Showing posts with label Best Lawyer Islamabad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Best Lawyer Islamabad. Show all posts

Saturday, 3 August 2024

Filing of Appeal during Summer Vacations

 PLJ 2021 Lahore (Note) 74

Present: Asad Munir, J.

AHSAN JAVED--Appellant

versus

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE etc.--Respondents

W.P. No. 19674 of 2011, decided on 4.11.2011.

West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964--

----S. 17-A--Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles--Non-payment of interim maintenance allowance--Defence of petitioner was struck off--Suit was decreed--Appeal--Dismissed being time-barred--Appeal was filed during summer vacations--Challenge to--Additional District Judge wrongly held that petitioner’s appeal was time-barred as was filed during of summer vacations in month of August--In view of section 4 of Limitation Act, 1908, petitioner had two options as he could either file his appeal during summer vacations on any day in August, 2010 or he could file it on 01.09.2010 upon reopening of Courts--Appeal filed by petitioner during summer vacations was within time as it could be filed later on 1.9.2010--Argument that suit filed by respondents no.2 to 4 has been disposed of with regard to other claims made therein is untenable as appeal has been wrongly dismissed as time-barred instead of being decided on merits--Petition allowed.

                                                                                      [Para 3] A & B

Mr. Muhammad Shahbaz Rana, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Zaman Bhutta, Advocate for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 15.9.2011.

Order

After the dissolution of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.2 on 21.01.2010, a composite suit for the recovery of maintenance allowance for the two minor children, respondents
No. 3 and 4, for the reimbursement of the delivery expenses of respondent No. 4 and for the return of respondent No. 2’s dowry articles, valued at Rs. 1516334/-, was filed on 03.02.2010. Vide order dated 17.06.2010, the learned Judge Family Court, Lahore, allowed Rs. 4000/-.as interim maintenance to each of the two minors which was to be paid by the 14th of every month. The interim maintenance was not paid by the petitioner by 14.07.2010 whereupon vide order dated 16.07.2010 the learned Judge Family Court struck off the defense of the petitioner under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 and also passed judgment/decree dated 16.07.2010 whereby monthly maintenance of Rs. 4000/- has been allowed to each minor with effect from the date of institution of the suit subject to the annual increase of 10%. On 21.08.2010, the petitioner filed an appeal which has been dismissed for being time-barred by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, vide his order dated 21.08.2010 which has assailed through this writ petition.

2. Learned counsel while challenging the impugned order has contended that the appeal could not be dismissed as time-barred as it was filed during the summer vacations commencing from 01.08.2010 till 31.07.2010. Reliance has been placed on Fazal Karim and another versus Ghulam Jillani and others (1975 SCMR 452), Habib Bank Ltd throuuh Authorized Attorneys versus Messrs Wisdom Education System (Pvt.) Ltd. and 6 others (2009 CLD 1367), Port Muhammad Bin Qasim versus National Insurance Corporation, Karachi and 13 others (1983 CLC 3126), Shah Muhammad and others versus Muhammad Ashraf (1994 CLC 90) and Ikramullah and others versus Said Jamal (1980 SCMR 375). In response, the only submission made by the learned counsel for Respondents No. 2 to 4 is that the question of maintenance cannot be re-opened by the learned Additional District Judge as no suit is pending now in the Family Court as other claims made in the suit have already been decided.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the learned Additional District Judge wrongly held that the petitioner’s appeal was lime-barred as it was filed on 21.08.2010 during the currency of the summer vacations in the month of August. It may be stated that in view of section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the petitioner had two options as he could either file his appeal during the summer vacations on any day in August, 2010 or he could file it on 01.09.2010 upon the reopening of the Courts. Thus, the appeal filed by the petitioner during the summer vacations was within time as it could be filed later on 1.9.2010. The aforesaid legal position is supported by the case law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The argument that the suit filed by Respondents No. 2 to 4 has been disposed of with regard to other claims made therein is untenable as the appeal has been wrongly dismissed as time-barred instead of being decided on merits.

4. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside with a direction to the learned Additional District Judge to decide the appeal on merits. There will no order as to costs.

(Y.A.)  Petition allowed

Thursday, 18 July 2024

Conviction Under Section 22(b) of Emigration Ordinance 1979

 PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Note) 31

[Lahore High Court, Multan Bench]

PresentTariq Saleem Sheikh, J.

ABBAS ALI--Appellant

versus

STATE and another--Respondents

Crl. A. No. 646 of 2018, decided on 15.11.2018.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 426--Emigration Ordinance, 1979, S. 22(b)--Suspension of sentence--Application of--Conviction and sentence u/S. 22(b) of Emigration Ordinance, 1979--Sentence awarded to petitioner is indeed short--There is no prospect of early fixation of main appeal of the petitioner which relates to year 2018--In case his sentence is not suspended there is a possibility that he may serve out his entire sentence before his appeal is decided--According to report dated 14.11.2018 submitted by Superintendent, District Jail, Multan, he is incarcerated since date of his arrest and has already served out imprisonment of two years--He cannot be kept behind bars for an indefinite period as it would amount to punishment in advance--Application was accepted. [Para 3] A

Prince Rehan Iftikhar, Advocate, for Petitioner.

Mr. Ansar Yasin, Deputy Prosecutor General for State.

Ch. Inamullah, Advocate, for the Complainant.

Date of hearing: 15.11.2018.

Order

CrlMisc.No. 1/2018

Petitioner Abbas Ali was tried by the learned Special Judge (Central), Multan, in case FIR No. 349/2016 dated 5.9.2016 registered at Police Station FIA/CC, Multan. Through the impugned judgment dated 9.7.2017 he was convicted under Section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance. 1979 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to him. The Petitioner has filed the above-noted appeal against the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 9.7.2017 which is still pending. Through the instant application he seeks suspension of his sentence.

2. Arguments heard. Record perused.

3. The sentence awarded to the petitioner is indeed short. There is no prospect of early fixation of the main appeal of the Petitioner which relates to the year 2018. In case his sentence is not suspended there is a possibility that he may serve out his entire sentence before his appeal is decided. According to the report dated 14.11.2018 submitted by Superintendent, District Jail, Multan, he is incarcerated since the date of his arrest and has already served out imprisonment of two years. He cannot be kept behind the bars for an indefinite period as it would amount to punishment in advance. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Abdul Hameed v. Muhammad Abdullah and others (1999 SCMR 2589), this application is accepted. The sentence of the Petitioner is suspended and he is released on bail subject to his furnishing baill bond in the sum of Rs. 100,000/- (Rupees one hundred thousand) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Deputy Registrar (Judl.) of this Bench. The Petitioner is, however, directed to attend this Court on each and every date of hearing till the final decision of his appeal.

(A.A.K.)          Application accepted

Thursday, 13 June 2024

Application for Impleadment in Appeal

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 437

[Multan Bench, Multan]

Present: Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J.

Mst. SHAHNAZ PARVEEN--Petitioner

versus

Mst. ASMA KALSOOM & 20 others--Respondents

C.R. No. 113 of 2018 & C.R. No. 1674 of 2017, decided on 13.9.2021.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----S. 42--Suit for declaration--Decreed--Appeal Filing of application
for impleadment as party during pendency of appeal--Accepted--Matter was remanded--Producing of documents at appeal stage
by respondent--Determination of documents--Challenge to--Admissibility of documents cannot be determined without giving chance to parties to exhibit same and or chance to produce makers and witnesses of documents--Any ruling as to authenticity of documents without proper examination can result into miscarriage of justice and at same time shall prejudice trial and/or appeals-- Order of remand by Appellate Court is simply a matter sent to trial Court for re-examination and this order is not final determination of rights of parties--Discretion exercise by Appellate Court is neither unwarranted nor unjust in circumstances--Counsel of petitioner has failed to make out any case of material irregularity or illegality, requiring interference in revisional jurisdiction--Revision petition dismissed.       [Pp. 439 & 441] A, C & D

PLD 1962 SC 291 ref.

Power of Court--

----Court is empowered, at all stages of proceedings, to add any party or parties whose presence before Court is necessary to adjudicate upon real matter in dispute or when presence of parties is necessary to enable Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon matter.

                                                                                              [P. 439] B

Malik Muhammad Tariq Nonari, Advocate for Petitioner (in Revision Petition No. 113-2018).

Mr. Iqbal Hussain Jafri, Advocate for Respondents.

Mr. Iqbal Hussain Jafri, Advocate for Petitioner (in Revision Petition No. 1674-2017).

Malik Muhammad Tariq Nonari, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 13.9.2021.

Judgment

Through this single judgment, the captioned revision petitions being outcome of same order, alongwith all the civil miscellaneous applications, shall be decided together.

