitation--Rejection of plaint--Scope--While dealing with the question of rejection of plaint under O.VII, R. 11, C.P.C. the contents of the plaint were to be assumed to be correct and same would be rejected if it was shown that the plaint on its face was barred by law of limitation--Where the plaint on its face did not show that same was barred by limitation, its rejection would not be justified.      [P. 209] A
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--
----S. 12--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11--Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell--Rejection of plaint--Scope--All the items on which grievances had been raised by the plaintiff were to be undertaken by the plaintiff itself and none by the defendant--Heading of the agreement though mentioned same to be an "agreement to sell" but its reading showed that it was not so but was a complete conveyance of the land by defendant to the plaintiff with giving of irrevocable general power of attorney for selling of the plots and recovery of sales proceeds and making of sub--leases in favour of prospective purchasers--Held, to the extent what was read from the agreement itself and complaints made in the plaint, there seemed to be no cause of action for filing of the suit by the plaintiff--Application for rejection of plaint was allowed.     [Pp. 211 & 212] B & D
1986 SCMR 497; PLD 1987 Kar. 132; PLD 1985 SC 153; PLD 1987 Kar. 292; 2001 CLC 946 and 1988 CLC 722 ref.
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--
----S. 12--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11--Suit for specific performance of agreement--Lease--Rejection of plaint--Scope--Agreement, though showed selling of 950 residential plots but their exact location was mentioned to be partly in specified survey numbers and as to where the remaining part of the land was situated, the agreement was altogether silent--Except for there being a covenant from the side of the defendant that it had a subsisting lease of land, no particulars or details were given about purported lease as to from whom it was obtained, what was its date, its nature, right given under it and to what specific land it related; agreement and plaint were altogether silent on this aspect of the matter--Where a document which, in the present case, was agreement to sell purported to have conveyed the land of 950 plots by the defendant to the plaintiff, it had to mention full particulars and details of the lease--Even the copy of purported lease was not attached with the plaint nor was available on record which would lead to the only inference that there was no existence of lease of the suit land--Application was allowed.  [Pp. 211 & 212] C & D
Mr. Muhammad Sadiq Hidayatullah, Advocate for Plaintiff.
Mr. Nazar Akbar, Advocate for Defendant No. 1.
Nemo for Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 5.
Date of hearing: 31.12.2008.
Order
(1) & (2) These are the two applications one is under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 & 2, C.P.C. filed by plaintiff and the other is under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. filed by Defendant No. 1. The Defendant No. 1 has filed counter affidavit to the first mentioned application while the plaintiff has filed objections to the second application to which rejoinder has been filed by Defendant No. 1. Both the counsel for the parties have made extensive submissions.
Learned counsel for Defendant No. 1 has contended that no notice was given by the plaintiff to Defendant No. 1 and that the suit is time barred and even otherwise plaintiff has no cause of action for filing of the suit. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the cases reported in 1986 SCMR 497. PLD 1987 Karachi 132. PLD 1985 SC 153, PLD 1987 Karachi 292 and 2001 CLC 946.
On the other hand learned counsel for plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff has made full payment of the consideration amount to the Defendant No. 1 and was put in possession of the property and that Defendant No. 1 was required to demolish the boundary wall and the agreement is irrevocable. He has finally contended that plaintiff's right is protected under Section 53-A Transfer of Property Act and has relied upon the case reported in 1988 CLC 722.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel and have gone through the record.
