INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

An International Law Firm

“We serve by giving legal services and legal awareness”

Organizational Profile

Introduction

International lawyer is an organization offering legal services and legal awareness globally. It is a unique kind of organization in this context. It was founded originally in 2009 under a different name. However, it has been renamed in 2013 as International Lawyer when its website is launched. At the website of this organization there are over 400,000 visitors till now.

The organization believes in giving. For the same reasons there are bare acts, judgments, principles of law, articles, reports and other legal content freely available on the website of this organization. We charge nothing for giving awareness to a level which we pass by. However for all new research work we charge a nominal fee from our customers. We keep all the information and services offered to our clients confidential in line with the international confidential and legal practitioner laws.

We only share propositions on our website which are not the property of anyone other than the public at large. Moreover we are dealing in different niches of law. These include corporate law, banking law, employment law, labor law, contract law, constitutional law, evidence law, civil law, criminal law, family law, drug law, consumer law etc. We are also working on the concepts of Alternate Dispute Resolution, Arbitration and Right to Information.

Legal Services

We offer the following services to Companies, Firms, NGO's, NPO's, Societies, SMC's, MNE's and all other kinds of business/non-business entities at nominal prices..

• Company, Firm, NGO, Foundation, Trust Registration
• Retainership Services
• Legal Advisories
• Legal Consultations
• General Litigation (Up to all Pakistan High Courts)
• Drafting Services
• Legal Opinions
• Legal Notices
• Organization Profile Making
• Proposal Writing
• Report Writing
• Monitoring & Evaluations
• Manuals Making
• Policies Writing
• SOPs
• Recruitment and Interviewing with reports
• Procurement
• Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn etc)-
• Business development (Feasibility Reports & Surveys)
• News letters
• Trainings
• MOU Making
• Joint Venture(JV) Making
• Arranging Meetings
• Representative Meetings
• Partnership Making
• Research Work
• Photography and Video making.
• Documentary Making
• Event Arrangement
• Work Force Management
• Website Development

For queries and hiring one or more services contact internationallawyerinfo@gmail.com. We also offer service packages to organizations of various sizes to make a perfect working relationship with them.

Projects

We are running the following projects in coalition with other organizations. We deal with the legal side of these projects.

Right to Information	Right to Information is a global concept which believes in the provision of information of public importance as a right to individuals. It is a fundamental right according to the provisions of Article 19-A of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. We have written various abstracts for social sector organizations related with this concept. Our team has also attended series of workshops and seminars on the promotion of this concept. Our coalition partners in this project are Journey for Life (JFL NGO), Humanity Assistance and Relief Trust (HART), The Pleaders (NGO).
Alternate Dispute Resolution	Alternate Dispute Resolution or ADR is one of the most liked concepts in the corporate world. It believes that the matters between the parties shall be settled outside the courts through arbitration and other means. That way time, effort and money of the litigating parties has been saved to a great extent. We offer our international arbitration services to help our customers in the implementation of this concept.
Legal Awareness Project	It is a project which believes in giving legal awareness to all seeking legal knowledge. We have published many major statutes, legal reports, judgments, legal articles and principles of law on our website. Apart from that we also arrange trainings on various topics of law in this project.
Promote Pakistan Project	It is a project to promote entrepreneurship in Pakistan. This project is actually a project of The Pleaders (NGO). However we are a coalition partner in this along with many other organizations to promote the concept of entrepreneurship in Pakistan. We also deal with the legal aspects of this project.
Green Pakistan Project	It is a project lead by Nexton Group of Companies. It is related with solar energy solutions to all areas of Pakistan. Some important installations have been made in various parts of Pakistan in recent years under the umbrella of this project. We deal with the legal aspects of this project.