2. The present revision petitions are arising out of the consolidated order dated 23.10.2017 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Khanewal in civil appeals.

3. The facts, necessary for the decision of these civil revisions, are that Mst. Shahnaz Parveen (the 'Petitioner') obtained a judgment and decree dated 22.02.2016 in civil suits No. 59 of 1997, whereby she was declared as lawful daughter of Hussain Ahmad Khan and Mst. Khursheed Jahan and Mutation No. 183 dated 19.01.1972 was cancelled. The Petitioner was held entitled to inherit the estate of her parents alongwith sisters namely Mst. Munawar Jahan and Mst. Raees Jahan and brother Sarwar Ali Khan. Appeals were filed by unsatisfied defendants.

4. Mst. Asma Kalsoom (the 'Respondent No. 1') filed applications under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure Act, 1908 in the referred appeals. Learned Additional District Judge, Khanewal on 23.10.2017 while accepting the applications, ordered to implead her as party in the suits as defendants. The entire matter was remanded to the learned trial Court with the direction to obtain the written statement of Respondent No. 1, frame proper issues and to decide the matter after recording evidence, if any produced. Said order has been challenged by way of present revision petitions.

5. Malik Muhammad Tariq Nonari, learned counsel for the Petitioner, while arguing the case submitted that the documents relied by the learned Appellate Court are fake and forged; that Madrasah/School certificate is inadmissible as the certificate produced contains a stamp which say "copy to copy is not admissible in Court" and further contended that the relevant school has refused to recognized the document; that similarly Marriage Certificate issued by Government of Punjab having entry dated 06.04.2016 is bogus; that Family Certificate has been ignored by the learned Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that suit titled "Mst. Kalsoom v. Manager NADRA" was filed on 16.06.2016 for correction of the name of father which was dismissed, likewise, some other suits for correction of the names were also dismissed. It has been further argued that the order of remand by the learned Appellate Court is illegal and the learned Appellate Court should have obtained the evidence itself instead of making the order of remand.

6. Conversely, Mr. Iqbal Hussain Jafri, learned counsel for the Respondents, has opposed this revision petition and submitted that the documents produced with this revision were never produced before the learned Appellate Court and the same were obtained after the decision of remand by influencing the authorized person.

7. I have heard the arguments and with the able assistance of the learned counsel for the parties record is perused.

8. Respondent No. 1 at the appeal stage produced the certificate, which shows her name as Mst. Asma Kalsoom, daughter of Muhammad Sarwar Ali Khan. Her Marriage Certificate with one Malik Irshad Hussain, which was issued on 06.04.2016, is reflecting the same. Divorce Deed dated 30.06.1998 is produced before learned Appellate Court, whereby Muhammad Sarwar Ali Khan has allegedly divorced the mother (Mst. Khalida Parveen) of Respondent No. 1. Though, the learned counsel for petitioner has countered these documents by placing on record certificate issued by the school and a marriage certificate dated 27.05.2016 which contains name of one Abdullah in column of the father's name and other documents have also been relied upon, which contradict the stance taken by the Respondent No. 1.

Description: A9. The admissibility of aforementioned documents cannot be determined without giving chance to the parties to exhibit the same and/or the chance to produce the makers and witnesses of these documents. Any ruling as to the authenticity of these documents without proper examination can result into miscarriage of justice and at the same time shall prejudice the trial and/or appeals.

Description: B10. It is settled law that the Court is empowered, at all stages of the proceedings, to add any party or parties whose presence before the Court is necessary to adjudicate upon the real matter in dispute or when presence of the parties is necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the matter. The person, who is claiming to own share in the suit for administration or inheritance, certainly falls in the category of persons, who are likely to be adversely affected by the adjudication.

11. It will be beneficial to reproduce the relevant part of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in case titled "Syed Mehdi Hussain Shah v. Mst. Shadoo Bibi and others" (PLD 1962 Supreme Court 291):

".... According to Order I, rule 10, of the Civil Procedure Code any persons whose presence is "necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit" may be added as a party to the suit. There should be no objection to a plaintiff joining in an administration suit all those who claim to be entitled to a share in the property of the deceased and whose claim he wants to be adjudicated upon. To refuse the plaintiff to implead such persons will lead to an almost intolerable situation. Suppose there are ten claimants to an estate of the deceased and the plaintiff who sues for administration admits the claim of only one of them. If he is allowed to implead only the one whose claim he admits the decree passed in the administration suit distributing the estate may be nullified by one of the remaining claimants filing a suit and serving a declaration that he is entitled to a share in the estate of the deceased. The heir who has already got a decree in the administration suit will, if he still desires distribution of the estate, have to file a second suit for administration impleading also the heir who has secured a declaration, but the decree in this second suit too may be nullified by another claimant filing a suit and getting a declaration that he is entitled to a share in the estate of the deceased. It seems clear therefore that an acceptance of the contention of learned counsel for the appellant may lead to a hopeless multiplicity of suits. Great stress is laid by learned counsel on the fact that the plaintiff will by an administration suit be getting possession from persons who are in fact only trespassers and this is outside the scope of an administration suit. But the plaintiff will be getting possession only from persons who claim to be entitled to a share in the property of the deceased and who claim no independent right in themselves. While an administration suit is not a remedy for getting possession from those who claim the property in their possession in their own right and adversely to the deceased there does not appear to be any valid objection to their dispossession if they claim only as heirs or under a will from the deceased and their claim is


negatived. The question as to whether a person is entitled to a share in the property of the deceased is a fit subject of decision in an administration suit and in fact learned counsel for the appellant does not contended to the contrary his plea being that a defendant in an administration suit can raise a question as to whether the plaintiff or another defendant is entitled to a share but that the plaintiff cannot raise such a plea as to a defendant. We see no good reason for this distinction. "

(Emphasis supplied)

Description: C12. Furthermore, order of remand by the learned Appellate Court is simply a matter sent to the learned trial Court for re-examination and this order is not final determination of rights of the parties. I am of the considered view that discretion exercise by the learned Appellate Court is neither unwarranted nor unjust in the circumstances. It cannot be said that while passing order of remand to re-examine the matter in the light of fresh facts, documents and parties, learned appellate Court has acted arbitrarily or without jurisdiction.

Description: D13. Learned Counsel of the petitioner has failed to make out any case of material irregularity or illegality, requiring interference in the revisional jurisdiction. The instant revision petition is, therefore, dismissed, with no order as to costs.

14. For reasons recorded above, the Revision Petition No. 1674 of 2017 having no substance is also dismissed.

15. C.M. No. 2970-C of 2018 in Civil Revision No. 1674 of 2017 for impleading Applicants as necessary party is disposed of, as the same can be filed before the learned Court, where the trial is pending, if permissible by law.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

Monday, 10 June 2024

Application for Summoning of Record Keeper

 PLJ 2024 Lahore 302

PresentRasaal Hasan Syed, J.

MUHAMMAD AKRAM--Petitioner

versus

Haji ILAM DIN (deceased) through L.Rs and others--Respondents

W.P. No. 48863 of 2023, decided on 1.3.2024.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----O.XVI R. 1--Application for summoning record keeper--Dismissed--Revision petition--Allowed--Petitioner’s application to filing of list of witnesses was declined--Revision petition--Dismissed--No sufficient cause was shown by petitioner--Recording of evidence--Challenge to--Petitioner was unable to show any “sufficient cause” for permission to file a List of Witnesses which was not filed earlier within seven days of issues and no “sufficient cause” was shown to satisfaction of Court--Respondents sought indulgence of Court for summoning witness as a Court-witness to find out truth and to do complete justice between parties and revisional Court after considering that aspect, deemed it just and fair to allow production of record; which was an official record of Treasury--Order of ADJ did not suffer from any error of law and jurisdiction and being based on rule of fair, just and complete justice, does not call for any interference--Petition dismissed.                                                 [Pp. 309 & 310] C, D & E

1992 SCMR 1778 and 2016 CLC (N) 127 ref.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----O.XVI R. 1--Summon as witness--A party could not summon any person as a witness unless they are named in list of witnesses which could be filed within seven days.             [P. 306] A

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----O.XVI R. 1--Powers of Court--Proviso to Rule 1 of Order XVI, C.P.C. empowers Court to condone default in filing list of witnesses within seven days if “sufficient cause” or “good reason” is shown to exist.           

                                                                                             [P. 306] B

Mr. Umar Farooq, Advocate for Petitioner.

Ms. Sabahat Rizvi, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 14.2.2024.

