Showing posts with label Best Attorney Islamabad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Best Attorney Islamabad. Show all posts

Thursday, 29 August 2024

Power of Attorney from Pakistan to be used in Saudi Arabia

  Sometimes it happens that a Pakistani National who has spent some time of his life in Saudia Arabia cannot go back to Saudi Arabia for some genuine reasons. Such a person can resolve his outstanding matters in Saudi Arabia by appointing any person in Saudi Arabia as his attorney. 

The procedure of preparing this power of attorney is little complicated. It has to be drafted in two languages i.e. English and Arabic. Ideally it should be drafted by a Pakistani lawyer in English and translated by a translation house dealing in embassy matters. Such power of attorney should contain authentic information related with the court case, CNIC details of the persons giving and obtaining power of attorney, passport details of both persons and so on. Generally a lawyer charges 100 USD (approximately 350 SAR) for drafting and translation services.

Once the document is ready, it should be attested by the Notary Public in Pakistan. Further the person giving power of attorney should visit Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for its attestation. The charges for attestation of such power of attorney are USD $150 (approximately 525 SAR) It needs further attestation from Saudi Embassy in Pakistan which costs around 200 SAR. Finally that document will be sent to the person in Saudi Arabia which can use it before the proper forum or court of law where required.

For queries you can consult lawyergolra@gmail.com

Regards,

Salman Yousaf Khan (Golra)

International Lawyer

+923335339880

Monday, 16 November 2020

Re-Examination after Final Arguments

 PLJ 1998 Karachi 328

Present: DR. GHOUS MUHAMMAD, J.

NAZIR HUSSAIN-Appellant

versus

ABDUL MANAN--Respondent

Revision Application No. 201 of 1996, dismissed in limine on 4.9.1997.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)-

—S. 115 read with O, XVIII, R. 17 & S. 151 -Suit for specific performance of contract at final stage-Application for further cross-examination allowed by trial Court while matter was pending for final arguments-Challengeto-Whether after closing their respective side by parties, can witness be recalled for further cross-examination and if so under whatcircumstances-Question of-Even in absence of any express provision atany state of trial or proceedings either on its own motion or upon requestof either party may call and recall witnesses for purpose of re-examination or cross examination if dictates of justice and equity sodemand—This can be done in exceptional and special circumstances-­Central idea being that court has to make endeavours to discover truth-­Such powers have been vested in courts under Order XVIII, Rule 17C.P.C.-Courts can press into service section 151 C.P.C. if such requestsare made at instance of parties-Held: Trial Court having jurisdiction inmatter has not committed any illegality or material irregularity bypassing impugned order-Petition having no merits, is accordinglydismissed, ~        [Pp. 330 & 331] A & B

Mr. Muhammad All, Jan, Advocate for Petitioner. Mr. Usman Ghani. Rasfiid, Advocate for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4.9.1997.

ORDER

This order will dispose of revision under section 115 C.P.C. The applicant has challenged the u.'d,: •: J.atocl 15.4.1996 passed by the learned Ill-Senior Civil Judge, Karachi West, in Civil Suit No. 904/1985 (Old No. 1711/1983.) whereby application under section 151 C.P.C., fded by the respondent for further cross-examination of the plaintiff was allowedBriefly stated the background of the matter is that the applicant filed suit for specific performance against late Abdul Man nan whose L.Rs. are now contesting the case as respondent/defendants. The prayer clause in the plaint reads as under:-

(a) decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 25.2.1981 directing the defendant, to execute and sign the documents of transfer of an area of 200 sq. yds. out of plot bearing No. M-2-612 (0-694) Block 'IT Shershah Colony, Karachi.

b) to execute and sign all the documents to effect mutation in regard to the Excise & Taxation Department and in the record of other authorities which may be declared competent by the concerned authorities to maintain the record of right of the said proper   Cost, of the suit

(d) Any other further and better relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of case."


The parties led their evidence and while the matter was pending for final arguments application was submitted by the respondents under section 151 C.P.C., for recalling the applicant/plaintiff for further cross-examination. In the supporting affidavit it was stated that the learned counsel for respondent was busy before this court therefore the defendant/respondent Abdul Maunau Pasha himself cross-examined the applicant but after looking into the cet, fied copies of the statement it transpired that material cross-examination could not be done due to serious illness and engagement of the learned counsel for the defendant. The applicant filed his counter affidavit and opposed the application on the plea that he was cross-examined at great length on 27.11.1995. Ultimately the learned trial court allowed that application vide the impugned order.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record.

Learned counsel for the applicant contended that, the impugned order is illegal, prejudicial and liable to be set, aside. He further submitted that the learned trial court ought to have considered that there is no provision of law whereby the respondents may be entitled to recall the witnesses for further cross-examination once the side stood closed after effecting cross-examination at length. Lastly he submitted that the learned lower court also failed to appreciate that the application for further cross-examination had been filed only to fill up the lacuna to which the respondents are not entitled under the law. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned order and submitted that the said order is just and proper.

The question which require consideration is whether after closing of their respective sides by the parties, can a witness be recalled for further cross-examination and if so under what circumstances?

In my considered opinion even in absence of any express provision the court may at any stage of trial or proceedings either at its own instance or that, of a patty recall a witness for further examination or cross-examination in the interest of justice though the party may have closed its side. This can be done in exceptional and special circumstances where the interest of justice so demand. (See Phipson on Evidence, 14th Edition page 215). The wisdom expressed by Phipson is squarely extendable to the present case. The court, either on its own motion or upon the request of either party may call and recall witnesses for the purposes of re-examination or cross-examination if the dictates of justice and equity so demand. The central idea being that the court has to make endeavours to discover the truth. Such powers have been vested in the courts under Order XVIII rule 17 CPC.The courts can press into service section 151 C.P.C. if such requests are made at the instance of the parties.

Following the above principle in the facts and circumstances of the case in my humble view the learned trial court, having jurisdiction in the matter has not committed any illegality or material irregularity by passing the impugned order. Accordingly, this revision having 110 merits is dismissed in limine alongwith M.A. No. 917/96.

(K.K.F.)                                                                        Dismissed in limine.

 

Thursday, 11 October 2018

Prior Notice before dispossessing a party


PLJ 2006 Lahore 442 (DB)


[Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi]
Present: Muhammad Akhtar Shabbir and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ.
S.M. ISMAIL--Appellant
versus
CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ISLAMABAD & 5 others--Respondents
I.C.A. No. 161 of 2004, heard on 28.6.2005.
(i)  Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Maintainability of--Respondent proceeded against appellant and dispossessed him from the site in dispute in violation of mandatory provisions of requiring prior notice--Held: Writ petition before High Court is competent. [P. 449] E
(ii)  Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Jurisdiction--Public functionaries deriving authority from or under law, are obliged to act justly, fairly, equitably, reasonably, without any element of discrimination and squarely within parameters of law, as applicable in a given situation--Held : Deviations, if of substance, can be corrected through appropriate orders under Art. 199 of Constitution.      [P. 451] H
(iii)  Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, (IV of 2001), Ss. 2(J)(i) & 17--Intra Court appeal--Capital Development Authority leased out plots to C.D.A. Staff Welfare Organization for setting Petrol Pump for thirty years in first instance and renewable for two subsequent terms of thirty years each--Staff Welfare Organization leased one plot to appellant for thirty years on 11.10.1973--Installation of petrol pump and C.N.G. Station by appellant--Application for renewal by applicant--Extention of lease for five years subject to payment of Rs. one lac per month--Appellant did not decline offer and requested extension for 30 years--Dispossession of appellant and sealing of premises--Constitutional petition of appellant disposed of--Validity--Action of dispossession of appellant by Staff Welfare Committee was without any lawful authority--Appellant has been dispossessed illegally, therefore, he is entitled for restoration of the possession--Rule of equity, good conscious and fairplay necessitates that period of lease of appellant be extended for further thirty years as same benefit has been availed by respondent for itself but they are relevant to extend such concession to appellant--Rejection of offer of appellant for extension of lease for 30 years is not only malicious act but this also shows the arrogant attitude of respondents--Intra Court appeal accepted, impugned order set aside and respondents directed to extent lease for thirty years.  [Pp. 448, 451, 452 & 453] C, I, J & K
(iv)  Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (IV of 2001)--
----Ss. 2 (j)(i) & 17--Dispossessed after expiry of lease period--Relationship of land lord and tenant between the parties and Rent Controller at Islamabad has jurisdiction--Contention of--It was a lease agreement originally executed between the parties and relationship between them is a lessor and lesse--Held: Contention is misconceived and cannot be accepted--Since it was a tenancy and did not cover under Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001.     [P. 449] D
(v)  Jurisdiction--
----Exercise of--Routine contractual disputes between private and public functionaries are not open to scrutiny under Constitutional jurisdiction--Breaches of such contracts which do not entail inquiry into or examination of minute or controversial questions of fact, if committed by Government, semi-Government or local Authorities or alike controversies if involving derelictions of obligation, flowing from a statute, rules or instructions can adequately be addressed to for relief under Constitutional jurisdiction.         [P. 450] F
(vi)  Obiter dicta--
----Contract carrying elements of public interest, concluded by functionaries of the State, has to be just, fair, transparent, reasonable and free of any taint of malafidies, and such aspects remaining open for judicial review.      [Pp. 450 & 451] G
(vii)  Possession--
----Status of--After expiration of the term fixed, lessee continuing in possession, will in absence of assent by the lessor or his representative in interest, only be a tenant by sufference--He can be sued in ejectment any time without any previous notice or demand of possession.                [P. 448] B
AIR 1919 Oudh 124; AIR 1929 Pat. 494; AIR 1919 Patna 254; AIR 1981 Raj. 206; AIR 1927 Bombay 192; AIR 1940 Lah. 410.
(viii)  Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882)--
----Ss. 106 & 116--Expiry of lease period of appellant--Continuing his possession over the site in dispute--Status of holding over possession falls within ambit of Section 116--Held: Provisions of Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to Islamabad Capital Territory, principle of Ss. 106 & 116 can be invoked as these provisions are not to be regarded being opposed by principle of equity and good conscious.        [P. 448] A
1988 SCMR 2268.
Mr. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman Kiani, Advocate for Appellant.
Malik Muhammad Nawaz & Mrs. Misbah Sharif, Advocates for Respondents.
Date of hearing : 28.6.2005.
Judgment
Muhammad Akhtar Shabbir, J.--This Intra Court Appeal arises out of the judgment dated 30.6.2004 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in Chamber in a Writ Petition No. 346/2004 vide which, the learned Judge referred the case of the appellant to the Staff Welfare Committee of the C.D.A. to decide the fate of the lease of the appellant afresh.
2.  Facts leading to the filing of the present I.C.A. are to the effect that the appellant entered into a lease agreement in respect of a plot measuring 90 x 150 feet, Embassy Road, G-6/4, Islamabad. The lease agreement had been reduced into writing and the period of lease agreed between the parties was 30 years w.e.f. 1.1.1973. That vide letter dated 15.1.2002, the C.D.A. (S.W.A.) had agreed to renew the lease period of the site Petrol-pump for a further period of 5 years subject to payment of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month with immediate effect without waiting for expiry of current lease agreement and sought the consent of the appellant. The appellant was also required to hand over the possession of the site in question forthwith. The plot/site in dispute had been reserved for installation of a patrol-pump after the lease agreement. The appellant installed a patrol-pump at his own cost and thereafter installed a C.N.G. Filling Station with the approval of the respondents. That in response to the offer of the respondents, the appellant through letter dated 21.1.2002 consented to the extension of the lease agreement but nor for a period of 5 years as per term of 30 years with an increase of 15 times in the initial rent i.e. Rs. 1,000/- per month. The offer of the appellant had not been responded to by the C.D.A./respondent. However, vide letter dated 27.12.2002, the vacation of the site was demanded by the C.D.A. from the appellant till 31.12.2003.
3.  The appellant feeling aggrieved of this letter had instituted a civil suit for perpetual injunction seeking protection of his possession on the site in the Court of Civil Judge, Islamabad. The respondent entered appearance in response to the process issued by the Civil Judge and made a statement in the trial Court to the effect that the appellant shall not be dispossessed except in due process of law. On undertaking of the learned counsel for the respondent, the suit was accordingly disposed of.
4.  The appellant had also filed an application under Section 29(c) read with other provisions of Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 for the determination of fair rent of the site in question before the learned Rent Controller, Islamabad on 20.1.2003. The respondents entered appearance filed written reply to the application of the petitioner and the learned Rent Controller vide his order dated 27.3.2003 fixed Rs. 20,000/- as tentative rent of the site in question and settled issue.
5.  That vide letter dated 10.4.2003 issued by the respondents, the appellant had been intimated that a meeting was scheduled to be held on 12.4.2003 to discuss the matter of renewal of leases of the Petrol-pumps including the Petrol-pump of the appellant. In response thereto, the appellant gave consent to attend the meeting. On 7.2.2004, a notice was again issued by the Respondent No. 2 requiring the appellant to vacate the premises within 24 hours otherwise dispossession of the appellant from the site in question was threatened forcefully. The appellant sent reply to the said notice but through an illegal and arbitrary process on 8.2.2004, the respondents forcefully dispossessed the appellant from the site in question and sealed the premises including assets valuing of Rs. 30 million. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant instituted Writ Petition No. 346 of 2004 in the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi and the Hon'ble Judge in Chamber vide order/observation dated 30.6.2004 disposed of the writ petition with the direction contained in Para Nos. 42 to 44 of the judgment.
6.  The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was initially granted lease of the plot by the respondent for the terms of 30 years w.e.f. 1.1.1973. The said plot was leased out to the appellant for installation of petrol-pump. The appellant installed Petrol-pumps well as the C.N.G. Filling Station at his own expenses and remained in possession till the time, but he has been forcefully dispossessed by the respondents. Further contended that the appellant in view of provisions of Section 2 (J)(i) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance was still a tenant and was not liable to be evicted from the site premises in his possession except in due process of law which has been prescribed in Section 17(1) of the said Ordinance and that the legal status of the appellant was that of a tenant with regard to site in dispute. Further contended the appellant had been dispossessed in violation of existing law. Further contended that despite the statement made by the counsel for the respondent before the Civil Judge, the appellant was forcefully dispossessed from the site in dispute and the statement given by the learned counsel for the C.D.A was binding upon it. The act of respondents dispossessing the appellant was illegal and without lawful authority. Further contended that the controversy for determination of the rent of the disputed site was subjudice before the Rent Controller Islamabad, who has directed the appellant to deposit the tentative rent of Rs. 20,000/- per month. Further contended that the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to the Islamabad Territory. And there was only one legal remedy available to the appellant before the Rent Controller. Further that the contract of lease was executed inter se between the appellant and the Staff Welfare Committee. Further contended that the relationship between the appellant and respondent was that of tenant and landlord which is governed under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance and the remedy against his dispossession though a Constitutional petition in the High Court was competent. In this context, he has placed reliance on the case of Abdul Haq and 2 others vs. The Resident Magistrate, UCH Sharif, Tehsil Ahmadpur East, Bahawalpur (P.L.D. 2000 Lahore 101). Further contended that the High Court is competent to restore the illegal possession of the appellant through a writ jurisdiction. In this context, he has placed reliance on the cases of Sikandar and 2 others vs. Muhammad Ayub and 5 others (P.L.D. 1991 S.C. 1041) and Muhammad Aslam vs. Station House Officer and others (1993 M.L.D. 152). Learned counsel further contended that the action of the respondents of forceful dispossess of the appellant is illegal, without lawful authority, based upon mala-fide and liable to be set-aside.
