Showing posts with label Islamabad High Court Attorney. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamabad High Court Attorney. Show all posts

Saturday, 12 August 2023

Proceedings Before Wafaqi Mohtasib

PLJ 2001 Karachi 263 (DB)

Present: S. AHMED SARWANA AND MUHAMMAD MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, JJ.

ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD.--Petitioner

versus

THE WAFAQI MOHTASIB (OMBUDSMAN) and others-

Respondents C.P. No. 1587 of 1992, decided on 1.2.2001.

(!) Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (P.O. 1 of 1983)-

—Arts. 9 & 10-Constitutional petition u/A 199 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Where anything is done, any action is taken or is purported to have heen taken, made or done under provisions of Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, without jurisdiction, High Court has jurisdiction to declare same as illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.                                                      [P. 268] B

(ii) Establishment of the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (P.O. 1 of 1983)-

—Arts. 10(5) & 29--Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (v of 1908), S. l--Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984 (10 of 1984), Art. 1--Proceedings before Wafaqi Mohtasib are not judicial in nature and provisions of C.P.C. and Qanun- e-Shahadat Order, 1984, are not applicable-Mohtasib can adopt such procedure as he consider appropriate for investigation and can make such inquiries as he thinks fit under Art. 10(5) of Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib because the institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib has been established to provide speedy and expeditious relief to people" outside judicial hierarchy in order to avoid proverbial delay in dispensation of justice.                      [Pp. 267 & 268] A

PLD 1992 Kar. 339 ref.

(Hi) Establishment of the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (P.O. 1 of 1983)-

—Art. 10(5)-Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Art. 199-Burden to show that any section has been taken or any act has been done by assumption of jurisdiction not vested in Wafaqi Mohtasib is always on person alleging lack of jurisdiction so as to warrant interference by High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction.             [P. 268] C


 (iv) Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (P.O. 1 of 1983)--

—Arts. 9 & 10-Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 24 & 199--Jurisdiction once acquired by Wafaqi Mohtasib would continue till conclusion of proceedings, notwithstanding the denationalisation of Bank-When the account holds were deprived of their money as a result of maladministration, Bank was an agency and even at the time of assuming of the jurisdiction by Wafaqi Mohtasib the Bank still was an agency-Until and unless there was any law declaring that on denationalisation the Bank, proceedings pending before Wafaqi Mohtaib would stand abated, proceedings would be deemed to be pending and continuing-Bank could not wriggle out of responsibility for maladministration and could not be absolved of maladministration resulting in deprivation of account holders of their valuable right of protection of property—Order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib being with proper jurisdiction, Constitutional petition was dismissed. [Pp. 269 & 270] D & E

PLD 1992 Kar. 339 distinguished.

Mr. Muhammad Muzaffarul Haque, Advocate for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 17.1.2001.

JUDGMENT

Muhammad Mujibullah Siddiqui, J.-The petitioner Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., has assailed the order dated 18.5.1992 by the Respondent No. 1. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) contending that the said order is illegal, without jurisdiction, void ab initio and of no legal effect.

