Wednesday 20 April 2016

Re-Investigation could not be debarred after submission of Challan

PLJ 2011 Lahore 545
[
Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi]
Present: Hassan Raza Pasha, J.
MEER DAD--Petitioner
versus
INSPECTOR GENERAL POLICE--Respondent
W.P. No. 1406 of 2010, heard on 23.4.2010.
Police Order, 2002 (22 of 2002)--
----Art. 18(6)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Recommended for re-investigation--Change of second investigation was approved--Challenge the legality and validity of order--Recommendation of P.S.B were approved by I.G. Police and investigation was entrusted (RIB)--Question of--Whether Police authorities were empowered to initiate re-investigation of the same crime for which they had already filed report u/S. 173, Cr.P.C.--Validity--Under Art. 18(6) of Police Order, the law bestows a power on duly constituted board to recommend for re-investigation and if the Board recommended for re-investigation of the case then even after submission of the challan the re-investigation could not be debarred--Petition was dismissed.         [P. 550] A
Duty of Investigating Officer--
----Administer justice--To collect all the relevant evidence pertaining to allegation levelled regarding the crime in issue so as to dig out the truth enabling and facilitating the Court to administer justice between the parties--Held: An investigating officer is not to render any opinion regarding guilt or innocence of an accused person and statutory provisions contained in Cr.P.C. Police Order and Police Rules, 1934 he is only to collect all the relevant evidence and to submit his report before the magistrate so that magistrate can form their own independent opinion regarding sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence and material order to decide whether to take cognizance of offence or not to summon any person to face a trial.            [P. 550] B
PLD 2002 Lah. 470, rel.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Police Order, 2002, Art. 18(6)--Constitutional petition--Change of second investigation--Submission of subsequent challan--Not barred--Discretion of Court to admit additional evidence--Alternative remedy--Validity--Holding of successive investigations were deprecated by the Court with intent to avoid undue lingering on the case--How a subsequent challan which almost was completed for submission in the Court of competent jurisdiction can be withheld or brushed aside--Even submission of subsequent challan was not debarred under the provisions of Cr.P.C.--It was entirely discretion of the Court to admit additional evidence if the cognizable of the case submitted to it by the police has already been taken--Complainant can avail an alternative remedy of filing a private complaint--Petition was dismissed.    [P. 551] C
Raja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate for Petitioner.
Syed Zafar Ali Shah & Syed Ali Shah Bukhari, Advocates for Respondents.
Mr. Abdul Wahid Babar, AAG for State.
Date of hearing: 23.4.2010.
Judgment
Through this constitutional petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of order dated 14.1.2010 passed by Inspector-General of Police Punjab, Lahore-Respondent No. 1 whereby "second change of investigation" was approved and investigation of the case was entrusted to Mr. Liaqat Ali Deputy Superintendent of Police, Investigation Branch Punjab.
2.  Brief facts of the case, giving rise to the filing of this petition are that the petitioner got registered F.I.R. No. 140 dated 9.4.2009 under Sections 302, 324, 427, 148, 149 PPC read with Section 7 Anti Terrorism Act at Police Station Murree District Rawalpindi with the allegation that on 9.4.2009 at 5.30 p.m. petitioner along with his brother Arshad, Muhammad Irfan and Rashid Sarwar, a taxi Driver were taking tea at Hotel Express Way situated in the area of Samli Bera and were waiting for Faisal to receive money. Imtiaz Bhola, owner of the hotel was also present there. In the meanwhile, Naseer Mehfooz, Waheed Mehfooz, Bashi Khan along with some other accused person came there on one Parado, one double cabin and two corolla cars. They alighted from the vehicles and started indiscriminate firing with their respective weapons and started demolishing the hotel. When Arshad forbad them not to demolish the hotel. Naseer Mehfooz fired a shot with Kalashnikov which hit him on his mouth who fell down and succumbed to the injuries at the spot. Waheed Mehfooz also fired a shot with Kalashnikov which hit on right wrist of Rashid Sarwar-Driver who fell down. Thereafter the accused while boarding the vehicles left the place of occurrence.
3.  Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after submission of challan before the trial Court the Inspector-General of Police could not transfer the investigation of the case. Learned counsel has argued that superior Courts have many a times disapproved the practice of successive investigation, thus action of Respondent No. 1 being a nullity in the eyes of law is liable to be quashed. Further argued that after Ist change of investigation, the investigation was conducted by the Superintendent of Police and now the investigation was entrusted to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. This fact smacked of mala fide on the part of the police. The act of Respondent No. 1 is nullity in the eyes of law and that the accused party is very much influential and the investigation was transferred to the Deputy Superintendent of Police by giving special task to favour the accused party. Learned counsel further argued that the purpose of the investigation is to collect evidence, which has already been collected and, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by further delaying the matter. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon Muhammad Nasir Cheema v. Mazhar Javaid and other (PLD 2007 SC 31).
4.  Learned counsel for Respondents No. 5, 6 & 7 as well as learned Assistant Advocate-General, have submitted that there is no statutory bar for the police authorities to embark upon investigation of the case even after submission of complete challan, that the petitioner has only challenged the order dated 14.1.2010 for 2nd change of investigation. He has not challenged the recommendations of the Provincial Sanding Board; that the policehas only to collect evidence far and against of either party and the trial Court will decide regarding the innocence or guilt of the accused; that the police can investigate the matter at any stage of the trial on the availability of fresh material and evidence. They have relied upon Ashiq Ali v. Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 4 others (2009 PCr.LJ 830), Javaid Iqbal v. Additional Inspector General of Police, Lahore and 4 others (PLD 2008 Lahore 488), Muhammad Naseem v. S.H.O. Police Station Thikriwala, District Faisalabad and 2 others (1997 MLD 1555) and Saddar Din v. Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Investigation), Capital City Police, Lahore and 6 others (PLD 2009 Lahore 585) Muhammad Yousaf v. The State and others (2000 SCMR 453).
