PLJ 2010 Karachi 154
Present: Shahid Anwar Bajwa, J.
Mst. SHAHNAZ GHULAM RASOOL--Petitioner
versus
MUHAMMAD SHAKEEL AHMAD SIDDIQUI
and 2 others--Respondents
C.P. No.461 of 2009, decided on 12.112009.
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)--
----Ss. 12 & 25--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Custody of child--Word "religion" used in S.17 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890--Scope--Nature of profession of parents of minor--Desirability--Minor son was more than seven years of age and trial Court removed him from the custody of mother and handed over to father--Upheld by First Appellate Court--Validity--Word "religion" used in S.17 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, was to be given its wider interpretation and not narrowing it down to sects and sub-sects in deciding custody of a minor, it would be of no relevance as to which sect did the father belong and as to which sect did the mother belong--Trial Court had extensively dealt with all questions--High Court disagreed with the observation of Guardian Judge that mother was running a tuition centre and domestic beauty parlour and, therefore, it was not conducive to minor--High Court directed trial Court to stay away from judgmental observations about professions which were permitted by law--While accepting application for custody of minor, two courts below had given cogent reasons after having appreciated the evidence--Minor appeared before Trial Court and clearly stated that his father loved him and he also stated that his grandmother also loved him--High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in concurrent findings of fact by two courts below--Petition was dismissed. [P. 164] A
1988 SCMR 1359; PLD 2008 Kar. 499; 1994 MLD 1098; 2000 YLR 3046; 2003 YLR 1105; 2008 SCMR 480; 2008 SCMR 488; PLD 1988 Kar. 252; 1980 CLC 785; PLD 2008 Kar. 198; 1974 SCMR 279; PLD 1964 SC 260; PLD 1974 SC 139; 2007 YLR 2982; PLD 1978 Kar. 328 and PLD 1996 SC 801 ref.
Khawaja Naveed Ahmad, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Muhammad Nouman Jamali, Advocate for Respondent No.1.
Date of hearing: 23.10.2009.
Judgment
Brief facts giving rise to this constitutional petition are that petitioner (since it is a matter relating to custody of a child I will refer to her as "the mother") married Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the father") on 25-9-1998. Out of this wedlock on 18-8-1999 son Munib A. Siddiqui was born. Application No. 1180/2004 under the Guardians and Wards Act was filed by the father. It was stated in the application that marriage was dissolved in 2004 by way of Khula'. It was stated by father in the application that on 18-6-2003 mother left her husband's house along with minor child. It is alleged by wife that on 18-6-2003 she was turned out of the house. In any case she has been living with her parents since 18-6-2003. Since father was not paying maintenance charges of child, on application the Family Court directed the father to pay maintenance charges of Rs.2,000 per month. Advocate for mother said in this case actual expenses are Rs.7,000 per month but he frankly conceded that maintenance charges allowed by the Court have not been challenged by the mother. He stated that balance expenses are being borne by the mother. Trial Court vide its order April, 26, 2008 granted to mother right of interim custody of minor from 7-00 p.m. on each Saturday to 7-00 p.m. of the following day. Mother was also allowed custody of minor on first day of occasion of each Eid. Permanent custody of minor was given to father. Regarding welfare of minor it was observed as under :--
"The case of the petitioner is based on two main points that the respondent who is real mother of the minor is a woman of harsh nature, ill temperament and uncompromising evidence and further she has got no adequate financial means and proper time to meet the upbringing and welfare of minor. In this connection he has proved his case to a larger extent. According to the petitioner, the respondent left his house along with minor without his permission in his absence and came to reside with her brother. In this connection he tried his level best to bring about compromise with her but all went in vain. While respondent deposed that she was turned out by the petitioner in three wearing clothes along with minor. The petitioner has produced applications to S.H.O. Super Market regarding the removal of custody of the minor by the respondent which are self-explanatory and surprisingly such application has not been denied by the respondent side in evidence and resultantly they are admitted as true. The petitioner further submitted that he approached to the respondent and her brother for compromise and again such contention of the petitioner has not been specifically denied by the respondent and the same are admitted as true. The decision of concerned U.C. Nazim which has been relied upon by the petitioner has also not denied by the respondent. The respondent made allegations of maltreatment against the petitioner but no Oral/Medical proof has been furnished by her. Even her advocate failed to argue in relation of maltreatment meanwhile his arguments. There is no mentioning of specific date and time and witnesses of such maltreatment. The respondent has herself admitted that petitioner properly maintained minor before separation therefore, the reason of maltreatment is out of understanding. The Respondent Nowhere in her pleadings and evidence has taken plea that the petitioner is either jobless for having minor financial means. The respondent has herself admitted that she becomes angry soon. It is also admitted fact that this was second marriage of the respondent and same remained unsuccessful. She has got another child/son from her previous husband to support/afford. She runs a beauty parlour and a tuition center at home and that is the only means for maintenance of her both sons. The evidence of the petitioner in relation to his compromising efforts, his proper maintenance of his wife and son, his financial earning has remained confidence-inspiring since he has got an attractive job in Agha Khan Hospital and thereafter runs a Dawakhana in evening. His witnesses have supported him on martial points while the whole case of the respondent is outcome of improvements omissions and contradictions.