Previous Work

In recent years we have pleaded and given consultations in number of cases related with Criminal law, Civil law, Corporate Law, Family Law, Guardian Law, Banking Law, Employment Law and so on. Some of those were:-

Case Title	Name of Court	Nature
Mst. Sumera Versus Airblue	Ameer Mukhtar Gondal, Civil Judge, Islamabad (2010)	Suit for Damages (Airblue Flight Crash Islamabad Margalla Hills Compensation Case)
Micheal John Versus The State	Muhammad Amir Munir Mughal, Judicial Megistrate, Islamabad (2010)	Custody of Vehicle (Superdari Petition)
Syed Abu ul Hasan Versus The State	Rai Muhammad Khan, Judicial Megistrate, Rawalpindi (2011)	Bail Petition (392, 411, 420, 468, 471 PPC)
Muhammad Ramadan Versus The State	Rai Muhammad Khan, Judicial Megistrate, Rawalpindi (2011)	Bail Petition (392, 411, 420, 468, 471 PPC)
Ijaz Versus SHO Secretariat	Riffat Sultan Sheikh, Additional Session Judge, Islamabad (2011)	22-A Petition
Malik Muhammad Qasim Versus SHO Golra	Raja Jawad, Session Judge, Islamabad, 2012	22-A Petition
Sumera Naveed Vs. Public At Large	Muhammad Aslam Gondal, Senior Civil Judge, Islamabad (2011)	Guardianship Petition
Sumera Naveed Vs. Public At Large	Wajid Hussain Mughal Civil Judge, Islamabad (2010)	Succession Certificate
Muhammad Nafees Vs. Babar Awan	Kamran Basharat Mufti, Civil Judge, Islamabad, 2010	Suit for Recovery of Money
Raja Kamran Altaf V. Habib Bank Limited	Akmal Khan, Additional Session Judge, Islamabad (2010)	Consumer Court Case, Islamabad
State Versus Syed Abul Hasan etc.	Ismael Tasleem Akhtar, Megistrate Section 30, Rawalpindi, 2011	Criminal Trial (Bank Dacoity Case Dubai Islamic Bank, Murree Road, Rawalpindi)
State Versus M. Ramadan	Ismael Tasleem Akhtar, Megistrate Section 30, Rawalpindi, 2011	(Criminal Trial)
Abdul Hannan V. Public At Large	Raja Farrukh Ali Khan, Civil Judge, Islamabad	Suit for Declaration for Bank Locker
Abdul Hannan V. Public at Large	Samia Asad, Civil Judge, Islamabad	Succession Certificate Matter
Tahir Aziz Versus The State	Ayesha Shabbir, Judicial Megistrate, Islamabad (2013)	Bail Petition 489-F
M. Raees V. House Building Finance Corporation	Banking Court, Rawalpindi	Stay Order against HBFC auctioning a house in Rawalpindi.
Umair Khan Khattak V. Pakistan Tobacco Company	Rai Liaquat Ali Kharal, Civil Judge, Islamabad (2012)	Employment Law Case
Raja Zeeshan V. Asma Zeeshan	Inaamullah, Family Judge, Islamabad	Child Custody Petition
Asma Saleem V. Raja Zeeshan	Inaamullah, Family Judge, Islamabad	Suit for Dessolution of Marriage

There are lots of others but we are not mentioning as not permitted by our clients..

Profile of Founder

SALMAN YOUSAF KHAN (GOLRA) Advocate High Court Ex- Candidate Member National Assembly, NA-48, Islamabad CEO The Pleaders CEO Humanity Assistance & Relief Trust

Salman Yousaf Khan is a practicing High Court Lawyer, Social Worker and a Politician from Islamabad, Pakistan.

Legal Experience

Salman Yousaf Khan is practicing the legal profession since 2009. He has experience of appearing in different courts of Pakistan in different cities in variety of cases. In recent years he has dealt with civil cases, family cases, guardian cases, criminal cases, corporate cases, employment cases, consumer cases, banking cases and so on. He also passed exam and interview of Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate conducted by Islamabad High Court in 2012. However, he was not allocated the post because of safarish system.

Social Work Experience

Salman Yousaf Khan is member of Youth Parliament of Pakistan since 2009. He is Founder & CEO of Humanity Assistance & Relief Trust (HART). He founded this organization in 2012. He is also Founder & CEO of ‘The Pleaders’ which is an organization working on legal awareness and human rights. He is founder of Promote Pakistan Project and Coalition to Promote Pakistan Project. He has been very active on the implementation of Article 19-A in coalition with some NGOs. Similarly he has been very vocal on the local government system and its implementation in Islamabad in coalition with some NGOs. In 2011 he was part of Seed Pakistan which was a ngo headed by Laila Zuberi. He arranged several events under that organization as a team member.

Political Experience

Salman Yousaf Khan contested General Elections for the post of Member National Assembly (MNA) in Pakistan on May 11, 2013 as the youngest candidate of NA-48 Islamabad. During his campaign he addressed several corner meetings in the constituency. He is still very active in his constituency and constantly meeting people in political circles to make grounds for next elections.