5.  I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. After registration of the case, the investigation was conducted by the S.H.O. who arrested Muhammad Pervez alias Bashi Khan and challaned to Court whereas Naseer Mehfooz and Waheed Mehfooz accused were declared innocent by the local police. The complainant feeling aggrieved of the investigation carried out by the local police applied to the C.P.O. Rawalpindi for Ist change of investigation and investigation was entrusted to Regional Investigation Branch (RIB) Rawalpindi Region, Rawalpindi. During investigation, conducted by Regional Investigation Branch Rawalpindi, both the accused namely Naseer Mehfooz and Waheed were found guilty. Being dissatisfied with the investigation conducted by Regional Investigation Branch Rawalpindi, an application was moved on behalf of Naseer Mehfooz and Waheed Mehfooz for 2nd change of investigation. Upon the said application a Provincial Standing Board comprising of Deputy Inspector General of Police. Investigating Branch Punjab (Chairman), Senior Superintendent of Police Investigating Branch Punjab (Member) and Deputy, Superintendent of Police Investigating Branch Punjab was constituted under Provisions of Article 18(6) of Police Order, 2002. The Provincial Standing Board recommended the above said case for 2nd change of investigation on the following grounds:--
(i)         As per report of complainant Meer Dad, he along with his brother Arshad Ali, Muhammad Irfan and Taxi Driver Muhammad Arshad were sippling tea at a Tea Stall on main road Murree and waiting for their friend when the accused Muhammad Pervez alias Bashi Khan, Waheed Mehfooz and Nasir Mehfooz along with some other persons came on cars and jeeps, made indiscriminate firing and started demolishing the tea stall. Arshad forbade them to do so on which Nasir Mehfooz fired at Muhammad Arshad killing him at the spot, Waheed Mehfooz fired at Rashid Sarwar injuring him seriously;
(ii)        The local police arrested Muhammad Pervez alias Bashi Khan sent him to judicial lock up and challaned him. The other two accused were declared innocent on the basis of their alibi.
(iii)       During investigation of RIB, the I.O. belied the alibi of two accused, held them guilty, arrested them and sent them to judicial lock up without recovery as the Court declined to remand the accused further.
(iv)       It has been noted that there is difference of opinion between local police and RIB regarding innocence/guilt of two accused.
(v)        There is no solid motive brought on record against the deceased.
(vi)       The owner of tea stall who was witness to the occurrence resiled from his stance.
(vii)      The I.O. also could not trace the accused other than nominated in the F.I.R.
6.  The recommendation of the Provincial Standing Board were approved by the Inspector-General of Police Punjab and the investigation was entrusted to Mr. Liaqat Ali Deputy Superintendent of Police, Investigation Breach Punjab. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the re-investigation of the case is motivated. The pivotal issue in the field is whether the police authorities are empowered to initiate re-investigation in respect of the same crime for which they have already filed report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.
7.  To resolve the present controversy the provisions of Article 18(6) of the Police Order, 2002, is reproduced as under:
"18(6)  Investigation shall not be changed except after due deliberations and recommendations by a Board headed by an officer not below the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police and two Superintendent of Police, one being incharge of the investigation of the concerned district:
Provided that the final order for the change of investigation shall be passed by head of investigation in the general police area who shall record reasons for change of such investigation:
Provided further that the second change or investigation may only be allowed with the approval of the Provincial Police Officer, or the Capital City Police Officer, as the case may be."
8.  Under Article 18(6) of the Police Order, 2002, the law bestows a power on the duly constituted Board to recommend for re-investigation and if the said Board recommends for reinvestigation of the case then even after the submission of the challan the re-investigation cannot be debarred. The job of an Investigating Officer, is thus only to collect all the relevant evidence pertaining to the allegation levelled regarding the crime in issue so as to dig out the truth enabling and facilitating the relevant Court to Administer Justice between the parties. I may clarify here that an Investigating Officer is not to render any opinion regarding guilt or innocence of an accused person and under the relevant statutory provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Police Order, 2002 and the Police Rules, 1934 he is only to collect all the relevant evidence and to submit his report before the relevant Magistrate so that the Magistrate or the trial Court can from their own independent opinion regarding sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence and material in order to decide whether to take cognizance of the offence or not to summon any person to face a trial. Reliance is placed on Khizar Hayat and others v. Inspector General of Police Lahore and others (PLD 2002 Lahore 470).
9.  Nevertheless, the re-investigation of a case after submission of the challan cannot be debarred. Reliance is paled on "Atta Muhammad v. Inspector General of Police" reported in PLD 1965 Lahore 734, wherein it has been held as under:
"There is no statutory prohibition in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the police not to embark on a fresh investigation of the case after the conclusion of the first and the submission of the final report whatever the defects in the first investigation or the flaws in the final report given in the wake of it, that might subsequently be detected. The first investigation may be utterly unsatisfactory for many reasons. It maybe due to non-availability of the evidence, or the successful induction of false evidence during the investigation, or the reason may be, the corrupt behaviour of the police officer concerned. To say that the same police officers or their superiors on receipt of further information or on the availability of better evidence cannot revive the investigation already done, leading to a contrary or a varied result, would virtually amount to putting a seal on human errors and frailties once committed whether by design or by inadventence, with no opportunity to make amends, although it be possible to do so. The police, as an agency of the State, should be as much interested as any other agency concerned in the administration of justice, to find out the truth in respect of a crime and lay the whole facts bare for determination by the competent Tribunals as honestly and correctly as possible. The statutory functions of the police and the Courts in this respect are complementary to each other and do not overlap. The facts that the previous investigation had yielded certain results should not act as a hurdle or a deterrent for the police in reaching the truth if additional facts and additional circumstances brought to light help in its discovery. The Magistrate himself does not have the legal powers to direct a further investigation by the police after he himself has taken cognizance of the case and had himself launched an inquiry or trial; but there is no bar for the police to pursue its own investigation and submit their results to the Court to find the guilt or innocence of the accused persons before it becomes too late. There is no bar to the investigation by the police after the submission of a final report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, nor is the police not competent to file, if it is so disposed, a second report as a result of its subsequent investigation into the case."
10.  No doubt that holding of successive investigations are deprecated by the superior Courts with the intent to avoid undue lingering on the case but how subsequent challan which almost is complete for submission in the Court of competent jurisdiction can be withheld or brushed aside, even otherwise submission of subsequent challan is not debarred under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, however, it is entirely the discretion of the Court to admit additional evidence if the cognizance of the case submitted to it by the Police has already been taken. Moreover, in case of any grievance, the complainant can avail an alternative remedy of filing a private complaint.
11.  In view of what has been discused above, I find no merit in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed.
(R.A.)  Petition dismissed.

Police is not statutory prohibited for reinvestigating a case

----------
PLJ 2012 Cr.C. (Quetta) 226 (DB)
Present: Ghulam Mustafa Mengal and Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, JJ.
ABDUL JABBAR--Appellant
versus
STATE--Respondent
Crl. Appeal No. 232 of 2009, decided on 23.6.2011.
Principle--
----Police or customs authorities are not statutorily prohibited from investigating a case as many times as they choose and can file a fresh challan in the Court as a result of subsequent investigation or events.      [P. 230] A
Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997)--
----S. 9(c)--Conviction and sentence awarded to appellant by trial Court--Challenge to--Allegation of--140 packets of recovered charas--Held: If the law requires something to be done in a specific manner, it should be done as law requires and departure is not permissible--The police or any other investigating agency has no unfettered powers to place a document on record in gross violation of the prescribed manner and thus, the trial Court has wrongly placed reliance upon the report of chemical expert which is not an admissible piece of evidence being procured and tendered illegally--Appeal dismissed.     [Pp. 230 & 231] B
Mr. Muhammad Qahir Shah, Advocate for Appellant.