7.  On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents Malik Muhammad Nawaz & Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocates vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner contending that after the expiry of period of 30 years of lease of the appellant, an offer was made to him by respondents for extension of further time for five years for demanding Rs. 1,00,000/- as lease money per month. The said offer had not been accepted by the appellant, who has claimed the extension of lease for 30 years on the basis of Rs. 1,000/-, the original consideration of lease. Further contended that the matter was put up before the C.D.A. authorities and the offer made by the appellant was declined by the Authorities. Further contended that the appellant neither deposited the rent nor any further agreement of lease has been executed, therefore, after expiry of lease period, he was liable to be ejected forthwith. Further contended that required notice was issued to the appellant either to accept the offer of the respondent or vacate the premises. Further contended that the appellant is a lessee under the lessor/respondent and not a tenant and no relationship of landlord and tenant exist between the parties. Further contended that the case of the appellant is not covered within the provisions of Section 2(J)(i) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance. Further contended that the notification was required to be issued in accordance with law declaring the area to be covered by the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, which had not been issued at the time of institution of the rent petition of the appellant. Further contended that lease period could be extended with the mutual consent of the parties. Further contended that under the direction of this Court, the Staff Welfare Committee considered the case of the appellant and declined to accept his offer for extension of his lease at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month for further 30 years. Learned counsel further contended that the provision of Section 106 of T.P. Act can be followed as principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Under this provision notice was issued to the appellant and compliance of law has been made. In this context, he has placed reliance to the case of Barkat Ullah Khan vs. Abdul Hamid (1981 S.C.M.R. 1200).
8.  We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9.  It is an admitted position that in the year 1973, two plots measuring 90 x 150 fee (1500 sq. yards) located at Embassy Road, Sector
G-6/4, Islamabad, were allotted to the CDA Staff Welfare Organization vide letter dated 9.10.1973 for setting up Petrol-pump. The period of lease was thirty years in the first instance, which was renewable for two subsequent terms of thirty, years each on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Authority. The annual ground rent was liable to be enhanced by 20% per month on expiry of first term of thirty years and then 40% for the next term. The Staff Welfare Organization further leased out one of the plots to the appellant for a period of thirty years at the rate of
Rs. 1,000/- as rent per month for fifteen years and after fifteen years increase in the rent would be subject to the ceiling of 20% per month. Consequently, a lease agreement dated 11.10.1973 was executed between the appellant and the Staff Welfare Committee.
10.  After obtaining the lease, the appellant installed a Petrol-pump at the site and continued payment of rent to the respondent Staff Welfare Committee as per terms and conditions of the agreement. Before the expiry of the lease period, the appellant applied to the respondent for renewal of rent agreement of the Petrol-pump and in response to the letter dated 18.5.2001, the respondent through letter dated 15.1.2002 informed the appellant for extension of lease period only for five years subject to payment of Rupees one lac per month as rent. The appellant had applied to the respondent before the expiry of the term of lease period i.e. 31.12.2002 meaning thereby that the appellant proposed to get extended further period of lease. The appellant did not decline the offer of the respondent Staff Welfare Committee and requested for extension of the period of lease for further thirty years. A meeting of the Staff Welfare Committee had been convened to discuss the matter regarding renewal of the rental agreement of the Petrol-pump site. In the meeting, it was decided that the negotiation with the lessees for new lease at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month may be carried out by the Chairman (SWC) and in the light of those negotiations Secretary (SWC) may bring a revised summary in the Board for consideration. In case no settlement is reached then the lease may be cancelled.
11.  In the present case, now the question to be determined between the parties was the period of lease and the amount of rent/lease money per month. There was correspondence between the parties and no specific denial or refusal by the appellant is established on the record for extension of the lease period. After the expiry of the lease period, the appellant continuing his possession over the site in dispute and his status of holding over possession clearly falls within the ambit of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Though the provisions of Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to Islamabad Capital Territory, but the principle of Sections 106 and 116 can be invoked as the provisions of Section 106 are not to be regarded being opposed by the principle of equity and good conscious. This proposition was discussed by the Hon'ble Judges in the case Messrs Airport Support Services vs. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam InternationalAirportKarachi and others (1998 SCMR 2268). After the expiration of the term fixed, the lessee continuing in possession, will, in the absence of an assent by the lessor or his representative in interest, only be a tenant by sufferance. He can be sued in ejectment at any time without any previous notice or demand of possession, as laid down in AIR 1919 Oudh 124, Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo and another vs. Jagannath Mahto and others (AIR 1929 Pat. 444), E.W.C. Moore and another vs. Makhan Singh (AIR 1919 Patna 254), AIR 1981 Raj 206, Maganlal Dulabhdas vs. Bhudar Purshottam and others (AIR 1927 Bombay 192), and Banwari Lal vs. Mt. Hussaini and another (AIR 1940 Lahore 410).
12.  The plot has been allotted on lease for about ninety years to the respondent/Staff Welfare Committee, which is an Organization of the employees of CDA, therefore, they being a private party could not proceed against the appellant except in due process of law. The Staff Welfare Committee has no authority or power and their action of dispossession of the appellant from the plot in dispute was without any lawful authority. After allotment of plot on the basis of lease agreement, the CDA Authorities, during the period of lease, have become functus officio and they have also no power to authority to act against the appellant without due process of law. Thus, the action of the respondents, either by the CDA or by the Staff Welfare Committee regarding dispossession of the appellant from the site in dispute was illegal, without lawful authority and based upon mala fide.
13.  The appellant has though requested for extension of the lease period for further thirty years and also wanted that the rent may be fixed at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month for fifteen years and thereafter 20% increase for further fifteen years. But the request of the appellant for extension of lease period for thirty years at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month was declined and vide notice dated 7.2.2004, the respondents issued a notice to the appellant to hand over the possession of the site within 24-hours.
In all the above said circumstances, the appellant was only liable to be dispossessed through a suit for possession and not illegally or forcibly, as has been done by the respondents in the case of the appellant.
14.  The most important feature of the case is that the CDA had leased out two plots to CDA Staff Welfare Committee for establishing Petrol-pumps. The Organization instead of establishing the Petrol-pump itself has further leased out the said plots to another party including the present appellant. It is an admitted fact that the CDA has allotted the plots to the Staff Welfare Organization for a period of thirty years in the first instance, which was renewable for two subsequent terms of thirty years each with increase of 20% and 4-% increase after every fifteen years on such terms and conditions as has been prescribed by the Authority.
In the instant case, before expiry of contract of lease, the appellant has requested the Staff Welfare Committee to extend the lease period and this offer was accepted by the Staff Welfare Committee and offered the extension for a period of further five years at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month as rent but the appellant did not decline this offer. The appellant only requested for extension of lease for further thirty years at the same rate.
15.  After obtaining the lease of the site in dispute, the appellant has installed a Petrol-pump and CNG Station from their own expenses and spent a colossal amount of rupees 3-4 Crors, as such the offer by the respondents regarding extension of lease only for five years was not based upon bona fide; rather it was with malicious intention. Since the appellant was under the impression that the Staff Welfare Committee/respondent is the lessee of the plots for ninety years, therefore, the respondent will also treat the appellant with the same terms and conditions and his lease would be extended for further thirty years.