Judgment

Petitioner in this constitutional petition has challenged order dated 15.7.2023 of the learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore whereby application to summon the Record Keeper of Treasury Office, District Lahore along with the record regarding stamp-paper at serial No. 409 dated 15.8.1998 issued by Muhammad Naeem, Stamp Vendor and for recording his statement as a Court-witness, was allowed by setting aside the order dated 18.1.2023 of the learned Civil Judge, Lahore, while accepting the revision petition.

2. Facts as will be relevant for disposal of this petition are that suit for specific performance titled Haji Ilam Din v. Ghulam Haider, etc. and another suit for specific performance and permanent injunction titled Muhammad Hanif v. Noor Muhammad were instituted and are pending in the civil Court in respect of land measuring 19 kanals and 16 marlas situated in Mauza Arainyan, Raiwind Lahore. Vide order dated 31.10.2019 both the suits were consolidated and consolidated issues were framed with the direction to the parties to file within seven days the list of witnesses and certificate of readiness to produce evidence. It is claimed that both the parties did not file list of witnesses after the framing of consolidated issues. On 20.1.2020 petitioner and his witnesses appeared in Court when objection was raised that list of witnesses was not filed and, therefore, their evidence could not be recorded. An application was moved by the petitioner claiming that list of witnesses having already been filed before the consolidation of suits may be treated as list of petitioner’s witnesses or alternatively the petitioner may be allowed to furnish fresh list of witnesses on the basis of additional issues framed by the Court. This application was declined vide order dated 01.2.2020. The order was challenged in revision which was also dismissed by the learned Addl. District Judge vide order dated 29.4.2021. These two orders were challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No. 30927 of 2021 which too was dismissed on 01.7.2021. It is claimed that an application under Order XVI, C.P.C. was filed on 24.10.2022 by defendant Nos. 3 to 9 (respondents herein) for summoning Record Keeper of Treasury Office, District Lahore along with record of stamp-paper at Serial No. 409 dated 15.8.1998 issued by Muhammad Naeem, Stamp Vendor which was opposed and declined by the learned Civil Judge vide order dated 18.1.2023. The respondents challenged the order in revision which was accepted by learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore vide impugned order dated 15.7.2023.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly argued that the list of witnesses having not been filed after the framing of additional issues by the petitioner, the permission to summon the Record Keeper of the Treasury, at this stage, could not be permitted in the absence of any good or sufficient cause which having not been shown, the order of the learned Civil Judge declining the application was justified and that interference in revision by the learned Addl. District Judge vide impugned order was contrary to the rule consistently laid by the superior Courts in terms whereof any party to the suit could not summon a witness not named in the list of witnesses which needs to be filed within seven days from the framing of issues; unless permission is solicited from the Court in terms of proviso to Rule 1 of Order XVI, C.P.C. by showing “good cause” which course having not been adopted in this case, the order of the learned Addl. District Judge in revision was unsustainable. It is added that the respondents being negligent in filing of the list of witnesses in time could not be allowed to by-pass the law and that the petitioner was not allowed to file list of witnesses after the framing of additional issues which order was sustained up to this Court and, therefore, the respondents could not be treated differently than treatment extended to the petitioner and that the rule of propriety demanded that the respondents should not have been permitted to summon the Record Keeper in the absence of any list of witnesses or “sufficient cause” for the delay in this context. Learned counsel relied on certain caselaw to emphasize that the superior Courts while considering the effect of Rule 1 of Order XVI, C.P.C. have consistently observed that the rule is mandatory and that no party can be taken by surprise and that the parties to a suit are under obligation to file a list of witnesses whom they want to summon through the process of Court and in case of failure to do so the Court is competent to grant permission for filing delayed list provided “sufficient cause” is established.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents contrariwise submitted that the documents were duly relied upon in the list of reliance submitted in Court under Order XIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. and Order VII, Rule 14, C.P.C. Referring to the certified copies of the list of reliance it was submitted that there was no element of surprise to the petitioner; rather the document was duly mentioned in the list of reliance. It was added that the petitioner Muhammad Akram himself appeared in the witness-box, recorded his oral statement and produced agreement to sell dated 15.8.1998 purportedly executed by Noor Muhammad son of Imam Din in favour of the petitioner which is Exh.D-1 in the suit titled Muhammad Hanif v. Noor Muhammad, etc. During cross-examination by the counsel for legal heirs of late Haji Ilam Din certain questions in regard to the agreement were put to Muhammad Akram petitioner who denied the same although he admitted that the stamp of Exh.D-1 bore Serial No. 409 but expressed lack of knowledge about the copy of the Form No. 409. He also denied the report of the Treasury in respect of the stamp-paper of Form No. 409. It was added that copy of the record of Stamp-Paper No. 409 dated 15.8.1998, purportedly agreement to sell in favour of Muhammad Akram son of Muhammad Shafi and report of Treasury of District Lahore dated 30.5.2019 showed that fraud was committed by the petitioner Muhammad Akram as the report was to the effect that the particulars of “register goshwara” for the years 1998 to 1999 when scrutinized revealed that stamp value of Rs. 10/-dated 15.8.1998 in favour of Ghulam Muhammad son of Shah Din resident of Lahore was entered. In view of the contradiction in the document provided by the petitioner, and its original entered in the stamp-paper goshwara, the respondent moved an application for summoning of the record of the Treasury Office, District Lahore in respect of Entry No. 409 dated 15.8.1998 issued by Muhammad Naeem, Stamp Vendor. Learned counsel submits that the contradictions in the two documents i.e. Exh.D-1 and the actual entries of endorsement in the record for sale of stamp will show that fraud was committed by the petitioner and that the stamp paper on which the agreement was prepared did not pertain to the petitioner and that the learned Civil Judge rejected the application without considering the objective of the application or noticing the material effect of the production of record on the fate of the case while the learned Addl. District Judge duly took into consideration the plea of the petitioner and rightly observed that the Court had the jurisdiction to call for the record if it is required to do justice and to determine the facts properly so as to reach the truth.

5. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have been given due consideration. It appears that initially the suits were tried separately and evidence was recorded. After their consolidation list of witnesses in respect of additional consolidated issues was not filed. Petitioner appeared in the witness-box and produced the agreement relied upon by him as Exh.D-1. Learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 3 to 7, the legal heirs of deceased Haji Ilam Din, put serious questions to the witness in respect of the stamp entry of Exh.D-1. In cross-examination he admitted that the stamp Exh.D-1 was prepared on Stamp Paper No. 409 but he showed his ignorance as to the form (copy of which was put to him) for supply of stamp Exh.D-1. On being asked about the report of the Treasury Department as regarded entries qua Stamp No. 409, the petitioner denied that the Stamp No. 409 for issuance of stamp-paper was in the name of Ghulam Muhammad son of Shah Din. He also denied that the stamp was issued on 16.7.1998. Learned Addl. District Judge reversed the order of learned Civil Judge with the observation that the Court was fully cognizant and had jurisdiction to summon any person as Court-witness to receive evidence and allow the parties to produce the same so that complete justice could be done in the case.

6. As regards the objection of Order XVI, Rule 1, C.P.C. to the effect that a party could not summon any person as a witness unless they are named in the list of witnesses which could be filed within seven days, there is no cavil with the proposition. It is also true that proviso to Rule 1 of Order XVI, C.P.C. empowers the Court to condone the default in filing the list of witnesses within seven days if “sufficient cause” or “good reason” is shown to exist. In this case perusal of the application for summoning of Record Keeper with record of Treasury shows that the application was not filed under any specific rule rather title of the application shows that it was filed under Order XVI read with Section 151, C.P.C. and all other enabling provisions of law while at paragraph 5 of the application it was stated that the Record Keeper of Treasury Office, District Lahore along with the relevant record of stamp-paper Serial No. 409 dated 15.8.1998 be summoned for recording statement as a Court-witness. Same was the request in the prayer clause of the application. It is thus obvious that the production of the witness and the record was claimed as a Court-witness which obviously meant that the provision of Rule 14 of Order XVI, C.P.C. was attracted which mandates that where the Court at any time considers it necessary to examine any person other than a party to the suit and who is not called as a witness by a party in the suit, the Court may of its own motion cause such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence or to produce any document in his possession, on a day to be appointed; and may examine such person as a witness or require him to produce such document. Rule 14-A of Order XVI, C.P.C. was inserted by the Lahore High Court Amendment which is to the effect that when a witness is summoned by the Court of its own motion under Rule 14 of Order XVI, C.P.C. their diet money, etc. will be paid by such party or parties as the Court may in its discretion, direct. It appears that the learned Civil Judge was simply persuaded by the fact that earlier an application was filed by the petitioner for permission to file a new list of witnesses after consolidation of suits which was declined vide order dated 01.2.2020, the order was affirmed in revision vide order dated 29.4.2021 by learned Addl. District Judge and also by this Court in W.P. No. 30927 of 2021 titled Muhammad Akram v. Noor Muhammad and others and, therefore, the respondent in this case should also decline to summon a witness not mentioned in the list, little appreciating that the Court itself had jurisdiction to allow any person’s statement or production of record even if the parties to the suit had not summoned such person or record and that the Court can exercise its power to record the statement as a Court-witness and, if need be, to allow production of evidence in rebuttal thereof. Learned Addl. District Judge did take note of this aspect of the matter which is reproduced for facility of reference:

“… it is necessary to refer that Court is competent to summon the witness keeping in view the importance and relevance of that piece of evidence so that justice could be done in the real sense and no one could be knocked out mere on technical ground. Stamp paper No. 409 dated 15.8.1998 is part of record, there, revision petitioner as alleged that it is a fake document, he produced the report of Record Keeper and want to summon him as a Court Witness so that the real fact could be unearth. It is sufficient to mention here that evidence proposed by the plaintiff is necessary to reach upon a just decision of the case. In such scenario the learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the record as well as the relevant law on the subject and has committed material illegality as well as irregularity while passing the impugned order, therefore, the instant revision petition is accepted and the impugned order is set aside and accordingly the application for summoning of record keeper filed by revision petitioner stands accepted….”

7. Perusal of the stance of the respondent as to the document produced by the petitioner being fake; to cross-examine the petitioner in respect of Exh. D-1; and the evasive reply received would make it obvious that the material fact as to whether the document was genuine or not in view of the report, if allowed to come on record, will be necessary to reach the truth for doing justice to the parties. It is for this reason that Rule 14 of Order XVI, C.P.C. empowers the Court to summon any witness for recording his statement or produce any document if need be for the just and fair decision of the case even if the parties to the suit had failed to produce them in the Court. It appears that the respondents being cognizant of the law, did not move the application under Rule 1 of Order XVI, C.P.C; rather the title of the application shows that it is under Order XVI read with Section 151, C.P.C. and all other enabling provisions of law. Even otherwise if had no particular provision of law been quoted, the Court will be fully empowered to determine as to which provision of law will attracted for the relief claimed in the application and mere fact that the prayer in the application was to summon the witness for their statement and to produce record of Treasury as a Court-witness was adequate to show that Rule 14 of Order XVI, C.P.C. will be attracted. In Zar Wali Shah v. Yousaf Ali Shah and 9 others (1992 SCMR 1778) it was observed to the effect that the Courts have ample power to collect evidence and allow the party to produce the same so that complete and ultimate justice is done in the case and that concept of filling any lacuna cannot be recognized and applied in the Islamic system of jurisprudence which is being progressively applied to the Courts and Tribunals that are vested with the powers to receive evidence. In Mst. Sardar Begum v. Zulfiqar Ali (2016 CLC Note 127) it was observed to the effect that the main object of Rules 1(2) and 14 of Order XVI, C.P.C. was that the entire evidence which was relevant and necessary for ascertaining truth and deciding the issues involved completely and effectively should come before the Court at the stage of trial while passing judgment and that merely on the pretext of non-submission of list of witnesses and non-mentioning of names of witnesses in the list of witnesses, the matter could not be thrown out of arena of litigation because same could be due to inexperience or lack of understanding on part of the counsel which omission amounted to “good cause”. Reference was made therein to the case of Agha Zahid Ali Hilali v. Muhammad Riaz and others (C.P. No. 1278 of 2013 decided on 23.9.2013) where it was observed as under:

“It is not disputed on the record that examination of scribe and stamp vendor in the litigation on going between the parties is imperative for the just decision of the case. Yes, the respondents did not mention the names of these witnesses in their list of witnesses but when during the course of cross examination, it was; suggested to Respondent No. 1 by the counsel for the petitioners that he failed to prove the document by not examining the scribe and the stamp vendor, he after having been set on his guards, proceeded to move an application for summoning of the aforesaid witnesses. This shows that omission to summon the witnesses owes its origin to either in-experience or lack of understanding on the part of the counsel or the party. Omission of this type was a good cause to all intents and purpose”

In the instant case the controversy was about the genuineness of the document produced as Ex.D-1 which according to respondents was prepared on a stamp-paper issued for a different person. The decision on the question would of course be relevant and helpful in determining the issue between the parties. It was in these circumstances that the learned Addl. District Judge allowed the revision petition to find out a truth for doing complete justice between the parties.

8. As regards the argument that the petitioner’s application under Rule 1, Order XVI, C.P.C. was dismissed and on that such premise the application of respondents should also have been declined; there is no substance in this argument for the reason that in the petitioners’ case he was unable to show any “sufficient cause” for permission to file a List of Witnesses which was not filed earlier within seven days of the issues and no “sufficient cause” was shown to the satisfaction of the Court. To the contrary in the instant case the respondents sought indulgence of the Court for summoning the witness as a Court-witness to find out truth and to do complete justice between the parties and the revisional Court after considering this aspect, deemed it just and fair to allow the production of record; which was an official record of the Treasury. The reasons that sustained with the learned Addl. District Judge being just and fair no except could be taken thereto. As to the objection of extending equal treatment, of course, the witness being summoned as a Court-witness to resolve the material controversy and to dig out the truth, both the parties will be allowed to cross-examine such witness and, if need be, to allow the petitioners an opportunity of evidence in rebuttal. The petitioners


shall, therefore, be fully protected. In view of the reasons supra the order of Addl. District Judge does not suffer from any error of law and jurisdiction and being based on rule of fair, just and complete justice, does not call for any interference.

9. Resultantly, the instant constitutional petition being devoid of any substance is dismissed.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

Dower Amount can be enhanced by Husband during subsistence of Marriage

 PLJ 2006 Lahore 1260

Present: Muhammad Muzammal Khan, J.

ABDULLAH--Petitioner

versus

NAILA ASLAM and 3 others--Respondents

W.P. No. 1468 of 2006, decided on 22.6.2006.

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXX of 1964)--

----Ss. 5 & 7--Muslim Family Law Ordinance, (VIII of 1961), S. 9--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for granting of maintenance allowance and recovery of dower amount as per agreement--Suit decreed and appeal was dismissed--Assailed--Enhancement of dower amount--Husband did not refuse his liability to pay maintenance allowance awarded to wife and minor son--Wife could not prove enhancement of dower amount and agreement by her was forged--Wife claimed in plaint, not only produced agreement executed by husband enhancing the dower amount but also examined its marginal witnesses--Denial of execution by the petitioner appeared to be after thought and was put forth just to avoid liability to pay enhanced dower amount--No effort on his behalf was ever made for comparison of signature from handwriting expert by moving application before Courts below which negatively reflects on his stance in written statement--Held: Dower amount was fixed in nikahnama but same under Islamic Law could have been enhanced by husband at any time during subsistence of marriage--Lawful decision within jurisdiction could not be substituted on petition and dismissed.     [P. 1262] A & B

Rana Muhammad Saleem Akhtar, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 22.6.2006.

Order

Instant Constitutional petition prayed judgments/decrees dated 5.4.2005 and 23.1.2006 passed by the learned Judge Family Court and the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad (Respondents Nos. 3 and 4) to be declared illegal, void and of no legal consequence, whereby suit filed by Respondent No. 1 for grant of maintenance allowance and dower amount was decreed and the petitioner's appeal was dismissed, respectively.

2.  Succinctly, relevant facts are that petitioner entered into a tie of marriage with Mst. Naila Aslam (Respondent No. 1) on 11.3.2001 through a registered Nikahnama according to Muslim rites. This marriage led to birth of a male child Muhammad Hassan (Respondent No. 2) but relations between the spouses did not remain cordial and after separation, ended into a divorce on 29.6.2002. Respondent No. 1 on her own behalf and on behalf of Respondent No. 2 filed a suit for recovery of her outstanding dower amount of Rs. 100,000/- alongwith maintenance allowance for both of them at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month. She pleaded in her plaint that divorce dated 29.6.2002 was revoked on 2.8.2002 with the condition of enhancement of dower amount from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 100,000/- besides payment of maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month and these conditions were reduced to writing in form of an agreement dated 15.8.2002. She further averred that petitioner left for Saudi Arabai and did not pay the dower amount or maintenance allowance, as per agreement inter parties.