Chaudhry Mumtaz Yousaf, Standing Counsel for State.
Date of hearing: 31.5.2011.
Judgment
Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, J--By this criminal appeal, judgment dated 29th June, 2009, passed by Special Judge, Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, Quetta, has been challenged, whereby appellant AbdulJabbar was convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment RI with fine of Rs. 100,000/-, in default whereof to further undergo SI for one year, with benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C.
2.  Mr. Muhammad Qahir Shah, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant and the trial Court on misreading and wrong conclusion of evidence convicted him. It was next argued that, out of alleged 140 packets of recovered charas, wrapped in plastic bags in rods shape, only 10/10 grams charas from 10 packets were obtained and sent to the expert for chemical analysis, thus, at the most, if the prosecution case is taken in toto, the appellant could only be convicted for the narcotic sent to the expert. He further contended that during course of trial, when the statements of PWs 1 and 2 were recorded, the investigating officer, just to fill up the lacunas, without obtaining prior permission of the trial Court, had sent the remaining material to the expert for analysis, which is not permissible under the law.
3.  Chaudhry Mumtaz Yousaf, learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of State, conceded to the arguments of appellant's counsel and admitted that the narcotic recovered from the appellant was in shape of rods, out of which, 10/10 grams charas from 10 packets in shape of rods were sent to the chemical expert for analysis, however, he opposed that the investigating officer has not authority to send the substance after submission of thechallan before the Court.
4.  We have considered the arguments of learned parties' counsel and have gone through the record including the impugned judgment. It is the case of prosecution that upon receipt of secret information, in respect of transportation of huge quantity of narcotics by means of a Toyota Pickup bearing Registration No. KH-4084 from Chaman to Quetta, by the Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (FBR), Karachi, a raiding party, under the supervision of Jaffar Hussain, S.I.O., was constituted, comprising of Ilyas Ahmed, S.I.O., Syed Adnan Kafeel, I.O,. Qasim Ali Alvi, I.O., driver Niamat BhattiSepoy Abdul Malik and Sobedar F.C. KhairBakhsh. It was alleged that on 13th January, 2008, during the course of surveillance, the said vehicle was intercepted at Baleli check post with the help of police and FC authorities. It was further alleged that on search, secret cavities were found in the vehicle and since there were no proper equipments to search the vehicle on spot thoroughly, therefore, the vehicle along with appellant was brought to Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation, Sariab RoadQuetta. After making entry in the Roznamcha, at about 06:00 p.m., the detailed search was carried out by de-casing the specially designed cavity by applying different tools and techniques, resulting into recovery of 170 kilograms charas wrapped in 140 packets. Out of the recovered charas, 30 numbers of samples from 10 packets (three samples from each packet, weighing 10 grams approximately) were separated and sealed into parcel for the purpose of chemical analysis, while the remaining charas was also sealed in separate parcels. The vehicle and charas were seized, appellant was arrested and FIR bearing No. V-Seiz/DCI/QA/06/2008 was registered against him.
PW-4 Syed Adnan Kafeel, Intelligence Officer was entrusted investigation, who sent the samples of recovered charas to FSL, which were initially drawn from 10 packets and obtained expert's report Ex.P/4-A. Subsequently, he sent samples of recovered charas from all the packets and received report of the expert Ex.P/4-B and after completion of formal investigation, submitted incomplete challan Ex.P/4-C and the appellant was sent up to face the trial before the Special Judge, CNS Act, Quetta.
The charge was read over to the appellant, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the charge, produced four witnesses. The appellant was examined under Section 342Cr.P.C. He recorded his statement on oath as provided under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. and also produced DW-1 Abdul Ghafoor, DW-2 Inayatullah, DW-3 Jamal-ud-Din and DW-4 Wazir Muhammad in his defence.
PW-1 Qasim Alvi, Intelligence Officer is complainant of the case and also recovery witness, deposed that on receiving secret information from the Director on 13th January, 2008, a raiding party was constituted under the supervision of Jaffar Hussain, Senior Intelligence Officer. At about 03:00 p.m., they were present at Baleli check post, a vehicle pick-up bearing Registration No. KH-4084 was intercepted being driven by the appellant. The vehicle along with appellant was brought to Police Station Airport and entry was made in the Roznamcha and thereafter, they went to Intelligence Office, Custom Sariab road, Quetta, as the necessary equipments were not available with them to properly search the vehicle. On search, 140 packets of Charas, weighing 170 kilograms, were recovered from the secret cavities of the vehicle. Appellant was served with a notice under Section 22 of the CNS Act and FIR was registered. He produced the notice and FIR as Ex.P/1-A and Ex. P/1-B. Recovery memo Ex. P/1-C was prepared which was signed by him. Personal search of the accused was conducted and memo was prepared as Ex.P/1-D. Earlier the simples were separated for chemical analysis and in this regard a memo Ex.P/1-E was prepared, over which he identified his signatures. The inventory memos Ex. P/1-F andEx.P/1-G in respect of charas and vehicle were respectively prepared, which were signed by him. He produced the recovered charas and vehicle in the Court as Art.P/1 to Art.P/12.
PW-2 Abdul MalikSepoy Customs Intelligence and PW-3 Syed Jaffar Hussain, Senior Intelligence Officer, Customs, are also recovery witnesses of the alleged recovered contraband material and reiterated the statement of PW-1. It may be noted that supplementary statement of PW-2 was also recorded on 6th May, 2009, whereas PW-4 Syed Adnan Kafeel, Intelligence Officer, is the investigating officer.
5.  It appears from the record that the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined at length, but nothing has come on record favouring the appellant or materially affects the case of prosecution to believe that charas was not recovered from Toyota pickup, which was being driven by the appellant at the relevant time. The prosecution has proved its case in respect of recovery of charas from the pickup, which was in possession and under control of the appellant, however, the prosecution witnesses in their account stated that the charas, recovered from the appellant, was in shape of rods, out of which, 10/10 grams charas from 10 packets, in the shape of rods, were sent to the chemical expert for analysis. The report of chemical examiner Ex.P/4-A dated 28th March, 2008 confirms that ten sealed parcels of 10/10 grams charas were received by him for test, meaning thereby initially only 100 grams of charas were sent to the expert for analysis. It may be noted that the alleged recovered charas was in shape of rods, weighing 170 kilograms, consisting 140 packets. There is nothing available on record, showing samples for examination by chemical examiner were taken out from all the packets or each rod to prove that entire rods/packets containing charas.