The suit has been filed for specific performance of contract, declaration and injunction. It is alleged in the plaint that plaintiff has entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 30-4-1998 with the Defendant No. 1 for purchase from Defendant No. 1 housing scheme by the name of Gulshan-e-Rumi upon besides other survey numbers including Survey Nos. 108, 109 and 110 situated in Deh Safooran, Tapo Gadap, Taluka & District East, Karachi on which 950 residential plots of 120 and 133 square yards have to be constructed and the plaintiff has agreed to purchase these plots. The consideration of Rs.750 per square yard including all outer and internal development charges together will all rights, title and interest with full vacant possession and free from encumbrances, charges and disputes. It is alleged that on the signing of the Agreement Rs. 100,00,000 was paid and further Rs.50,00,000 was also paid as per the schedule of the Agreement. It is alleged that on signing of the sale agreement and payment of Rs. 150,00,000 the defendant handed over actual vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff. Plaintiff got the lay out plan approved for 685 units/bungalows and obtained N.O.C. for sale of 218 units/bungalow, through its sister concern M/s. Sobia Enterprises from the Cantonment Board. The construction and development work was stopped because of the notice of Defendant No. 4 namely Cantonment Board who asked for obtaining of N.O.C. from Civil Aviation Authority. It is alleged that as per agreement the Defendant No. 1 had to obtain N.O.C. from competent authority and that the defendant failed to get demarcation of boundary wall of the said housing scheme. Defendant also failed to make internal development as per agreement of laying carpeting of roads and separate approval of the residential plots. It is alleged that plaintiff pressed the Defendant No. 1 to honour the terms of the agreement who kept the plaintiff on false promises and ultimately in March 2007 defendant failed to provide all the required N.O.C. and approval of residential status of housing scheme and construction and carpeting of road was not done. It is alleged that the defendant has threatened to dispossess the plaintiff and refused to honour the terms of the agreement. It is alleged that the cause of action for the suit accrued to the plaintiff in March 1997 when the plaintiff paid and defendant received a sum of Rs. 100,00,000 and handed over the vacant possession of the suit property and thereafter when plaintiff paid further sum of Rs.50,00,000 to the defendants and ultimately in March 2007 when the defendant failed to honour the commitment made in the agreement.
So far the first submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that no notice was given by the plaintiff to the defendant for seeking compliance of the said agreement and to show its own willingness to perform the agreement, it may be noted that no specific provisions of law was cited by the learned counsel to show that giving of a notice for filing of suit for specific performance is mandatory and without it the suit will not be maintainable. It appears to me that there is no legal requirement for giving of a notice before filing of a suit for specific performance of contract but prudency requires that giving of notice be adverted to before entering upon costly and time consuming affair of litigation. The exchange of notice and reply, in many cases may bring parties to some agreeable solution of the dispute or at least narrow down contentious issues between them and also crystallize their respective stand on point or points on which disagreement exist. This facilitates Court proceeding as it will only address to the narrowed controversy and answer to it. Since no specific law has been cited for giving of a notice before filing of the suit for specific performance of contract, therefore, this question cannot be considered for rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.
As regards the second submission of the learned counsel that the suit is time barred, Defendant No. 1 counsel has contended that even if the plea of the plaintiff that it has paid the amount of Rs. 15,000,000 is accepted in accordance with the schedule provided in clause (2) of the agreement still the suit will be time barred, as it has not been filed within 3 years from the last payment shown in the schedule. The schedule shows that a sum of Rs. 10,000,000 was paid on the date of agreement i.e. 30-4-1998, Rs.2,500,000 within 30 days of the signing of the agreement and further Rs.2,500,000 on expiry of 60 days from the date of agreement. Thus the last payment would be around 29-6-1998.
Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 provides limitation period for filing of suit for specific performance of contract that of 3 years from the date fixed for the performance and if no such date is fixed then from the date the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Admittedly, no date is fixed in the agreement for the performance, therefore, the second part of the provision will apply where limitation has to run from the date of refusal to perform the agreement. Plaintiff in the plaint has pleaded that refusal to perform the agreement has been made by the Defendant No. 1 in March 2007. The Defendant No. 1 has not shown any document that there was refusal on its part to perform the agreement prior to the date which is alleged in the plaint. In the absence of any such prior refusal, the question as to whether there was a refusal to perform the agreement by the Defendant No. 1 in March 2007 is a question of fact which can only be determined after evidence is recorded by the parties. After all while dealing with the question of rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C, the contents of plaint are assumed to be correct and it will be rejected if it is shown that the plaint on its face is barred by the law of limitation. The plaint, on its face does not show that it is barred by limitation law.
As regards the last arguments of the learned counsel for the Defendant No. 1 that the plaintiff has no cause of action for the suit, it may be noted that the Agreement to Sell was made between the plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 in respect of housing scheme of Gulshan-e-Rumi on land besides other survey numbers including survey Nos. 108, 109 and 110 in Deh Safooran, Taluka and District Karachi East. Second recital of the agreements provide that the Defendant No. 1 has agreed to sell, transfer, convey and assign to the plaintiff a total area of 115975 square yards partly from the said survey numbers for development and construction of approximately 950 residential plots of 120 and 133 square yards at an agreed sale consideration to be calculated at the rate of Rs.750 per square yard each inclusive of all development charges together with tight, title and interest with full vacant possession, free from all encumbrances. Developing charges is defined in clause (b) of this recital with is as follows :--
(b) The agreed Sale consideration to be calculated at the rate of Rs.750 per each square yard of the said Land shall also be inclusive of all the internal development charges such as construction and carpeting of Roads as per approved Layout Plan, separate approved Plans from the concerned authorities with all required N.O.C.'s together with approval of their Residential status under the said Housing Scheme, permission/N.O.C. for sale and allotment of the said plots to the individual allottees including the permission/N.O.C. for construction in respect of the plots involved in the said Land from the concerned authorities of the Cantonment Board and from all other concerned Governmental Authorities."