It has been admitted by the respondent that she has got a house of two rooms where she runs beauty parlour as well as tuition center, hence such atmosphere is not conducive for the welfare of the minor and further the respondent saves short time to meet the welfare of her two sons. On the other hand she has admitted herself that house of the petitioner is very much spacious consisting of four rooms.
It has been contended by the respondent that mother of the petitioner is above 80 years of age hence she is not in position to grow up minor betterly in comparison to her. Contrary to this respondent herself admitted in her cross-examination that mother of the petitioner does cooking even to this age. This appears that re-course be made to the health of a person and not age. Moreover, the minor is above 8 years of age and at this juncture he needs not primary type of care as in age of 2, 3 years.
More importantly, the petitioner has contracted no marriage after Khula' taken by the respondent which shows love of the petitioner towards the minor which is very much necessary for his physical, social, mental and psychological welfare.
Last but not the least, the minor is above 7 years of age and in this connection it is settled principle of Islamic Sharia that custody of male child be given to the father except exceptional circumstances arise which may otherwise disentitle him from custody of minor. In this case no such exceptional circumstances arise and further leaving Hazanat right the welfare of the minor lies with the father. There is valuable rich and sacred concept, behind right of Hazanat provided by Islam which cannot be repugnant to the principle of welfare of minor. The minor has attained 8 years of age and here he needs iron but kind hand of his father who can protect him in street, in school, in game shops, in markets etc. from his possible involvement and company in criminal minded people and un-civilized society and the same cannot be done by a household lady which remained failed in her both the marriages and these days runs a beauty parlour and a tuition center at her two rooms house. The law ruling submitted by the petitioner side are very much consistent with the case in hand while law citations relied upon by the respondent side are irrelevant."
2. Being aggrieved by the order of the trial Court mother filed appeal. Appellate Court vide order dated 27-7-2009 dismissed the appeal. Being aggrieved by the order this constitution petition has been filed in this Court.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner/mother made following submissions:--
(i) Child has been living with the mother all along.
(ii) Every child's first and inseparable attachment is with his mother. Father comes thereafter.
(iii) Father has not shown sensitivity and concern for child as he has been paying meagre amount of Rs.2,000 per month for maintenance of child which amount is totally inadequate.
(iv) Even if trial Court ordered for Rs.2,000 per month and even after this order was accepted as it was not be challenged by mother. It was duty of father to show required degree of sense and sensitivity.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon Ch. Nazir Ahmed v. Additional District Judge III, Sahiwal and others 1988 SCMR 1359; Saad Amanullah Khan V. IVth Senior Civil Judge, (South) Karachi and 3 others PLD 2008 Kar. 499; Mst. Zainab Bibi v. Rehmat Ali and 2 others 1994 MLD 1098; Mst. Farah Waqar v. Dr. Waqar Ahmed Khan 2000 YLR 3046; Barkat Bibi v. Zahid Perveen and 2 others 2003 YLR 1105;
5. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 made the following submissions:--
(i) There are concurrent findings of fact by the learned Courts below and High Court should be most reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of fact.
(ii) Although child has been living with mother all along but when child appeared before the trial Court he consented to live with his father and stated that his best friend is a Cat.
(iii) In written statement no ground whatsoever was taken regarding adequacy maintenance expenses paid by father.
(iv) This was the petitioner's second marriage. She has another child from the earlier/(first) marriage by the name "Zeeshan" and petitioner has been taking care of that child during subsistence of his marriage.
(v) Under Muslim Personal Law since the son is for more than 7 years of age father has right to custody of the child.
(vi) No doubt mother is entitled to give reasonable visitation right which rights have been given by Courts below.