16.  Admitted, that it was a lease agreement originally executed between the parties and the relationship between them is a lessor and lessee. As to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the learned Rented Controller at Islamabad has the jurisdiction to determine the fair rent, as Rent Restriction Ordinance has been enforced in Islamabad Capital Territory being misconceived cannot be accepted. Since it was not a tenancy and did not cover under Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, certainly it was a lease agreement and the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that to constitute the agreement, necessary requirement would be unconditional and acceptance thereof by the competent person/authority. In the present case, the offer was not categorically refused or declined by the appellant, therefore, a right has accrued to the appellant to approach this Court for enforcement of legal right.
17.  In the present case, the Staff Welfare Committee/respondent under the shed of the CDA has proceeded against the appellant and dispossessed him from the site in dispute and in such circumstances if in violation of the mandatory provisions of the requiring prior notice the appellant has been dispossessed, the writ petition before the High Court is competent, as laid down in the case, referred to above, wherein the rule is founded on the premises that the public functionaries, deriving authority from or under law, are obligated to act justly fairly, equitably, reasonably, without any element of discrimination and squarely within the parameters of law, and deviations, if of substance, can be corrected through appropriate orders under Article 199 of the Constitution. In another case Suleiman Khan & Co. vs. Pakistan Railways through General Manager, Railways Headquarters & 2 others (2003 SCL 331) it has been observed that the fee of leased property was enhanced and the High Court set aside the order of the Authority and remanded the case for decision afresh in accordance with law.
18.  The learned Single Judge of this Court while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 346 of 2004 filed by the appellant has observed that the question with respect to the renewal of lease has now independently be decided by the Staff Welfare Committee as the offer of the respondents with regard to the rate of rent of rupees one lac has been admitted by the appellant, therefore, their one condition has been accepted. The respondents have already offered the extension of lease for a period of five years, which is not declined by the appellant, but his request is for extension of lease period for thirty years, as he has spent a huge amount, therefore, keeping in view the expenses incurred by the appellant on the installation of Petrol-pump and CNG Station at the site in dispute, he is fully entitled for extension of further longer period of 30-years.
19.  Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has accepted the lease when nobody was willing to install a Petrol-pump on the said place because at that time, Islamabad City was not thickly populated and its roads were not so busy and the rush of traffic was not like the present one. However, after the arguments of the case, while dictating the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant has entered appearance in our Chamber and made a statement that his client/appellant is willing to accept the offer of the respondents for extension of the lease for a consideration/rent of Rupees one lac per month. In this respect, one condition of the respondent has been accepted by the appellant and his other demand is that the lease period be extended for further fifteen or thirty years. The appellant is a licensee of the Oil Company who supplies petrol to the appellant's Petrol Pump. The appellant has also installed CNG Station. As it is the requirement of the Oil Company marketing for long term lease rights at least for fifteen years, extendable for further fifteen years' term, the renewal period should also not be less than thirty years.
20.  So far as the objection of the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable, suffice it to say that routine contractual disputes between the private parties and public functionaries are not open to scrutiny under the Constitutional jurisdiction, breaches of such contracts, which do not entail inquiry into or examination of minute or controversial questions of fact, if committed by the Government, semi-Government or Local Authorities or alike controversies if involving derelictions of obligations, flowing from a statute, rules or instructions can adequately be addressed to for relief under the Constitutional jurisdiction. Further a contract, carrying elements of public interest, concluded by functionaries of the State, has to be just, fair, transparent, reasonable and free  of  any  taint  of  mala  fides, all such aspects remaining open for judicial review. The rule is founded on the premises that public functionaries, deriving authority from or under law, are obligated to act justly, fairly equitably, deriving authority from or under law, are obligated to act justly, fairly equitably, reasonably, without any element of discrimination and squarely within the parameters of law, as applicable in a given situation. Deviations, if of substance, can be corrected through appropriate orders under Article 199 of the Constitution.
21.  the appellant has been dispossessed by the C.D.A. authority which is a statutory body and the dispossession has been made by them without performing requirement of law and it has been held in the case Messrs Airport Support Services Vs. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others (1998 SCMR 2268) that the question before the High Court in Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was not one of enforcement of contractual obligations but of violation of mandatory provisions of the requiring prior notice as envisaged in Section 3, Central Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965, writ petition was maintainable.
22.  In another case, M/s. Wak Orient Power & Light Limited Gulberg-III Lahore vs. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of water and Power through its Secretary Islamabad & 2 others (PLJ 1998 Lahore 665 (FB) it has been observed by the Full Bench of the High Court that trend of authorities has now changed and remedy of writ is permitted to be resorted to in cases involving contract between private person and state/statutory functionary as it is considered to be more efficacious and speedy remedy as compared to civil suit or arbitration proceedings. The lessees/tenants have enforceable rights against their landlords/lessors to protect their tenancy rights through Courts and it is settled proposition that if a person is dispossessed forcibly, he has a legal right for restoration of his possession on the basis of the protective legislation vis-a-vis by filing a suit for possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. This argument is strengthened by the dictum laid down in Sikandar and 2 others vs. Muhammad Ayub and 5 others (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 1041) and Muhammad Aslam vs. Station House Officer and others (1993 MLD 152) wherein the writ petitioner had challenged the action of the police functionaries whose duty is to protect the citizens against all kinds of excesses from any corner, but instead of performing their duty strictly within the four corners of law, the guardians of law themselves sided with the law-breakers and acting in a  most indecent haste had deprived the petitioner of his possession of the Petrol-pump in spite of existence of status quo order issued by the Civil Court. The police functionaries were overzealous in completing the illegal mission. The whole action of police functionaries in depriving the petitioner of his possession of filling station was consequently declared as illegal having got no sanction of law and the petitioner was directed to be put back in possession forthwith by the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. The same is the case  of  the  present  petitioner,  who  has  been  dispossessed  illegally  and forcibly by the CDA Staff Welfare Association without due process of law, therefore, the appellant is entitled for restoration of the possession.
23.  So far as the consideration/price of the lease per month at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has made a statement that the appellant has authorized him to accept the offer of the respondents in respect of the lease at the rate Rs. 1,00,000/- per month, meaning thereby that the condition imposed by the respondents offering the appellant to accept the extension of lease for further period at the rate of rupees one lac having been accepted.
24.  Now the question remains in respect of the period of lease. Admittedly, the respondents have themselves offered the extension for a period of five years and the appellant wanted extension in period for thirty years. The appellant has spent colossal amount at the site in dispute for installation of Petrol-pump and the CNG Station and if the lease period is not extended, the appellant's family would be financially ruined and doomed. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the rule of equity, good conscious and fair play necessitate that the period of lease of the appellant be extended for further thirty years as the same benefit has been availed by the respondent/Staff Welfare Committee for itself but they are reluctant to extend this concession to the appellant. The Staff Welfare Organization having it upper hand as lessor should consider the difficulties and hardship of the other party/appellant.
25.  the offer letter issued by the Staff Welfare Organization for extension of the lease of the appellant for further five years has not been declined by him rather a request was made for extension of lease for a longer period. The offer for extension of lease period is impliedly accepted by the appellant and his learned counsel while entering appearance in our Chamber has made a statement whereby he accepted the payment of lease consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac) per month. It means that the appellant is ready and willing to fulfill his obligation but so far as the decision of the Staff Welfare Committee rejecting the offer of the appellant for extension of lease for further period of thirty years is concerned, it is not only their malicious act but this also shows the arrogant attitude of the respondents. When the leased plot has been allotted by the C.D.A. to the Staff Welfare Committee for ninety years by two subsequent terms of thirty years each why the respondent/CDA (SWA) is not giving the same benefit to the appellant who has also accepted its demand regarding the rate of rent of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month.
26.  In view of the above discussion and keeping in view the principle of equity, good conscious as well as fairness and also in order to save the appellant's family from financial ruinous, we are constrained to accept this Intra Court Appeal and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in Chamber is set aside and the respondents are directed to extend the  lease  in  favour  of the appellant for further period of thirty years in two consecutive terms of fifteen years each at the rate of rupees on lac per month with increase of 20% rent after fifteen years. There is no order as to costs.
 (M.A.R.)         Appeal accepted.