Clause (2) of the agreement shows payment of Rs. 10,000,000 as partial payment towards consideration and further two payments of Rs.2,500,000 in two instalments of 30 days and 60 days respectively from the date of agreement. Clause-3 contains schedule on earn and pay basis and it provides that 65 % out of the amount to be recovered by the plaintiff on account of sale proceeds of 950 residential plots from prospective purchasers shall be invested by the plaintiff upon construction of model bungalows, bungalows on account of development and on other construction work and payment to the Defendant No. 1 of 25% out of the amount recovered by the plaintiff from the perspective purchaser for adjustment of full and final consideration of the land and the rest 10% will be retained by the plaintiff against investment in the housing scheme. By clause-4 Defendant No. 1 covenants with the plaintiff that the lease in respect of the land of 950 residential plots under sale is in full force, valid and subsisting and that the Defendant No. 1 has full power and lawful authority to sell, transfer, convey and assign the said land to the plaintiff in the manner done by the agreement. By clause-5 Defendant No. 1 covenants with the plaintiff that it has paid all assessment, taxes, cesses and development charges, ground rents etc, till the delivery of vacant possession. By clause-7 defendant covenants with the plaintiff that it shall do or cause to be done all lawful acts, deeds and things for better selling and perfectly assigning the said land unto the plaintiff free from all encumbrances and that the Defendant No. 1 shall execute an Irrevocable General Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff or his nominee containing all the powers and authorities for booking and selling of the said plots to individual sub-lessees, to handover sub leases, to get publication or advertisement for sale, recover sale proceeds, to get construct house on 950 plots, to deliver physical possession thereof to perspective purchaser, to sign, execute and admit execution of sublease deeds of the said plots in favour of individual allottees and sub-lessees. By clause-8 Defendant No. 1 has delivered full vacant possession of the land to the plaintiff with stipulation that now the plaintiff is fully and legally entitled to get the plots  sold to the perspective purchase of its own choice either under old or new name of housing scheme and to recover sale proceeds there-from without any concern whatsoever of the Defendant No. 1. By clause (9) the Defendant No. 1 has covenanted with the plaintiff that it shall sign, execute and issue allotment letters and possession letters of 950 residential plots of the said land in favour of the newly established partnership firm namely Messrs G.M. Developers Karachi. In clause (10) the Defendant No. 1 covenanted that it will demolish the entire boundary wall at their own cost and expenses and by Clause-11, the agreement has been made irrevocable and binding upon the parties, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assignees.
The grievance of the plaintiff is that the obligation of obtaining approval of lay out plan of 685 units/bungalow, N.O.C. for sale of 218 units/bungalows was of the Defendant No. 1. It is also complained that the Defendant No. 1 failed to get demarcation of the boundary wall and internal development as per agreement that of laying carpeting of roads and separate approved plan of residential plots. On the perusal of the agreement as noted above, all the items on which grievance has been raised by the plaintiff were to be undertaken by the plaintiff itself and none by the Defendant No. 1. This is clear from reading of second recital and moreso by its sub-para, (b) and clause (3) of the agreement. Although heading of the agreement mentions it to be an Agreement to Sell but its reading shows that it is not so but is a complete conveyance of the land by the Defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff with giving of Irrevocable General Power Attorney for selling of the plots and recovery of sale proceeds and making of sub leases in favour of the prospective purchaser. To the extent what is read from the agreement itself and complaints made in the plaint, there seems to be no cause of action for filing of the suit by the plaintiff.
The other very interesting feature of the case is that though the agreement shows selling of 950 residential plots but their exact location is mentioned to be partly on survey Nos.108, 109 and 110 in Deh Safooran, Taluka & District East, Karachi. Where the remaining part of the land is situated, the agreement is altogether silent. Except for there being a covenant from the side of the Defendant No. 1 that it has a subsisting lease of the land, no particulars or details are given about purported lease as to from whom it is obtained, what is its date, its nature, right given under it and to what specific land it relates. The agreement and the plaint are altogether silent on this aspect of the matter. Where a document which in the present case is Agreement to Sell  purports  to have conveyed the land of 950 plots by these Defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff, it has to mention full particulars and details of the lease. Even copy of purported lease is not attached with the plaint nor is available on record which will lead to only inference that there is no existence of lease of the suit land.
