Term ‘police authorities’ used in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include FIA

 PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 83

Present: Ali Zia Bajwa, J.

NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and another--Petitioners

versus

STATE and others--Respondents

W.P. No. 30742 of 2021, decided on 21.5.2021.

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 199--Availability of alternate remedy--Jurisdiction of Justice of peace--Police authorities--Powers of Police officials--Maintainability--To challenge vires of inquiry conducted by Federal Investigating Agency on allegations of illegal issuance of loans and money laundering--Question of--Whether term ‘Police authorities’ used in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. includes F.I.A. and if it does, whether judicial review under Article 199 of Constitution is maintainable--Crucial question emerging for consideration is whether F.I.A. falls within expression ‘police authorities’ as used in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C.--Ex-officio justice of peace is very much competent to issue directions to respondents as it can issue to Provincial police and contention of counsel for petitioners regarding lack of jurisdiction of ex-officio justice of peace in matters of F.I.A. is not tenable--Term ‘police authorities’ used in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include FIA officials and does not only connote provincial police authorities especially when FIA authorities can use all powers of a police officer of provincial police under Cr.P.C.--Directions under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. can be issued to F.I.A. as status of F.I.A. is also of police--An aggrieved person can also seek his remedy against F.I.A. by filing complaint before ex-officio justice of peace--Provisions of Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. were made part of statute book with object to reduce burden of this Court by designating Sessions Judges and on their nomination Additional Sessions Judges as ex-officio justice of peace to share powers of this Court--Due to availability of an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy under Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. instant writ petition is not maintainable.

                                      [Para 1, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 16] A, B, C, D, E & F

PLD 2013 Islamabad 26; 2010 MLD 1346; 2011 SCMR 1813; 2005 MLD 1593; PLD 2007 SC 571 ref.

Mr. Khurram Abbas Jafri, Advocate for Petitioners.

Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General for Federation with Mr. Zahid Javed Butt, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents.

Hafiz Asghar Ali, Deputy Prosecutor General on Court’s call.

Date of hearing: 21.5.2021.

Order

Instant writ petition has been filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter ‘Constitution’) to challenge the vires of inquiry conducted by Federal Investigating Agency (hereinafter ‘F.I.A’) on the allegations of illegal issuance of loans and money laundering. Primarily it has been prayed that F.I.A. authorities be directed to drop the inquiry against the petitioner bank and its employees on the ground of excess committed by the respondent investigating agency.

2. It was fervidly contended by the learned counsel representing petitioner bank that no illegality had been committed by the bank as due process was followed for issuance of loans. It was further argued that allegation of money laundering is postscript. Further prayed that respondents be restrained from harassing bank employees and also to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’) for obtaining the Bank record of documentation pertaining to issuance of loans in question. Petitioner No. 2 Khadim Hussain, Executive Vice President/Regional Corporate Head, Faisalabad and Multan National Bank of Pakistan is accused against whom inquiry in question is in progress.

3. When learned counsel for the petitioners was confronted with the question of maintainability of instant petition, he submitted that instant petition is competent in every respect as no other efficacious and adequate remedy is available to the petitioners as respondents are transgressing their authority and are harassing the officers of petitioner bank which has badly affected its business and renown. It was argued that Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. only applies to F.I.A. to the extent of issuance of direction qua the registration of case.

4. While on the other hand, learned law officer refuted all the contentions of the petitioner side with vehemence and asserted that this petition is not maintainable in presence of an adequate alternate remedy under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. by filing a complaint with ex-officio Justice of Peace regarding any alleged misuse or excess of authority by the F.I.A. officials. He further asserted that Section 25 Anti-money Laundering Act, 2010 ousts the operation of Section 94, Cr.P.C. and has an overriding effect being a non obstante clause incorporated in the special law which otherwise prevails over general law. Lastly contended that no illegality has been committed by the respondent authority and inquiry in progress is strictly in line with the relevant law.

5. Matter heard in detail.

6. After hearing both the parties, the vital questions, which require consideration in the instant writ petition are whether the term ‘Police authorities’ used in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. includes F.I.A. and if it does, whether the judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable.

7. Before dilating upon the maintainability of writ petition in hand, it will be advantageous to have a bird eye view of the powers available to an ex-officio justice of peace under subsection (6) of Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. which was inserted into the statute through the Code of Criminal Procedure (3rd Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 which provides infra:

“22-A(6) an ex-officio justice of peace may issue appropriate directions to the police authorities concerned on a complaint regarding-

(i)       non-registration of a criminal case;

(ii)      Transfer of investigation from one police officer to another; and

(iii)     Neglect, failure or excess committed by a police authority in relation to its functions and duties.”

8. Above reproduced provision of law is self-explanatory and Court does not have a slightest of hesitation to hold that it provides an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy to any person who is aggrieved by the excess committed by the ‘police authorities’.

9. Now the next crucial question emerging for consideration is whether F.I.A. falls within the expression ‘police authorities’ as used in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. It shall be beneficial to scrutinize few provisions of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (hereinafter Act of 1974). F.I.A. was constituted under Section 3 of this Act and under Section 4 superintendence and administration of agency shall vest in Director General of Agency. Sections 4 and 5 are reproduced hereinafter for further elaboration:

“4-Superintendence and administration of the Agency:

1.       The Superintendence of the Agency shall vest in the Federal Government.

2.       The administration of the Agency shall vest in the Director General who shall exercise in respect of the Agency such of the powers of an Inspector General of Police under the Police Act, 1861 (V of 1861), as may be prescribed by rules.

5-Powers of the members of the Agency:

1.       Subject to any order which the Federal Government may make in this behalf, the members of the Agency shall, for the purpose of an inquiry or investigation under this Act, have throughout Pakistan such powers, including powers relating to search, arrest of persons and seizure of property, and such duties, privileges and liabilities as the officers of a Provincial Police have in relation to the investigation of offences under the Code or any other law for the time being in force.

