PLJ 2013
AJ&K 76 (FB)
Present: Ghulam
Mustafa Mughal, CJ., Munir Ahmed Chaudhary & M.
Tabassum Aftab Alvi, JJ.
SHERIJ KHAN &
others--Petitioners
versus
AZAD GOVT. OF
JAMMU AND KASHMIR through its Chief Secretary & others--Respondents
W.P. No. 1829 of
2012, decided on 31.12.2012.
AZ&K Interim
Constitution Act, 1974--
----Ss. 3, 4(8),
15, 17 & 4--Notification for reservation of seats for MBBS course--No law,
rule or policy can be framed against injunctions of Islam in manner to
discriminate citizen--Violative of fundamental rights--Notification was
challenged--Validity--Petition was refused on ground that petitioner was not an
aggrieved person because neither he was member of parliament nor his any other
tangible interest was violated--Even if seats reserved for doctor's children
and overseas quota were declared ultra vires of Constitution and added in
general merit of district wise quota, therefore, petitioners were not
aggrieved, hence were not entitled to any relief--Petitioners had not bothered
to amend the petition, therefore, without affording an opportunity of hearing
to those candidates who had been nominated on basis of notification under
challenge no writ can be issued--High Court directed Govt. to revisit
notification and provide a legal cover to medical colleges. [Pp. 85, 87 & 88] A, B, C & D
Raja Amjad Ali
Khan, Advocate for Petitioners.
Sardar Shahid
Hameed Khan, Advocate for Respondents No. 1 to 6.
Mr. Abdul
Rasheed Abasi, Advocate for Respondents No. 7 to 13.
Mr. Mansoor
Sultan, Advocate for PM&DC.
Date of hearing:
31.12.2012.
Order
Ghulam Mustafa
Mughal, CJ.--M/s. Sherij Khan, Muqadas Mushtaq, Kalsoom Shareef and Awais
Qayoom, through this petition filed under Section 44 of the Azad Jammu &
Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, have challenged the vires of
Government. Notification No. SH/I/(24)1
Part-II/2011 dated 31.01.2012, whereby seats for MBBS course have been
allocated to the different categories; on the grounds that the same is
violative of Section 3 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution
Act, 1974, as no law, rule or policy can be framed against the injunctions of
Islam and in a manner to discriminate the citizens. It is further alleged that
all the citizens are equal before law and liable to be treated as such. It is
claimed that due to reservation of the quota/seats for overseas Kashmiris and
Doctors' children, a privileged class has been created by the Government which
is violative of fundamental rights Nos. 4(8),(15) and (17) guaranteed by the
interim Constitution Act, 1974.
Petition has
been resisted by the respondents by filing separate written statements. Their
defence is that the Executive Committee was necessary party and no writ can be
issued in its absence. It is further claimed that petitioners are not aggrieved
and the petition has been filed in violation of sub-rule (2) of Rule 32 of the
AJ&K High Court Procedure Rules, 1984. It is also claimed that petition is
premature because nomination has not been made yet. In the written statement
filed on behalf of Respondents No. 7 to 13 it is pleaded that petitioners are
not aggrieved because it is not disclosed by them in the petition that how they
are aggrieved or they have been deprived of any right or tangible interest due
to reservation of quota for overseas Kashmiris and Doctors' children. Petition
has been filed for academic discussion and such like petitions are not
entertained by the Courts. It is further claimed that petitioners have also
applied for seats in Medical Colleges against the quota reserved for District
Muzaffarabad and Hattian Bala, therefore, they are estopped by their conduct
and cannot challenge the allocation of seats and their petition is not
maintainable on the basis of principle of approbation and reprobation.
Moreover, petition is mala fide because petitioners have deliberately and
without any reasonable justification have picked up the quota of two
categories, whereas the reservation of quota for other categories like district
wise quota, quota for J&K refugees settled in Pakistan etc., has not been
challenged by them. It is submitted that students who have applied for
admission and have been allocated seats against district wise quota as well as
quota for overseas Kashmiris, Doctors' children are necessary party and no writ
can be issued without impleading them as party. It is further submitted by them
that admission in the Medical Colleges are regulated by PM&DC regulations
which also recognize the allocation of the quota under challenge. Hence,
notification issued by the Government is in line with the PM&DC
regulations. The plea of discrimination pointed out in the petition is also
refuted on the ground that in various professional institutions, universities
and civil services, quota has been reserved for different categories for the
purpose of admission of the children of civil servants,
therefore, the reservation of quota for Doctors' sons is not an arbitrary act
of the Government.
