Sunday 6 May 2012

Judgement Related with State Bank Employees Pension Matters


PLJ 2012 SC 289
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, C.J., Tariq Parvez and Ghulam Rabbani, JJ
STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through Governor and another--Appellants
versus
IMTIAZ ALI KHAN and others--Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 581 of 2011, decided on 19.10.2011.
(On appeal from the judgment/order dated 7-12-2010 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Constitutional Petition No. D-1684 of 2006).
State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1993--
----Regln. 19--State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980, Regis. 2(i) & 4--State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956), S. 54(1) [as (Amendment) Act (II of 1994)]--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 185(3) & 199--Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme, 1997 for its structuring with a view to improve its efficiency and performance by offering a voluntary exit to its surplus employees up-to 22-11-1997 on payment of retirement benefits available to them under existing Rules and Regulations in addition to other normal benefits as compensation--Bank accepted option of 1400 employees of different ranks and paid them amount of their compensation--Appeals were filed after six years by some employees claiming pensionary benefits returned by Service Tribunal--Constitutional petition filed by petitioners was accepted by High Court while directing Bank to pay commutation of their gross-pension irrespective of such Scheme.  [Pp. 293, 294 & 295] A & B
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 185(3)--State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980, Regls. 2(i) & 4--State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1993, Regls. 19--Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, inter alia, to examine as to whether under such Scheme, employees who had served the Bank for a period of less than 25 years and more than 10 years on having opted such Scheme were paid compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% commutation of gross pension as full and final settlement as a "Special Case" without creating any precedent, could still claim to be entitled to payment of pension on monthly basis. [P. 296] C
PLD 2006 SC 602 ref.
State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980--
----Reglns. 2(i) & 4--State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1993, Regln. 19--State Bank of Pakistan Act (XXXIII of 1956), S. 54(1) [as amended by State Bank of Pakistan (Amendment) Act (II of 1994)]--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 185(3) & 199--Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme, 1997 for its structuring with a view to improve its efficiency and performance by offering a voluntary exit to its surplus employees upto 22-11-1997 on payment of retirement benefits available to them under existing Regulations in addition to other normal benefits as compensation as full and final settlement--Option of 1400 employees of different ranks accepted by Bank on payment of compensation--Appeal before Service Tribunal after six years by some employees--Tribunal returned appeal for its presentation before the competent forum--Constitutional petition was accepted by High Court while directing the Bank to pay commutation of their gross-pension irrespective of such Scheme--Bank's plea was that petitioners having voluntarily opted to leave the Bank on acceptance of such Scheme were not entitled to gross pension, which was payable to an employee after completing service of ten years or above--Validity--Such Scheme was voluntary and was not imposed upon employees and none was compelled or under duress, pressure or coercion to opt for same--Petitioners had been allowed four weeks time to ponder over such Scheme and before they exercised their option, they were circulated a print-out copy showing approximate benefit payable to them on its acceptance--Word "retirement" as per State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980 would mean retirement of an officer under State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1993, meaning thereby that regular retirement of an employee would be either after completion of 25 years' service or on attaining age of 60 years entitling him to pensionary benefits--According to terms of such Scheme, employees having opted therefore would not be entitled to pensionary benefits, rather they would be paid compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% commutation of gross pension, which would be a full and final settlement as a special case--Petitioners had not completed 25 years of service at time of exercising such option--Had petitioner not opted for such Scheme, but had claimed pension on basis of rendering more than 10 years' service, then they would have been entitled thereto for same being a regular retirement under the Regulations--Petitioners had not retired from service by application of Regulations, 1980 nor under Regulations, 1993, but they had left service voluntarily after accepting such Scheme, which would govern their cases--Petitioner had remained silent for more than six years after accepting such Scheme without any objection--Petitioners had failed to prove/show infringement of any right and were guilty of laches in approaching legal forum for redressal of their alleged grievance--Impugned judgment was set aside. [Pp. 307, 308, 310, 311 & 315] E, F, G, H, M, N & O
PLD 2006 SC 602; 2004 PLC (CS) 1213; PLD 2007 SC 681; (Civil Appeal No. 976-1000 of 2009); PLD 1992 SC 825; 1999 SCMR 255; 2009 SCMR 177; 2005 SCMR 126; PLD 1984 SC 170 and 2004 SCMR 35 ref.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--
----S. 11 & O. VII, Rr. 1(g) & 8--Constructive res judicata--Failure of a party to ask for all relief to which he was entitled--Effect--Such relief, even if available and not asked for, could not be claimed by filing a subsequent legal proceedings as same would fall within mischief of constructive res-judicata. [P. 312] I & J
PLD 1999 SC 990 and 2000 SCMR 1232 ref.