2.       Subject to rules, if any, a member of the Agency not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector may, for the purposes of any inquiry or investigation under this Act, exercise any of the powers of an officer-in-charge of a Police Station in any area in which he is for the time being and, when so exercising such powers, shall be deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a Police Station discharging his functions as such within the limits of his station.

3.       …………………..

4.       For the purpose of the exercise by the members of the Agency of the powers of an officer-in-charge of a Police Station,” Police Station” includes any place declared, generally or specially, by the Federal Government to be a Police Station within the meaning of the Code.”

10. Section 4(2) of the Act of 1974 provides that the administration of the Agency shall vest in the Director General who shall exercise, in respect of the Agency, the powers of an Inspector General of Police under the Police Act, 1861. While Section 5(1) in most unequivocal manner provides that the members of the Agency shall, for the purpose of an inquiry or investigation under this Act, have throughout Pakistan such powers, including powers relating to search, arrest of persons and seizure of property, and such duties, privileges and liabilities as the officers of Provincial Police have in relation to the investigation of offences under the Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force. Likewise, Section 5(2), for the purpose of any inquiry, empowers a member of the agency, who is not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector to exercise any of the powers of an officer-in-charge of a Police Station.

11. Therefore, when status, functions, rights, privileges and liabilities of officials of F.I.A. are same as that of Provincial Police officer under the Cr.P.C., ex-officio justice of peace is very much competent to issue directions to the respondents as it can issue to the Provincial police and contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding lack of jurisdiction of ex-officio justice of peace in matters of F.I.A. is not tenable.

12. The term ‘police authorities’ used in Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include FIA officials and does not only connote provincial police authorities especially when FIA authorities can use all the powers of a police officer of provincial police under the Cr.P.C. There is no quibble that there may be some provisions of Act of 1974, which one may find in direct conflict with the provisions of Cr.P.C. and in that case, being special enactment, provisions of the Act of 1974 shall take precedence but this is not the case in instant lis as no provision of the Act of 1974 contradicts the powers of ex-officio justice of peace granted under Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. This view is further fortified by the dictum in Makhdoomzada Syed Mushtaq Hussain Shah’s case cited as (PLD 2013 Islamabad 26), where Islamabad High Court has vividly held that directions under Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. can be issued to F.I.A. as status of F.I.A. is also of police. Relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder:

“14. Though by Section 10 of the Act, the Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance, 1948 was repealed on promulgation of Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, therefore, there remained no ambiguity to concerned agency (FIA) and powers exercised by its members as officer Incharge of the Police Station. Therefore, status of the FIA defines as Police Station and Incharge whereof is officer Incharge of the Police Station as Station House Officer, therefore as defined being Police Station and Officer Incharge of the said Police Station. The Ex-Officio Justice of Peace can issue such direction while exercising powers under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C., which includes the appropriate direction to the Police Authority concerned. For such purpose FIA, being Agency is a Police Authority comes within such definition.”

13. Same view was taken by this Court in Ch. Abdur Rehman’s case, reported at (2010 MLD 1346) that an aggrieved person can also seek his remedy against F.I.A. by filing complaint before the ex-officio justice of peace. Therefore, an aggrieved person is fully competent to file a complaint under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. with the ex-officio justice of peace against any neglect, failure, or excess committed by the F.I.A. authorities and can conveniently get adequate redressal of his grievance from that quasi-judicial forum.

14. Regarding efficacy and adequacy of this alternate remedy, suffice is to say that in view the judicial prescriptions expounded by the august Supreme Court in Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi’s case reported at (2011 SCMR 1813) and by this Court in Mehboob Ali Malik’s case reported at PLD 1963 (W. P.) Lahore 575 to judge the adequacy of an available remedy, filing complaint with an ex-officio justice of peace is very much adequate and efficacious alternate remedy for an aggrieved person, with respect to its nature, extent of relief, point of time of availability of relief and the conditions on which that relief would be available particularly the conditions relating to the expense and inconvenience involved in securing the same.

As it is clearly established that petitioner had an alternate remedy under Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. and in such like cases, this Court always shows reluctance to encourage the practice to invoke the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. It has become more necessary than ever to put a legitimate check on the carefree constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution, considering the heavy burden of pending cases in the Constitutional Courts. The provisions of Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. were made part of the statute book with the object to reduce the burden of this Court by designating Sessions Judges and on their nomination Additional Sessions Judges as ex-officio justice of peace to share the powers of this Court in the matters mentioned in subsection (6) of Section 22-A Cr.P.C. In Syed Zafar Ali Shah’s case reported at (2005 MLD 1593), this object was highlighted by this Court in the following words:

“4. Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. was inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure just to lessen the burden on this Court whereby such-like matters ought to be resolved by the Court of first instance by deciding matter.”

Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. is only applicable to the extent of direction to F.I.A. authorities qua the registration of criminal case has no substance as it a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that provision of law must be read and applied in toto as was held by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mirza Shaukat Baig’s case cited as PLD 2005 SC 530.

It was reiterated in Fazal Dad’s case cited as (PLD 2007 SC 571) that:

“It is a settled law that provisions of law must be read as a whole in order to determine its true nature, import and scope as law….”

Same view was taken by a full Bench of this Court in Aziz Ahmad’s case reported at 2019 YLR 355, where it was categorically held by this Court that:

“…A Statute is to be read and constructed as a whole and the same holistic approach is to be adopted with regard to a particular provision/section thereof and, thus, a provision cannot be dissected into pieces….”