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Execution of Lease Agreement - Inquiry by Rent Controller

PLJ 2018 Islamabad 276
PresentMiangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J.
M/s. PANTHER DEVELOPERS--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE (ADJ), WEST, ISLAMABAD and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 977 of 2018, decided on 10.4.2018.
Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (IV of 2001)--
----S. 17(9)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Execution of lease agreement--Default in payment of rent--Violation of terms and Conditions--Eviction Petition--Dismissed for non prosecution--Application for restoration--Allowed--Tentative order--Struck off right of defence--Eviction Petition allowed--Appeal was dismissed--Determination--Direction to--It is well settled that when a suit is dismissed for non-prosecution, and an application for restoration is filed, Court/Tribunal can, while said application is pending, pass interim orders--It is also well settled that when an application for restoration of suit is allowed, all interim orders passed prior to dismissal of suit for non-prosecution, stand revived--Whether or not petitioner tendered advance rent for one year in accordance with terms and conditions of lease agreement between petitioner and Respondent No. 3 is to be determined during an inquiry by learned Rent Controller--Learned Rent Controller is also to decide whether petitioner committed a breach of terms and conditions of lease agreement--Petition allowed. [Pp. 282, 283 & 284] A, B, C & D
Muhammad Usman Khan and another vs. Miraj Din and another
PLD 1978 LHR, 790, ref.
Sardar Arshad Mahmood Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.
Syed Asghar Hussain Sabzwari, and Syed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocates for Respondent No. 3.
Date of hearing: 2.4.2018.
Judgment
Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner, M/s. Panther Developers, impugns the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2018, passed by the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad, whereby the petitioner’s appeal against the order dated 18.12.2017, passed by the Court of the learned Rent Controller, Islamabad, was dismissed. Vide the said order dated 18.12.2017, the learned Rent Controller struck off the petitioner’s right of defence under Section 17(9) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (“I.R.R.O.”), and accepted Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition. Furthermore, the petitioner was directed to forthwith handover vacant possession of the rented premises (i.e., Half Basement, 1-E, Ali Plaza, Jinnah Avenue, Blue Area, Islamabad) to Respondent No. 3.
2.  The record shows that on 12.03.2014, a lease agreement was executed between the petitioner (tenant) and Respondent No. 3 (landlord), whereby the rented premises were leased for a period of five years (from 01.04.2014 to 31.03.2019). On 24.04.2017, Respondent No. 3 filed an eviction petition against the petitioner under Section 17 of the I.R.R.O. The grounds taken in the said eviction petition were; (i) default in the payment of rent and (ii) violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement on the petitioner’s part. The petitioner contested the said eviction petition by filing a written reply. In the said reply, it was pleaded inter-alia that Respondent No. 3 had refused to accept the rent from the petitioner, and that the lease agreement was valid until 31.03.2019.
3.  On 31.05.2017, the learned Rent Controller passed a tentative rent order fixing Rs.1,15,762/- per month as the tentative rent, and directed the petitioner to deposit the monthly rent from April 2017 in the Court. Furthermore, the petitioner was directed to deposit the future monthly rent at the said rate “in advance before 15th of each month till final conclusion of the petition.” This order was passed by the learned Rent Controller under Section 17(8) of the I.R.R.O., which is reproduced herein below:--
“17(8)In proceedings under this section on the first date of hearing, or as soon thereafter as may be but before the issues are framed, the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit in his office before a specified date all the rent due from him and also to deposit regularly, till the final decision of the case before the fifteenth day of each month, the monthly rent which subsequently becomes due, and if there be any dispute as to the amount of rent due, the Controller shall determine such amount approximately.”
4.  On 04.07.2017, the said eviction petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. Until the dismissal of the eviction petition, the petitioner had deposited rent in accordance with the tentative rent order. On 08.07.2017, Respondent No. 3 filed an application for the restoration of the eviction petition. The petitioner claims to have got knowledge of the said application on 27.07.2017. Even though the eviction petition has not been restored, the petitioner deposited the tentative rent on 28.07.2017. On 21.09.2017, the learned Rent Controller restored Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition.
5.  Vide order dated 18.12.2017, the learned Rent Controller struck off the petitioner’s defence by invoking the provisions of Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O. Furthermore, the said eviction petition was allowed, and the petitioner was directed to forthwith hand over vacant possession of the rented premises to Respondent No. 3. Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O., is reproduced herein below:--
“17(9) If the tenant fails to deposit the amount of rent before the specified date or, as the case may be, before the fifteenth day of the month, his application if he is an applicant shall be dismissed or his defense, if he is a respondent, shall be struck off, and the landlord shall be put in possession of the building without any further proceedings.”
6.  The petitioner’s appeal against the said order dated 18.12.2017 was dismissed by the learned appellate Court, vide judgment dated 10.03.2018. The said concurrent orders/judgments passed by the learned Courts below have been impugned by the petitioner in the instant writ petition.
7.  Learned counsel for the petitioner, after narrating the facts leading to the filing of the instant writ petition, submitted that as per the terms of the lease agreement between the petitioner and Respondent No. 3, the former had until 10.04.2017 to pay yearly advance rent to the latter; that in discharge of the said obligation, the petitioner sent Cheque No. 43697199, dated 04.04.2017 for an amount of Rs. 1,380,000/- to Respondent No. 3, which he refused to accept; that the grounds taken by Respondent No. 3 in his eviction petition were frivolous; that the petitioner had not committed any default in the payment of rent; that the petitioner had shown compliance with the tentative rent order by depositing the rent in Court; that the petitioner could not have been expected to deposit the tentative rent after the eviction petition had been dismissed for non-prosecution; that a day after the petitioner came to know about the filing of the application for the restoration of the eviction petition, the tentative rent was deposited in the Court; that although the eviction petition was restored on 21.09.2017, the petitioner could not have been penalized for not depositing the tentative rent for the month of July, 2017 when the eviction petition stood dismissed for non-prosecution; and that Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O. is a penal provision which must be construed strictly. Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for the instant petition to be allowed, and for the concurrent orders passed by the learned Courts below to be set- aside.
8.  On the other hand, learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 submitted that there are no jurisdictional infirmities in the concurrent orders passed by the learned Courts below so as to warrant interference in the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court; that it is well settled that upon the restoration of the suit, all the interim orders stand revived with retrospective effect; that the tentative rent order obligated the petitioner to deposit the monthly rent in advance before the 15th of each month; that it is an admitted position that the tentative rent for the month of July, 2017 was deposited on 28.07.2017; that by not depositing the tentative rent for the month of July, 2017 on or before 15.07.2017, the petitioner exposed himself to penal measures under Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O.; that even when an eviction petition is dismissed for non- prosecution, the tenant should continue to deposit the tentative rent in accordance with the tentative rent order; that the tentative rent order had required the petitioner to deposit the tentative rent “till final conclusion of the petition”; and that dismissal of an eviction petition for non-prosecution could not be considered as “final conclusion of the petition”.
9.  Furthermore, it was submitted that Respondent No. 3 does not agree with the petitioner’s contention that the latter had paid yearly advance rent to Respondent No. 3 through cheque dated 04.04.2017; and that relief sought in writ jurisdiction cannot be given to a petitioner who has twice committed default in the payment of rent. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 prayed for the writ petition to be dismissed. In making his submissions, learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of Muhammad Saleh vs. Muhammad Shafi (1982 SCMR 33) and M.A. Shami vs. Additional District Judge, Lahore (2012 YLR 2058).
10.  I have heard the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting parties, and perused the record with their able assistance.
11. The facts leading to the filing of the instant writ petition have been set out in sufficient detail in paragraphs 2 to 6 above, and need not be recapitulated.
12.  The sole question that needs to be determined is whether after the restoration of Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition in September, 2017, the petitioner’s defence could have been struck off under Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O. for not depositing the tentative rent for the month of July, 2017 by 15.07.2017, when Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition stood dismissed for non-prosecution and an application for the restoration of the eviction petition was pending.