Raja Amjad Ali
Khan, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, vehemently argued
that the reservation of seats for overseas Kashmiris and Doctors' children is
violative of the fundamental rights No. 8, 15 and 17 enshrined in Section 4(4)
of the Constitution which guaranteed that all the state subjects are equal
before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. He argued that the
discriminatory treatment is also prohibited by the Holy Quran and Sharia. He
further argued that vide notification dated 31.01.2012, a privileged class has
been created without any reasonable classification, therefore, petitioners'
fundamental right of equality before law and equal protection of law has been
infringed and jeopardized. The learned Advocate maintained that the apex Court
of Pakistan has already declared the reservation of seats on the basis of quota
ultra vires, of the constitution; therefore, respondents are not vested with
any authority to reserve seats for the aforesaid categories that too, without
any statutory backing. The learned Advocate placed reliance on case titled Mst.
Attiyya Bibi Khan and others vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of
Education (Ministry of Education) Civil Secretariat, Islamabad and others reported
as [2001 SCMR 1161].
Mr. Abdul
Rasheed Abbasi, the learned Advocate appearing for the private respondents,
vehemently argued that petitioners are not aggrieved because due to issuance of
notification under challenge they have not been deprived of any right and no
averment to that effect is made in the writ petition and in the prayer clause.
The learned Advocate argued that it is not sufficient to state that a person is
a strong candidate for any job or admission rather it is necessary that due to
the act or omission under challenge, one has suffered a loss or at least
deprived of a tangible interest. The learned Advocate maintained that as the
petitioners have selected for admission, therefore, their right of admission
has been secured and they cannot file writ petition just for academic
discussion. The learned Advocate contended that jurisdiction conferred on this
Court is not unlimited rather it can be exercised subject to restriction placed
in Section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974. The learned Advocate
maintained that 1st condition for invoking writ jurisdiction of High Court,
except for writs of Quo Warranto and Habeas Corpus, is that the petitioner must
be an aggrieved person and where this condition is missing the Court will
refuse to exercise the jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, the learned
Advocate placed reliance on the following case law:--
1. Ghias ul Haq and others Vs. Azad
Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir etc. [PLD 1980 SC (AJK) 5];
2. Muhammad Malik Vs.
Karam Elahi & another [2011 SCR 431];
3. Ch. Muhammad Yasin Vs. Sardar Muhammad
Naeem Khan
and 3 others [2010 SCR 17];
4. Asif Hussain Vs. Azad Govt. and 47 others
[2008 SCR 619]; and
5. Raja Iqbal Rasheed Minhas Vs. AJ&K Council and 3 others [2001 SCR 530].
By referring to
the prayer clause, it is next argued by the learned Advocate that the writ
petition has been filed on wrong assumption of facts. The learned Advocate
contended that the number of seats given in Para
2 of the prayer clause is not correct. The total number of seats is 100 out of
which 10 seats have been reserved for open merit and 65 have been reserved for
district wise quota. The learned Advocate argued that even otherwise
petitioners are estopped by their conduct to challenge the notification because
they have challenged the reservation of quota for overseas Kashmiris and
Doctors' children despite the fact that they themselves have claimed benefit
and admission on the basis of district quota reserved by the same notification.
According to the learned Advocate if it is assumed that petitioners are
aggrieved from reservation of quota even then they cannot be granted relief on
the principle of approbation and reprobation because the district quota against
which the petitioners have been admitted is reserved on account of place of
birth and the Constitution does not provide such reservation. By referring to
the written statement and documents appended thereto, the learned Advocate
contended that Miss Muqadas Mushtaq and Kalsoom Sharif are on merit and others
petitioners cannot be admitted even the notification under challenge is quashed
and seats reserved for overseas Kashmiris and Doctors' sons are distributed on
the basis of district quota, hence, the petitioners cannot be treated
aggrieved. The learned Advocate placed reliance on:--
1. Pakistan
2. Khiali Khan Vs.
Haji Nazir and 4 other [PLD 1997 SC 304]; and
3. Azad Government of the State of J&K
and others Vs. Haji Summandar Khan & others [1995 SCR 259].