4. Learned counsel for Reasonable No.1 has relied upon: Khan Muhammad v. Mst. Surayya Bibi 2008 SCMR 480; Malik Muhammad Hussain v. District Returning Officer and others 2008 SCMR 488; Sultana Begum v. Mir Afzal and others PLD 1988 Kar. 252; Surraya Bibi v. Abdur Rashid 1980 CLC 785; Imran Ali v. Mst. Iffat Siddiqui and 2 others PLD 2008 Kar. 198; Khuda Bukhsh v. Muhammad Sharif and another 1974 SCMR 279; Syed Azmat Ali v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and others PLD 1964 SC 260; Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD 1974 SC 139; Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited, Karachi v. Director of Octroi, Karachi and 2 others 2007 YLR 2982; Messrs Karachi Industrial and Textile Mills, Karachi and another v. Settlement Commissioner (Industries), Lahore and another PLD 1978 Kar. 228 and Sabur Rehman and another v. Government of Sindh and 3 others PLD 1996 SC 801.
7. I have considered submissions made by the learned counsel. I have also gone through record of petition as well as case-law cited by learned counsel for the parties.
8. On 21-10-2009 when both the learned counsel concluded their arguments it was ordered that petitioner along with her son be present in Court on 23-10-2009. On that date petitioner and her son came to the Court. I spoke to child. He appeared to be well behaved child, receiving good education and having opportunity for developing of a well rounded balanced personality. I cannot say that he was being neglected in any manner.
9. Before I refer to the case law I must express my personal anguish. In Holy Qur'an ALLAH ALMIGHTY says that everybody is born from a father and a mother. Both have equal responsibility for bringing up of child. Whereas child is a gift of Allah to the parents, it is an onerous responsibility of every father and every mother, they are responsible in respect of their children not only in this world but also in hereafter. Marriage may be contracted and marriage may be dissolved but the eternal indissoluble bond that child has with seed of his father and milk of his mother remains unbroken as long as blood courses through veins of body of that child. Therefore, parents while entitled to pleasures of their marriage must also and always remember their responsibilities towards the child. This responsibility does not come to an end when marriage is dissolved: they remain responsible for it. Obviously, distinct or separately responsibilities are determined by Islamic law but, such responsibility does not come to an end with dissolution of marriage. Therefore, a couple which decides to their separate ways though they are perfectly entitled to their such decision in accordance with law, must keep in mind that even after separation they have grave common responsibility and grave common interest. They should remember this interest: Remain separate but conscious of duties for sake of welfare of your child. This should be underlining them in all such situations. Responsibility also includes not to carry the child in the filth of their bitterness and dug heap of their acrimonies.
10. Proposition of law that in respect of custody of children prime consideration should be welfare of child does not need any authority anymore. The following case law may be referred as illustrative example:--
(i) In Ch. Nazir Ahmed's case the girl child was 14 years old, had been living with her maternal grandmother: both her father and her mother had remarried after their separation. 14 years old girl stated that she is well looked after by her grandmother.
(ii) In Saad Amanullah Khan's case two children were born out of marriage. It was decided on basis of agreement executed and before Supreme Court. Father was given visitation rights.
(iii) In Mst. Zainab Bibi's case there were three minor children one boy and two girls, boy's custody was given to father. It was held that age of boy is not conclusive for judgment as to whom custody should be handed over. If minor has attained age of discretion his consent should be obtained. Matter was consequently remanded.
(iv) In Mst. Farah Waqar's case there were two children boy ten years old and girl of 8 years. Boy was asked by High Court and stated that he would be happy with his mother and maternal grand parents and would not like to go to a boarding school as his father wanted him to.
(v) In Barkat Bibi's case three children were born out of wedlock and after death of father mother stated living with her parents. Thereafter she remarried and the children continued to stay with their maternal grandmother. Mother filed application under sections 17 and 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act for custody of minors against the grandmother. Trial Court ordered that custody of two boys be handed to mother and custody of girl child was given to the grandmother. Appeal was dismissed. In High Court it was contended that mother had practically severed her connection with the minors after her remarriage and minors had reached age discretion had clearly expressed their choice as they wanted to live with their grandmother. High Court held that children had attained age of discretion, remanded the matter.
(vi) In Khan Muhammad's, case two sons and a daughter were born out of their wedlock. After dissolution of marriage father applied for custody of children who were with mother and mother filed application for custody of child who was with father. Applicant's application was accepted and mother's application was dismissed. Mother filed appeal and the same was accepted to the extent of custody of two children already with her but her application for custody of third child was rejected. Writ petition was rejected. It was observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that right of father being natural guardian of the minors is subject to welfare of the minor because overriding fundamental and paramount important consideration is always welfare of the minors.