13.  It is an admitted position that the petitioner’s eviction petition, which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 04.07.2017, was restored on 21.09.2017. The petitioner was non-suited by the learned Courts below by holding that upon the restoration of the eviction petition, the tentative order revived with retrospective effect, and that since the petitioner had deposited the tentative rent for the month of July, 2017 on 28.07.2017 instead of 15.07.2017, its defence was liable to be struck off and Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition was to be allowed under Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O. In non- suiting the petitioner, the learned appellate Court relied on the judgments in the cases of Muhammad Saleh vs. Muhammad Shafi (supra) and M.A. Shami vs. Additional District Judge, Lahore (supra).
14.  An analysis of the above referred judgments of the Superior Courts is necessary before I give my findings on the merits of the case. In the case of M.A. Shami vs. Additional District Judge, Lahore(supra), it was held by the Hon’ble Lahore High Court that upon the restoration of a suit, which had earlier been dismissed for non- prosecution, all the ancillary orders made prior to its dismissal become alive and operate retrospectively. In holding so, the Hon’ble Lahore High Court relied on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Saleh vs. Muhammad Shafi (supra). In the latter case, the tenant had failed to deposit the tentative rent for the months of February and March, 1977 in accordance with the tentative rent order inasmuch as the tentative rent for the said months was deposited with the delay of one day. Subsequently, in July, 1977 the eviction petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. On the landlord’s application under Order IX, Rule 9, C.P.C., the eviction petition was restored in December, 1977. During the period when the eviction petition stood dismissed for non-prosecution, the tenant kept on sending the monthly rent to the landlord by money order which the latter refused to receive. The tenant admittedly stopped tendering the monthly rent after the eviction petition had been restored in December, 1977. The learned Rent Controller allowed the landlord’s application for striking off the tenant’s defence for not showing compliance with the tentative rent order. The tenant’s appeals were dismissed by the Court of the learned Additional District Judge as well as the Hon’ble High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also dismissed the tenant’s petition. In the said report, it was held inter-alia that “once a suit or appeal, dismissed for default is restored by the order of the Court under Order IX, Rule 9, C.P.C. all ancillary orders passed in the suit or appeal before the dismissal also stand revived and become operative since that date with all their legal implications”.
15.  As regards the case at hand, it is my view that reliance by the learned appellate Court on the above referred judgments in non- suiting the petitioner was misconceived. I say this because a closer study of the case of Muhammad Saleh vs. Muhammad Shafi (supra) shows that the tenant was non-suited not because of non- compliance with the tentative rent order during the period when the landlord’s eviction petition stood dismissed for non-prosecution, but because after the restoration of the eviction petition in December, 1977, the tenant did not deposit the tentative rent in accordance with the tentative rent order. Perusal of paragraph-6 of the said judgment shows that the landlord had urged that the tenant had not paid any rent after December, 1977 and had also been guilty of one day’s default in depositing the installments of arrears of rent in the months of February and March, 1977. The Hon’ble Supreme Court overlooked the delay in the deposit of rent by one day in the months of February and March, 1977. However, it was on the basis of the tenant’s failure to deposit rent after the restoration of the eviction petition in December, 1977, that the tenant’s defence was held to have been correctly struck off. Nowhere in the said judgment is mentioned that the tenant’s defence was struck off due to his failure to deposit the tentative rent during the period when the eviction petition stood dismissed for non-prosecution. On the contrary, it has been noted in the said judgment that “during the period from July, 1977 (when the ejectment application was dismissed in default) to December, 1977 (when the same was restored), the petitioner kept on sending the monthly rent to the landlord by money order which the latter refused to receive”.
16.  It is not disputed that it is always within the realm of possibilities that an application for the restoration of a suit or an eviction petition would not be allowed. What the learned Courts below have, in effect, held is that the petitioner should have, in July, 2017 crystal ball gazed and foretold the future that in September, 2017 Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition will most definitely get restored, and therefore, in order to escape the penal consequences envisaged by Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O., he should deposit the tentative rent by the 15th of each month during the period when Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition stood dismissed for non- prosecution and his restoration application was pending. Hypothetically speaking, if a Court passes an injunctive order against a defendant, and subsequently the suit in which such an order was passed is dismissed for non-prosecution; and after such dismissal, the defendant performs acts which would have amounted to violation of the injunctive order had the same remained in the field, would the defendant be liable to be proceeded against for contempt of Court upon the restoration of the suit? I would say, certainly not.
17.  It is well settled that when a suit is dismissed for non- prosecution, and an application for the restoration is filed, the Court/Tribunal can, while the said application is pending, pass interim orders. In the case of Muhammad Usman Khan and another vs. Miraj Din and another (PLD 1978 Lahore 790), it has been held as follows:-
“5.  The learned counsel then argued that the injunction could not be granted under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. since no suit was pending before the Court. He further argued that Section 151, C.P.C. could not apply after the termination of the suit. It is correct that Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. are applicable to injunction in suit but it cannot lead to the conclusion that Section 151, C.P.C. which only saves inherent powers of the Court cannot apply. Although there is no suit pending before the Court yet an application for restoration is before it. If this application is allowed, the temporary injunction already issued will stands revived. If the wall is constructed before the restoration of the suit that will result in depriving the plaintiffs of their right to be benefited by the temporary injunction already granted even if their application for restoration of the suit is allowed. It will, therefore, be in the interest of justice to issue temporary injunction under inherent powers of the Court. Such injunction can be granted whereever Order XXXIX is not applicable.”
18.  Since a tentative rent order is also in the nature of an interlocutory/interim order, by analogy, after an eviction petition is dismissed for non prosecution, the Rent Controller can, while entertaining an application for the restoration of an eviction petition, pass a tentative rent order for the period until the decision of the restoration application. Such an order will bind the tenant only after he is duly served with such an order. It is also well settled that when an application for the restoration of the suit is allowed, all interim orders passed prior to the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution, stand revived. In the same way, if a tentative rent order is passed prior to the dismissal of the eviction petition for non-prosecution, upon the restoration of the eviction petition, the tentative rent order also stands revived. After the restoration of the eviction petition, there is no need to pass a fresh tentative rent order. In the event, after the restoration of the eviction petition, the tenant does not show compliance with the tentative rent order, which had been passed prior to the dismissal of the eviction petition for non- prosecution, the tenant exposes himself to penal measures under Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O. However, where the Rent Controller does not pass a tentative rent order while entertaining an application for the restoration of the eviction petition, a tenant cannot be penalized under Section 17(9) of the I.R.R.O. for not depositing rent during the period when the eviction petition stood dismissed for non-prosecution.
19.  In the case of Anees Ahmed Rushdi vs. Mst. Zulekha (1984 CLC 748), that great jurist, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid (as he then was) did not non-suit a tenant for not depositing rent in accordance with the tentative rent order for the period during which the eviction petition had remained dismissed for non- prosecution. It in said report, it was held inter-alia as follows:
“4.  It was then contended by the learned counsel for the applicant/landlord that it was an admitted position that rent payable under the tentative rent order, dated 3rd December, 1965 was not deposited from July, 1966 till 21st December, 1966 when the respondent deposited one year’s rent, that is, for the period from 1st July, 1966 to 30th June, 1967. In my view as the rent application has not been restored till 15th August, 1966, in case the rent had not been deposited till 15th August, 1966 for the period when the rent application remained dismissed there would be no default on the part of the tenant. This is so as during this period, the rent application was lying dismissed and when the rent application was lying dismissed it cannot be said that the tentative rent order remained alive. The tentative rent order stood revived only when the rent application was restored. (Emphasis added)