The learned
Advocate contended that notification under challenge has been issued on
13.01.2012, whereas the writ petition has been filed on 17.09.2012, which is
hopelessly time barred. The relief is liable to be
refused and has been refused by the apex Court in the cases where infringement
of fundamental right has been proved. The learned Advocate placed reliance on
Summandar Khan's case 1995 SCR 259, 1996 SCR 7, 1993 SCMR 168, 2010 SCR 215 and
2000 SCR 97. The learned Advocate contended that seats have been reserved for
the state subjects including the refugees settled in Pakistan and the residence
of occupied Kashmir, students from Gilgit, therefore, quashment of the
notification will be against the policy of the Government which create inconvenience
and would also be injurious to the national interest. The learned Advocate
argued that the overseas Kashmiris' quota has been recognized by PM&DC
Regulations; while acting on these Regulations the Government has reserved the
quota for overseas Kashmiris and the Doctors' children, therefore, without
challenging the PM&DC Rules the notification in question cannot be struck
down. The learned Advocate contended that if the reservation of quota is
declared as unconstitutional even then the judgment will be prospective because
the merit list has been finalized and published and a vested right stood
accrued to the selected candidates who are not before the Court. The same view
was taken in Attiyya Bibi's case [2001 SCMR 1161]. The learned Advocate contended
that quota has been recognized by the Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir in
civil service and the same is duly acted upon in various professional
institutions. He referred to the prospectus of different institutions in
support of his submissions. Besides documentary evidence, the learned Advocate
placed reliance on 2010 SCR 186 and 1999 SCR 243. The learned Advocate further
contended that the Government is competent to frame Rules, reserve quota and
make a reasonable classification in order to provide equal opportunities to the
differently placed state subjects who have no equal opportunity of study. He
argued that the Courts though have power of judicial review even of the
administrative orders and the Government policy regarding the quota cannot be
quashed because the same is not violative of any law. In support of his
submissions, the learned Advocate placed reliance on [PLJ 1999 SC AJK 190]. The
learned Advocate lastly argued that the rule of law laid down in Attiyya Bibi's
case supra cannot be made applicable in Azad Kashmir because the judgment has
been handed down keeping in view the various provisions of the Constitution of
Pakistan whereas in Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974,
the similar provisions are not available.
Mr. Mansoor Sultan,
the learned Advocate appearing for PM&DC and Sardar Shahid Hameed Khan, the
learned Advocate appearing for Respondents No. 1 to 6, adopted the arguments
advanced by Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbasi. Mr. Mansoor Sultan, the learned Advocate
for PM&DC, referred to different provisions of the PM&DC Regulations,
2010 and identified the quota recognized by the PM&DC for the different
categories. He argued that reservation of seats is the administrative business
of the Government and PM&DC only insist not to reassess total allocation of
seats.
The learned
Advocate for the petitioners in rebuttal has submitted that so far as objection
regarding prayer clause raised by the learned Advocate for the respondents is
concerned, an application for correction of the number of seats in prayer
clause is on the record, this mistake can be corrected at any time and relief
cannot be refused to the petitioners on this ground. The learned Advocate
submitted that to be an aggrieved person one has not proved loss of vested
right rather if loss of tangible interest is shown then relief cannot be
refused on the ground that a petitioner before the Court is not aggrieved..
After hearing
the learned Advocates for the parties we have gone through the record.
It may be stated
that after establishment of the two medical colleges in Azad Jammu &
Kashmir, the Government of AJK has issued the notification for reservation of
seats, whereby seats have been reserved for different categories. For proper
appreciation of the controversy the same is reproduced as under:--
"Azad
Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir
(Secretariat
Health)
"Muzaffarabad"
Dated:13th Jan, 2012 .
Dated:
Notification:
No. SH/I/(24)1 Part-II/2011. In suppression of
Notification No. SH/I/(24)1 Part-II/2011 dated 10th of January, 2012,
the President of Azad Jammu & Kashmir has been pleased to accord approval
of the allocation of M.B.B.S seats for each medical college of Azad Jammu &
Kashmir as first admission for current year, keeping in view, shortage of time
to start the classes as per scheduled period.