(vii) In Imran Ali's case mother had filed application that she may be appointed guardian of ward, two children and be given custody. Application was decided in favour of mother and appeal was dismissed., In High Court writ petition was filed by father, High Court made the following observations:
"I have given full consideration to the arguments of learned advocates for the parties and have gone through the entire evidence. Admittedly Ali Muhammad is aged about 8 years old and Hyder Ali is about 5 and a half years old and the petitioner is the real father and is a Ismaili Aga Khan Shia and he has sufficient means to look after the welfare of the minors so also to grow up the minors in better atmosphere as per his own sect. From the record it appears that the minors used to go to school prior to handing over the temporary custody to the Respondent No. l. Thereafter, there is no evidence available on record whether minors are going to school. It has also come on record that minors are not going to Jamat Khana for their spiritual and religious education. The record reveals that Respondent No. l is residing with her three brothers namely Iqbal Ahmed Siddiqui, Kaleem Ahmed Siddiqui and Azeem Ahmed Siddique, who are her real brothers. It is an admitted fact that Iqbal Ahmed Siddiqui is a convicted person and was in Dubai Jail. The record also shows that the family atmosphere of the petitioner is too better for future growth of the minors as the mother of the petitioner is retired principal of Ibrahim Ali Bhai School, his elder brother is running his own school namely Ameen academy and his second brother is getting education in Australia. From the record it also appears that the petitioner has sufficient source of income to maintain the minors in better way. As far as love and affection is concerned the father and mother have equal love with the children moreso even minors need love, affection, better education, mental and physical health and civil and social atmosphere. It is well-settled principle of law that the children be grown up according to the sect/religion of father. From the record it appears that the minors are not going to Jamat Khana which is a great injustice with the minors as minors are ultimately legal heirs of the petitioner. The minors have to adopt the sect of father, if they are not attending the spiritual classes at the Jamat Khana in future they will not be in a position to mix up with the Aga Khani community that would adversely affect the future career of the minors."
(viii) Regarding scope of interference in writ jurisdiction, although learned counsel referred to a number of authorities but I think reference to only one would be sufficient in Sabur Rehman's case in PLD 1996 Supreme Court 801 at page 809 it is observed as under:--
"From the preceding discussion it follows that the High Court while examining a case in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution will normally not interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction where such finding of fact is based on evidence. The sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence in such cases are not open to be gone into by the High Court. However, where finding of facts recorded by the tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction is based on no evidence, such findings loses its binding effect as the tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction are equally bound by the rule that all findings on questions of fact must be based on legal evidence. Therefore, a finding of fact recorded by Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction without evidence, is a finding without jurisdiction which binds on one. Similarly a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction by misreading the evidence or by ignoring the material evidence on record, will be open to interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The learned judges of the Division Bench though did not reach any different conclusion on the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review, with a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction it declined to interference with the convictions and sentences awarded by the Special Military Court for the following reasons:--
We have examined the evidence in the light of the above authorities and principles and are of the view that even after the exclusion of the confession it cannot be said that there is no evidence to justify the impugned order. Nor the learned counsel for the petitioners have pointed out to the blatant misreading of evidence manifesting denial of justice."
11. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 referred to Section 17(2) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Said section is in the following words:--
"17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian:
(2) In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor the Court shall have regard to the age, sex, and religion of the minor the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes if any of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his property."
12. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 emphasized that one of the fact to be considered by the Court is "Religion of the minor". Learned counsel submitted that in present case petitioner/mother belongs to Ismaili Shia sect and Respondent No. 1/father belongs to Sunni sect. Contention of the learned counsel was that minor should be brought up in Sunni environment and not in Ismaili Shia environment and expressly placed reliance in this regard in Imran Ali's case, quoted above. In my opinion, a Muslim is a Muslim and that should be it. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was once asked as to which sect did he belong and he very bravely stated that he belonged to the same sects as that Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (Sallala-ho-Alahe Wasallam). I do not think, while deciding question of custody to minor, it should be of any relevance as to which sect the parent in question belonged I do not agree with observations in respect of the relevance of sect made by Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Soomro in Imran Ali's case. In my opinion word Religion used in section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act is to be given its wider interpretation and not narrowing it down to sects and sub-sects. Therefore, in my qpinion it would be of no relevance of whatsoever in deciding custody of a minor, as to which sect did the father belong and as to which sect did the mother belong.
13. However in this case learned trial Court has extensively dealt with all the questions. Although, I do not agree with observations of the learned trial Court that mother is running a tuition center and domestic beauty parlour and therefore it would not be conducive to minor. Court should stay away from judgmental observations about professions which are not permitted by law.
14. While accepting this application two Courts below have given cogent reasons and after having appreciated the evidence. I do not think, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction any ground is made out for disturbing concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below. The child, as I stated above, appeared in this case clearly stated that his father loves him (he also stated that his mother loves him more, but that is obvious in almost all cases) and he also stated that his grandmother also loves him. For the above reasons this writ petition is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
(R.A.) Petition dismissed.