20.  In the said case, it was also held that after the restoration of the eviction petition, it was not necessary for the Rent Controller to pass a fresh tentative rent order. While coming to the said conclusion, the Hon’ble High Court of Sindh was cognizant of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Saleh vs. Muhammad Shafi (supra).
21.  Whether or not the petitioner tendered advance rent for one year in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease agreement between the petitioner and Respondent No. 3 is to be determined during an inquiry by the learned Rent Controller. The learned Rent Controller is also to decide whether the petitioner committed a breach of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement.
22.  In view of the above, the instant petition is allowed, the impugned orders/judgments dated 18.12.2017, and 10.03.2018, passed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned appellate Court, respectively, are set-aside. Furthermore, the matter is remanded to the learned Rent Controller who is expected to decide Respondent No. 3’s eviction petition expeditiously. No order as to costs.
(Y.A.)  Petition allowed



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Relaxation of Upper Age Limit

PLJ 2018 Islamabad 302
PresentMohsin Akhtar Kayani, J.
RASHID AMEER--Petitioner
versus
FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Interior and 4 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 1631 of 2017, decided on 29.12.2017.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of upper age limit) Rules 1993, R 3--Civil Servants (APT) Rules 1993, R 12--Recruitment in Counter Terrorism Force--Personnel of Islamabad Police seeking upper age relaxation--Notification of age relaxation issued by Establishment Division---SRO No. 1079/1/93--Minimum age prescribed was 18 to 25 years--Applicability of Respondents invited applications for post of ASI in Counter Terrorism Force, petitioner’s application was turned down being over-aged by 4 years, 1 month & 10 days--Inspector General Police denied age relaxation on ground that notification of establishment division does not apply on Islamabad Police Validity--Establishment Division made rules under title Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper age limit) Rules 1993, whereby relaxation in recruitment rules was provided in respect of different candidates--Vide another office Memo, clarification regarding general relaxation of 5 years in upper age limit prescribed in Recruitment Rules was made--Rule 3 of Rules 1993 as well as office Memo clearly establish that any person, who is working in government department and has completed two years continuous service on closing date of receipt of application, 10 years age relaxation is permissible to him, whereas, at time of advertisement for post of ASI, petitioner was 29 years old--Petitioner cannot be deprived from his valuable right, which has accrued in his favor through office memo--Petition was allowed.
                                                   [Pp. 305, 306, 308 & 309] A, B, C & D
Sardar Muhammad Tariq Fareed Gopang, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Arshad Mahmood, Superintendent Establishment Division for Respondents.
Mr. Abdul Rauf, Inspector Legal Islamabad Police on behalf of Respondents Nos. 3 & 4.
Ms. Saima Naqvi, State Counsel.
Date of hearing: 21.12.2017.
Judgment
Through this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 27.04.2017, passed by Inspector General of Police, Islamabad/Respondent No. 3, whereby application filed by the petitioner for relaxation in age limit to apply for the post of ASI (BPS-11) in Islamabad Police Counter Terrorism Force (CTF) was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner is over aged by 4 years, 1 month and 10 days against the prescribed age limit of 25 years.
2.  Brief facts, necessary for disposal of the instant writ petition are that the petitioner is a constable in Islamabad Police and performing his duties since 10.07.2007. Father of the petitioner died during his service on 03.11.2011 as DSP in Sindh Police, Karachi. Respondent No. 4 published vacancies for the post of ASI and the petitioner in order to apply for the said post moved an application to Inspector General of Police/Islamabad/Respondent No. 3 on 18.04.2017 for relaxation in age, however, the application of the petitioner was turned down vide impugned order dated 27.04.2017 on the ground that requisite age for the post of ASI is 25 years, whereas petitioner is over aged by 4 years, 1 month and 10 days.
3.  Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that order of rejection of the application filed by the petitioner is against the rules, whereas Establishment Division vide office memorandum dated 24.06.2010 gave clarification regarding general relaxation in upper age limit, which is also applicable to Islamabad Capital Territory Police but Respondent No. 3 did not consider the said office memorandum, which is misconduct on part of Respondent No. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the petitioner being already in service is entitled for age relaxation as per office memorandum of Establishment Division; that Establishment Division/Respondent No. 2 in its report submitted before this Court regarding age relaxation has also acknowledged that office memorandum dated 24.06.2010 provides 05 years general age relaxation to all citizens of Pakistan and 10 years to those employees, who have completed 02 years continuous government service on the closing date for receipt of application.
4.  Conversely, Inspector Legal, Islamabad Police argued that office memorandum dated 24.06.2010 is not applicable to Islamabad Police and the advertisement published for the recruitment of ASI was duly approved by the Establishment Division through Ministry of Interior, Islamabad but the Establishment Division did not refer any such office memorandum at that time. He further argued that if relaxation in age limit is allowed, it will open Pandora box; that recruitment process of ASI (CTF) has already been completed and selected candidates are getting training in Hangu Police College since 25.11.2017. He further argued that petitioner will be given chance in the next recruitment process for the post of ASI subject to his clearance under the rules.
5.  I have heard the arguments and gone through the record.
6.  From perusal of the record, it has been observed that Respondent No. 3 made advertisement in different newspapers inviting applications from suitable Pakistani Nationals for the post of ASI in Counter Terrorism Force, Islamabad, Capital Territory Police [CTF(ICT Police)]and as a result whereof, the petitioner being a constable in ICT, Police filed an application before Inspector General of Police, Islamabad/Respondent No. 3 for relaxation in age limit to apply for the said post, which was turned downvide impugned order/letter dated 27.04.2017 mainly on the ground that petitioner is over aged by 4 years, 1 month and 10 days, whereas prescribed age limit for the post of ASI is 25 years and no relaxation in age is admissible as per advertisement. The application submitted by the petitioner before Respondent No. 3 is reproduced as under:
بخدمت جناب انسپکٹر جنرل آف پولیس اسلام آباد۔
عنوان:  عمر میں رعایت برائے بھرتی بطور ASI سال 2017
جناب عالیٰ!
گزارش ہے کہ فدوی مورخہ 10.7.2007 کا بطور کنسٹیبل بھرتی شدہ ہے۔ فودی کو بذریعہ اخبار معلوم ہوا ہے کہ محکمہ اسلام آباد پولیس میںASI کی پوسٹ کیلئے چند آسامیاں خالی ہیں۔ فدوی ASI کی پوسٹ کے مطلوبہ میعار پر پورا اترتا ہے۔ جبکہ فدوی کو بذریعہ اشتہار معلوم ہوا کہ ASIکی پوسٹ کیلئے عمر کی حد 25 سال مقرر کی گئی ہے۔ جبکہ فدوی کی عمر 29 سال ہے، فدوی محکمہ ہذا میں تقریبا 10 سال سے ڈیوٹی سر انجام دے رہا ہے لہذا فدوی جناب سے بذریعہ درخواست استدعا  کرتا ہے کہ فدوی کو محکمہ ہذا میں بطور کنسٹیبل ہونے کی بنا پر ASI کی پوسٹ کے لئے اپلائی کرنے کیلئے عمر میں رعایت دی جائے تاکہ فدوی ترقی حاصل کر سکے۔
فدوی نے درخواست کے ہمراہ (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993 مجاریہ Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat Establishment Divisionکے نوٹیفیکیشن نمبر S.R.O. 1079(1)/93 کی کاپی بھی لگائی ہے جس کے تحت فدوی Part-II General Relaxation  کی سیریل نمبر (iii) اور سیریل نمبر  (v)پر پورا اترتا ہے۔
سیریل نمبر (iii) کے مطابق فدوی متعلقہ اسامی کی آخری تاریخ تک فدوی اپنی 02 سالہ ملازمت پوری کرچکا ہے۔ اور اس لئے فدوی کو 10 تک کی رعایت حاصل ہے۔
سیریل نمبر (v) کے مطابق فدوی کے والد Civil Servant ﴿سندھ پولیس میں بطور DSP﴾ تھے جو دوران سروس وفات پا گئے تھے۔ اس طرح فدوی 5سال کی رعایت کا مستحق ہے۔
فدوی کی آپ جناب سے گزارش ہے کہ دونوں میں سے کسی بھی ایک Rule کے تحت فدوی کو ASI کے لئے Apply کرنے کی اجازت دی جائے۔ جناب کی عین نوازش ہوگی۔
7.  The above referred application was forwarded to Respondent No. 3 by Superintendent of Police Headquarters, Islamabad on 18.04.2017. Respondent No. 3 while deciding the same did not considered the law referred in the application in its true perspective.
8.  It has been observed from the record that Establishment Division vide S.R.O. No. 1079(I)/93 in pursuance of rule 12 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion Court and Transfer) Rules, 1993, made rules under the title Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993, whereby relaxation in the recruitment rules was provided in respect of the different candidates. Rule 3 of Initial Appointment to Civil posts (relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993 is reproduced as under:--
“(3) Maximum age limit as prescribed in the recruitment rules shall be relaxed in respect of the candidates mentioned in column (2) below to the extent mentioned against each under column (3):--
Sl No.
Category of candidates
Age relaxation admissible.
1
2
3
i)
(a) Candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes Buddhist Community, recognized tribes of the Tribal Areas, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas for all posts under the Federal Government
3 years.
(b) Candidates belonging to Sindh (R) and Balochistan for posts in BPS-15 and below under the Federal Government.
3 years
ii)
Released or retired Officers/personnel of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
15 years or the number of years actually served in the Armed Forces of Pakistan, whichever is less.
iii)
Government servants who have completed 2 years continuous Government service on the closing date for receipt of applications.