Despite above failings patent on the record, the defendants Nos.3 & 5 who are respectively Mukhtiarkar, District Malir and Province of Sindh through Secretary Land Utilization have filed written statement, which is signed and verified by one Iqbal Ahmed son of Muhammad Umar without mentioning his designation and in para, (e) under the heading of preliminary objection it contains as follows:
"(e) That entries in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were kept on the basis of registered sale deed but so far no proof is filed to establish that the sellers and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 possessed any marketable title."
Now, what one can make out of what is purported to be pleaded in this paragraph of the written statement. In the first place it says that entries in favour of defendants Nos. 1 & 2 were kept on the basis of registered sale deed and in the second place it says that no proof is filed to establish that sellers and defendants Nos. 1 & 2 possessed any marketable title. These are totally destructive and inconsistent pleas, which are irreconcilable and seem to have been made only to facilitate wrong doing by defendants Nos.3 & 5. It has introduced facts which are altogether not pleaded in the plaint nor mentioned in the agreement itself. This appears to be totally dubious plea. The Secretary Land Utilization Department, Government of Sindh is directed to enquire into and file complaint against the said Iqbal Ahmed son of Muhammad Umar in the Anti Corruption Court and at the same time take disciplinary action and suspend him. A report of action taken be transmitted to MIT of this Court within a period of two months. A copy of this order be sent to Secretary Land Utilization Department, Government of Sindh for making compliance. A copy of this order be also transmitted to MIT for keeping track of the matter and in case its compliance is not made, he is directed to put up his reference to Court for taking of further action in there matter.
Resultantly, application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. is allowed. Plant is rejected and all other applications are disposed of.
(R.A.)      Order accordingly.

Friday, 19 February 2016

Local Commission after Preliminary Decree

PLJ 2012 Lahore 511
Present: Muhammad Khalid Mehmood Khan, J.
REHMAT ALI--Appellant
versus
Mst. RABIA BEGUM and 10 others--Respondents
R.S.A. No. 89 of 2000, heard on 28.4.2010.
Rendition of Account--
----Local commission was appointed in terms of preliminary decree--Objections against but withdrew--Blunt statement of counsel for accepting report of local commission--No objection against the final decree according to report of local commission be passed--Question of--Whether counsel was authorized to record statement--Fresh instructions for challenging the report were issued--Terms and conditions of Wakalat Nama--Validity--When local commissioner submitted the report, appellant must have consulted the same with counsel and appellant might be under his legal advise has decided to raise objections against report of local commission--Withdrawal of objection mean the appellant is taking liability of loss suffered after death of predeceased was admittedly for the period when respondents were conducting the business--Not given instructions to his counsel to withdraw the objections against report of local commissioner and the appellate Court has declined to interfere on the ground that there is no specific allegation of lack of authority on part of appellant against counsel--Withdrawal of objections is collusive malafide and without authority--Case was remanded to trial Court with direction to file an application challenging authority of statement of counsel in light of grounds of appeal.       [Pp. 515 & 516] A, C, D & F
Relationship of Counsel and Client--
----Recording of statement the counsel under instructions of appellant--Validity--Relationship of counsel and client is a privileged relationship and counsel is morally and legally bound to act on instructions of his or her client.    [P. 515] B
Non-existent Partnership--
----Partnership on day of death and suffered loss--Partnership on day of death become non-existent and trial Court come to conclusion that there was no partnership between the parties and dismissed suit to that extent--Validity--After finding of trial Court that no partnership exist between the parties, trial Court was bound to adjudicate issue of liability of loss recoverable from estate of deceased occurred after his death. [P. 516] E
1994 SCMR 1248, rel.
Mr. Tariq Masood, Advocate for Appellant.
Mian Abdul Hayee, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 28.4.2010.
Judgment
This second appeal has been preferred against judgment and decree passed by the learned Addl. District Judge Sialkot on 11.4.2000 and judgment and decree dated 11.2.1999 passed by learned Civil Judge Sialkot.