1. Reserve seats 25
2. Open merit 10
3. District/ Refugee quota
prevailing in Azad
Jammu andKashmir 65
prevailing in Azad
Jammu and
Total 100
In case any seat
remains unfulfilled, it will be added to open merit.
Detail of
reserve seats in each medical college is as under:
1 Punjab 02
2. Sindh 02
3. Blochistan 02
4. KPK 04
5. FATA 01
6. Overseas Kashmiri 05
7. Gilgit Baltistan 05
8. Occupied Kashmir 02
9. Doctor's Children 01
10 Disabled Students 01
Total 25
(Abdul Latif Shah)
Additional Secretary Health "
Additional Secretary Health "
The
constitutional jurisdiction has been conferred on this Court by Section 44 of
the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, subject to the
other provisions of the Act and restrictions imposed by Section 44 of the said
Act. One of the fundamental conditions and requirements is that in order to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under the abovementioned section, an
applicant must be an aggrieved person. Only two exceptions are provided by the
section itself i.e. Section 44(2)(b)(i) and (ii) which
deals with writ of Quo Warranto and Habeas Corpus. In view of above, the first
question which needs to be resolved is as to whether petitioners, herein, are
aggrieved person within the purview of Section 44 of the Azad Jammu &
Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 and are entitled to file the petition.
The proposition has been considered in numbers of cases by this Court and the
apex Court, some of them have been referred to by the
learned Advocates for the parties. In Ghiasul Haq's case supra, some petitions
were filed by civil servants before this Court, whereby vires of Azad Jammu
& Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977, were
challenged. After necessary proceedings the petitions were accepted. It was
argued before the apex Court that petitioners who were granted relief by this
Court were not aggrieved because they sought a declaration simpliciter. Due to
grant of simpliciter declaration wrong done to them cannot be rescinded because
for that purpose an independent forum was available. The apex Court after
examining the case law on the subject observed as under:--
"Could, in
the circumstances, the High Court give any direction to the Government for
enforcement of the said fundamental rights, knowing fully well that it was not
seized of any matter concerning the writ petitions? The answer has to be in
negative. And if this is so the petition, as framed, was not maintainable under
Section 44 (c) because the High Court cannot under the said constitutional
provision grant a declaration simpliciter, nor anyone can move the Court pro
bono publico to challenge the vires of a law on the ground that the same
offends against any provision of the Constitution. The person who seeks a
command from the High Court for enforcement of fundamental right must first
show with reference to admitted or proved facts, as to how he is an aggrieved
person; from that particular act or action he feels aggrieved, and to which
authority he wishes the writ of the High Court to be directed. Otherwise, he
must fail.
At Page 42 it
was observed by the apex Court as under:--
"----------that
a law, even if it is unconstitutional, cannot be declared as invalid so long as
law does not practically affect the rights of somebody. In the instant case the
High Court was also faced with the similar situation. The writ petitioners had
frankly conceded that the validity of the action taken and order passed against
them could only be gone into by Service Tribunal. They merely wanted an
abstract declaration from the High Court that sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) of
Rule 6 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and
Discipline) Rules, 1977, were ultra vires of Fundamental Right No. 15 contained
in Section 4 of the Constitution Act."
While concluding
the proposition, at page 43, the apex Court observed as under:--
"28. Thus
it would appear that there was no case before the High Court and we hold that
writ petitions, as framed, challenging in abstract the vires of the rules, were
not competent, because under causes (a) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section
44, the writ petitioners must have disclosed the controversy or lis to bring
their cases within the requirements of the conditional provisions viz., that
"they should be aggrieved party" or "aggrieved persons".
This being a condition precedent to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, the High
Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petitions unless the
respondents herein were aggrieved party or persons claiming relief in respect
of an order adversely affecting them."
In Muhammad
Malik Vs. Karam Elahi and another [2011 SCR 431] the
apex Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir has considered the term
aggrieved/aggrieved person with reference to the various provisions of Hadood
and Qisas laws. The ratio of the other cited case is same, hence, need not to
be discussed. It is correct that to qualify as an aggrieved person a right in
strict juristic sense may not vest in a person yet he must at least show that
he has some interest that respondents should act in accordance with law.