3.  Petitioner being defendant in the suit, contested the same by filing his written statement. Controversial pleadings of the parties necessitated framing of issues and recording of evidence. The learned Judge Family Court, seized of the matter, after doing the needful, decreed the suit of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and awarded maintenance allowance to Respondent No. 1 at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month till her Iddat period whereas to Respondent No. 2 at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month till his majority. Respondent No. 1 was also awarded decree for her outstanding dower amount of Rs. 100,000/-, through the judgment/decree dated 5.4.2005.

4.  Petitioner aggrieved of decision of the trial Court filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, but remained unsuccessful as the same was dismissed on 23.1.2006. He has now filed instant petition with the prayer noted above.

5.  I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have examined the record, appended herewith. Petitioner did not refuse his liability to pay maintenance allowance awarded to either of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 but his main stress was against the decree awarded to Respondent No. 1 for dower amount of Rs. 100,000/-. It was contended that Respondent No. 1 could not prove enhancement of dower amount and the agreement relied by her was forged/fictitious. Respondent No. 1 in support of her claim in the plaint, not only produced an agreement executed by the petitioner enhancing the dower amount as Ex.P.1 but also examined its marginal witnesses. Both the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have compared signatures of the petitioners on Ex.P.1 with his admitted signatures on Exh.D.1 and have returned specific findings that both the signatures tally to each other. Petitioner himself is living in Saudi Arabia and in his absence, his special attorney appeared in the witness box a DW.1, who alongwith other witness DW.3, deliberately avoided to admit signatures of the petitioner on Exh.D.1 though this document was sent by him through Embassy of Pakistan at RiyadhSaudi Arabia. Denial of execution of Exh.P.1 by the petitioner, appears to be afterthought and was put forth just to avoid liability to pay enhanced dower amount, as no effort on his behalf was ever made for comparison of signatures from some handwriting expert by moving any application before the trial or appellate Court or even by making such request during the course of hearing of instant petition, which negatively reflects on his stance in the written statement. No doubt, initially the dower amount was fixed as Rs. 500/- in the Nikahnama but the same under Islamic Law could have been enhanced by the husband at any time during the subsistence of marriage. File is absolutely thirsty of the proof that petitioner ever since his compromise with Respondent No. 1 reverted back to his married life or discharged his obligations under the agreement, voluntarily executed by him. Respondent No. 1 since her desertion is leading an isolated life and has devoted herself for bringing up of Respondent No. 2, which should have been shared by the petitioner. Keeping in view sacrifices of Respondent No. 1 and her contribution towards the brought up of offshoot of the parties, I refrain to exercise my Constitutional jurisdiction in aid of the petitioner. Scan of record and impugned judgments revealed that lis was correctly concluded without committing any error of law.

6.  For the reasons noted above, no case for interference in Constitutional  jurisdiction  was  made out. Even otherwise, a lawful decision within the ambit of conferred jurisdiction cannot be substituted on this petition, which being devoid of any merit, is dismissed in limine.

(Waseem Iqbal Butt)           Petition dismissed

 

Saturday, 1 June 2024

Mediation Practice Direction (Civil) Rules, 2023

 Mediation Practice Direction (Civil) Rules, 2023

To regulate the practice and procedure of Courts in relation to

Mediation in Civil Disputes

Mediation as a method of alternate dispute resolution is given statutory recognition by the Alternate Dispute Resolution Act 2017 (the Act). In furtherance of the Act, rules are being notified from time to time.

For mediation as a sub-specialty of alternate dispute resolution, the following rules have thus far been notified by the Federal Government:

(i) Alternate Dispute Resolution (Accreditation) Rules, 2023.

(ii) ADR Mediation Accreditation (Eligibility) Rules, 2023.

In furtherance of the supervisory function of the High Court, the Islamabad High Court issues these rules in the exercise of its powers under Article 202 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to be known as the Mediation Practice Direction (Civil) Rules 2023, and to be practiced by all Courts within the jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court.

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Contents

1 Notified Mediators; Notified ADR Centres

2 Consent to Mediate

3 Decree on Settlement Agreement

4 Court-referral without a suit

5 Inconclusive Mediation

6 Mediation Register

7 Annex – Mediation Consent Form

1 Notified Mediators; Notified ADR Centres: (1) Except for sufficient cause recorded in the order referring the dispute to mediation, Court-referred mediations in civil disputes should be referred for mediation by mediators notified under the Act, practising individually or under the aegis of an ADR Centre notified under the Act.

(2) The expression ‘Mediator’ henceforth in this Practice Direction means a mediator notified under the Act, practising individually or under the aegis of an ADR Centre notified under the Act.

(3) Notwithstanding sub rules (1) & (2), mediations in family cases may be referred to ‘agreed upon persons’1, who are not notified mediators. Such agreed upon mediators should preferably be the trusted elders of the families.

2 Consent to Mediate: (1) On the first appearance of a party, the Court shall direct such party to sign and file a Mediation Consent Form (per the Annex) for the parties’ respective stances on mediation to be brought on record.

(2) The Court shall also cause the parties to sign and file a Mediation Consent Form in cases already filed where the recording of evidence has not commenced. For the avoidance of doubt, the Court shall on the parties’ joint request refer the parties to mediation regardless of the stage the case has reached.

(3) Where the parties agree to mediate, the Court will refer the parties to mediation and the parties’ agreement to mediate shall be the foremost consideration for the Court.

(4) The Court’s assessment of ‘impossibility of mediation success’ and ‘intricacy of a question of fact or law’ per sections 3(1)(b) and (c) of the Act should entail a very high threshold of Court’s satisfaction to lean against mediation and, barring exceptionally strong reasons, should not override the parties’ willingness to mediate, it being understood that the essence of mediation process is for the parties to be able to find a workable solution regardless of the underlying intricacies of fact and law.

(5) Where a party declines to mediate, the order sheet will reflect the Court’s observations on the reasonableness of the refusal to mediate, and the order on costs at the conclusion of the trial will factor in an unreasonable refusal to mediate, not as a penalty, but as a reasonable estimate of the litigation costs the consenting party would have avoided if the case had gone to mediation, basing such estimate on the statement of litigation costs filed by the parties under the Costs of Litigation Act, 2017. This order will be made regardless of the party refusing mediation being successful in obtaining judgment in its favour2.

1 Section 5 of the Alternate Dispute Resolution Act, 2017

2 Section 35(1)(iii), Costs of Litigation Act, 2017

3 Decree on Settlement Agreement: (1) When mediation leads to a settlement, the settlement shall be reduced to writing as a Settlement Agreement, duly witnessed, and signed by the mediator and by the parties or their duly authorized representatives. It is mandatory to file the Settlement Agreement with the Court for Court-referred mediations3, and optional for non-Court-referred mediations4.

(2) The Court shall on notice to the parties pass judgment and decree in terms of the Settlement Agreement5, recording in the decree that it was passed in terms of the Settlement Agreement without formal adjudication by the Court and is executable6 as a decree by consent.

4 Court-referral without a suit: (1) Court-referred mediations include mediation referrals by Court on joint application by the parties without a suit filed by either party7. Such applications are to be registered as suits for record management purposes.

(2) The parties must demonstrate to the Court for their application being considered that they have applied, without success, to all notified ADR Centres for mediation, and the Courts shall not be requested, without good cause, to perform this function of ADR Centres.

5 Inconclusive Mediation: If mediation in a pending case does not lead to a Settlement Agreement within the timeframe stipulated in the Act, the case will be re-listed in the cause list of the Court for judicial proceedings to resume. It is clarified that there is no bar on either party or the Court proposing mediation again and the parties resorting to mediation at a later stage during the proceedings.

6 Mediation Register: Each Court will maintain a register of mediation referrals and will transmit the following particulars to the Registrar of the High Court on a monthly basis by the first week of the succeeding month:

i. number of mediation referrals, with referral dates,

ii. number of applications received and disposed of under section 8 of the Act

iii. number of successful mediations, reckoned from the date of decree.

Tuesday, 22 August 2023

Depriving the daughters in their inheritance share

 PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 108

PresentCh. Muhammad Iqbal, J.

Mst. RASOOLAN BIBI--Petitioner

versus

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through District Collector--Respondents

C.R. No. 24767 of 2017, heard on 12.4.2023.

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----S. 42--Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 17 & 79--Suit for declaration--Dismissal of--Concurrent findings--Entitlement for inheritation--Oral gift mutation by defendants--Depriving of daughters from their inheritance share--Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of law--Neither attesting witnesses of oral gift mutation in question nor Revenue Officers who entered gift mutation were produced in evidence to prove alleged oral gift mutation-- It is mandatory for beneficiary respondents to produce requisite number of witnesses of very oral gift transaction as well as gift mutation--Non-compliance of mandatory provisions of law which is considered fatal for case of respondents--Respondents tried to deprive petitioner from her legal share in estate of her deceased father by committing fraud and got entered alleged gift mutation in their favour--This Court is well within jurisdiction to reverse such illegal and perverse concurrent findings of learned lower fora in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC.    