Retainership

We offer legal services in shape of Retainership contracts to our customers. In a retainership the employer can hire us for a certain period of time depending upon the provisions of the agreement. There is usually a monthly retainership fee which the customer has to pay. In return we offer all kinds of legal assistance and legal backing to our customer in his/her legal matters. We offer retainerships in Pakistan locally as well as international retairnerships to international customers. We also ensure online and real time support to our customers.

In our professional retainership services we also offer special attendance other than normal attendance from one of our attorneys in times of need to our customers. Similarly for outstation traveling for dealing in any kind of litigation, we provide attorneys and support staff. The customer only has to provide logistic support where possible are required. We are very much flexible in negotiating on terms with our customers before signing retainership agreements so that there is no ambiguity at later stages. We work like a team with our customers. We stand with them and support them to a level beyond the written agreement at times. For availing our retainership please feel free to contact us at your convenience.

Regards,

Salman Yousaf Khan

Advocate High Court

Founder and Chairperson

International Lawyer

internationallawyerinfo@gmail.com

www.internationallawyer.info

How to Register a Single Member Company?

A single member company is the one which has only one director. He is all in all handling the operations of the organization. He can hire and fire anyone and he can make rules for the appointment of various employees in the company being a director.

In Pakistan a single member company is a private limited company which is registered under The Companies Ordinance, 1984. The process of registration usually takes 15 to 30 days time unless there is any objection regarding the registration documents of the company.

For the registration the following are the requirements:-

1. One Director
2. One Nominee of the Director
3. One Alternate Nominee.
4. One Legal Representative to process the incorporation documents.
5. Copies of CNIC of all above mentioned persons.
6. Office at a commercial area in Islamabad.
7. Fee as per the share capital of the company.

For more feel free to contact internationallawyerinfo@gmail.com

Regards,
Salman Yousaf Khan
Advocate High Court
Founder and Chairperson
International Lawyer

Limitation is three years to demand dowry articles (Article 49)

PLJ 1993 Lahore 448

Present: GUL ZARIN KlANI, J JAMSHAID HUSSAIN flana-Petitioner

versus

Mst. REHANA KAUSAR-Respondent

Civil Revision No. 1076 of 1993, dismissed on 4.7.1993.

(i) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)-

—S. 115-Value of dowry-Recovery of-Suit for-Suit decreed and decree upheld by appellate court-Challenge to-Lower courts, on proper canning of evidence, found that respondent was entitled to recovery of Rs. 24800/- as equivalent money value of her articles of dowry-They took account of every bi⁽ of evidence placed before them and did not overlook any part of record- Held: Finding being on a question of fact based on rjroper appreciation of oral evidence led in suit, was not susceptible to review for being upset or substituted in revisional jurisdiction-Finding upheld.        |P.450]A

< ii) Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908)-

—Art. 49-Value of dowry-Recovery of-Suit for-Whether suit was time- barred-Question oi--Terminus-a-quo for recovery of other specific movable property' or for compensation is three years when property is wrongfully taken or detainer's possession becomes unlawful-From time of divorce onward, detention of articles of dowry in house of petitioner, was unlawful-In such a case, period of three years contemplated in Article 49 began to run from a demand by respondent for return of dowry articles and refusal of petitioner to deliver same to her-Held: Right construction of Article 49 of Limitation Act brings suit within limitation period-Revision dismissed.                                                                  [P.451]B

AIR 1969 Audhra Pradesh 41 rel.

Sh. \aveed Shaheryar, Advocate for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 4.7.1993.

•JUDGMENT

Civil revision was against the agreed judgments of the lower Courts by which they gave the decree and sustained it for a sum of Rs.24,800/-, as the equivalent money-value of the articles of dowry to the respondent.

Respondent was married to the petitioner on 14.8.1987. Their Nikah was registered under fhe Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Their marriage was extremely short-lived. On 30.1.1989, the petitioner irrevocably divorced respondent. Divorce was rendered effective on 29.4.1989.