Although learned law officer has also resisted this petition on merits but it is settled law that once this Court makes-up its mind that in presence of an alternate adequate remedy, relief cannot be granted to a petitioner, Court should refrain itself from commenting upon the merits of the case and should leave this exercise for the competent alternate forum, otherwise no fruitful purpose would be served to send such aggrieved person to that alternate forum. In this regard this Court is enlightened from the decision of august Supreme Court in Khalid Mehmood’s case cited as 1999 SCMR 1881, where it was firmly held by the august Supreme Court that:

“To sum up, therefore, the High Court in the circumstances, should have declined to say anything on merits of the dispute and preferred to non-suit the petitioner on the sole ground of maintainability.”

15. To summarize the legal position discussed above, this Court holds:

i.        Phrase ‘police authority’ as used in Section 22-A (6) Cr.P.C., includes FIA officials therefore any neglect, failure or excess committed by them in relation to their functions and duties, can be complained before ex-officio justice of peace.

ii.       Remedy provided under Section 22-A (6) Cr.P.C. is adequate and efficacious in nature, hence constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked without exhausting that remedy.

16. The resultant position that emerges from the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs is that due to availability of an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy under Section 22-A (6) Cr.P.C. instant writ petition is not maintainable, hence dismissed in limini without touching the merits of the case.

(Y.A.)

Quashing of FIR, mainly on ground that no offence was made out of allegations recorded in FIR

 PLJ 2023 SC 247

[Appellate Jurisdiction]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Mrs. Ayesha A. Malik, JJ.

FIA through Director General, FIA and others--Petitioners

versus

Syed HAMID ALI SHAH and others--Respondents

C.P. 1257 of 2020, decided on 6.2.2023.

(Against the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, dated 04.02.2020, passed in W.P. No. 2367/2018)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 561-A--Pakistan Penal Code, (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409/109--Prevention of Corruption Act, (II of 1947), S. 5(2)--Illegal upgradations--Quashing of FIR--The High Court while accepting Writ Petition of respondents, as well as a writ petition and two criminal miscellaneous applications of other accused persons, has quashed FIR--The “FIA” conducted an inquiry and found that prima facie a case of abuse of authority was made out against officers who processed and approved those illegal upgradations--Quashing of FIR, mainly on ground that no offence was made out of allegations recorded in FIR--The High Court agreed with ground pleaded, accepted Writ petitions and quashed FIR--The High Court has observed in impugned judgment that matter in issue, which relates to violation of terms and conditions of service of CDA employees, does not constitute offence of criminal misconduct punishable under Section 5(2) of PCA--The High Court has quashed FIR, by holding that FIA authorities have failed to legally justify their actions of initiating inquiry and registration of FIR--The High Courts can declare such acts of police officers, to have been made without lawful authority and of no legal effect if they are found to be so and can also make any appropriate incidental or consequential order to effectuate its decision, such as quashing FIR and investigation proceeding--The powers of public servants are like a trust conferred upon them and they should exercise them fairly, honestly and in good faith as a trustee; but entrustment of power to upgrade his subordinate officials is not equivalent to entrustment of property as mentioned in Section 405 PPC and its misuse, or use in violation of relevant rules and regulations, does not constitute cognizable offences punishable under Section 409 PPC and Section 5(2) PCA--The misuse of such a power may constitute misconduct under service laws, but does not attract criminal misconduct punishable under criminal laws--The acts of FIA officers in registering FIR and carrying out investigation in present case are certainly without lawful authority--These petitions being meritless and against law settled by this Court have unduly wasted time of Court depriving it from attending to more lawful and genuine claims pending before it--Such vexatious and frivolous litigation must be dealt with firmly and strongly discouraged. We, therefore, dismiss present petition and decline leave to appeal, with costs. [Pp. 250, 251, 252 & 254] A, B, F, G, I, N, O, P, Q

PLD 1966 SC 650 ref.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 561-A--Quashing of FIR, mainly on ground that no offence was made out of allegations recorded in FIR.  [P. 250] C

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 561-A--Quash a judicial proceeding--A High Court, can quash a judicial proceeding pending before any subordinate Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C., if it finds it necessary to make such order to prevent abuse of process of that Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.                    [P. 251] D

PLD 1971 SC 677 (5-MB); 2011 SCMR 1813 ref.

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 199--Constitutional jurisdiction--judicial review--Constitutional jurisdiction of high Court under article 199 of constitution, 1973 for judicial review of said acts of police officers. [P. 251] E

PLD 2018 SC 40 ref.

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)--Constitutional powers of High Courts--Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of Constitution empowers High Courts to judicially review acts done or proceedings taken by persons performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation, a Province or a local authority and if find such acts or proceedings to have been done or taken without lawful authority, to declare them to be so and of no legal effect--The registration of an FIR and doing of an investigation are acts of officers of police department (a provincial law enforcement agency) who perform functions in connection with affairs of a Province and are thus amenable to jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of Constitution.                                                                    [P. 252] H

Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1974)--

----Ss. 3, 5--The FIA has been established by Federal Government under Section 3 of Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (“FIA ACT”), for inquiry into, and investigation of offences specified in Schedule to said Act, including an attempt or conspiracy to commit, and abetment of, any such--Under Section 5 of FIA Act, officer of FIA have such powers, including powers relating to search, arrest of persons and seizure of property.       [P. 252] J

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 154--Under Section 154 of Cr.P.C., a first information report (FIR) can be registered only with regard to commission of cognizable offence.                                                        [P. 253] K

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 156--Investigation--An investigation can be made by a police officer, without order of a Magistrate, under Section 156 of Cr.P.C only in respect of a cognizable offence.         [P. 253] L

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----Ss. 154 & 156--FIR & Investigation--It is contents of FIR which are to be seen to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is made out of allegations contained therein and mere mentioning of a particular section of PPC or any other offence under law in FIR is not determinative in this regard.      [P. 253] M

PLD 2007 SC 48 ref.

Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Addl. AGP and Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR for Petitioners.

Syed Naeem Bokhari, ASC for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 6.2.2023.

Order

Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.--The petitioners seek leave to appeal against a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, dated 04.02.2020 (“impugned judgment”), whereby the High Court while accepting the writ petition of the respondents, as well as a writ petition and two criminal miscellaneous applications of other accused persons, has quashed FIR No. 05/2018 registered against them at Police Station FIA, Islamabad, for offences punishable under Sections 409/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (“PPC”) and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (“PCA”).

2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on a news item published in a daily newspaper, reporting that a number of employees of the various directorates of the Capital Development Authority (“CDA”) had been illegally upgraded in violation of the relevant rules and regulations during the years 2007 to 2013, the Federal Investigation Agency (“FIA”) conducted an inquiry and found that prima facie a case of abuse of authority was made out against the officers who processed and approved those illegal upgradations as well as against the beneficiary officials of the CDA (including the respondents). With this finding, the FIA registered the above-mentioned FIR and initiated the formal investigation, which may have included the arrest and detention of the accused persons. The respondents and some other persons nominated as accused in the FIR as well as in the investigation proceeding, filed two writ petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 (“Constitution”) and two criminal miscellaneous applications under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (“Cr.P.C.”) for quashing of the FIR, mainly on the ground that no offence was made out of the allegations recorded in the FIR. The High Court agreed with the ground pleaded, accepted the writ petitions and miscellaneous applications, and quashed the FIR vide the impugned judgment. Hence, the petitioners have filed the present petition for leave to appeal.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, read the cases cited by them and examined the record of the case.

4. First of all, we want to make it clear that a High Court has no power under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR or an investigation proceeding; therefore, the criminal miscellaneous applications filed under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. by some of the accused persons in the High Court for quashing the FIR and investigation proceeding in the present case were not maintainable. This is because jurisdiction of a High Court to make an appropriate order under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. necessary to secure the ends of justice, can only be exercised with regard to the judicial or Court proceedings and not relating to proceedings of any other authority or department, such as FIR registration or investigation proceedings of the police department. This has been authoritatively held by a five-member bench of this Court in Shahnaz Begum.[1] A High Court, therefore, can quash a judicial proceeding pending before any subordinate Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C., if it finds it necessary to make such order to prevent the abuse of the process of that Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; however, it should not ordinarily exercise its power under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to make such order unless the accused person has first availed his remedy before the trial Court under Section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C.[2] Where before the submission of the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. to the Court concerned, the accused person thinks that the FIR has been registered, and the investigation is being conducted, without lawful authority, he may have recourse to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article199 of the Constitution for judicial review of the said acts of the police officers.[3]

5. In the present case, as the High Court was competent to judicially review the acts of registering the FIR and conducting the investigation by the officers of the FIA in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, therefore, the acceptance of the criminal miscellaneous applications filed by some of the accused persons under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. and the reference to Section 561-A Cr.P.C. while quashing the FIR have no material bearing on the jurisdiction of the High Court while passing the impugned judgment. Even otherwise, if the reasons stated for passing the impugned judgment fall within the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the reference to a wrong or inapplicable provision of law will not by itself have any fatal consequence.[4] The High Court has observed in the impugned judgment that the matter in issue, which relates to the violation of the terms and conditions of service of the CDA employees, does not constitute the offence of criminal misconduct punishable under Section 5(2) of the PCA nor are the ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 409 PPC made out. The High Court has also specifically quoted the statement made before it by the Addl. Director, FIA that “FIA has concluded investigation and no element of bribery has been found in the entire inquiry against any official of CDA”. With the said observations, the High Court has quashed the FIR, by holding that FIA authorities have failed to legally justify their actions of initiating the inquiry and registration of the FIR. These reasons squarely fall within the scope of the provisions of Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution.

6. Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution empowers the High Courts to judicially review the acts done or proceedings taken by the persons performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority and if find such acts or proceedings to have been done or taken without lawful authority, to declare them to be so and of no legal effect. The registration of an FIR and the doing of an investigation are the acts of officers of the police department (a provincial law enforcement agency) who perform functions in connection with the affairs of a Province and are thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution. The High Courts can declare such acts of the police officers, to have been made without lawful authority and of no legal effect if they are found to be so and can also make any appropriate incidental or consequential order to effectuate its decision,[5] such as quashing the FIR and investigation proceeding. The acts of registering the FIR and conducting investigation by the officers of the FIA, in the present case, are also subject to said jurisdiction of the High Court, as they have been done by the officers performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation.

7. The FIA has been established by the Federal Government under Section 3 of the Federal Investigation Agency Act 1974 (“FIA Act”), for inquiry into, and investigation of the offences specified in the Schedule to the said Act, including an attempt or conspiracy to commit, and abetment of, any such offence. Under Section 5 of the FIA Act, the officers of the FIA have such powers, including powers relating to search, arrest of persons and seizure of property, and such duties, privileges and liabilities as the officers of a Provincial Police have in relation to the investigation of offences under the Cr.P.C., and its officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector may, for the purposes of any inquiry or investigation under this Act, exercise any of the powers of an officer-in-charge of a Police Station under the Cr.P.C. That being so, one has to look at the provisions of Sections 154 and 156 of the Cr.P.C., which relate to the registration of FIRs and conducting the investigations, for the purpose of examining whether the acts of registering the FIR and doing the Investigation by the FIA officers in the present case were with or without lawful authority.