                                                     [Para 10, 12 & 15] B, C, D, E, F & G

PLD 2011 SC 241, PLD 2015 SC 187, 2015 SCMR 1044, 2022 SCMR 309, PLD 1990 SC 1, 2016 SCMR 24.

Muhammadan Law--

-----Para Nos. 149 & 150--Ingredients of valid gift--Three important prerequisites are described for a valid gift such as explicit offer of gift by donor, acceptance of gift by donee and voluntary delivery of possession to donee under very oral gift transaction.                                                         [Para 9] A

Ref. 2016 SCMR 662, 2017 SCMR 402, 2019 SCMR 1095.

Mian Tariq Hussain, Advocate for Petitioner.

Raja Muhammad Arif, Addl. Advocate General for Respondents No. 1 to 3.

Ch. M. Lehrasib Khan Gondal, Advocate for Respondent No. 4.

Date of hearing: 12.4.2023.

Judgment

Through this civil revision, the petitioner has challenged the validity of judgment & decree dated 23.02.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mandi Bahauddin who dismissed the suit for declaration filed by the petitioner and judgment & decree dated 16.03.2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin who dismissed the appeal of the petitioner.

2. Brief facts of the case are that Mst. Rasoolan Bibi, petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit the declaration against the respondents/defendants alleging therein that her father Khushi Muhammad was owner in possession of suit land measuring 227-Kanals 07-Marlas fully described in Para No. 2 of the plaint. He died as Sunni Muslim on 06.07.1978 at the age of about 82. The plaintiff being daughter of deceased is entitled to inherit from his estate to the extent of 1/7th share as per Sharia. That gift mutation No. 1943 dated 21.03.1972 was got attested fraudulently by the defendants in connivance of revenue official. That her father Khushi Muhammad (deceased) who was above 82 years age at the time of attestation of impugned mutation was illiterate and infirm mind person. That respondents /Defendants No. 4 & 5 used to give share produce to the petitioner/plaintiff but six months prior to institution of the suit they refused to give produce share. That she consulted the revenue record wherefrom it came to her knowledge regarding attestation of the impugned mutation then she filed suit within time.

Respondents/Defendants No. 4 & 5 filed contesting written statement with the assertion that their father from his own free will gifted the property and got sanctioned gift mutation in their names. That the plaintiff has no locus standi to challenge the gift. That the suit is time barred. Respondents /Defendants No. 6 to 8 filed contesting written statement. Out of divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed issues, recorded pro and contra evidence of both the parties and vide judgment & decree dated 23.02.2015 dismissed the suit for declaration filed by the petitioner. Appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed by the learned appellate Court vide judgment & decree dated 16.03.2017. Hence, this civil revision.

3. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties at full length and gone through the record with their able assistance.

4. The pivotal issues in this case are Issues No. 1 & 2 which are reproduced as under:-

“1.      Whether mutation of gift No. 1943 dated 21.03.1972 was result of fraud and misrepresentation and liable to be cancelled? OPP

2.       Whether the mutation No. 1943 dated 21.03.1972 was validly sanctioned? OPD”

To prove these issues, plaintiff/Rasoolan Bibi appeared as PW1 and in her statement she has stated that her father name is Khushi Muhammad who was owner of the suit land. That Ali Ahmad and Muhammad Azam are her brothers. She has not received any share from her father’s property, as such fraud has been committed with her. The gift mutation was fraudulently got entered by one Muhammad Hayat, her paternal uncle (چچا) on the basis of his interest to marry his daughter with Ali Ahmad. Her father aged about 80 years was illiterate and unsound mind person and his land was being cultivated by tenants. Her father never appeared before any Tehsildar or Halqa Patwari for sanctioning of gift mutation nor he imposed his thumb impression on the official document. Defendants used to give rice and clothes etc. in lieu of her share. For the last two years they did not give share of rice and clothes to her. Their father neither informed regarding depriving of his daughters from their inheritance share nor he disclosed about making of gift of property to his sons. Muhammad Hayat is her paternal uncle (چچا). In their family share was given to the daughters. That Tehsildar or Patwari never disclosed any information in the village that the property has been gifted to the defendants nor any relative ever discussed in respect of gift. In cross examination, she stated that

حیات ہمارا سگا چچانہ تھا تا ہم وہ برادری سے تھا۔۔۔۔۔ یہ درست ہے کہ دوسری بہنوں کو حصہ پیداوار وغیرہ مل رہا ہے اس لیے انہوں نے کیس نہ کیا ہے۔ مجھے انہوں نے چاول وغیرہ دینا چھوڑ دیئے ہے اس لیے میں نے دعوی کر دیا۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ مجھے پتہ ہے کہ دعوی میں جو کچھ لکھا میں نے اپنا حصہ لینا ہے۔

On the converse, Muhammad Azam /Defendant No. 5 appeared as DW1 who stated that plaintiff/Rasoolan is his sister and his father name was Khushi Muhammad who had four daughters namely Rasoolan Bibi, Salehan, Amina and Taleyan Bibi and two sons Ali Ahmad and Muhammad Azam. When mutation was entered his age was three years and Ali Ahmad was aged about 9/10 years. After attestation of mutation his father remained alive for about 5/6 years. The mutation was challenged only by the plaintiff whereas her other sisters have not challenged the same. In cross examination, he deposed that his father transferred total land through gift in his as well as in the name of his brother. Further deposed as under:--

جب والدم نے مجھے ھبہ کیا میں تحصیلدار کے پاس نہ گیا تھا کیونکہ میں اسوقت چھوٹا تھا۔ اور اسوقت میری عمر 3 سال تھی۔ بوقت ھبہ میں چھوٹا تھا میری عمر 3 سال تھی۔۔۔ یہ درست ھے کہ میں 3 سال کا تھا اسلیے والدم کی خدمت کرنے سے قاصر تھا۔ والدم نے اپنی مرضی سے ہمیں ھبہ کیا اور بہنوں کے نام نہ کیا۔ مجھے علم نہ ھے کہ ھبہ نامہ پر والدم نے کوئی دستخط یا انگوٹھا لگایا تھا یا نہیں کیونکہ میں اسوقت چھوٹا تھا۔ جب مجھے اراضی ھبہ ہوئی تو اسوقت میری جانب سے عدالت نے کوئی گارڈین مقرر نہ کیا تھا۔ مجھے علم نہ ھے کہ بوقت ھبہ نمبر دار کا بیان ہوا تھایا نہیں۔ مجھے علم نہ ھے کہ روبرو تحصیلدار والد م کا بابت ھبہ کوئی بیان ریکارڈ ہوا تھا یا نہیں ۔۔۔ مجھے علم نہ ھے کہ والدم روبرو پٹواری پیش ہوئے یا نہیں۔۔۔ یہ درست ہے کہ مدعا علیہ نمبر 5 انتقال کا گواہ تھا۔ یہ درست ہے کہ میرے سامنے انتقال کے گواہان نے انگوٹھے       کیے تھے یا نہیں۔۔۔ یہ درست ہے کہ محمد حیات کی بیٹی کی شادی علی احمد سے ہوئی ہے۔

Description: SabatAmina Bibi/Defendant No. 6 appeared as DW2 and in cross examination, she deposed that:-

میں ھبہ کی گواہ نہ ہوں۔ بوقت ھبہ میں موجود نہ تھی۔۔۔۔۔۔ یہ درست ہے کہ بوقت ھبہ میری عمر 21 سال تھی۔

Description: Bibi5. Admittedly, Khushi Muhammad deceased contracted three marriages, one with Mst. Fatima Bibi, second with Mst. Jallan Bibi and third with Mst. Hakim Bibi. The detail of his wives as well as his progeny respectively is mentioned in the pedigree table which is as under:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

As per pedigree table, petitioner Mst. Rasoolan Bibi is daughter of Mst. Fatima Bibi whereas Mst. Jallan Bibi had one son Salehon deceased and two daughters namely Salehan Bibi and Taleyan Bibi. The deceased Salehon had two daughters namely Nasreen Bibi and Bilqees Bibi and one son Muhammad Nawaz. Mst. Hakim Bibi has one daughter Amina Bibi and two sons namely Muhammad Azam and Ali Ahmad.