Prior to it, respondent had applied to Arbitration Council for maintenance from the petitioner. On 24.8.1989, the Arbitration Council awarded her the maintenance at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per month w.e.f. 15.1.1987 to 29.4.1989. Petitioner preferred a revision to the Collector of District Gujrat. Revision was allowed on 29.1.1990, and, the monthly rate of maintenance was reduced to Rs.500/- per month. Thereupon, petitioner instituted a civil suit (No.348 of 1990), in the Civil Court, at Gujrat for setting-aside of the orders passed by the Arbitration Council and the Revising Authority. Fate of the civil suit was not known to the learned counsel but an application for temporary injunction wasdismissed on 16.5.1990.

On 9.3.1992, respondent instituted a civil suit to recover her articles of dowry from the petitioner, and, in the alternative, claimed their money-value assessed at Rs.24,800/-. It was asserted that at the time of her marriage, respondent was given the articles of dowry which were taken to the house of the petitioner who unlawfully detained them and was not returning them to her, despite demands made for it. Petitioner was abroad. His sister, Mst. Rifat Ara defended the suit against him as his Mukhtar-i-Aam. In the written statement submitted by her, shecontroverted the averments in the plaint, and, submitted that the suit was barred by Article 49 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It was further averred that respondent was estopped by her conduct to file- the suit for recovery of articles of dowry.

Upon appropriate issues being settled in the suit and evidence taken from' the parties and its consideration, the trial Court decreed the suit to the respondent, on 23.1.1993. An appeal preferred from the decree by the petitioner was dismissed, on 10.4.1993, by learned Additional District Judge, Gujrat. This way, findings of the trial Court were maintained and affirmed. Against the above agreed judgments, a petition in revision was filed in this Court.

It was urged that in terms of Article 49 of the first Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, the suit was barred by limitation; the delivery and receipt,of articles of dowry by the petitioner was not established and the value assessed for the articles of dowry was excessive. In support of bar of limitation, learned counsel referred to the case of Janat Bibi v. Abdul Karim, NLR 1981 AC 86 (AJK).

Upon hearing the learned counsel and examination of the existing record, I was unable to sustain either of the contentions. In support of her claim for articles of dowry detained by the petitioner, respondent produced three witnesses, and, herself stepped in the witness box as PW-1. List of articles of dowry given to her at the time of her marriage with the petitioner and taking to his house was prepared by the respondent and marked Exh.P.l on file of the case. She and her three witnesses deposed that the articles mentioned in Exh.P.l were given to her and taken to the house of the petitioner and that the petitioner withheld them from the respondent. As far the value of the unreturned articles, respondent gave assessment of their value. Petitioner was employed abroad. After giving divorce to the respondent, he had contracted second marriage in the month of December, 1992. He occasionally returned home, but did not appear as a witness in support of his defence in the suit filed against him. His defence was conducted all throughout by his sister who acted as his Mukhtar-i-Aam. Her statement waswholly insufficient to effectively rebut the evidence adduced by the respondent in the case. Lower Courts, on proper scanning of the evidence found that the respondent was entitled to the recovery of Rs.24,800/- as the equivalent money-value of her articles of dowry detained by the petitioner. In taking this view, they took account of every "bit of evidence placed "before ftiem and were not sViown "to have overlooked any part of the record from their judicious consideration. The finding being on a question of fact based on proper appreciation of oral evidence led in the suit was not susceptible to review for being upset or subtituted in revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, I would uphold the above finding and agree with the lower Courts in this behalf.

Next comes the question of bar of limitation to the suit instituted by the respondent. It is a common ground that Article 49 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act applied to the facts of the case. The terminus-a-quo for recovery of other specific movable property or for compensation or for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same is three years, when the property is wrongfully taken or injured or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful. It was held above that articles of dowry belonging to the respondent were taken to the house of the petitioner. The wife and the husband lived together for a short-while. The wife was effectively divorced on 29.4.1989. Though the articles of dowry were in the house of the petitioner during the period of the respondent's desertion, yet, the presence of articles of dowry at that place was not unlawful. There was yet a hope, though slim, for rehabilitation of broken marital relations. Divorce however dashed the hope and put it asunder. From that time onward, the detention of articles of dowry in the house of petitioner was unlawful. In the inception, the possession of articles of dowry looked permissive and lawful. With pronouncement of effective divorce, the detainer's possession became unlawful. In such a case, the period of three years contemplated in Article 49 began to run from a demand by the respondent for return of her articles of dowry and refusal by the petitioner to deliver them to her. The precedent case relied upon in this behalf was not a close parallel to the facts in this case, and, therefore, was not much helpful for the decision of the point relating to bar of limitation. In my opinion, right construction of Article 49 of the Limitation Act brought the suit within limitation period. Side note (c) in case reported in AIR 1969 AndhraPradesh 41 dealing with application of Article 49 reads: "Starting point of unlawful possession-Property to be delivered by person in possession at end of particular term detained--Detainer's possession does not bcome unlawful on mere expiry of term but it becomes unlawful, when detainer refuses to deliver possession on demand. (1912) ILR 35 Mad 636 and AIR 1920 Allahabad 353 (2), relied on". Observations in the cited case support the above construction on Article 49 of the Limitation Act. 1908. Thus construed, the suit for return of articles of dowry ortheir money-value in the alternative, at the time of its institution in the trial Court was within limitation.