2.  Briefly stated the facts of the case are that on 2.7.1995, the appellant filed a suit for rendition of accounts claiming that he and his brother Muhammad Ali (since deceased) were doing business in partnership jointly of Iron Rods and T.R. Their share of profit and loss was equal. The investment of both the partners in the business was Rs. 5,00,000/-. His brother Muhammad Ali died on 9.4.1993 and after his death the Respondents No. 1 and 2 took over the charge of business. He further claimed that after the death of Muhammad Ali the Respondents No. 1 to 3 and appellant are his legal heirs. He adds that he is not responsible for the loss caused by the respondents after the death of Muhammad Ali. The Respondents No. 1 and 2 have refused to render the accounts and as such a decree of rendition of accounts be passed.
3.  The Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested the suit and the learned trial Court framed the following issues:--
"ISSUES.
1.         Whether the plaintiffs have got no cause of action and locus standi to file the present suit?OPD
2.         Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties?OPD
3.         Whether the Plaintiff No. 2 is not widow of Muhammad Ali as Muhammad Ali deceased has already divorced to Plaintiff No. 2 during his life time?OPD
4.         Whether the plaintiffs have estopped by their words and conduct to file the present suit?OPD
5.         Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected U/S. 7 Rule 11 CPC? OPD
6.         Whether the suit is false, frivolous and base less and the defendants are entitled to special costs U/S. 35-A CPC? OPD
7.         Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree of rendition of accounts as prayed for? OPP
8.         Relief.
4.  After recording evidence of both the parties the learned Civil Court passed preliminary decree on 10.5.1999 and appointed Rao Muhammad Pervaiz Advocate Sialkot as local commission with the direction to take possession of the books of accounts and submit detailed report about the assets, liability, profit and loss of the business. However, the suit to the extent of claim of partnership was dismissed. The preliminary decree dated 19.5.1997 was assailed through an appeal which was dismissed on 6.12.1997. The local commission submitted his report on 21.1.1998. The appellant filed objections to the report of local commission and finally on 7.2.1998 the learned counsel for the appellant recorded his statement and accepted the report of local commission. In terms of statement of learned counsel for the appellant dated 7.2.1998, the learned trial Court passed final decree vide judgment and decree dated 11.2.1999.
5.  The appellant assailed the judgment and decree through an appeal which was dismissed on 11.4.2000.
6.  Learned counsel for the appellants submits that their counsel was not authorized to withdraw the objections raised against the report of local commission. His authority was restricted to the extent that he has to prosecute the objections filed against the report of local commission, he was never authorized nor any instructions were passed on to him for the withdrawal of objections and as such the preliminary and final decrees dated 11.2.1999 and 11.4.2000 are against law and facts. He further submits that learned Courts below have wrongly accepted the report of local commission to the effect that after the death of Muhammad Ali Respondents No. 1 and 2 have illegally conducted the business and loss caused by these respondents cannot be charged against the estate of deceased.
7.  Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the local commission has submitted his report in terms of his reference. The withdrawal of the objections raised by the appellant by his counsel is binding on the appellant, the final decree was passed by the learned Courts bellow is perfectly in accordance with law, the case was adjourned six times after the withdrawal of objections against the report of local commission but the appellant never objected about the statement recorded on 7.12.1998. He submits that if the appellant is dis-satisfied that his counsel has not acted under his instructions, he has the right to sue his counsel and to recover damages if any. He relied onNoor Muhammad and others Vs. Muhammad Siddique and others (1994 SCMR 1248).