Briefly stated the facts as alleged in the petition are that Messrs N.J.N. Garments and Hosiery (Pvt.) Ltd. and Mrs. Nighat Nusreen Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 respectively have bank accounts with the petitioners' Ancholi Branch, Karachi. They filed a written complaint to the President of the Bank to the effect that two cheques in the sum of Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 1,30,000 which were not signed by them were encahsed from their Current Account No. 589 and P.L.S. Account No. 212 respectively. The complaints were not entertained for the reason that after investigation, it was found that the cheques were signed by the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and there was no discrepancy. According to the petitioner, the signatures on the disputed cheques were genuine. Thereafter the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed a joint complaint with the Respondent No. 1 who entertained the same on 16.9.1991. The petitioner was intimated that the action was being taken and the petitioner replied that the matter was got thoroughly probed through their Circle Audit Head, Karachi and the complaint was found baseless. The matter was heard by the Investigating Officer, appointed by Respondent No. 1 on 13.2.1992 when the petitioner contended that the Bank had been privatised on 12.9.1991 and its administration handed over to the new management and therefore, the Respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain such claim. It is further contended that the action taken by the Respondent No. 1, does not fall within Articles 9 and 29 of the President's Order No. 1 of 1983 by virtue of which the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib was established. It is submitted in the petition that the objection to the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1 was not entertained and the cheques were sent to the A.I.-G. Police Criminalistic Division, Sindh, Karachi. The said A.I-G. sent a report to the effect that these cheques did not bear the signatures of the Account holders. It is alleged that the said report was not given to the petitioner to challenge the same in rebuttal and on the basis of said report and without giving further opportunity to the petitioners, it was ordered that the responsibility of honouring the cheques bearing forged signatures lies on the bank and into the account holders. The petitioner was directed to refund the amount so encahsed. It is further contended in the petition that the Respondent No. 1 is not a Constitutional office and has been established under a statute therefore, all those conditions which are attached to the Constitutional office are not available to him and the impugned action can be challenged by the petitioner in the Constitutional jurisdiction. It is stated in the grounds of appeal that the complaint of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 does not fall within the meaning of maladministration as defined in the Presidential Order No. 1 of 1983.

When the petition was taken up for admission it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that according to Article 9 of the Presidential Order No. 1 of 1983, the Wafaqi Mohtasib can undertake any investigation into an allegation of maladministration on the part of any Agency or any of its Officers or employees. The term "agency" is defined in Article 2(1) sf the said Order as follows :

"Agency means a Ministiy, Division, Department, Commission or Office of the Federal Government or a statutory corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Federal Government but does not include the Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Federal Shariat Court or a High Court."

It was submitted that since the petitioner is now privately owned, therefore, it does not fall within the purview of "Agency" and the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order directing the petitioner to refund the amount of Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 1,30,00 to Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. On 8.9.1992 the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Wafaqi Mohtasib PLD 1992 Karachi 339, contending that the judgement supported the petitioner's case. The petition was accordingly admitted for regular hearing. On 13.10.1992 the petitioner was directed-to deposit the amount in question with the Nazir of this Court with the direction to invest the same in some Government securities. The operation of impugned order was suspended till the decision of the petition. The amount was deposited with the Nazir of this Court on 25.5.1994. The petition was fixed for hearing on 29.11.1999, when it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the main question is whether the petitioner was an agency to whom direction could be given by the Respondent No. 1. The learned counsel was not able to show that, this was the position on 24.7.1991 when the application was made to the Wafaqi Mohtasib and that subsequent change shall have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought time to prepare himself on all the questions involved in the petition. On his request the hearing was adjourned to 16.12.1999. The petition however could not be heard till 17.1.2001.

On this date nobody was present for the respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner was present. He addressed arguments in support of the petition but. he was no able to show that any subsequent change shall have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Respondent No. 1. He is not able to deny that when the cheques were encahsed in the years 1988 and 1989 the petitioner was an agency as defined in Article 2(1). His contention that the act complained against does not fall within the purview of "maladministration" as defined in Article 2(2) of President's Order No. 1 of 1983 is not tenable for the reason that in the definition of maladministration contained in Article 2(2)(ii) neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, inefficiency and ineptitude, in the administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities are also included.

Mr. Muhammad Muzaffarul Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the right of cross-examination was not afforded to the petitioner. We are not impressed with the contention because in Article 10(5) it is provided that Mohtasib may adopt such procedure as he considers appropriate for such investigation and may obtain information from such persons and in such manner and make such inquiries as he thinks fit.

A perusal of the impugned order shows that a meeting was held in the office of Investigating Officer, Mr. Shaukat Ali Sheikh. The following persons were present in the meeting :--

(1)             Mr. Noor Ahmed Khan for complainants.

(2)              Syed Hasan Saghir, Manager, A.B.L.

(3)              Mr. Khalid Mahboob, Senior Vice-President, A.B.L.

(4)              Mahir Raza, Zonal Chief, A.B.L.