6.  The record reveals that, after submission of challan Ex.P/4-C and examination of two witnesses, on 02-08-2008, the investigating officer separated and prepared 130 parcels, weighing 5 grams charas each, for the purpose of examination. The same were sent to expert by hand through a customs officer and report Ex.P/4-B was produced by the investigating officer. The record also reflects that the said report Ex.P/4-B was never submitted before the trial Court through a proper and supplementary challan as required under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C, rather it has been placed on record by the investigating officer at the time of recording his statement, while picking it out from his pocket in spite of the objection raised by the defence counsel.
7.  The record also reflects that for the second time, samples were separated and sent to the chemical expert after lapse of about seven months i.e. on 02-08-2008 after the arrest of appellant on 13-01-2008. Nothing has come on record, which could show that during such period of time where the charas was lying whether in the Customs Intelligence office or somewhere else? The prosecution was duty bound to place on record the entire evidence in order to prove its case against the appellants effectively beyond any shadow of doubt, but the evidence, which has been brought on record, clearly missing the chain, as it has nowhere come on record as to why and what circumstances, the investigating officer, at the time of recovery, instead of obtaining the samples from the whole quantity of charas, had initially obtained samples from 10 packets. Moreover, according to the report Ex.P/4-B, the expert received the samples from a customs officer, but the entire record does not disclose the name of said officer, nor the prosecution could bother to produce him before the Court in order to testify the allegation of sending samples to the expert for the second time. In this regard, we placed reliance on a judgement-reported in 1993 P.Cr.L.J. 2287 (FSC).
8.  It is well established principle of law that the police or customs authorities are not statutorily prohibited from investigating a case as many times as they choose and can file a fresh challan in the Court as a result of subsequent investigation or events. We have no doubt in our mind that the powers of police to reinvestigate the case or submit subsequent challan are unlimited and there is no law precluded the police from reinvestigation the case, however, the fact that any document, which the prosecution intended to rely upon, should be submitted before the Court through proper and subsequent challan as envisaged under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. If the law requires something to be done in a specific manner, it should be done as law requires and departure is not permissible. The police or any other investigating agency has no unfettered powers to place a document on record in gross violation of the prescribed manner and, thus, the trial Court has wrongly placed reliance upon the report of chemical expert Ex.P/4-B, which is not an admissible piece of evidence being procured and tendered illegally.
9. Another fact of the case, which needs mention here, is that whether Ex.P/4-B was required to be supplied to the appellant as required under Section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 before commencement of trial. The object of Section 265-C of the Cr.P.C. appears to be to meet the vacuum created by the abolition of commitment proceedings and to make available to the accused all the available evidence, which the prosecution have for the unfolding of the true case before the Court. The purpose is that the accused can known before he is sent up to stand trial in a charge punishable with death or imprisonment for life as to what evidence he would have to meet at the trial in order to take up a proper defence plea. The interval of seven days emerged under Section 265-C of the Cr.P.C. is also significant, because it is meant to give the accused sufficient time to study the allegations against him and to prepare his plea in defence. Admittedly and surprisingly, placing on record Ex.P/4-B before the Court by the investigating officer has caused serious prejudice to the appellant. The non-compliance of Sections 173 and 265-C of the Cr.P.C., in peculiar circumstances of the case, has rendered Ex.P/4-B as inadmissible piece of evidence, which cannot be relied upon in any manner.
10.  We, after discarding the expert's report Ex.P/4-B, while following the dictum laid down in the judgment-reported in PLD 2004 SC 858, are of the view that the prosecution has proved its case against the appellant only to the extent of 100 grams charas. The appellant is in custody since 13th January, 2008, thus, the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant be treated as already undergone.
Appeal merits dismissed.
(A.S.)   Appeal dismissed

Quashment of FIR on the illegality of Police

PLJ 2012 Lahore 763
[Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi]
Present: Sagheer Ahmad Qadri, J.
MUHAMMAD MUNIR--Petitioner
versus
STATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION DHUMAN, DISTRICT CHAKWAL and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 543-Q of 2012, decided on 9.5.2012.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Arts. 410 & 199--Criminal Procedure Code, (V of 1898), S. 561-A--Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, S. 216--Quashing of FIR--Harbouring of an offender--No evidence to connect accused with commission of offence--Validity--Facing trial after going through procedural pre-requisites was just a futile effort rather putting innocent person under agony of trial which likely to result in his acquittal--Whenever an act or omission constitutes an offence committed by a person he in accordance with provisions provided under laws was to be penalized but at same time every body had a right to be provided safeguard against his false implication under charges with mala fides--Right of individual citizen is to be dealt with accordance with law as guaranteed u/Art. 4 of Constitution--When police had committed a patent illegality while getting registered FIR, basic ingredient of which was lacking, registration of FIR and subsequent proceedings including investigation and submission of challan were void ab-initio and liable to be quashed--FIR was quashed.   [Pp. 767 & 768] A & C
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 10--Right to fair trial--To level an allegation against a person is easy but to rebut same is very difficult task--Rights guaranteed under Constitution to protect innocent citizens from involvement is false, motivated and groundless charges, which would result in acquittal--Courts were bound to decide of such like cases at initial possible stages.    [P. 767] B
Mr. Abdul Jabbar Awan, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Saif-ur-Rehman, AAG for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 9.5.2012.
Order
This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is moved by petitioner Muhammad Munir who is an accused in case FIR. No. 236 of 2011 dated 20.12.2011 registered under Section 216, PPC at Police Station Dhuman District Chakwal.
2.  FIR mentioned above was lodged by Abdul Jalil, ASI of Chowki Mulhal Mughlan, Police Station Dhuman mentioning that on that day he along with other officials in connection with investigation of case FIR. No. 186 dated 30.9.2011 under Section 496-A, PPC for the arrest of proclaimed offenders Tafseer, Jahangir and Adeel Ahmad sons of Muhammad Munir, the present petitioner, was present at Ijaz Abad Picket, when complainant of said case informed that Muhammad Munir along with his two sons Jahangir and Adeel (Proclaimed Offenders) was present at Dhok Taliyan Chowk opposite the Farm owned by Raja Altaf and if raided the P.Os could be arrested. On this information complainant Abdul Jalil, ASI along with other police officials reached at Dhok Taliyan Chowk at 10:00 a.m. and on seeing police party, Jahangir andAdeel managed to escape from the spot while Muhammad Munir present petitioner was apprehended, who was arrested. As he harboured Jahangir and Adeel and managed their escape from the arrest by police, hence, committed offence under Section 216, PPC, on this report instant FIR mentioned above was registered.
3.  Petitioner was interrogated and was sent to judicial lock up. The Investigating Officer during investigation recorded statements of two witnesses namely Nauman Tariq and Muhammad Baqir Constables under Section 161, Cr.P.C. showing that they accompanied the complainant under information at the specified place and on seeing them the accused/P.Os fled away while petitioner was apprehended and challan has been submitted in the trial Court.