8. Under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., a first information report (FIR) can be registered only with regard to the commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly, an investigation can be made by a police officer, without the order of a Magistrate, under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. only in respect of a cognizable offence. Needless to say that it is the contents of an FIR which are to be seen to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is made out of the allegations contained therein, and mere mentioning of a particular Section of the PPC or any other offence under the law in the FIR is not determinative in this regard.[6] However, the falsity or truthfulness of those allegations is not under examination for the purpose of determining the legal authority of the police officer to register the FIR. The precise question is: whether the allegations as contained in the FIR make out the commission of a cognizable offence; if so, what is that?

9. When asked how the accused officers who processed and approved the alleged illegal upgradations have committed the cognizable offences of criminal breach of trust and criminal misconduct punishable under Section 409 PPC and Section 5(2) PCA and how the officials who were granted the illegal upgradations are the abettors in the commission of those offences and are thus liable for the offence of abetment punishable under Section 109 PPC, we got no plausible reply. The allegations as contained in the FIR do not involve the very essential ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in Section 405 PPC, (i) the entrustment of, or dominion over, any property, and (ii) the dishonest misappropriation or conversion to his own use of that property, or the dishonest use or disposal of that property in violation of any direction of law or of any legal contract. Therefore, the cognizable offence of criminal breach of trust by a public servant punishable under Section 409 PPC mentioned in the FIR is not made out. Similar is the case with the cognizable offence punishable under Section 5(2) PCA mentioned in the FIR, which is also not made out of the allegations as contained in the FIR. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally misconceived, that the authority conferred upon the accused officers, who granted the illegal upgradations, was a trust and by misusing that authority, they have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 409 PPC and the offence of criminal misconduct punishable under Section 5(2) PCA. No doubt, the powers of the public servants are like a trust conferred upon them and they should exercise them fairly, honestly and in good faith as a trustee;
but the entrustment of the power to upgrade his subordinate officials is not equivalent to the entrustment of property as mentioned in Section 405 PPC and its misuse, or use in violation of the relevant rules and regulations, does not constitute the cognizable offences punishable under Section 409 PPC and Section 5(2) PCA. The misuse of such a power may constitute misconduct under the service laws, but does not attract criminal misconduct punishable under the criminal laws.

10. In view of the above legal position, the acts of the FIA officers in registering the FIR and carrying out investigation in the present case are certainly without lawful authority. We thus find no legal flaw in the impugned judgment. The present petition is not only meritless but also vexatious, as it amounts to continuation of harassment caused to the respondents by initiating the criminal proceeding against them in relation to their service matter, without any lawful authority. Additionally, these petitions being meritless and against the law settled by this Court have unduly wasted the time of the Court depriving it from attending to more lawful and genuine claims pending before it. Such frivolous litigation clogs the pipelines of justice causing delay in dispensation of justice, thereby impairing the right to expeditious justice of a genuine litigant. Such vexatious and frivolous petitions add to the pendency of cases which over-burdens the Court dockets and slows down the engine of justice. Such vexatious and frivolous litigation must be dealt with firmly and strongly discouraged.[7] We, therefore, dismiss the present petition and decline the leave to appeal, with costs of Rs. 100,000/-under Order 28 Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The costs shall be deposited by petitioner No. 2, Inspector Irfan Azim Burki, In-charge FIA, Corporate Crime Circle, Islamabad, who registered the FIR and was making the investigation against the respondents, from his own pocket, with the Registrar of this Court within 30 days from today, and after the deposit, they shall be paid to the respondents. A compliance report, in this regard, shall be placed on the record of the case. In case of non-compliance, the matter shall be put up before the Court for appropriate orders.

(K.Q.B.)          Petition dismissed

---

[1].       Shahnaz Begum v. High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677 (5-MB).

[2].       Sher Afgan v. Ali Habib 2011 SCMR 1813.

[3].       See Shahnaz Begum case (supra).

[4].       Olas Khan v. NAB PLD 2018 SC 40.

[5].       R. SIM & Co v. District Magistrate PLD 1966 SC 650 (5-MB).

[6].       State v. Sultan Ahmed PLD 2007 SC 48.

[7].       See Naveed-ul-Islam v. District Judge 2023 SCP 32 (Citation on the official website of this Court) on the objectives of imposition of costs.

FIR lodged after 25 years of Transaction

 PLJ 2024 Cr.C. 618

[Islamabad High Court]

Present: Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J.

Ms. GHAZALA ALI--Appellant

versus

SIKANDAR RAMZAN Chaudhry and another--Respondents

Crl. A. No. 172 of 2021, decided on 5.12.2023.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----Ss. 249-A & 417(2A)--Pakistan Penal Code, (XLV of 1860), Ss. 420, 468 & 471--Acquittal from charge--Registration of FIR--Transfer of house--Family settlement agreement--Settlement agreement was not cancelled--FIR was lodged after twenty years of transaction--Report of handwriting expert--Allegation of forgery--Non-implication of respondent--Estate of deceased was settled through an agreement--The appellant and her brother were also signatories of agreement--The said agreement, as per documents, still holds field and was not yet been cancelled by Court of competent jurisdiction despite questioned by appellant and her brother--Subject FIR was got registered by appellant in year 2018 i.e. after twenty-seven years of alleged transaction and after about twenty years of first agreement wherein she had also been a signatory, challenged same subsequently after twenty years of alleged transaction--Before registration of instant FIR, appellant had already filed suit for cancellation of agreement with a delay of more than twenty years--The report reveals that signatures of late Ch. Ramzan Ali were similar in characteristics with his routine signatures--Report, authenticated and verified by Deputy Director and Director Technical Wing FIA, negated allegation of forgery, as alleged by appellant in her FIR-- Apart from fake Handwriting Expert Report, rest of incriminating material made basis to indict respondents for offence alleged, comprised of documents mentioned in recovery memo.--Neither CDA nor Investigation Agency alleged any forgery in preparation of said documents--Entire prosecution evidence did not implicate respondents for commission of alleged fraud and forgery--Appeal dismissed.