During the discussion it was argued by all the parties that the issue hinges on the genuineness of the signatures on the cheques. The Investigating Officer after a thorough discussion with the parties came to the conclusion that the question, whether the cheques bore the signatures of the account-holders or not could be decided by a Handwriting Expert alone. The cheques were therefore referred to Mr. G.A. Jafri, A.I.-G. Sindh, Karachi


and the hearing was adjourned to 29.12.1992 which was attended by the following persons:—

(1)              Mr. Noor Muhammad Khan complainant.

(2)              Syed Hasan Saghir, Manager, A.B.L.

(3)              Mr. S.M.I. Rizvi, Zonal Chief.

(4)              Mr. G.A. Jafri, A.I.-G. Police, Sindh, Karachi.

At the hearing Mr. G.A. Jafri requested that the following documents be handed over to him for examination in the Laboratoiy :--

(1)              Cheques in Original.

(2)              Bank Specimen Cards.

(3)              Account Opening Form.

(4)              Ten Undisputed Cheques.

(5)              Identity Card of the Account-holders.

(6)              Signatures of the account-holders taken in presence of the Investigating Officer.

The next meeting was held on 21.4.1992 which was attended by the following persons :—

(1)              Syed Hasan Saghir, Manager, A.B.L.

(2)              Mr. G.A. Jafri, A.I.G., Police Sindh, Karachi.

The representative of the complainants was absent on the said date. Mr. G.A. Jafri submitted a report containing the conclusion that the disputed cheques did not bear the signatures of the account-holders.

On conclusion of the above proceedings and in presence of Handwriting Expert's report, the Respondent No. 1 held that the responsibility for honouring the cheques bearing the forged signature lies t;; the Bank which includes staff of the Bank and not on the account-holders. It was ordered that the respective amounts debited to the account of the account-holders be refunded to them. The petitioner was directed to submit a compliance report within one month of the receipt of the order. A perusal of the record made available to us shows that no objection was raised to the procedure adopted for investigating into the complaint before the Investigating Officer. On the contraiy the petitioner supplied the documents to the Handwriting Expert, Mr. G.A. Jafri vide their letter dated 8th March, 1992. After the submission of report by the Handwriting Expert no request was made for giving an opportunity for cross-examination of the Expert and no objections were filed thereto. Thus the petitioner is now estopped from raising plea that any prejudice has been caused to it by not providing an opportunity of cross-examining the Handwriting Expert. The proceedings before Wafaqi Mohtasib are not judicial in nature and the provisions of C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat are not applicable. As already observed earlier, the Mohtasib can adopt such procedure as he considers appropriate for investigation and can make such inquiries as he thinks fit under Article 10(5) of the President's Order No. 1 of 1983. No exception can be taken to the procedure adopted for deciding the complaint. The technicalities and niceties of the civil litigation in judicial proceedings, are not attracted to the proceedings before the Wafaqi Mohtasib because the institution has been established to provide speedy and expeditious relief to the people outside the judicial hierarchy in order to avoided the proverbial delay in the dispensation of justice. For the reason, no appeal or revision is provided against the order of Wafaqi Mohtasib except representation to the President under Article 32 of the President's Order No. 1 of 1983. The jurisdiction of the Courts is also barred under Article" 29 of the President's Order No. 1 of 1983, which reads as follows:

"29. Bar of jurisdiction-No Court or other authority shall have jurisdiction-

(1)              to question the validity of any action taken, or intended to be taken or order made, or anything done or purporting to have been taken, made or done under this Order; or

(2)              to grant an injunction or stay or to make any interim order in relation  to  any  proceedings  before,   or  anything  done   or intended to be done or purporting to have been done, by or under the orders or at the instance of the Mohtasib."

However, we would unhesitatingly add that if anything it done, any action is taken or is purported to have been taken, made or done under the President's Order No. 1 of 1983 without jurisdiction, the High Court shall always have the jurisdiction to delcare the same as illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect. If any authority is required on this point it is available in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), PLD 1992 Karachi 339. The burden to show that any action has been taken or any act has been done by assumption of jurisdiction not vested in the Wafaqi Mohtasib shall, however, always be on the person alleging the lack of jurisdiction so as to warrant interference by this Court in Constitutional jurisdiction.