6. Petitioner categorically stated that fraud has been committed by Muhammad Hayat only under the design to get solemnize marriage of her daughter with Ali Ahmad son of Khushi Muhammad and this fact is admitted by DW1 in his cross examination. Petitioner/plaintiff stated that fraud was committed by Muhammad Hayat only to deprive other heirs of the deceased Khushi Muhammad. Thus, onus was shifted upon the beneficiary/respondents/defendants to prove validity of oral gift as well as the gift mutation by describing exact information of date, time place and venue of the said transaction in their pleading (written statement) and same should have been proved by leading the affirmative evidence accordingly. Perusal of the written statement shows that the respondents /defendants neither furnished the requisite details in their defence regarding date, time, place of gift nor proved the making of any offer of gift and acceptance of the same by them or on their behalf, as such they had failed to prove the oral gift transaction of the suit land as well as the to valid incorporation of the impugned oral gift mutation in the revenue record. Reliance is placed on the case titled as Muhammad Akram & Another vs. Altaf Ahmad (PLD 2003 SC 688), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:--

“8. It is a settled principle of law that a mutation confers no title. Once a mutation is challenged, the party that relies on such mutation(s) is bound to revert to the original transaction and to prove such original transaction which resulted into the entry or attestation of such mutation(s) in dispute. This oft repeated principle of law is quite logical because a mutation not being a title deed, is merely an evidence of some original transaction between the parties that had been struck somewhere prior to entry of a mutation. Respondent Altaf Ahmad has utterly failed to revert back to any transaction and bring on record any oral or documentary evidence thereof. The burden squarely lay on him to prove the transaction because the existence thereof has throughout been alleged by him in affirmative. He was bound to fail in the event of the non-proof of transaction. Only the trial Court realised it.”

Reliance is placed on the case titled as Amjad Ikram vs. Mst.Asiva Kausar and 2 others (2015 SCMR 1) relevant portion whereof is reproduced as under:-

“It is an equally settled principle of law that it is the duty and obligation of the beneficiary of a transaction or a document to prove the same. Reference in this behalf may be made from the judgments of this Court, reported as Akhtar Ali v. The University of the Punjab (1979 SCMR 549), Haji Muhammad Khan and others v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 2 others (1992 SCMR 2439) and Khan Muhammad v. Muhammad Din through LRs (2010 SCMR 1351). Thus, the contention of the learned counsel regarding non framing of specific issue qua fraud looses all significance, as no prejudice appears to have been caused to-the appellant. Even otherwise, during the course of proceedings before the learned trial Court, neither any effort was ever made by the appellant to claim any further issue nor such contention was raised before the learned High Court. Thus, such contention cannot be entertained at this belated stage before this Court.”

Reliance is placed on Muhammad Nazir vs. Khurshid Begum (2005 SCMR 941), Abdul Sattar and others vs. Muhammad Ashraf and others (2008 SCMR 1318), Khaliq dad Khan and others vs. Mst. Zeenat Khatoon and others (2010 SCMR 1370) and Phul Peer Shah vs. Hafeez Fatima (2016 SCMR 1225).

7. Respondents/Defendants No. 4 & 5 while filing written statement neither disclosed the ingredients of oral gift nor deposed while appearing as DW1 regarding making of any offer of the gift by the donor and acceptance of the same by the donee or by any person on their behalf as they were minors nor it is disclosed that who accepted the gift.

8. The oral gift mutation is at discord between the parties, as such it is mandatory for the beneficiary (respondents/defendants) to describe meticulous details of day, date, time, venue, presence of witnesses as well as making of gift, offer & acceptance and delivery of possession in the pleadings (written statement) whereafter such asserted fact should have been necessarily proved through corroborative, affirmative and trustworthy evidence but the respondents/beneficiaries have not mentioned the detail declaration of oral gift in their written statement. It was the primary duty of the beneficiary i.e. respondents /defendants, to prove the above mentioned constituents with elaborated specifications but no such evidence is produced in this regard. The absence of above material information in the written statement renders the statement of the defence witnesses (DWs) beyond the scope of pleadings and same can validly be excluded from the judicial consideration. Thus, non-proving of the asserted stance of oral gift transaction through corroborative, credible & trustworthy evidence is considered a material flaw which dismantles the very foundation of the stance of the respondents/defendants. Reliance is placed on the cases titled as Peer Baksh through LRs & others vs. Mst. Khanzadi & others (2016 SCMR 1417), Muhammad Nawaz & others vs. Sakina Bibi & others (2020 SCMR 1021), Atta Muhammad & others vs. Mst. Munir Sultan (deceased) through her LRs & others (2021 SCMR 73), Syed Ahmad vs. Ali Akbar & others (2021 SCMR 743) & Faqir Ali & others vs. Sakina Bibi & others (PLD 2022 SC 85).

9. As per Para Nos. 149 and 150 of the Muhammadan Law three important prerequisites are described for a valid gift such as explicit offer of the gift by donor, acceptance of the gift by the donee and voluntary delivery of possession to the donee under the very oral gift transaction. The above ingredients are mandatory in nature and absence of proof of any ingredient whereof render the very gift transaction as invalid. Here, in this case the above said ingredients have neither been pleaded in the written statement nor proved by producing any witness which is considered a material flaw and non-observance of law dismantled the validity of the oral gift mutation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a judgment titled as Mst. Saadia vs. Mst. Gul Bibi (2016 SCMR 662) held as under:-

14. Indeed, if a document in the form of memorandum of gift has been executed between the parties (donor and donee) as an acknowledgment of past transaction of oral gift, its non-registration will not have much bearing as regards its authenticity or validity, but the other important thing is the proof of fulfillment of three conditions of a valid gift “offer”, “acceptance” and “delivery of possession”.

Reliance can also be placed on the cases titled as Allah Ditta & others vs. Manak alias Muhammad Siddique & others (2017 SCMR 402), Naveed Akram & others vs. Muhammad Anwar (2019 SCMR 1095) & Muhammad Sarwar vs. Mumtaz Bibi & others (2020 SCMR 276).

10. Even otherwise, neither the attesting witnesses of the oral gift mutation in question nor the Revenue Officers (Patwari & Tehsildar) who entered/sanctioned the said gift mutation were produced in evidence to prove the alleged oral gift mutation. Under Article 17 & 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, it is mandatory for the beneficiary respondents to produce the requisite number of the witnesses of the very oral gift transaction as well as gift mutation; but the respondents have failed to produce the witnesses of the oral gift mutation. The non-production of the require witnesses is blatant non-compliance of the aforesaid mandatory provisions of law which is considered fatal for the case of the respondents. Reliance is placed on the cases cited as Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain vs. Muhammad Din through legal heirs and others (PLD 2011 SC 241), Farzand Ali and another vs. Khuda Bakhsh and others (PLD 2015 SC 187) and Farid Bakhsh vs. Jind Wadda & others (2015 SCMR 1044).

11. Respondents/defendants failed to produce the witnesses of oral gift mutation Patwari and Tehsildar who entered and sanctioned the impugned oral gift mutation nor any convincing reason has been expounded for non-producing them in evidence which amounts to withholding of the material evidence and it would be legally presumed that had the said witnesses produced in the evidence, they would have deposed against the respondents, as such presumption under Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 clearly operates against them. Reliance is placed on the cases titled as Sughran Bibi vs. Mst. Aziz Begum & 4 others (1996 SCMR 137) & Jehangir vs. Mst. Shams Sultana & others (2022 SCMR 309).

12. As per available record the respondents /defendants tried to deprive the petitioner from her legal share in the estate of her deceased father by committing fraud and got entered the alleged gift mutation in their favour, whereas such like custom/practice of depriving of the females from their accrued share in the legacy of her prepositious has seriously been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in its landmark judgment, cited as Ghulam Ali and 2 others vs. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1). Relevant part of the judgment (supra) is reproduced as under:

“……………As is discussed in the case of Haji Nizam (approved in Mohammad Bashir’s case) which was also a case of clash of Islamic principles against those of other systems-a widowed daughter-in-law, seeking maintenance for her minor child against the grandfather, it is the duty of the Courts within the permissible fields, as specified therein, to enforce Islamic law and principles. This case also required similar, if not better, treatment. The scope of rights of inheritance of females (daughter in this case) is so wide and their thrust so strong that it is the duty of the Courts to protect and enforce them, even if the legislative action for this purpose of protection in accordance with Islamic Jurisprudence, is yet to take its own time.