                                                      [Pp. 621, 624 & 625] A, B, C, D & E

PLD 2007 SC 386 & 2022 CLC 1064 ref.

Raja Iftikhar Ahmad, Advocate for Appellant.

Mr. Mudassar Hussain Malik, Advocate for Respondents.

Mr. Hazrat Younas for State.

Date of hearing: 8.11.2023.

Judgment

Through the listed criminal appeal in terms of Section 417 (2A) Cr.P.C., “appellant” namely Ms. Ghazala Ali (complainant) impugns order dated 12.10.2021, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Section-30, Islamabad-West whereby respondents 1&2 namely Sikandar Ramzan Ch. and Ms. Samina Babar Ramzan (‘respondents’) were acquitted in terms of Section 249-A Cr. P.C in case FIR No. 228, dated 25.05.2018, under Sections 420, 468 & 471 PPC, Police Station Aabpara, Islamabad.

2. Precisely, subject FIR stood registered on the complaint of appellant Ms. Ghazala Ali wherein it was alleged that she is daughter of Ch. Ramzan Ali, who was owner of House No. 41, Street No. 12, Sector F-6/3 Islamabad (‘subject house’); that her father died in the year 1990; that her two brothers namely Sikander Ramzan Ch. (Respondent No. 1) and Babar Ramzan Ch. (late), by producing fake person in CDA and putting fake signatures of her father got transferred subject house in their name; that at the relevant time, other brother and sisters had been abroad, therefore, remained unaware regarding said forged transaction; that their father Ch. Ramzan Ali died on 30.10.1990 while the subject house stood transferred in the name of two brothers on 23.11.1991; that her brother Babar Ramzan Ch. died in the year 1992 and at that time their mother Ms. Anwar Sultana was alive and entitled to 1/6th share in subject house; that her mother Ms. Anwar Sultana died in the year 1997; that after the death of her mother, her legal heirs including appellant and brother Tariq Ramzan Ch. were entitled to their due share in the subject house; that in the year 2005 respondents Sikandar Ramzan. and Ms. Samina Babar Ramzan prepared forged succession certificate and fraudulently got transferred the subject house in their names and in the names of their children, thus deprived the appellant and other legal heirs of their legal share in subject house by employing fraud and forgery.

3. After due investigation, report in terms of Section 173 Cr.P.C was submitted before the Court of competent jurisdiction for trial. The said report primarily based upon documentary evidence including the application and transfer forms collected from CDA containing signatures of late Ch. Ramzan Ali and Opinion of Handwriting Expert wherein on examination, questioned signatures of the late found not similar with that of his routine signatures. Subsequently, on an application by Respondent No. 1 regarding tendering of Opinion with fake signatures of the Examiner, supplementary report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted before the Court with Opinion of Handwriting Expert of even date i.e. 19.04.2019 wherein, the signatures of the late on questioned documents and routine signatures were found similar in nature. At the trial, respondents were charge-sheeted on 31.07.2019 where after they filed an application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties, accepted the application vide order dated 12.10.2021, being impugned through the listed appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the parties addressed lengthy arguments by referring previous litigation, both civil and criminal, launched by the appellant and one of her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch. against respondents and others. Both the sides documented the appeal to highlight their respective contentions. Respondents through separate civil misc. placed on record copies of FIRs, orders passed thereupon and copies of civil litigation and orders thereupon besides an agreement-family settlement dated 17.01.1998.

5. The circumference of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant had been to the effect that respondents by playing fraud and forgery, deprived the appellant and other legal heirs of their share in the subject house; that forgery and fraud is substantiated by the Opinion of Handwriting Expert and that in order to perpetuate illegal act just to grab the property by depriving other legal heirs, respondents subsequently got prepared succession certificate by deliberately concealing all legal heirs and then fraudulently got transferred the subject house in their names and in the names of their children. Learned counsel in support of his submissions referred various documents, tendered before the CDA for the purpose of transfer of allotment of subject house by the respondents. According to learned counsel, the subject transfer of allotment in the name of respondents, on the face of it, is bogus as it was made after the death of Ch. Ramzan Ali, who died on 30.10.1990 while alleged transfer of allotment in the name of respondents was made much later on 23.11.1991, therefore, under the circumstances, proper course for the Trial Court was to record evidence and then decide the case on merits instead to knockout the appellant without affording her due opportunity to produce evidence, thus impugned order being against the spirit of natural justice, contrary to incriminating material made basis to indict the respondents for the alleged offence and offensive to right of fair trial envisaged in Article 10-A of the Constitution is liable to be set aside.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents vehemently repelled the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant by contending that respondents had been/are facing dense litigation, both civil and criminal, initiated by the appellant and the other brother Tariq Ramzan Ch. while none of the other two sisters came forward to support the appellant; that the matter inter se the parties had already been settled regarding estate of their predecessor through family settlement in the year 1998 where after, appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch. launched criminal and civil actions, one after the other out of personal grudge and vendetta against widow of their late brother and the other brother with whom they had already settled the family issue; that in an identical case lodged by Tariq Ramzan Ch, respondents were acquitted in terms of Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. and appeal against the said order was also dismissed by this Court with costs, therefore, instant appeal being frivolous, vexatious and offshoot of malicious prosecution launched by appellant, deserves the same treatment.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and consulted the documents made available on file with their able assistance.

8. The parties-to-lis hail from common pedigree. The subject house was owned by Ch. Ramzan Ali (predecessor in interest of the parties) who died on 30.10.1990. the appellant and respondents are closely related with each other. The appellant and Respondent No. 1 Sikander Ramzan Chaudhry are real brother and sister while Respondent No. 2 Ms. Samina Babar Ramzan Ch. is widow of Babar Ramzan Chaudhry, late brother of appellant and sister-in-law (bhabi) of appellant. Late Ch. Ramzan Ali (died in 1990) was survived by Ms. Anwar Sultana (died in 1997) widow, three sons Tariq Ramzan Ch., Sikander Ramzan Ch. (Respondent No. 1), Babar Ramzan Ch. (died in 1992) and three daughters Bushra Bibi, Zahida Parveen and Ms. Ghazala Ali (appellant).