Consequent to the above discussion it is held that the plea that the impugned order is bad for want of opportunity to cross-examine the Handwriting Expert is not available to the petitioner for the reasons that, firstly, it is not the requirement of any law, secondly, the procedure adopted by the Respondent No. 1 for investigating into the complaint is permissible under the President's Order No. 1 of 1983, thirdly the petitioner has already participated in the meetings held from time to time in the office of Investigating Officer of Respondent No. 1 without any objection to the procedure adopted, fourthly, it has not caused any miscarriage of justice and fifthly, the action taken by the Respondent No. 1, within its competence and jurisdiction cannot be challenged.

We would now revert to the last point which was agitated by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the first date of hearing and again raised on 29.11.1999. It is an admitted position that when the act complained against was committed, the petitioner was an agency as defined in Article 2(1) of the President's Order No. 1 of 1983 and so was the position when the complaint was made to the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show how with the denationalisation of petitioner, the Respondent No. 1 shall be divested of the jurisdiction already assumed   and   acquired   and   that  the   proceedings   pending  before   the respondent No. 1 shall stand abated. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction once acquired by Respondent No. 1 shall continue till the conclusion of the proceedings, notwithstanding the alleged denationalisation of the  petitioner-bank.  The  reason being that when the  Respondents Nos. and 3 were deprived of their money as a result of maladministration on the part of petitioner, the petitioner was admittedly in agency and when the jurisdiction was assumed even at that time the petitioner was an agency. The denationalisation takes place with the transfer of all the assets and liabilities. Until and unless is any law declaring that on denationlisation of the petitioner, the proceedings pending before Respondent No. 1 shall stand abated, the proceedings shall be deemed to be pending and continuing, with the result that the petitioner cannot wriggle out of the responsibility for maladministration   and   cannot  be   absolved   of the   maladministration resulting in deprivation of the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 of their valuable right of protection to property. It is, therefore, held that the Respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order with proper jurisdiction. The objection raised in this behalf is not tenable as the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to substantiate the contention that the impugned action taken by the Respondent No. 1 was without jurisdiction. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner has not placed reliance on the judgment in the case of National Bank of Pakistan v.  Wafaqi Mohtasib, PLD 1992 Karachi 399 at the time of final arguments, however, we have gone through the said judgment as reliance was placed on it at the time of admission of the petition. A perusal of the cited judgment shows that it is based on entirely different and distinguishable facts and therefore, the ratio of the cited judgment is not attracted to the present petition. In the cited judgment an employee of the National  Bank was proceed with for omissions and commissions,   in respect of service matter. After inquiiy, the competent authority awarded punishment. The order was challenged by the employee before the Lahore High Court by a petition which was accepted by the High Court and the infliction of punishment was set aside. The Bank challenged the aforesaid judgment of Lahore High Court before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in which leave to appeal was granted but finally the appeal was dismissed. The Bank preferred review petition which was also rejected. The employee thereafter filed proceedings for contempt in the Lahore High Court. The contempt proceedings were finally dismissed. Respondent; No. 2 in the cited petition filed a complaint with Wafaqi Mohtasib who directed the petitioner to report complete compliance of the Order of High Court. The Order of Wafaqi Mohtasib was assailed in a Writ Petition and it was held that the matter complained against related to a person grievance and therefore, Wafaqi Mohtasib had no jurisdiction in the matter. It was held that Wafaqi Mohtasib is not legally competent to take upon himself the functions of an executing Court in the matters emanating from the orders in Writ Petition. In these circumstances it was held that the impugned order made by the Wafaqi Mohtasib seeking compliance of the order of High Court and Supreme Court was without jurisdiction, illegal and of no legal effect. The facts involved in the present petition are entirely distinguishable and therefore, no reliance can be placed on the ratio of the judgment in the cited case.

Consequent to have findings, it is held that the petition is without substance, which sands dismissed with cost.