4.  Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that no evidence is available on record to connect the petitioner with the commission of the alleged offence rather if contents of the FIR and evidence collected is seen, no offence under Section 216, PPC is shown committed by the petitioner. Contends that although it is alleged that petitioner harboured his two sons, who were declared P.O in case registered under Section 496-A, PPC but they both were granted bail by this Court on 19.12.2012, hence, they cannot be termed as P.Os; that there is no evidence available on record that two sons of the petitioner namely Jahangir and Adeel if ever were declared P.Os by any competent Court of law. No such evidence was collected nor placed on record with the report under Section 173, Cr.P.C.; that registration of FIR, arrest of the petitioner, subsequent proceedings and submission of challan thus are nullity in the eye of law rather illegal and without any lawful justification, hence further proceedings against the petitioner before the learned trial Court are clear abuse of process of law, hence, liable to be quashed.
5.  Conversely, learned AAG has opposed the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner on the grounds that as report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. has already been submitted before the learned trial Court, therefore, if petitioner has any grievance he may move petition under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. before the learned trial Court. Prayed that as prima-facie offence under Section 216, PPC is made out, therefore, this petition be dismissed.
6.  I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
7.  Admittedly, petitioner's two sons namely Jahangir and Adeel were accused in case FIR. No. 186 dated 30.9.2011 under Section 496-A, PPC registered at Police StationDhuman District Chakwal. Except mere assertion in the FIR by the complainant that they were declared Proclaimed Offenders, no evidence was collected by the Investigating Officer to prima-facie prove them as such. It is alleged in the FIR lodged by the complainant Abdul Jalil, ASI that he was provided information by the complainant of case FIR. No. 186 of 2011 that petitioner Muhammad Munir along with his two sons Jahangir and Adeel (P.Os) was present at Dhok Taliyan Chowkopposite the Farm owned by one Raja Altaf. Statement of said complainant has not been recorded by the complainant/I.O of that case in this respect. As far as the allegation about harbouring of an offender is concerned, the word "harbour" is defined under Section 52-A of, PPC, which reads as under :--
"Except in Section 157, and in Section 130 in the case in which the harbor is given by the wife or husband of the person harboured, the word "harbor" includes the supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means of conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means whether of the same kinds as those enumerated in this section, or not, to evade apprehension."
Harbouring is punishable under Section 216, PPC wherein it is provided:--
"Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose apprehension has been ordered: Whenever any person convicted of or charged with an offence being in lawful custody for that offence, escapes from such custody;
Or whenever a public servant, in the exercise of the lawful powers of such public servant, orders a certain person to be apprehended for an offence, whoever, knowing of such escape or order for apprehension, harbours or conceals that person with the intention of preventing him from being apprehended shall be punished in the manner following, that is to say;"
--------------
--------------
--------------
If report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. along with documents produced before the learned trial Court in the light of record produced before this Court is seen, the I.O/complainant Abdul Jalil, ASI only sent complaint on the basis of which above mentioned FIR was recorded. He prepared a site plan showing the alleged place of arrest of the accused/petitioner, as well as wherefrom allegedly Jahangir and Adeel (P.Os) were able to fled away. He only recorded statements of two witnesses namelyNauman Tariq and Baqir Constables supporting his version about the provision of information by the complainant of case, then reaching at the spot and escaping of the accused/P.Os and arrest of the petitioner from the spot. If the above mentioned definition of harbouring as provided under Section 52-A, PPC and Section 216, PPC is seen, it is clear that harbouring is an offence if a person knowingly provides shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means of conveyance, or the assistance by any of the means to evade his apprehension. Under Section 216, PPC in order to penalize a person for harbouring an offender it is essential that a public servant must have issued orders for the apprehension of a person who is involved in commission of an offence and a person knowingly provides assistance to that person for evading his apprehension as defined under Section 52-A, PPC. Herein this case, firstly, the Investigating Officer/complainant only alleged that information was provided to him by the complainant of case FIR No. 186 of 2011 registered under Section 496-A, PPC that petitioner along with his two sons Jahangir and Adeel, allegedly declared P.Os in the above mentioned case, were present at the given place but no such orders whereby petitioner's sons were declared P.Os either were obtained or annexed with the file. Secondly, he did not record statement of the complainant showing his presence at the alleged place of apprehension or escape by the P.Os. These are mere assertions brought on record through registration of FIR as well as statements of two alleged witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C., who were also the police officials. Keeping in view the above circumstances, offence under Section 216, PPC is not made out. Hence, registration of FIR itself is illegal rather abuse of the process of law.
8.  The argument advanced by learned AAG that as report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. has already been submitted in the learned trial Court, therefore, petitioner may move petition under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. in the Court concerned, is not a valid argument in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, wherein registration of FIR itself is without any lawful justification. Facing trial after going through the procedural pre requisites in these circumstances is just a futile effort rather putting the innocent person under the agony of trial which ultimately likely to result in his acquittal. No-doubt, whenever an act or omission constitutes an offence committed by a person he in accordance with the relevant provisions provided under the relevant laws is to be penalized but at the same time everybody has a right to be provided a safeguard against his false implication under such charges with malafides. Right of an individual/citizen is to be dealt with in accordance with law as guaranteed under Article 4 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Under Article 10-A further right to fair trial has been guaranteed recently. It is commonly known to everybody that to level an allegation against a person is easy but to rebut the same is a very difficult task. Keeping in view the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to protect the innocent citizens from their involvement in false, motivated and groundless charges, which ultimately would result in their acquittal, the Courts are bound to decide/dispose of such like cases at earliest/initial possible stages. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances mentioned above when complainant Abdul Jalil, ASI has committed a patent illegality while getting registered instant FIR in respect of an offence, the basic  ingredient of which is lacking, therefore, registration of FIR and all subsequent proceedings including investigation and submission of challan are void ab initio and liable to be quashed. So far as the arguments advanced by learned AAG that petitioner may avail the remedy under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. is a futile effort just to linger on the agony of the petitioner.Resultantly, while allowing this writ petition FIR. No. 226 of 2011 dated 20.12.2011 registered under Section 216, PPC at Police Station Dhuman District Chakwal is hereby quashed.
(R.A.)  FIR quashed

Amended Challan can be presented in Court

PLJ 2013 Lahore 16
Present: Muhammad Khalid Mehmood Khan, J.
M/s. AMSON VACCINES AND PHARMA (PVT.) LTD., etc.--Petitioners
versus
CHAIRMAN DRUG COURT, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 16170 of 2009, decided on 16.5.2012.