9. As per the documents made available on file, before the rift cropped up between the parties, dispute with regard to estate of the deceased was settled through an agreement dated 17.01.1998. The appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch. were also signatories of the said agreement. The said agreement, as per documents, still holds the field and has not yet been cancelled/revoked by the Court of competent jurisdiction despite questioned by the appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch through a civil suit.

10. Record further reveals that appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch commenced the litigation, both civil and criminal, against respondents and others in the year 2018, then in 2019 and 2020 as well.

The first action was initiated on 09.01.2018 by appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch by filing suit against respondents and others seeking decree for declaration, partition, cancellation of agreement dated 17.01.1998, permanent and mandatory injunction.

After about five months of filing of said suit on 25.05.2018 appellant got registered FIR, subject matter of instant appeal wherein respondents were acquitted vide impugned order.

Thereafter, on 11.12.2018, Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry got registered FIR No. 432, under Section 420 PPC, at same Police Station i.e. Aabpara Islamabad, regarding preparation of forged agreement dated 13.02.2007 (after more than ten years of said agreement) against respondents. In the said case, respondents were acquitted in terms of Section 249-A Cr.P.C by learned Judicial Magistrate Section-30 Islamabad-West vide Judgment dated 12.10.2021. Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry assailed the said order before this Court through Crl. Appeal No. 199 of 2021 which was dismissed with costs of Rs. 200,000/-. Paragraph 7, 8 and 9 being significant are reproduced:

          “07. Father of the appellant namely Ch. Ramzan Ali, got transferred House No. 41, Street No. 12, Sector F-6/3, Islamabad in the names of his sons Sikandar Ramzan and Babar Ramzan on 11.08.1990, in his life time, by adopting legal procedure in the office of Capital Development Authority, Islamabad.

          08. The deceased father affixed his signatures and thumb impression himself on the transfer application form, consequently transfer letter was issued by the office of C.D.A on 23.11.1991, after the death of Ch. Ramzan Ali but all the legal and codal formalities of transfer of the property were completed on 11.08.1990, during life time of Ch. Ramzan Ali.

          09. When confronted, learned counsel for the appellant has admitted that there is no expert report that the thumb impressions and the signatures of deceased father are fake or forged.” {Emphasis added}

On 20.02.2019, Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry again got registered another FIR Bearing No. 131, under Section 420, 468, 471 PPC, this time at Police Station Civil Lines Rawalpindi, against the respondents on the same allegation of preparing forged agreement dated 13.02.2007. It this juncture, it is necessary to mention that as per stance of respondents said agreement had been made pursuant to original agreement/ settlement of 1998 in order to protect rights of legal heirs.

On 09.05.2019 Tariq Ramzann Chaudhry filed an application against his sister-in-law/Respondent No. 2 Ms. Samina Babar Ramzan for cancellation of guardianship certificate dated 25.07.1995 but the same was dismissed by learned Guardian Judge vide order dated 02.12.2021.

On 11.09.2019 Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry fled suit for declaration, possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction against respondents and others.

On 23.12.2019, one Tariq Masood, employee of Hammad son of Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry got registered FIR No. 435, under Sections 324, 34 and 109 PPC, at Police Station Shalimar Islamabad against respondents and others wherein the latter were acquitted in terms of Section 249-A Cr.P.C by the learned Judicial Magistrate Section 30 Islamabad-West vide order dated 02.11.2021.

On 01.05.2020, Tariq Ramzanan Chaudhry got registered FIR No. 122, under Section 420, 468, 471, 201, 498-A and 466 PC, at Police Station Shahzad Town Islamabad, on the allegation of fraudulent transfer of property of her in laws by excluding other legal heirs wherein Respondent No. 2 Samina Babar Ramzan was allowed pre-arrest bail by learned ASJ-II Islamabad East vide order dated 30.07.2021.

11. Perusal of documents regarding above litigation, launched by appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry reveals that respondents were subjected to face criminal and civil litigation primarily on the same subject matter. Besides present FIR, four FIRs were got registered against them besides two civil suits, filed by appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry against respondents and an application for cancellation of guardianship certificate which was dismissed. It appears that the appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry had been/are keeping the respondents on their target. The above mentioned proceedings though no directly related to subject FIR yet their relevance and significance cannot be ignored, primarily for the reason of having one and the same original cause of action, made basis by appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch. to launch proceedings against respondents and the aspect that same do form part of judicial record, having direct nexus with the subject matter of instant appeal. Under the principle, documents that retain such like qualifications can be made basis to take judicial notice of the same. Ordinarily, documents are produced through a witness who testifies on oath and who may be cross-examined by the other side. However, there are exceptions with regard to facts which need not be proved; these are those which the Court can take judicial notice of under Article 111 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order, 1984 and are mentioned in Article 112, and facts which are admitted (Article 113, Qanun-e-Shahdat Order, 1984), pertaining to part of judicial record, having direct nexus with subject matter of instant appeal. Reliance is placed upon recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through LRs v. Misri Khan (CA No. 1698 of 2014).