8.  Arguments heard. Record perused.
9.  It is a matter of record that Rao Muhammad Pervaiz Advocate was appointed a local commission in terms of preliminary decree dated 10.6.1997 passed by the learned Civil Court. The learned local commission submitted his report on 21.1.1998. Appellants raised objections there against but withdrew the same vide statement dated 17.12.1998, it is also a matter of record that after recording the statement of appellant's counsel the case continued to adjourn from 7.12.1998 to 11.2.1999 but the appellant has not objected the statement of his counsel. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent that counsel of appellant has recorded the statement under his instructions is concerned, the record shows that on the day when the counsel of the appellant made statement appellant was not present in Court. Learned counsel while recording his statement has not mentioned that he is recording the statement under instructions of appellant. On 7.12.1998 appellant learned counsel made the following statement:--
10.  Perusal of statement of learned counsel shows that it is no where mentioned that he is recording statement under the instructions of the appellant, rather, it is a blunt statement of learned counsel for the appellant, whereby he frankly conceded that he accepts the report of local commission dated 21.1.1998. He has no objection there against and the final decree according to the report of local commission be passed. The question arose whether the counsel for the appellant was authorized to record this statement or not? The appellant has executed power of attorney in favour of his counsel. A preliminary decree was passed and local commission was appointed, the local commission submitted his report,   the   counsel   for   the   appellant   filed   objections   under   the instructions of appellant as the appellants were not satisfied about the report of local commission. This means that appellant issued fresh instructions to his counsel for challenging the report and objections were filed and as such these objections were under the specific instructions of the appellant. If the counsel for the appellant wants to withdraw the objections, he was bound to obtain fresh instructions from the appellant, as this was not a routine matter covered under the terms and conditions of power of attorney (Wakalat Nama). When the local commission submitted the report, the appellant must have consulted the same with their counsel and the appellant may be under his legal advise has decided to raise objections against the report of local commission. The withdrawal of objection mean the appellant is taking a liability of loss suffered after the death of Muhammad Ali, which was admittedly for the period when Respondents No. 1 and 2 were conducting the business. The other possibility may be that parties were agreed to settle the dispute as is argued by learned counsel of the respondents. The statement recorded by the counsel for the appellant shows that appellant was not present in Court. Further while recording the statement the counsel of the appellant has not mentioned that he is recording the statement under the instructions of appellant. The relationship of counsel and client is a privileged relationship and the counsel is morally and legally bound to act on the instructions of his or her client. In this case the matter is otherwise. The appellant is claiming that he has not given instructions to his counsel to withdraw the objections against the report of local commission and the appellate Court has declined to interfere on the ground there is no specific allegation of lack of authority on the part of appellant against the counsel. The grounds of appeal before the first appellate Court shows that appellant has specifically alleged against his counsel that withdrawal of objections is collusive, malafide and without authority. As far as the objections of respondent that after recording the statement of their counsel the case remained pending upto 11.2.1999 but no objection was raised by the appellant is concerned, nothing is available on record showing that the statement of withdrawal was in the knowledge of the appellant. The allegation of appellants against his counsel required to be proved on record, it is factual controversy whether the appellant has passed on instructions to his counsel authorizing him to withdraw the objections, in these circumstances learned appellate Court was bound to probe the actual facts either himself or through learned trial Court.
11.  Other argument of learned counsel for the appellant is also convincing when he submits that even if for the sake of arguments if it is admitted that counsel for the appellant has withdrawn the objections against the report of local commission even then the Court was bound to pass a decree according to the report of local commission. The report of local commission shows that Respondents No. 1 and 2 were conducting the business after the death of Muhammad Ali and suffered loss, the learned trial Court was bound to give verdict that the said loss is payable by whom. The partnership on the day of death of Muhammad Ali become non-existent and the learned trial Court further itself come to the conclusion that there was no partnership between the parties and dismissed the suit to that extent. After the finding of learned trial Court that no partnership exist between the parties the learned trial Court was bound to adjudicate the issue of liability of loss recoverable from the estate of deceased occurred after his death. The learned Courts below have not examined this aspect of the case and passed the decree without deciding the controversy between the parties. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Noor Muhammad and others Vs. Muhammad Siddique and others (1994 SCMR 1248). The facts of this case are different from the present case. In this case the defendant made an offer to plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption that if plaintiff pays the amount mentioned in the sale deed, he has no objection for passing a decree. There was a dispute between the parties about the sale price, the plaintiff was claiming sale price Rs.27,420/- and the defendant was claiming Rs.38,125/- meaning thereby the defendant was gaining some thing out of his statement, but in the present case the appellant is losing every right and is accepting liability. So the facts of this judgment are distinguishable.
12.  As there was serious allegation of appellant against his counsel it was obligatory on the Court below to call reply of learned counsel for the appellant and to record his statement to confirm or deny the allegations of appellant, but the learned Courts below has not examined this legal aspect of the case.
13.  In view of above, I have no hesitation to hold that the allegations of appellant have not been redressed or attended to by the learned Courts below while deciding the appeal and suit. In view of the above, I hereby set aside the judgment and decree of the learned appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court and remand the case to the learned trial Court with the direction that he will frame the issue on their allegations against their counsel and will record the evidence of the parties and will decide the case on merits. The trial Court will allow the appellant to file an application challenging the authority of statement of their counsel in the light of the grounds of appeal and will call reply from the respondent. This is an old case, the learned trial Court will decide the suit within six months from the date of receipt of this order.
(R.A.)  Case remanded

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