Drug Act, 1976 (XXXI of 1976)--
----S. 23--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional Petition--Warranty of drug--Grant of permission to prosecute for violation--If once presented against a specific accused no subsequent accused can be added on statement of accused--Duty of investigating agency to investigate matter and submit challan--Alleged drugs under warranty of petitioner and as such prima facie petitioner was responsible for substandard medicine--Drug Inspector while investigate was duty bound to summon the petitioner and investigate him--Drug Inspector had failed to perform his duties that was reason drug Court directed to file amended plaint--Validity--It is also an established principle of law that Court is not an investigating agency but has to decide allegation against accused as per prosecution story--Court should have direct I.O to reinvestigate the matter and after investigating the petitioner submit amended challan as petitioner has every right to explain allegations leveled against him before investigating agency--Petition was partly allowed.         [P. 18] A, B & C
Mr. Atta Mohy-ud-Din, Advocate for Petitioners.
Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, Additional Advocate General, Punjab alongwith Ahmad Tariq, Drug Controller, Gujranwala for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 16.5.2012.
Order
The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and is licensed pharmaceutical manufacturer. The petitioner is also having ISO certificate for 9001, 14001 and 18001 by Lloyds UK. The petitioner is also registered with the Provincial Health Department.
2.  Respondent No. 5 on 10.6.2006 inspected the premises of Respondent No. 8 and collected 10 vials of Forax Inj. 500mg (Cefotaxime Sodium), Batch No. 028, manufactured by petitioner. The sample was sent to Drug Testing Laboratory, Lahore for analyses. The Drug Testing Laboratory declared the said sample substandard vide test report No. 15737 dated 08.8.2006. Respondent No. 4 directed Respondent No. 8 for providing invoice/warranty of the. alleged drug vide letter dated 19.02.2007, Respondent No. 8 failed to provide the said warranty and ultimately Respondent No. 4 referred the case to Respondent No. 6 for grant of permission to prosecute Respondent No. 8 for violation of Section 23 of the Drugs Act and rules thereunder. Respondent No. 6 issued show-cause notice to Respondent No. 8 and after providing opportunity of hearing to Respondent No. 8 approved the prosecution of Respondent No. 8 vide order dated 29.7.2008. Challan was submitted to the learned Drug Court on 5.8.2008. Respondent No. 8 while appearing before the learned drug Court disclosed that he purchased the alleged medicine from Sunshine Traders, an approved distributor of petitioner. One Sohail Ahmad appeared on behalf of Sunshine Traders, before the learned drug Court and deposed that he has purchased the alleged medicine from petitioner under the warranty dated 30.3.2005. The learned drug Court on the statement of one Sohail Ahmad issued a show-cause notice to petitioner. The petitioner replied the said show-cause notice and the learned drug Court on 13.5.2009 directed Respondent No. 4 to file amended complaint arraying the petitioner as accused.
3.  The petitioner, thus asserted that impugned order dated 13.5.2009 is against law. Further submits that there is no evidence available on record on the basis of which the petitioner could be arrayed as accused in the challanwhich admitted has been filed against Respondent No. 4.
4.  Learned counsel for petitioner submits that Drug Act, 1976 is a special law and as such the challan, if once presented against a specific accused, no subsequent accused can be added on a statement of accused. Learned counsel further submits that it is the duty of investigating agency to investigate the matter and submit the challan, the Investigating Officer has not called the petitioner nor investigated the petitioner as no material was collected against the petitioner by the Investigating Officer.
5.  Learned Additional Advocate General submits that learned Drug Court was within his powers to direct Respondent No. 4 to amend the challan by arraying the petitioner as accused for the simple reason that petitioner is admittedly manufacturer of drugs recovered from Respondent No. 8, the petitioner has issued a warranty of said medicine to its distributor, this fact has not been denied by the petitioner and as such the impugned order is perfectly in accordance with law.
6.  Heard. Record perused.
7.  Admittedly the petitioner is a manufacturer of medicine allegedly declared as substandard. The prosecution has completed the investigation and submitted challan in the Court. Respondent No. 8 no doubt is the seller of the alleged substandard medicine but he is not the manufacturer of the same. M/S Sunshine Trader is admittedly the distributor of petitioner. Respondent No. 8 purchased the alleged drugs from Sunshine Trader under the warranty of petitioner and as such prima-facie the petitioner is responsible for the substandard medicine.
8.  It is an admitted fact that Drug Inspector while investigating the matter was duty bound to summon the petitioner and investigate him but it seems that Drug Inspector has failed to perform his duties in accordance with law and that is the reason the learned drug Court directed Respondent No. 4 to file amended complaint. It is also an established principle of law that Court is not an investigating agency but has to decide the allegation against accused as per the prosecution story. In these circumstances learned trial Court should have direct the Investigating Officer to reinvestigate the matter and after investigating the petitioner, submit the amended challan as the petitioner has the every right to explain the allegations levelled against him before investigating agency.
9.  In view of the above, this petition is partially allowed and Respondent No. 4 is directed to reinvestigate the matter by associating the petitioner and after completing the investigation within 2 months be submit the amendedchallan to learned trial Court if it is established that petitioner is responsible for manufacturing substandard medicine allegedly recovered from Respondent No. 8.
(R.A.)  Petition allowed

Re-investigation of decided case is not allowed

PLJ 2015 Lahore 1227[Multan Bench Multan]
PresentMahmood Ahmad Bhatti, J.
GHULAM ABBAS--Petitioner
versus
REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER, D.G. KHAN and 12 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 5893 of 2015, heard on 27.5.2015.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Police Order, 2002, Art. 18-A(1)--Constitutional petition--Change of investigation--Quashing of order--Validity--Order of transfer of first investigation can be made by D.P.O. u/Art. 18-A(1)--R.P.O. gets involved in change of investigation--After obtaining opinion of R.S.B can order change of investigation for second time--If R.P.O. had decided an application for transfer of investigation, PPO may order transfer of investigation of case to an investigation officer or team of Investigating Officer--Officer who passed order and transferred investigation to DSP, R.P.B was not supposed to entertain fresh application for transfer of investigation either on part of an accused or on part of complainant.
                                                                   [Pp. 1221 & 1232] A, B & C
Re-investigation--
----Reinvestigation was not permissible--Second time investigation was wholly un-warranted--Validity--Re-investigation of case subsequent to submitting of challan and taking cognizable by Court was not legal and tenable.            [P. 1233] D
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 173--Change of investigation--Where trial had already commenced and changing investigation or ordering further investigation in matter thereafter was an exercise unsustainable in law.     [P. 1234] E
Investigation--
----Restrained from carrying out fresh investigation--Once a case is decided by trial Court or appellate Court for that matter, police are not vested with any authority to make re-investigation of case.
                                                                                            [P. 1234] F
Re-investigation--
----Opinion of police--Ipsi dixit--Pronounce verdict of guilty--Validity--Reason for such approach is not far to seek--On one hand, ipsi dixit of police is not binding on Courts and, on other, when a Court pronounces a verdict of guilty or otherwise, opinion of police relegates to background and becomes meaningless for all intents and purposes.          [P. 1234] G
Rana Shaukat Hayat Noon, Advocate for Petitioner.