12. Adverting to the merits of the case, it is noticed that the alleged transaction of transfer of allotment in the name of two brothers i.e. Respondent No. 1 Sikandar Ramzan Chaudhry and Babar Ramzan Chaudhry (late), husband of Respondent No. 2 was made in the year 1991 while subject FIR was got registered by the appellant in the year 2018 i.e. after twenty-seven years of alleged transaction and after about twenty years of the first agreement wherein she had also been a signatory, challenged the same subsequently after twenty years of alleged transaction. Before the registration of instant FIR, the appellant had already filed suit on 09.01.2018 for cancellation of agreement dated 17.01.1998 with a delay of more than twenty years.

13. As there were two reports of Handwriting Expert of even date, filed before the Trial Court along with reports under Section 173 Cr.P.C, one allegedly contained fake signatures of the Official concerned while the other, filed with supplementary report under Section 173 Cr.P.C, testified as genuine. In order to verify the veracity of the report, on the direction of this Court, FIA filed comprehensive report on 24.10.2022 highlighting the procedure and SOPs, being followed for examination of questioned documents. As per said report, made part of file, after careful examination and adopting due process, report was prepared by the concerned official, then examined and approved by Deputy Director Technical and thereafter Director Technical Wing FIA. The report dated 19.04.2019 reveals that signatures of late Ch. Ramzan Ali are similar in characteristics with his routine signatures. Thus, report, authenticated and verified by the Deputy Director and Director Technical Wing FIA, negates allegation of forgery, as alleged by the appellant in her FIR and pressed to seek full-length inquiry on the basis of reports containing fake signatures of the official concerned, which of course, deserves stern departmental action against the delinquent/s, after tracing them out by the FIA and the police as well.

14. Apart from fake Handwriting Expert Report, rest of incriminating material made basis to indict the respondents for the offence alleged, comprised of documents mentioned in the recovery memo. The same are allotment letter in the name of original owner pertaining to the year 1964, application form for transfer of allotment, requisition of transfer application, document containing signatures of late-predecessor in interest of the parties, transfer letter, application for transfer of share, letter of transfer of allotment in the name of Respondent No. 2, letter of division of subject house and photo copies of CNICs. None of these documents even remotely suggest that any fraud, as alleged, had been played by the respondents. It was also for the reason that neither the CDA nor the Investigation Agency alleged any forgery in preparation of said documents. Therefore, entire prosecution evidence did not implicate the respondents for commission of alleged fraud and forgery.

15. It is well settled that in terms of Section 249-A Cr.P.C, the Magistrate may acquit an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutors and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. The prerequisites for invoking the power in terms of Section 249 Cr.P.C are to the effect that before passing the order, Magistrate should hear the parties and consult the incriminating material and draw opinion regarding acquittal on the basis of said incriminating material only in case when the charge appears to be groundless or there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. In the present case, as discussed above, charge against respondents, on examination of incriminating material, appears to be groundless and there was no probability of the respondents being convicted of any offence, in case prosecution was allowed to lead entire prosecution evidence.

16. To sum up, on careful examination of incriminating material, made basis to indict the respondents coupled with the fact of launching dense litigation, both civil and criminal highlighted above, by the appellant and her brother Tariq Ramzan Ch., whose identical appeal was earlier dismissed by this Court with costs, it can safely be held that charge against the respondents was groundless and there was no remote probability of their conviction in case the prosecution was allowed to produce entire evidence.

17. It is significant to note that instant case appears to be a classic example of frivolous litigation. It appears that there was blatant abuse of process of law to settle personal vendetta instead to agitate genuine grievance despite the fact that parties are closely related to each other. Such frivolous, vexatious and speculative litigation unduly burdens the Courts giving artificial rise to pendency of cases which in turn clogs the justice system and delays the resolution of genuine disputes. Such type of litigation is required to be rooted out of the system and one of the ways to curb such practice of instituting frivolous and vexatious cases is by imposing of costs. The specter of being made liable to pay actual costs should be such as to make every litigant think twice before putting forth a vexatious claim or defence before the Court. These costs in an appropriate case can be over and above the nominal costs which include costs of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost, besides the amount of the process fee and lawyer’s fee paid in relation to the litigation. The imposition of costs in frivolous and vexatious cases meets the requirement of fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution, as it not only discourages frivolous claims or defences brought to the Court but also absence of such cases allows more Court time for the adjudication of genuine claims. The imposition of costs lay foundation for expeditious justice and promotes a smart legal system that enhances access to justice by entertaining genuine claims. The purpose of awarding costs at one level is to compensate the successful party for the expenses incurred to which he has been subjected and at another level to be an effective tool to purge the legal system of frivolous, vexatious and speculative claims and defences. The imposition of costs encourages alternative dispute resolution; settlements between the parties; and reduces unnecessary burden of the Courts, so that they can attend to genuine claims. The costs are a weapon of offence for the plaintiff with a just claim to present and a shield to the defendant who has been unfairly brought into Court. Reliance is placed upon Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge, Gujrat etc. (CP 3127 of 2020), Province of Balochistan v. Murree Brewery Company (PLD 2007 SC 386 (5-MB), Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj (2010) 8 SCC) and Edwin Coe LLP v. Naseem Ahmad Sarfraz Khan (2022 CLC 1064-Islamabad).

18. In view of above, impugned order, being in accordance with law and facts of the case, does not call for any interference. Consequently, by following the course adopted by learned co-equal Bench while dismissing Crl. Appeal No. 199 of 2021, titled “Tariq Ramzan Chaudhry v. Sikander Ramzan etc.” instant appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs. 200,000/-which the appellant shall pay to respondents within a period of two months from the date of this judgment. In case of non-payment of costs by the appellant within the prescribed time, same shall be recovered from her as money decree with 10% monthly increase, and the costs of the execution proceedings shall also be recovered in addition thereto. Office is directed to transmit copy of this judgment to IG, ICT and DG FIA to hold in-depth inquiry and proceed against the delinquent(s) in accordance with law in terms of Paragraph 12 above.

(Y.A.)  Appeal dismissed