In Umer Din
Kiani Vs. Azad Government and 2 others [1995 SCR 166]
the matter again came up for consideration before the apex Court of Azad Jammu
& Kashmir. At Page 170 of the report it was observed as under:
"The
Service Tribunal has rightly held that under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals
Act an appeal can only be field before the Service Tribunal by an aggrieved
civil servant but the appellant before us cannot be termed as aggrieved. As
already noted by us, under Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act a person can
only be promoted to a higher post if he possesses minimum qualification
prescribed for the higher post. It means that the appellant cannot be promoted
to the post under dispute. Although it is not necessary to qualify as an
aggrieved person that a right in a strict juristic sense should be vested in
him, yet a person must at least show that he has some interest that the
respondents should act in accordance with law. The appellant does not seem to
fulfill even this condition. Even if the objections raised by him are accepted
and consequently the appointment of Respondent No. 3 is held to be invalid no
benefit would accrue to the appellant because he is not eligible for promotion
to the disputed post. The points raised by him may more appropriately be raised
in a writ of quo warranto which can be filed by any person as distinguished
from an aggrieved party. Therefore, we uphold the view taken by the Service
Tribunal that the appeal filed by the appellant was not maintainable before the
Service Tribunal."
A full bench of
this Court has also considered the proposition in Noor-ul-Amin's case,
who challenge an
amendment effected in the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, on the ground
that the same is violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution.
The petition was refused on the ground that petitioner, therein, is not an
aggrieved person because neither he is a Member of the Parliament nor his any
other tangible interest has been violated. The full bench of this Court pleased
to observe as under:--
"6. In the
present case, the alleged grievance is to be redressed in the light of the
provisions contained under sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of
Section 44. Thus, it is imperative that before laying hands on merits of the
proposition under consideration, it ensure and satisfy that the petitioner is
an aggrieved party as contemplated under the Constitution. The petitioner is a
citizen of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and an Advocate. He claims his designation
as Chairman of the foreign Relations Board of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
League. It is alleged that the aforesaid facts qualify him as an aggrieved
person as contemplated under the Constitution, as such, he is competent to
challenge the vires and propriety of the impugned amendment of the Constitution.
He has demonstrated his grievance by describing himself as a disgruntled
subject, disillusioned elector and an extremely disenchanted office-bearer of a
political party.
7. Ordinarily, an aggrieved person is he who
suffers a grievance by loss of any interest or right in consequence of an act
or omission caused by an order, decision or action of a tribunal or authority
or person. The term "aggrieved person" received attention of the
superior Courts of the subcontinent in various cases from time to time. The
consensus is that a person is deemed as "aggrieved person" when he
satisfies that he suffered loss of the curtailment of a privilege or right in
consequence of non-performance of a duty. In this context, it is emphasized
that the claimant must show any evasion or injury to his personal interest by
an act or omission in order to bring his case within the purview of an
aggrieved person. In Muhammad Younus's case (1), Mr. Justice Sardar Muhammad
Iqbal, the learned Judge who spoke for the Court, described the term
"aggrieved person" in the following manner:--
"In order
that a person is an `aggrieved person' within the meaning of Article 98 he may
not have right in strict juristic sense but he must show that he had a
`personal interest in the performance of the legal duty' and that the
non-performance of the duty is to result in the loss of some `personal benefit
or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege'. Unless he shows that he will
lose `some benefit or advantage which he would have gained if the order was in
accordance with law', he cannot be an aggrieved person."
8. In Jalal Din's case (3), Mr. Justice Muhammad
Yaqub Ali, who delivered the verdict on behalf of the Court maintained that
under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962), writ petition could be
filed only by a person aggrieved and, as such, relief granted must be in
relation to his grievance and not the grievance of any third person. In Ghias-ul-Haq's case (4), Mr. Justice Chaudhry Rahim Dad Khan,
CJ. (as he then was) construed the provisions of law relating to
enforcement of fundamental rights (Section 44 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir
Interim Constitution Act) and observed that no one can move the High Court pro
bono publico to challenge vires of a law. Person seeking High Court's command
for enforcement of a fundamental right must first show how he felt aggrieved.
The learned Chief Justice elaborated his observation by making critical
analysis of the case-law on the proposition.