Sardar Zafar Ahmad Lund, Advocate for Respondent No. 9.
Mr. Muhammad Javed Saeed, AAG for Respondent No. 10.
Date of hearing: 27.5.2015.
Judgment
Ghulam Abbas, the petitioner has filed this petition seeking to quash the order dated 15.4.2015 passed by the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan, Respondent No. 1, whereby he ordered a change of investigation of case FIR No. 140/2014 dated 20.5.2014 registered under Sections 302/148/149, PPC at Police Station Shehr Sultan, District Muzaffargarhfor the second time.
2.  Putting in a nutshell, the facts are that Nazir Ahmad, Respondent No. 9 herein, lodged the above-mentioned FIR against the petitioner and others for causing the death ofMushtaq Ahmad, his father. To be exact, Jam Faiz Akbar, co-accused was alleged to have knocked down Mushtaq Ahmad, due to which he breathed his last.
3.  The Investigating Officer of the above-mentioned case declared Nasir Iqbal and Muhammad Hussain, co-accused innocent. It was also opined by him that the petitioner and co- accused, Hazoor Bakhsh did not take part in the incident contrary to the allegations made in the FIR and that place of occurrence did not belong to the complainant, as was claimed in the FIR. Be that as it may, Jam Faiz Akbar, the principal accused filed an application with the District Police Officer, Muzaffargarh for a change of investigation in terms of Article 18A (1) of the Police Order, 2002, as amended by Act XXI of 2013 in Punjab. After having obtained the opinion of the District Standing Board, District Police Officer, Muzaffargarh, changed the investigation vide order dated 18.12.2014. As a consequence, the investigation of the case was undertaken by Abdul Sattar, Inspector. Reposing no confidence in him, the petitioner and Jam Faiz Akbar, the aforementioned made a joint application to the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan, Respondent No. 1. It so happened that he, after obtaining the opinion of the Regional Standing Board, allowed their application vide order dated 20.2.2015, thereby transferring the investigation to Shah Alam Gishkori, DSP, Regional Investigation Branch, D.G. Khan, Respondent No. 5. Nazir Ahmad, Respondent No. 9 seemed ill at ease. He also approached the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan, Respondent No. 1 for a further change of investigation. Oddly enough, Respondent No. 1 also obliged him and ordered the change of investigation vide the impugned order dated 15.4.2015.
4.  In support of this petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has put forward two arguments. One, once the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan had ordered the change of investigation vide order dated 20.2.2015 he could not exercise this authority for the second time to change the investigation. Two, the second investigation was undertaken by a DSP in consequence of the order dated 20.2.2015 passed by the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan, but when he passed the impugned order, the investigation was entrusted to a team consisting of an Inspector, an ASI and a Constable, which was clearly violative of the provisions of sub-Article (2) of Article 18A of the Police Order, 2002. It was elaborated by him that whenever an investigation is to be changed, the Investigating Officer is to be either equal to the rank of the previous Investigating Officer or he should rank higher than him.
5.  Learned counsel for the Complainant/Respondent No. 9 has opposed this petition tooth and nail. He has made the argument that if the investigation can be changed on the asking of the accused why cannot this right be conferred upon a complainant? It has further been argued by him that the impugned order dated 15.4.2015 is to be read in continuation of the order dated 20.2.2015. In other words, Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan did not pass a fresh order on 15.4.2015. According to him, only the names of the Investigating Officers were changed, while the investigation is to be carried out by the police officials posted at Regional Investigation Branch (RIB), Dera Ghazi Khan. He postulated that a team of three persons would be better equipped to conduct investigation impartially than its being carried out by a single person. Towards the fag end of his arguments, he did a somersault. It was pointed out by him that the challan of the case has already been submitted. Neither the second nor the third change of investigation could be ordered. To reinforce his submissions, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Muhammad Nasir Cheema VsMazhar Javaid and others (P.L.D. 2007 S.C. 31).
6.  Learned Law Officer did not take sides. Apparently, he found it difficult to support the impugned order.
7.  I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their assistance. I have also acquainted myself with the relevant provisions of law having bearing on the outcome of the controversy raised in this writ petition.
8.  In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be advantageous to reproduce Article18A of the Police Order, 2002 hereunder:--
18A. Transfer of investigation.--(1) Within seven working days of the filing of an application, the Head of District Police may, after obtaining opinion of the District Standing Board and for reasons to be recorded in writing, transfer investigation of a case from the Investigating Officer to any other Investigating Officer or a team of Investigating Officers of a rank equal to or higher than the rank of the previous Investigating Officer.
(2) If the Head of District Police has decided an application for transfer of investigation, the Regional Police Officer may, within seven working days of the filing of an application, after obtaining opinion of the Regional Standing Board and for reasons to be recorded in writing, transfer investigation of a case from the Investigating Officer or a team of Investigating Officers to any other investigation officer or a team of Investigating Officers of a rank equal to or higher than the rank of the previous Investigating Officer or officers.
(3) If a Regional Police Officer has decided an application for transfer of an investigation, the Provincial Police Officer may, after obtaining opinion of a Standing Review Board, transfer investigation of a case to an investigation officer or a team of investigation officers of a rank equal to or higher than the rank of the previous investigation officer or officers.
(4) A case under investigation with a District Investigation Branch may only be transferred to another officer or a team of officers of the District Investigation Branch, Regional Investigation Branch or Provincial Investigation Branch.
(5)  For the purpose of this Article--
(a)      ‘District Standing Board’ means the District Standing Board constituted by the Head of District Police consisting of a Superintendent of Police as chairperson and two officers not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police as members;
(b)      ‘Regional Standing Board’ means the Regional Standing Board constituted by the Regional Police Officer consisting of a Superintendent of Police as chairperson and two Superintendents of Police as members;
(c)      ‘Standing Review Board’ means the Standing Review Board constituted by the Provincial Police Officer consisting of a Deputy Inspector General of Police as chairperson and two officers not below the rank of Superintendent of Police as members; and
(d)      reference to Head of District Police and Regional Police Officer in the case of Capital City District shall be construed to mean the Head of District Investigation Branch of the Capital City and the Capital City Police Officer, respectively.”