10 years, upto the age of 55 years.
iv)
Disabled persons for appointment to posts in BPS-15 and below.
10 years
v)
Widows, son or daughter of a deceased civil servant who dies during service
5 years
9.  Besides the above, referred rule, vide office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010 clarification regarding general relaxation of 5 years in upper age limit prescribed in Recruitment Rules was made and this very fact has been admitted by Respondent No. 2/Establishment Division in its report submitted before this Court in the instant writ petition. Relevant paragraphs of the above referred office memorandum are reproduced as under:--
“2.  In light of the recommendation of the Senate Standing Committee, the Ministries/Divisions/Departments are advised that hence-forth, the concession of 5 years general relaxation in upper age limit shall be clubbed with the maximum limit of the post in their advertisements. In case usual upper age limit of posts in various Basic Pay scales is as in column (2) below:--
Basic pay Scale
(1)
Age Limit.
(2)
General Age Relaxation
(3)
Maximum Age Limit
(4)
1-15
25 years
+5 years
30 years
16
28 years
+5 years
33 years
17
30 year
+5 years
35 years
18
35 years
+5 years
40 years
19
40 years
+5 years
45years
20
45 years
+5 years
50 years
21
50 years
+5 years
55 years
3.  The Ministries/Divisions are further advised that the following relaxation in upper age limit available to the category of candidates specified below (to the extent mentioned against each) should be clearly mentioned in their advertisements for vacant posts:--
Sl. No.
Category of candidates
Age relaxation admissible
1
2
3
(i)
(a) Candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes Buddhist Community, recognized tribes of the Tribal Areas, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas for all posts under the Federal Government.
3 years.
(b) Candidates belonging to Sindh(R) and Balochistan for  posts in BPS-15 and below under the Federal Government.
3 years.
(ii)
Released or retired Officers/personnel of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
15 years or the number of years actually served in the Armed Forces of Pakistan, whichever is less.
(iii)
Government servants who have completed 2 years continuous Government service on the closing date for receipt of applications.
10 years, upto the age of 55 years.
iv
Disabled persons for appointment to posts in BPS-15 and below.
10 years
(v)
Widows, son or daughter, of a deceased civil servant who dies during service
5 years
Note:  Where a candidate is entitled to age relaxation under more than one categories specified above, he shall be allowed relaxation in age only in one category.
4.  In addition to above, the President/Prime Minister may, on extreme compassionate grounds, grant age relaxation to an individual candidate for a period not exceeding three years.
5.  Further, where the Ministries/Divisions/Departments have recently advertised various posts and the candidates have appeared in written test but their interviews are yet to be held i.e. their selection process is not over, the said posts may be re-advertised for additional applications with clear rule position about age limit and age relaxations as at paras 2 & 3 above.
10.  The above referred Rule 3 of Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993 as well as office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010 clearly establish that any person, who is working in the government department and has completed two years continuous service on the closing date of receipt of the application, 10 years age relaxation is permissible to him, whereas at the time advertisement for the post of ASI, the petitioner was 29 years old but his request for relaxation in age to apply for the post of ASI was turned down by Respondent No. 3
11.  The stance taken by Islamabad Police Department in its report/reply to the writ petition is based upon advertisement, wherein age limit was mentioned 18 to 25 years for both categories alongwith other pre-requisite.
12.  In the light of office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010, an order was passed in CM No. 01/2017 on 21.06.2017, whereby the IG of Islamabad Police was directed to issue direction to the relevant authorities to include the name of the petitioner for his participation in the recruitment process but surprisingly Respondent No. 3 did not bother to obey the said order. The Conduct of the police official is highly disregarded to the Court’s orders.
13.  Islamabad Police also acknowledged passing of order dated 21.06.2017 in CM No. 01/2017 in its report/reply to the writ petition, however, Islamabad Police took the stance that all the selected candidates have joined the Hangu Police College for training on 25.11.2017 and it is not possible for them to accommodate the petitioner this stage.
14.  The petitioner cannot be deprived from his valuable right, which has accrued in his favour through office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010.
15.  Moreover, clause 5 of the said office memorandum further strengthen case of the petitioner that if the advertised posts are under the process of selection and interviews have not yet been taken, the said post will be re-advertised for additional application with clear rule position about age limit and age relaxations, therefore, it can safely be concluded that Islamabad Police being under the Administrative control of Ministry of Interior was under obligation to follow the law regarding age relaxation in stricto sensu and despite Rule 3 of Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993 as well as office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010, Respondent No. 3 did not extend the benefit of relaxation in age to the petitioner, which is contrary to the law.
16.  Keeping in view the background and law on the subject referred above, this Court is of the considered view that the process of recruitment of ASI, in which the petitioner was not granted relaxation in age by ignoring Rule 3 of Initial appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993 as well as office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010, Islamabad Police Department has deprived the petitioner to apply for the post of ASI in clear cut violation of the rules. Depriving the petitioner to apply for the post of ASI by ignoring the relevant rules is also violation of  Article 4 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantees equal protection of law.
17.  For the foregoing reasons, instant writ petition is accepted and the petitioner is declared to be eligible to apply for the post of ASI on the basis of relaxation in age by 10 years as he is serving in Islamabad Police as constable since his appointment i.e 10.07.2007, therefore, impugned order dated 27.4.2017 is hereby set aside and instant writ petition is allowed.
18.  As per report/reply of Islamabad Police Department the recruitment process has been completed and selected candidates have joined their training on 25.11.2017, therefore, at this stage, if this Court set asides the entire recruitment process, it will affect the other selected candidates, who have already earned their legitimate right after due process of law and they should not be suffered for the wrong of Respondent No. 3, who did not bother to follow the rules, law and even order of this Court. While relying upon the judgments 2011 PLD SC 365 (Shahid Orakzai vs Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, Islamabad) & (PLJ 2011 [Lahore] 32) (DB) (All Pakistan Textile Mills Association vs. FOP), whereby the relief can be molded in the changed circumstances, Respondents No. 3 & 4 are directed to reinitiate recruitment process for the post of ASI (BPS-11) in Islamabad Police (CTF) only to the extent of petitioner, wherein the petitioner shall apply and participate in written test, physical test or any other test, which were taken by the Recruitment Committee in the cases of previously selected candidates. This recruitment process shall be completed on merits within 30 days from the date of announcement of this judgment under intimation to this Court through learned Registrar. If the petitioner successfully completes all the stages of recruitment process, he shall be appointed and sent to training in Hangu Police College, where the already selected candidates are getting training.
19.  Inspector General of Police Islamabad/Respondent No. 3 is dircted to strictly follow office memorandum of Establishment Division dated 24.06.2010 regarding relaxation is age in future recruitments and if any advertisement regarding recruitment in Islamabad Police is made in violation of the said office memorandum as well as Rule 3 of Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993, the same shall be illegal, hence, Secretary Establishment is directed to convey the said office memorandum to the Secretary Ministry of Interior as well as Chief Commissioner, Islamabad and Inspector General of Police for ready reference and application of the rules regarding relaxation in age.
20.  As earlier mentioned in Para 12 of the judgment that order passed in C.M No. 01/2017 on 21.06.2017 was not complied with by Respondent No. 3 despite the fact that the order was passed in the presence of Abdul Rauf, Inspector Legal, Islamabad Police, Tahir Jamil Ahmed, D.S (R-II) Establishment Division and M.Waqar, P.A (R.6) Establishment Division, therefore, office is directed to issue notice to the Inspector General of Police and Assistant Inspector General Police (Estabishment), i.e. Respondents No. 3 & 4 to explain their position as to why the petitioner was not allowed to participate in the recruitment


process and contempt of Court proceedings may not be initiated against them for willful defiance of this Court’s order dated 21.06.2017. The Inspector General of Police shall submit detailed report comprising of recruitment process, stages, dates of recruitment and after fixing the responsibility of the delinquent police official who has not complied with the Court order.
21.  The replies of above mentioned persons shall reach to this Court within 15-days from the date of announcement of this judgment, whereafter office shall register this case as criminal original and place before this Court on 25.1.2018 for further proceedings.
(Z.I.S.)            Petition allowed


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