As far the contention that money-value of articles of dowry was excessive, it had no substance in it. In these days of sky-high prices of all types of goods and spiralling inflationary trends in currency, it could not be successfully said that the money-value of articles of dowry given in the list Exh.P.l was in any manner excessive or disproportionate.

In result, civil revision is dismissed in limine. Records be returned.(MBC)                            (Approved for reporting)       Petition dismissed.

Limitation is six years where law is silent

PLJ 2009 Lahore 917

Present: Kh. Farooq Saeed, J.

AHMAD KHAN--Petitioner

versus

KAUSAR PERVEEN and another--Respondents

W.P. No. 12269 of 2008, heard on 12.2.2009.

West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 5 & Schedule--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Art. 199--Suit for recovery of dowry articles--Factual controversy--Constitutional jurisdiction--Maintainability of--Whether the articles were taken away or not was concerned--Being factual matter could not be discussed in a writ jurisdiction such factual controversies were never brought to discussion unless there were some material irregularities or jurisdictional error--Petition was dismissed.  [P. 919] A

West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 5 & Schedule--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--Art. 199--Suit for recovery of dowry articles--Concurrent findings--Delay of 15 years in filing of suit--Non-challenging the point of limitation at early stage but challenged under constitutional jurisdiction--Applicability of CPC--Duty of Court--No objection with regard to delay in filing the petition had been raised either at the first stage or before the first appellate forum--It is the duty of Court to determine as to whether the petition or appeal is within time or not--It is the duty of Court to check the issue of limitation while on the other hand limitation plea cannot be waived and even if waived it can be taken by party waiving it and by the Court themselves--Such finding had been given while referring Rule 11 Order VII of CPC--Rest of the para deak with the exceptional cases, wherein, he was debarred from raising the plea of limitation--Such would be a general principle of estoppel arising from defendant conduct and the same becomes applicable where the issue involves an enquiry of fact--The issue as to whether the right to sue accrue years after the desertion and there were certain negotiations going on between the two parties or not, obviously was a factual controversy--After getting two judgments and decrees from the two subordinate forums and exhausting almost two years in litigation, raining a point of limitation at this stage in a mix question of law and facts could not be allowed while exercising a writ jurisdiction--Petition dismissed.      [Pp. 919, 920 & 921] C, D, E, F, G & H

Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908)--

----S. 3--Limitation--Suit filed or an appeal preferred after limitation provided in law is without jurisdiction--Validity--It should be dismissed even if no body has pointed out such lacuna in filing the petition or appeal whatsoever.   [P. 919] B

Mr. Muhammad Rashid Chaudhary, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Noon, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 12.2.2009.

Judgment

The petitioner has challenged the order of the Judge Family Court as well as Addl. District Judge dated 23.4.2008 and 25.8.2008 respectively.

2.  The main argument is that the proceedings before the Judge Family Court were time barred. Besides, it is a case of non-reading and misreading of the evidence produced before the Judge Family Court. The claim of the petitioner is that the husband of the respondent died 15 years ago. The respondent was statedly asked to leave the house of her father-in-law six months after the said demise. The case having been filed in 2007 was late by almost 11 years which is hopelessly time barred. Furthermore, no receipts of dowry articles issued by the shopkeeper wherefrom the same were purchased were produced. Also that at the time of her second marriage she took away the said dowry articles with her.

3.  So far as the issued with regard to the controversy as to whether the articles were taken away or not is concerned, the same being factual matter cannot be discussed in a writ jurisdiction. Such factual controversies are never brought to discussion unless there are some material irregularities or jurisdictional error. The law with regard thereto is very clear, hence, no interference with regard thereto is required.