Mr. Muhammad Muzaffarul Haq, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the petition is dismissed the amount deposited with the Nazir of this Court may be released to the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 but the profit earned thereon may be allowed to be appropriated by the petitioner. The request is not tenable. It is the money of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, which had been invested under the orders of this Court in the month of May, 1994. The Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have already been deprived of the profits of the money, which was wrongly encahsed from their accounts in the year 1988 and 1989. In between the years 1988/1989 and the years 1994, they have not reaped any benefit of this amount. They cannot be deprived further of the profit earned on their own money. The contention is, therefore, repelled and the Nazir is directed to release the amount deposited with him alongwith the profit earned on the investment to the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 on proper verification and identification. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

(A.P.)                                                                             Orders accordingly.

 

Monday, 16 November 2020

Re-Examination Allowed by Islamabad High Court

 PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 3 (DB)

Present: Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui & Athar Minallah, JJ.

SHEREEN GUL alias FATIMA--Petitioner

versus

SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-TERRORISM COURT-I,
ISLAMABAD, etc.
--Respondents

Crl. Rev. No. 52 of 2014, decided on 9.9.2014.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----Ss. 439, 161 & 540--Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, (10 of 1984), Art. 161--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional Petition--Re-examination of witness--Re-summoning to make better statement amount to improve examination in chief and to fill up lacunas which would adversely affect defence version--Scope of re-examination was limited--Validity--It is mandatory for Court to summon a witness to recall and re-examine him if it appears just and essential for decision of case--After filing of complaint, some progress was made during investigation in case for payment of ransom amount and for that purpose, applicant/complainant got recorded his statement by narrating factual aspect regarding mode of payment to abductor, to that extent his deposition was not recorded before Court, therefore, it does not amount to fill up any lacuna in evidence rather essential and helpful for reaching to just conclusion of case--Order for production of a documents in order to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, in any form, at any time from any witness or form parties and also cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question except some exceptions provided in order--Revision was dismissed.         [P. 6] A & B

Ch. Abdul Khaliq Thind, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 9.9.2014.

Order

Instant Revision Petition u/S. 439, Cr.P.C., has been preferred against the order dated 10.06.2014 passed by learned Special Judge, Anti Terrorism Court, Islamabad whereby the application u/S. 540, Cr.P.C. moved by the complainant/Respondent No. 2, Azmat Khan in case FIR No. 260, u/S. 365-A, PPC, registered with P.S Ramna, Islamabad for re-examination of witness/complainant. The application u/S. 540, Cr.P.C. was moved by the witness/complainant who is the real son of the abductee namely Haji Rahim with the assertion that his incomplete statement was recorded on 24.04.2014 and no chance was given to the complainant to narrate the complete story; therefore, he may be permitted to complete his statement recorded u/S. 161, Cr.P.C. dated 15.07.2014 in Zimni No. 6. Learned Judge, Special Court (ATC-I) allowed the said application for re-examination of witness/ complainant.

2.  Learned counsel for petitioner contended that Respondent No. 2/complainant was called for evidence as PW-1 on 24.04.2014 who recorded his evidence and also cross-examined, That during the examination-in-chief PW-1 did not involve the petitioner in the commission of crime and learned Judge at the completion of his evidence verbally reprimanded the said witness for not naming/involving the petitioner, thereafter, the respondent filed an afterthought application u/S. 540, Cr.P.C. for re-examination of the PW-1 which the Respondent No. 1 accepted vide impugned order dated 10.06.2014.

3.  Learned counsel for petitioner argued that impugned order is illegal against law and facts of the case and learned trial Court fell in error while accepting the application u/S. 540, Cr.P.C. That the re-summoning of the complainant to make a better statement amount to improve his examination-in-chief and to fill up the lacunas which would adversely affect the defense version. That the scope of Re-examination is limited and placed under certain clogs, that too if certain ambiguity is sought to be removed, or certain explanation is need which is not subject of the impugned order.

Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.  For convenience sake, operative part of the impugned order dated 10.06.2014 passed by learned Special Judge, ATC-I, Islamabad is reproduce as under:--

"I have given careful consideration the available record as well arguments advanced by both sides and to observe that basically the applicant/complainant filed a complaint regarding abduction of his father namely Haji Rahim and got recorded his statement before this Court. After filing of complaint, some progress was made during investigation in the case for payment of the ransom amount and for that purposes, the applicant/complainant got recorded his statement vide Zimini No. 6, by narrating the factual aspect regarding mode of payment to the abductor, to that extent his deposition was not recorded before this Court. The arguments advanced by the defense counsel that if permission is granted for re-examination of the complainant, it will prejudice the case of the accused. I do not agree with the contention of the learned defense counsel because the complainant has joined investigation after filing of the complaint and got recorded his statement as prosecution witness, therefore, such omission for not recording his statement does not in any way fill up the lacuna of the prosecution case but the same will be helpful for reaching to just conclusion, whether the ransom amount was demanded and aid according to the prosecution version, therefore, in the interest of justice, I allow the instant application for re-examination of witness/ complainant namely Azmat Khan u/S. 540, Cr.P.C. who be summoned for the adjourned date."

For reaching to a just conclusion, Section 540, Cr.P.C. is reproduced hereunder:

"540. Power to summon material witness or examine person present.--Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case."

5.  Perusal of above provision makes it abundantly clear that in order to reach to a just conclusion, it is mandatory for the Court to summon a witness to recall and re-examine him if it appears just and essential for the decision of the case. In the present case, after filing of complaint, some progress was made during investigation in the case for payment of the ransom amount and for that purpose, the applicant/complainant got recorded his statement vide Zimini No. 6 by narrating the factual aspect regarding mode of payment to the abductor, to that extent his deposition was not recorded before the Court, therefore, it does not amount to fill up any lacuna in the evidence rather essential and helpful for reaching to the just conclusion of the case. This material fact is also mentioned in the report u/S. 173, Cr.P.C.. The law favours adjudication of cases on merit rather than technicalities and should always be interpreted in aid of justice and fairplay. Article 161 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, also empowers a Judge to put questions or order for production of a documents in order to obtain proper proof of the relevant facts, in any form, at any time from any witness or form the parties and also cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question except some exceptions provided in the order ibid. We are not persuaded with the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that impugned order resulted into filling up the lacunas left in the case.

6.  In view of above, by placing our reliance on case law reported as PLD 1984 S.C 95, we are of the view, that order passed by the learned Special Judge, ATC-I, Islamabad is well reasoned and no exception can be taken thereto, hence the Revision Petition is dismissed.