In the rural areas where 80% of the female population resides, the inheritance rights of the females are not as protected and enforced, as Islam requires. Cases similar to this do come up even to Supreme Court. In a very large majority of them the Courts act rightly and follow the correct rules. But it is a wide guess as to how many females take the courage of initiation or continuing the legal battle with their close one in matters of inheritance, when they are being deprived. The percentage is very low indeed. Neither the Courts nor the law as at present it stands interpreted, are to be blamed. The social organizations including those in the legal field are yet to show up in the rural area. They are mostly managed by Urban volunteers. When will they be able to move out of mostly managed by Urban volunteers. When will they be able to move out of sophisticated methods of American speech/seminar system and all that goes with it, in the enlightened urban society? It is a pity that while an ubranised brother, who is labourer in a neighbouring Mill, has the protection of such mass of Labour Laws; which sometimes even Courts find it difficult properly to count-right from the definition of ‘rights’, up to the enforcement’ even in homes, through ‘Social Security’ Laws, with web of network of ‘Inspectorates’ etc. who are supposed to be helping him at every step, his unfortunate sister, who is deprived of her most valuable rights of inheritance even today by her own kith and kin--sometimes by the urbanized brother himself, is not even cognizant of all this. She is not being educated enough about her rights. Nearly four decades have passed. A new set up is needed in this behalf. Social Organizations run by women have not succeeded in rural field. They may continue for the urban areas where their utility might also be improved and upgraded. At the same time they need to be equipped with more vigorous training in the field of Islamic learning and teachings. They should provide the bulk of research in Islamic Law and principles dealing with women. It is not the reinterpretation alone which is the need of the day but a genuine effort by them for the reconstruction of the Islamic concepts in this field. It cannot be achieved by the use of alien manner or method alone.”

The above said principle has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment cited as Farhan Aslam and others. vs. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and Another (2021 SCMR 179).

13. Further, on the query put to PW-1 regarding non-payment of any share of produce, she in cross examination has categorically explained the payment of share of produce as under:

یہ درست ہے کہ دوسری بہنوں کو حصہ پیداوار وغیرہ مل رہا ہے اس لیے انہوں نے کیس نہ کیا ہے۔ مجھے انہوں نے چاول وغیرہ دینا چھوڑ دیئے ہیں اس لیے میں نے دعوی کر دیا۔

The above statement shows that respondents were giving share of produce to the petitioner as well as other sisters. That the petitioner and respondents are step siblings and issue is regarding share in estate of their deceased father and in such like cases no limitation runs when women folk are deprived of the legal share and mere sanctioning of gift mutation does not create any right until and unless the basic transaction of the gift is proved through corroborative and trustworthy evidence. Even the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has repeatedly held that no limitation runs against the inheritance matters. Reliance is placed on the latest judgment cited as Ghulam Qasim and others vs. Mst. Razia Begum and others (PLD 2021 SC 812) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:

“4. Immediately on the death of a person, his/her legal heirs become owner of his estate under Muslim law. In the case of Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi it was held that:

The main points of the controversy in this behalf get resolved on the touchstone of Islamic law of inheritance. As soon as an owner dies, succession to his property opens. There is no State intervention or clergy’s intervention needed for the passing of the title immediately, to the heirs. Thus, it is obvious that a Muslim’s estate legally and juridically vests immediately on his death in his or her heirs and their rights respectively come into separate existence forthwith. The theory of representation of the estate by an intermediary is unknown to Islamic Law of inheritance as compared to other systems. Thus there being no vesting of the estate of the deceased for an interregnum in any one like an executor or administrator, it devolves on the heirs automatically, and immediately in definite shares and fraction.

The above-noted principle has been continuously affirmed, including in the cases of Mst. Reshman Bibi v Amir, Mirza Abid Baig v Zahid Sabir, and Farhan Aslam v Mst. Nuzba Shaheen.

5. Therefore, the contention that the possession of the land was with the petitioners and the suit filed in the year 2008 could not challenge the gift mutation stated to have been made in the year 1986, as it was beyond the limitation period, will not in itself make the suit time-barred. This is because the possession by an heir is considered to be constructive possession on behalf of all the heirs. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Ghulam Ali v Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi where it was held that:

The heir in possession was considered to be in constructive possession of the property on behalf of all the heirs in spite of his exclusive possession, e.g., the possession of the brothers would be taken to be the possession of their sisters, unless there was an express repudiation of the claims of the sisters by the brothers.

Circumstances may exist in which an inference of knowledge can be drawn, or in which the laches or negligence of the co-owners is so great that knowledge will be presumed but a case of that type would have to be exceptional. The law does not penalise a co-owner who relies on the honesty of his co-sharer, and therefore ordinarily the mere fact that he does not take the trouble to assert his rights as he may be entitled to, would not justify an inference of ouster.

The above-mentioned two-member Bench decision of this Court was also followed by a three-member Bench decision in the case of Khair Din v Salaman. Therefore, the cause of action would only accrue when the respondent was denied her rights, and it would be from such date that the time would start to run, the burden to establish this lay on the petitioners which they had also failed to establish. However, as observed in Mst. Grana v. Sahib Kamala Bibi, the law of limitation would be relevant when the conduct of the claimant demonstrates acquiescence and particularly when third party interest is created in the inherited property.

Another reliance is placed on the case titled as Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. and others vs. Mst.Khatoon Bibi and others (2017 SCMR 1476), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:-

“11 Similarly, in the cases of claiming right of inheritance, it is well settled that the claimant becomes co-owner/’co-sharer of the property left by the predecessor along with others the moment the predecessor dies and entry of mutations of inheritance is only meant for updating the revenue record and for fiscal purposes. If a person feels himself aggrieved of such entries, he can file a suit for declaration within six years of such wrong entries or knowledge. Any such repetition of the said entries in the revenue record would again give him afresh cause of action or when the rights of anyone in the property are denied it would also give fresh cause of action. Similarly, it is again settled by now that no limitation would run against the co-sharer. We for instance can quote few judgments covering all these aspects like Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1), Riaz Ahmad and 2 others v. Additional District Jadge and 2 others (1999 SCMR 1328), Mst. Suban v. Allah Pitta and others (2007 SCMR 635), Muhammad Anwar and 2 others v. Khuda Yar and 25 others (2008 SCMR 905) and Mahmood Shah v. Syed Khalid Hussain Shah and others (2015 SCMR 869).

(emphasis supplied)

Reliance is also placed on judgments titled as Shabla and others vs. Ms. Jahan Afroz Khilat and others (2020 SCMR 352) & Faiz Ullah & others vs. Dilawar Hussain & others (2022 SCMR 1647). As such findings of the lower foras on Issues No. 1 & 2 are patently illegal and same are not sustainable.

14. Furthermore, it transpires from the record that Jamabandi of the year 2008 (Ex.D-1), copy of khasra gurdawari (Ex.D-2), copy of application (Ex.D-3 & D-4) as well as impugned mutation No. 1943 (Ex.D-5) were produced in the statement of learned counsel for the respondents, as such the same is considered as an invalid mode of tendering of document in evidence, which is inadmissible in evidence. It is settled law that the documents relied upon or on the basis of which the case has been filed should be produced in the evidence by party itself giving a fair opportunity to the other party to cross-examine the same as such the documents produced by the respondents’ counsel cannot be relied upon as valid evidence and such document could not be taken into consideration. Reliance is placed on the case title Mst. Akhtar Sultana vs. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others (PLD 2021 SC 715). Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in its latest judgment cited as Rustam & others vs. Jehangir (deceased) throush LRs. (2023 SCMR 730) wherein it is held as under:

“7. As regards the other two documents i.e. Mutation No. 1836 (Exh.D-9) and Mutation No. 1837 (Exh.D-8), it is suffice to say that according to principle settled by this Court in the cases reported as Mst. Hameeda Begum and others v. Mst. Irshad Begum and others (2007 SCMR 996), Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another v. Jaffar Khan and others (PLD 2010 SC 604), Province of the Punjab throush Collector. Sheikhupura and others v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others (2017 SCMR 172) the document should be produced in the evidence by the party itself and a fair opportunity should be given to the opposite party to cross-examine the same, as such, the said two documents produced by the defendants counsel in his statement could not be taken into consideration.”

15. As the decisions of the learned lower fora on Issues No. 1 & 2 suffer from blatant misreading and non-reading of the evidence as well as mis-application of law, as such the findings of both the learned Courts below on Issues No. 1 & 2 being against the record, are hereby reversed and the same are decided in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff and against the respondents/defendants. This Court is well within jurisdiction to reverse such illegal and perverse concurrent findings of the learned lower fora in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. Reliance is placed on the cases titled as Nazim-ud-Din , & others vs. Sheikh Zia-tul-Qamar & others (2016 SCMR 24).

16. In nutshell, this civil revision is allowed. Judgment & decree dated 23.02.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mandi Bahauddin and judgment & decree dated 16.03.2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin are hereby set aside and suit for declaration filed by the petitioner is decreed. No order as to cost.

(Y.A.)  Civil Revision allowed

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