4.  Learned counsel for the petitioner main emphasis that the case is time barred, is based upon Article 120 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. The said Article has provided six years time to the suits for which no time has been provided within the law itself. The Article inter alia provides that the time shall start from the date when the right to sue accrues. The petitioner claim is that right to sue, if any, accrued on the date of her desertion which is statedly six months after the death of her old husband.

5.  He, however, was not in a position to point out the exact date. Relying upon (2008 C.L.C. 1570) re: "Mst. Khalida Vs. Raja Muhammad Khurshid Khan and 9 others" read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, he urged that the judgment should now be set aside by this Court by holding then without jurisdiction.

6.  This Court is conscious of the fact and it would not require detailed discussion to say that a suit filed or an appeal preferred after the limitation provided in law is without jurisdiction. It should be dismissed even if no body has pointed out such lacuna in filing the petition or the appeal whatsoever. However, the facts of each case being separate this issue shall be decided after due appreciation of the facts of this case.

7.  The respondent case on the other hand is that during the entire intervening period she remained in contact with her earlier father-in-law. There were lot of meetings in between her and Punchayat was also made a party. She was continuously given the impression that the dowry articles shall be returned to her in due course of time after settling the exact number and description of the same. There was, therefore, no intentional delay in this case.

8.  Be that as it may, no objection with regard to the delay in filing the petition has been raised either at the first stage or before the first appellate forum. One may agree with the petitioner that it is the duty of the Court also to determine as to whether the petition or appeal is within time or not. However, where the same has neither been challenged nor the Court itself has considered it necessary to embark upon the same, the presumption would be that the same was not considered as an issue before it. The law with regard thereto is very clear. In fact even the judgment referred by learned counsel is not all in his  favour.  In  the  said  judgment  further  reliance  has been placed on

"Hakim Muhammad Buta and another Vs. Habib Ahmad and others" reported in (P.L.D 1985 Supreme Court 153), which reads as follows:--

"(a) Limitation Act-------

-----Sections 3, 4 to 25----Matter of limitation is not left to pleadings of parties. It imposes a duty in this regard upon Court itself As such if from statement in plaint suit appears to be barred by limitation, Court is obliged to reject plaint under

R. 11, Order VII, C.P.C. Similarly, limitation plea cannot be waived and even if waived it can be taken up by party waiving it and by Courts themselves. In exceptional cases, a defendant would, however, be debarred from raising plea of limitation. This would be a general principle of estoppel arising from defendant's conduct and would be particularly so if plea belatedly taken involves an inquiry on facts."

9.  Above para confirms that it is the duty of the Court also to check the issue of limitation while on the other hand limitation plea cannot be waived and even if waived it can be taken by party waiving it and by the Court themselves. However, this finding has been given while referring Rule 11, Order VII of C.P.C.

10.  Needless to mention that Civil Procedure Code has been made expressly inapplicable in the Family Court proceedings. The rest of the above para deals with the exceptional cases, wherein, he is debarred from raising the plea of limitation. This would be a general principle of estoppel arising from defendant conduct and the same becomes applicable where the issue involves an inquiry of fact. In the present case, above para is applicable with full strength. The issue as to whether the right to sue accrue years after the desertion and there were certain negotiations going on between the two parties or not, obviously is a factual controversy.

11.  In such circumstances, the action of the present petitioner of not challenging the same in any forum whatsoever also is of disadvantage to him. The principle that an issue should arise out of the impugned order shall also come into operation in the circumstances of this case. After getting two judgments and decrees from the two subordinate forums and exhausting almost two years in litigation, raising a point of limitation at this stage in a mix question of law and facts under the circumstances of this case, cannot be allowed while exercising a writ jurisdiction.

12.  The Hon'ble Supreme Court has very clearly held that when the question of limitation is of fact or mixed question of law and facts, it should be raised before the trial Court. Appellate Courts are not obliged to  examine  the  question which is not raised below. Reliance is on (1985 S.C.M.R 799) re. "Muhammad Ishaq and others Vs. Shah Muhammad and others", (1986 S.C.M.R 1957) re: "Allah Yar Khan Vs. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others" and (1988 S.C.M.R 1526) re: "Muhammad Rafiq and others Vs. Barkat Ali and others". Further not pressing before lower Court would amount option not to have finding thereof. Reliance is on (1989 C.L.C 482) re: "Ghulam Rasool and 5 others Vs. Zaheer Ahmad" and (1989 M.L.D 4820) re: "Meraj Begum Vs. Abdul Sattar".