(R.A.)  Petition dismissed

Tuesday, 15 March 2016

Stay of Execution in Rent Matter

PLJ 2015 Lahore 738
Present: Abdus Sattar Asghar, J.
MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ--Petitioner
versus
W.P. No. 4302 of 2015, decided on 19.2.2015.
----O. XXI, R. 29--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Scope of--Suspension of execution proceedings--Injunctive order--Dispute of ownership of demised premises is pending, execution ejectment order be stayed--It is well settled that only relationship of landlord and tenant is relevant to exercise jurisdiction by Rent Tribunal under Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009--Controversy between parties with regard to plea of ejectment stood resolved through ejectment--Respondents were not holding a decree of a Civil Court where petitioner’s suit for declaration was pending rather an ejectment order passed by Rent Tribunal against petitioner is being executed in accordance with law--Provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI of are not attracted.
                                                                                                                        [P. 741] A & B
----Wilful and mala-fide concealment of material facts by petitioner in his plaint also disentitles him to any relief under principle of equity.
                                                                                                                        [P. 721] C
----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 and O. XLI, R. 29--Injunctive order--Restraining from interfering in possession over suit properties--Execution proceedings--Validity--Status quo order passed by civil judge does not attract provisions of R. 29 of Order XXI Rule 29 of CPC--Petitioner was not entitled to claim stay of execution proceedings of ejectment order--Lawful order passed by a revisional Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be called into question in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.                                            [P. 741] D & E
Syed Qaisar Gilani, Advocate for Petitioner.
Date of hearing: 19.2.2015.
Order
Petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to impugn the order dated 7.2.2015 passed by learned Additional District Judge Sargodha whereby application for suspension of execution proceedings before the learned trial Court has been declined.
2.  It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned revisional Court erred in law and failed to exercise its jurisdiction while declining his application to stay the execution proceedings before the learned trial Court through the impugned order which is untenable and liable to set aside.
3.  Arguments heard. Record perused.
4.  Brief facts leading to this petition are that respondents’ ejectment petition against the petitioner was accepted by the learned Rent Tribunal Sargodha vide order dated 14.10.2010. Respondents lodged execution petition before the learned Rent Tribunal on 23.10.2010. Petitioner’s appeal against the ejectment order dated 14.10.2010 was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge Sargodha vide judgment dated 20.1.2011. Being aggrieved petitioner assailed the ejectment order and the said judgment before this Court through Writ Petition No. 3031 of 2011 which was also dismissed vide order dated 6.8.2014. Being aggrieved of the order dated 6.8.2014 petitioner preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan which he later on withdrew. In the above state of affairs the ejectment order dated 14.10.2010 passed by learned Rent Tribunal Sargodha against the petitioner in favour of the respondents has attained finality. In the meanwhile on 9.12.2014 petitioner lodged a suit for declaration etc. against the respondents and others claiming his ownership in various properties including the subject matter of the ejectment petition. Along with the said suit petitioner also lodged an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC restraining the respondents and others from interfering in his possession over the suit properties. Learned Civil Judge vide order dated 9.12.2014 issued ad-interim temporary injunction i.e. “status quo in respect of alienation and possession of the suit property be maintained till next date of hearing”. On the basis of said injunctive order petitioner lodged an application before the learned revisional Court under Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with a prayer that since the dispute of ownership of the demised premises between the parties is pending before the Civil Court therefore execution of the ejectment order be stayed. The said application was resisted by the respondents. The learned executing Court after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties dismissed the petitioner’s application under Order XXI Rule 29 of the CPC through the order dated 4.2.2015. Petitioner being aggrieved assailed the said order through a revision petition before the learned Additional District Judge Sargodha along with an application to suspend the execution proceedings which was declined by the learned revisional Court through the impugned order dated 7.2.2015, hence this constitutional petition.
5.  At the outset it may be expedient to reproduce the provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads below:--
“29.  Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment debtor:--Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided.”
6.  The expression “against the holder of a decree of such Court” used in the above quoted provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI of CPC is significant and of great importance. It is well settled that only relationship of landlord and tenant is relevant to exercise the jurisdiction by the learned Rent Tribunal under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. The controversy between the parties with regard to plea of ejectment stood resolved through the ejectment order dated 14.10.2010 maintained up-till the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is pertinent to mention that in this case respondents were not holding a decree of a Civil Court where petitioner’s suit for declaration was pending rather an ejectment order passed in favour of the respondents by the learned Rent Tribunal against the petitioner is being executed in accordance with law therefore provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not attracted to the facts of this case. The execution of ejectment order passed by the learned Rent Tribunal therefore cannot be interfered with in terms of Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Besides careful reading of the contents of the plaint in the suit for declaration lodged by the petitioner against the respondents and others clearly manifests that petitioner willfully concealed the factum of lawful ejectment order dated 14.10.2010 passed by learned Rent Tribunal in favour of the respondents against him. Wilful and mala-fide concealment of material facts by the petitioner in his plaint also disentitles him to any relief under the principle of equity. The status quo order passed by the learned Civil Judge in the suit for declaration lodged by the petitioner does not attract the provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI of CPC therefore the petitioner on that basis is not entitled to claim stay of execution proceedings of the ejectment order. I do not find any factual or legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order dated 7.2.2015 passed by learned Additional District Judge Sargodha. Needless to say that a lawful order passed by a revisional Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be called into question in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
7.  For the above reasons this writ petition having no merit is dismissed in limine.

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