8. Reference to the above authorities is made to
show that a person desirous of invoking the authority of the High Court under
Section 44 clauses (a) and (c) of the Constitution, must first satisfy that he
is an aggrieved person. Unless this condition is fulfilled, High Court cannot
be moved to annul a law resulting in the benefit of a third party. We have
noticed in the present case that the impugned amendment obviously operates as a
restriction on the vote of a member of the Assembly alone. Its obvious impact
confines to the effect of vote of a member of the Assembly cast in favour of a
resolution for a vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister. The
petitioner is not a member of the Assembly nor he can
claim so by any stretch of imagination. Therefore, he is unable to show that
the impugned amendment has affected his interest right or privilege expressly
or impliedly. In our estimation, the real aggrieved person, if at all one is
aggrieved it is a member of the Assembly alone."
The matter was
again considered by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir apex Court in Raja Iqbal Rasheed
Minhas, Advocate's case [PLD 2002 SC(AJ&K) 182] and after detailed survey
of case law on the point in Paras 11 and 14 of the report, it was observed as
under:--
11. Except the above referred authority from Karachi
14. It may also be pointed out that there is a
wide difference between a writ of certiorari and a writ of habeas corpus or a
writ of quo warranto. Except the writ of habeas corpus and the writ of quo
warranto which can be invoked by any person, the other writs can be prayed for
only by an aggrieved person. It may be stated generally that an aggrieved party
is not in a writ of prohibition whose rights are threatened, in writ of
mandamus whose rights are being denied and in writ of certiorari whose rights
have been affected by a decision. The word "right" is not used here
in strict juristic sense. It if sufficient if the person alleging to be an
aggrieved has a personal interest in the performance of a legal duty which if
not performed would result in the loss of some personal advantage. A party who
stands to lose or gain an advantage by observance or non-observance of law is
an aggrieved party. A person aggrieved must be a person who has suffered a
legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has
been pronounced which has wrongly deprived to him of something, or wrongfully
refused him something of wrongfully affected his title to something. The
petitioner being not falling in any of the categories, mentioned above, had not
competence to lodge either the writ petition or an appeal in this Court against
the impugned judgment of the High Court.
As the
Petitioners No. 1 and 2 have been admitted in the relevant sessions and
Petitioners No. 3 and 4 cannot be admitted, even if the seats reserved for
doctors' children and overseas quota are declared ultra vires of the
constitution and are added in the general merit or district wise quota,
therefore, petitioners, herein are not aggrieved; hence, are not entitled to
any relief. Even otherwise, respondents have appended merit list with the
written statement indicating the nominations of the candidates against their
respective quota including the categories under challenge. The petitioners have
not bothered to amend the petition, therefore, without affording an opportunity
of hearing to those candidates who have been nominated on the basis of
notification under challenge no writ can be issued in view of the principle
laid down in Attiyya Bibi Khan's case 2001 SCMR 1161, wherein in Para 50 of the
report the apex Court of Pakistan observed as under:--
"For the
aforesaid facts, circumstances and reasons I am inclined to declare reservation
of seats for all categories in Medical Colleges illegal and without lawful
authority, except for disabled persons within the meaning of Disabled Persons
(Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance,
1981 districts as
well as Azad Kashmir and Northern Area, Afghan Refugees who have taken
school and intermediate education in the educational institutions situated
within those areas and students of foreign countries on reciprocal basis for
period of seven years for the time being. I agree that C.P.L.A. No. 1905/2000
is without any merit and must be dismissed. CPL.A. Nos. 1979 and 1980 of 2000
re: Miss Nida Zulfiqar V. Government of Punjab
and others and Miss Sana Arshad V. Government of Punjab
and others seeking admission against seats earlier reserved for doctors' sons
and daughters even after abolition of such seats by the Medical Colleges are
dismissed for the reasons stated hereinabove."
In view of
above, the petition stands dismissed, however, we direct the Government to
revisit the notification dated 31.01.2012 to the extent of quota reserved for
categories under challenge in view of the law laid down in Attiyya Bibi Khan's
case, 2001 SCMR 1161 supra. We also direct the Government to provide a legal
cover to Medical Colleges set up in Azad Jammu and Kashmir
in order to stream line their business/admissions at par with the Province of Punjab
(R.A.) Petition
dismissed
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