14.  Keeping in view the discussion above case law referred and particularly the ambient circumstances of the case under discussion, this Court is not willing to entertain the objection of limitation at this stage of the proceedings. The writ petition, therefore, is considered without any merit, hence is dismissed.

 (N.I.)     Petition dismissed.

Writ Petition dismissed when filed with delay of 4 years

PLJ 2012 Lahore 133
[Multan Bench Multan]

Present: Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, J.

Mst. AAMNA ABDULLAH--Petitioner

versus

JUDGE FAMILY COURT, MULTAN and another--Respondents

W.P. No. 10933 of 2010, decided on 24.5.2011.

West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 10(4)--Limitation Act, (IX of 1908), S. 5--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court after lapse of four years--Laches--Suit for dissolutation of marriage, recovery of dower and dowry articles--Pre-trial re-conciliation proceedings failed, suit for dissolution of marriage was decreed on ground of Khula--Direction to return of five tolas gold in lieu of Khula--Challenged to--Validity--Whereas in filing of constitutional petition lapse of time or question of laches is to be examined on equitable principles for reason that exercise of constitutional jurisdiction is always in nature of equitable relief--Petitioner had invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court after a lapse of four years--Petitioner invoking constitutional jurisdiction is guilty of contumacious lethargy, inaction, laxity and gross negligence in enforcement of her right--Petition was liable to be dismissed on ground of laches--Petition was dismissed.          [P. 137] A

PLD 2010 Lah. 308, 2005 CLC 1447, PLD 1987 Lah. 471, 1999 SCMR 1072, 2006 CLC 1662 & 2008 CLC 587, rel.

Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman Mayo, Advocate for Petitioner.

Rana Muhammad Javed Iqbal, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 24.5.2011.

Order

Mst. Aamna Abdullah has called in question the legality of the order and decree dated 31.1.2007 passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Multan whereby her suit for seeking decree for dissolution of marriage was decreed subject to the return of Rs.500/- and five tolas gold ornaments in lieu of Khula.

2.  Mst. Aamna Abdullah (petitioner) instituted suit for seeking decree for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance for herself and her minor son, for recovery of dower and dowry articles against Nemat Ullah (Respondent No. 2) with whom her marriage was solemnized on 08.02.2004. Her dower was fixed as Rs.500/- in cash, five tolas gold and a house, consisting of 2 1/2 Marlas. The articles mentioned in the list Annexure-A were also given to her at the time of her marriage. Her dower is still unpaid. According to her the attitude of the Respondent No. 2 was cordial in the beginning but became harsh lateron and he started to beat her and a after four months of the marriage, Respondent No. 2 ousted her from his house. Adeel the minor son was born in the house of her parents and respondent has not even paid the expenditures incurred on delivery. Now it is impossible for her to live with her husband within the limits prescribed by Almighty Allah. Hence, this suit.

3.  Respondent No. 2 contested the suit and allegations leveled in the plaint were denied and it was contended that the dower of Rs.500/- and five tolas gold ornaments had already been paid to the plaintiff.

4.  On 31.01.2007 when the case was fixed for pre-trial reconciliation proceedings, Respondent No. 2 did not appear in the Court and the learned Judge Family Court in the light of the provision of Section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 after declaring the pre-trial reconciliation proceedings fail, decreed the suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula. It was also held that from the copy of the Nikkah Nama produced with the file, Rs.500/- and gold ornaments weighing 5 Tolas were paid to the plaintiff/petitioner as dower at the time of her marriage, therefore, she was directed to return the same. Aggrieved by the order of returning the Cash Rs.500/- and five tolas gold in lieu of Khula, the petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

5.  Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Respondent No. 2 has never claimed the return of dower in lieu of Khula, the petitioner has not claimed dissolution of marriage mere on the basis of Khula, therefore, the order of the Judge Family Court regarding the returning of Rs. 500/- and five tolas gold ornaments is illegal and void. Reliance has been placed on Muhammad Zafar v. Judge, Family Court and another (2005 CLC 1844) and Farida Khanum v. Maqbul Ilahi and 2 others (1991 MLD 1531). It is further contended that the petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court due to the illegal advice of her previous counsel and due to her ailment, therefore the delay in filing the writ petition is liable to be condoned in the light of Farzand Raza Naqvi and 5 others v. Muhammad Din through legal heirs and others (2004 SCMR 400), S.A.Jameel v. Secretary to The Government of the Punjab, Cooperative Department and others (2005 SCMR 126) andMasooda Begum through legal heirs v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Forest, Lahore and 9 others (PLD Supreme Court 90).