9.  From a bare perusal of the above provisions of law, it is abundantly clear that the order of transfer of first investigation can be made by the Head of District Police under sub-Article (1) of Article 18A of the Police Order, 2002. Thereafer, the Regional Police Officer gets involved in change of investigation. He alone, after obtaining the opinion of the Regional Standing Board, can order the change of investigation for the second time. Once he makes any order under sub-Article (2) of Article 18A of the Police Order, 2002, nothing remains in his hands and he virtually becomes functus officio. Should one or the other party have any genuine grievance regarding the conducting of investigation by the Investigating Officer or the team of officers to whom investigation is entrusted by him, it has only one remedy open to it. It might approach the Provincial Police Officer for a change of investigation for the third time. As is defined in clause (xvii) of Article 2 of the Police Order, 2002, the Provincial Police Officer is none other than the Inspector General of Police appointed under Article 11 of the Police Order, 2002. The construction so put on sub-Article (3) of Article 18A of Police Order, 2002 is in consonance with the phrasealogy used by the legislature. This sub-article opens with the words that if a Regional Police Officer has decided an application for transfer of an investigation, the Provincial Police Officer may order the transfer of investigation of a case to an Investigating Officer or a team of Investigating Officers. However, his powers are hedged in by the constraints that he would first obtain the opinion of a Standing Review Board before ordering the transfer of investigation. Furthermore, Investigating Officer or a team of Investigating Officers so appointed by him should not be below the rank of the previous Investigating Officer or the team of officers. He should either be co-equal to the previous Investigating Officer or the team of Investigating Officers appointed by him should be higher in rank than the team of Investigating Officers appointed by the Regional Police Officer.
10.  To return to the facts of the instant case, the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan, Respondent No. 1 overstepped his authority and went beyond his jurisdiction when he passed the impugned order dated 15.4.2015. It bears repeating that the officer who passed the order dated 20.2.2015, and transferred the investigation to Shah Alam Gishkori, DSP, Regional Investigation Branch, Dera Ghazi Khan was not supposed to entertain a fresh application for the transfer of investigation either on the part of an accused or on the part of the complainant. He had better advise the complainant to approach the Inspector General of Police for the redressal of his grievance, if any. His order is also not sustainable on another ground as well. When he passed the impugned order dated 15.4.2015, he ordered to entrust the investigation to a team which ranked below the previous Investigating Officer. Although the new investigating team consists of three members, none of them holds the post of a DSP. Looked it from whatever angle, the impugned order dated 15.4.2015 passed by Respondent No. 1 is a nullity and liable to be set aside.
11.  This brings me to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant that once a challan is submitted to a Court, re-investigation of a case is not permissible. The argument of the learned counsel for the complainant literally turns the table on him. It was pointed out to him that if his argument was accepted, the investigation changed by Respondent No. 1 for the second time was wholly unwarranted. To his credit, he folded his papers and left the rostrum. Be that as it may, there appear to be two strands of opinion. At one end of the spectrum, it has been held in a string of judgments that re-investigation of a case subsequent to the submitting of a challan and taking cognizance by the Court is not legal and tenable. In this behalf, reference may be well made to the judgments reported as: Qari Muhammad Rafique versus Additional Inspector General of Police (Inv), Punjab and others’ (2014 SCMR 1499), Zahoor Ahmad versus The State’ (PLD 2007 SC 231), ‘Muhammad Ashfaq versus Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation) Punjab, Lahore’ (2013 P.Cr.L.J. 920), Liaqat Ali Virk versus Inspector General of Punjab, Police, Lahore’ (PLD 2010 Lah 224),‘Muhammad Siddique versus Inspector General of Police, Punjab’ (PLD 2013 Lahore 85),‘Muhammad Gulfam versus Regional Police Officer, Sheikhupura Range, Lahore’ (2012 P.Cr.L.J. 1493), ‘Muhammad Mazhar versus Additional I.G. Police Investigation Branch, Punjab, Lahore’ (2011 YLR 2463 Lahore), ‘Aftab Ahmad versus Hasan Arshad’ (PLD 1987 SC 13), Bahadur Khan versus Muhammad Azam (2006 SCMR 373), Khizar Hayat versus Inspector General of Police (Punjab), Lahore’ (PLD 2005 Lahore 470), ‘Mir Dad versus Inspector General of Police, Punjab’ (2010 YLR 3201) and ‘Muhammad Hafeez versus District Police Officer, Narowal’ (2010 YLR 3142) At the other end of the spectrum there is plethora of judgments in which an altogether different view has been taken. In this category falls the judgments reported as ‘Raja Khurshid Ahmed versus Muhammad Bilal (2014 SCMR 474), ‘Muhammad Ashfaq versus Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation), Punjab,Lahore (2013 P. Cr.L.J. 920), ‘Muhammad Iqbal versus The State’ (2010 P.Cr.L.J. 888) and Liaquat Ali Virk versus Inspector General of Punjab Police, Lahore’ (PLD 2010 Lahore 224).
12.  The cleavage of opinion can be better appreciated by taking a look at a few excerpts from the two sets of judgments. In the case of ‘Muhammad Nasir Cheema versus MazharJavaid and others’ (PLD 2007 SC 31) it was held that:--
“At this stage, the learned Additional Advocate-General informs us that some additional I.G. Police had passed some order on 15.07.2006 and had changed the investigation. We are surprised at this order passed by the Addl. I.G. Police (Investigation Branch), Punjab for more than one reasons. First, because the report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. had already reached the trial Court as noticed above where the trial had already reached the trial Court as noticed above where the trial had already commenced and changing the investigation or ordering further investigation in the matter thereafter was an exercise unsustainable in law.”
13.  In the case of Qari Muhammad Rafique versus Additional Inspector General of Police (Inv), Punjab and others’ (2014 SCMR 1499) the above view was reiterated in the following words:--
“Learned counsel for the petitioner while arguing the matter before the learned Division Bench, seized of the Intra Court Appeal No. 288 of 2013, admitted in clear terms that thechallan was submitted in Court at least two months prior to the transfer of investigation and at that time charge had also been framed against the accused by the learned trial Court. The trial had also commenced at the time of transfer of investigation, as such, the order for transfer of investigation at that belated stage was not sustainable in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Muhammad Nasir Cheema v. Mazhar Javaid and another (PLD 2007 SC 31).”
14.  The following extract from the judgment reported as Raja Khurshid Ahmed Vs. Muhammad Bilal and others (2014 SCMR 474) is illustrative of the other view:
“It would be seen that as per settled law, there is no bar to the reinvestigation of a criminal case and the police authorities are at liberty to file a supplementary challan even after submission of the final report under Section 173, Cr.P.C.”
15.  There is only one exception in which police have been restrained from carrying out fresh investigation. Once a case is decided by the trial Court or the appellate Court for that matter, the police are not vested with any authority to make the re-investigation of the case. The reason for this approach is not far to seek. On the one hand, the ipsi dixit of police is not binding on the Courts and, on the other, when a Court pronounces a verdict of guilty or otherwise, the opinion of the police relegates to the background and becomes meaningless for all intents and purposes.

16.  In view of the discussion made above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 15.4.2015, passed by the Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan, Respondent No. 1 is declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect, which accordingly is set aside.
(R.A.)  Petition allowed

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