6.  On the other hand, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 has contended that the learned Judge Family Court has passed the impugned order in accordance with law after going through the evidence present on record especially the copy of Nikkah Nama submitted by the petitioner herself wherein it was mentioned that Rs.500/- and five tolas gold ornaments had been given to the petitioner at the time of her marriage. The learned Judge Family Court has rightly directed the petitioner to return those benefits in lieu of Khula. Learned counsel for the respondent has further contended that the writ petition has been filed alter lapse of four years of passing the impugned order and decree which was required to be filed within a reasonable time. Such inordinate delay in approaching High Court can not be condoned. He further contended that the impugned order and decree are in accordance with law. Learned counsel relied on Mst. Rahmat v. Additional District Judge-II, Muzaffargarh and 2 others (PLD 2010 Lahore 308), Tayyab Iqbal v. Member, (Colonies) Board of Revenue, Punjab Lahore and 3 others (2005 CLC 1447), Shams Din v. Aman Ullah and 3 others (1987 PLD Lahore 471), Gatron (Industries) Limited v. Government of Pakistan and others (1999 SCMR 1072), Babar Islam v. Mst. Sheeba Bashir and another (2006 CLC 1662) and Abdul Haq Shahid v. District Judge, Toba Tek Singh and 2 others (2008 CLC 587).

7.  After the failure of the reconciliation proceedings, the learned Judge Family Court decreed the suit of the petitioner for dissolution of marriage in view of the proviso of the Section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. In Paragraph No. 10 of the plaint it has been categorically mentioned that the attitude of the respondent was harsh towards plaintiff. He has failed to maintain her, therefore she has developed hatred in her mind against him and can not live with him within the limits prescribed by Almighty Allah. Therefore, she wants decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula.

8.  The proviso of Section 10(4) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 is as under:--

"That notwithstanding any decision or judgment of any Court or tribunal, the Family Court in a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and also restore the husband the Haq Mehr received by the wife in consideration of marriage at the time of marriage."

9.  In the instant case, the petitioner has relied on the Nikkah Nama wherein it has been mentioned that Rs.500/- and five tolas gold ornaments had been given to the petitioner at the time of her marriage. The entry of Nikkah Nama regarding the payment of aforesaid dower has not been challenged by the petitioner so far before any competent forum. The bare perusal of Nikkah Nama reveals that Rs. 500/- and five tolas gold ornaments have been given to the petitioner at the time of marriage. According to the aforesaid proviso of Section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 it is mandatory upon the Family Courts that a decree for dissolution of marriage is dependant upon the restoration of Haq-ul-Maher to the husband. In the present case the learned Judge Family Court has properly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it and dissolved the marriage strictly in accordance with law. The case law produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner has claimed dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula which has been granted to her in accordance with law. The constitutional petition has not been filed within a reasonable time, while dealing the matter delay in filing of the legal proceedings within the period  specified  under the provision of law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled S.A. Jameel v. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Cooperative Department and others (2005 SCMR 126) has held that in case of limitation, the delay of each day is to be explained by furnishing sufficient cause for enlargement of time and condonation of delay within the contemplation of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 whereas in filing of Constitutional petition lapse of time or question oflaches is to be examined on equitable principles for the reason that the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction is always discretionary with the Court and relief so granted is always in the nature of equitable relief---In case High Court comes to a conclusion that equity leans in favour of petitioner, the Court must exercise discretion in favour of such party but in the instant case, the petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court after a lapse of four years. The petitioner involving the constitutional jurisdiction is guilty of contumacious lethargy, inaction, laxity and gross negligence in the enforcement of her right. Therefore, this petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

10.  In the light of aforesaid discussion, the present petition is without merits and the same is hereby dismissed.

(R.A.)  Petition dismissed