Laches--
----Laches was a doctrine whereunder a party which may have a right, which was otherwise enforceable, loses such right to the extent of its enforcement, if it was found by the Court of law that its case was hit by the doctrine of laches/limitation--Right remains with the party, but he cannot enforce it--Limitation is examined by the Limitation Act, 1908 or by special laws which have inbuilt provisions for seeking relief against any grievance within the time specified under the law and if party aggrieved does not approach the appropriate forum within the stipulated period/time, the grievance though remains, but it cannot be redressed because if on the one hand there was a right with a party which he could have enforced against the other, but because of principle of limitation/laches, same right then vests/accrues in favour of the opposite party.   [Pp. 312 & 313] K
Equity--
----Delay would defeat equity--Equity would aid vigilant and not an indolent.            [P. 313] L
PLD 2007 SC 472; PLD 2003 SC 132; 2005 SCMR 126; 1987 SCMR 1119; PLD 1953 PC 19 and 1878 LR 3 AC at Page 1279 rel.
Mr. Khalid Anwar, Sr. ASC for Appellants.
Mr. Abdur Rahim Bhatti, Sr. ASC for Respondents Nos. 1 - 132, 134 and 137 - 202.
Sardar Asmatullah, Sr. ASC for Respondent No. 136.
Respondent No. 133 in person.
Respondent No. 135 in person.
Date of hearing: 27.9.2011.
Judgment
Tariq Parvez, J.--This appeal, by leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment dated 7-12-2010 passed by High Court of Sindh,
Karachi, whereby Writ Petition No. D-1684 of 2006 filed by the respondents has been allowed.
2.  The State Bank of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as `the Bank') is a body corporate, established under the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act, 1956'), with a preamble that the Bank shall regulate the monetary and credit system of Pakistan and to foster its growth in the best national interest for securing monetary stability and fuller utilization of the country's productive resources. It has played a vital role in the development of the economy of Pakistan and is financial backbone.
3.  In order to regulate its affairs, mandate has been given to the Bank under the Act, 1956 and to discharge its functions and perform its duties effectively, it has Central Board and other employees at all levels to run its day-to-day business.
In exercise of powers, the Central Board of the Bank on or about 29th day of December, 1979 approved the State Bank of Pakistan Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as `the Regulations, 1980'), which in substance has incorporated the pension scheme of the Central Government of Pakistan. It is to be noted that between the years 1993-1994, number of amendments were made in the banking laws of the country including the Act, 1956 so as to confer autonomy on the Bank. Section 54(1) of the Act, 1956 was amended by means of State Bank of Pakistan (Amendment) Act (Act-II), 1994 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act-II of 1994') whereby the words `subject to the approval of the Federal Government' were omitted; thus the exercise of powers by the Central Board of the Bank under that section was made fully autonomous, which does not require previous sanction/approval of the Federal Government viz. its Rules/Regulations making power.
4.  Because of such amendment, the Bank acquired absolute discretion in the recruitment process of officers and servants including their terms and conditions of service; Constitution of superannuation, beneficial and other funds, with or without Bank's contribution both for officers and servants of the Bank for their welfare and for extending them other amenities including the medical facilities, grant of loans and advances, etc. By omission of the words `prior approval' for the purpose of Section 54 of the Act, 1956, the Bank has become fully autonomous and is not bound by the policies of the Central Government.
5.  The State Bank of Pakistan, in exercise of its discretionary powers and in order to modernize its banking as was being done in the private sector Banking, decided its restructuring with a view to improve its efficiency and performance. Considering the best interest of the national  economy  but  simultaneously  looking  generously to the needs and requirements of its employees the State Bank of Pakistan introduced several initiatives one of which was to offer a totally voluntary exit to its employees vide Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme. 1997 (hereinafter referred to as `the Scheme'), which was introduced by way of Circular No. 9 of 1997 dated 23-10-1997.
6.  Circular No. 9 of 1997 incorporates the reasons and objects followed by entitlement of its employees in case they opt for it i.e. the Scheme. The object to introduce the Scheme has been highlighted in its opening paragraph by stating that the working conditions requires that the Bank shall also restructure itself in view of modernize procedures and during the process of restructuring, it was felt that certain offices will become redundant and employees working therein were to be put into surplus pool of the staff and officers at all levels; such staff and officer would be entitled to reduce compensation as compared to other present emoluments; however, before a need of establishing surplus pool, it was decided to offer an attractive Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme to all employees, therefore, `the Scheme' was introduced wherein the staff and officers were asked that they will be entitled to retirement benefits available under the existing Rules and Regulations and in addition to other normal benefits, the Bank will provide financial benefit package to all its employees. Detail of the Scheme regarding entitlement of the officers/staff members was as under:--
(a)        Three (3) months Basic Pay for each completed years of service One and a half months Basic Pay for each remaining months of service, whichever is less, however, subject to a maximum of 90 months basic pay.
PLUS
(b)        Benevolent Fund Grant equivalent to 10 years to be paid in lump sum in advance at the time of settlement of dues, as a final payment as per entitlement.
(a)        Employees who have completed 25 years of Service or More
(i)         Under Old Retirement Benefits.
            Provident Fund own and Bank's contribution and Gratuity @ one month's Basic Pay for each completed year of service.
(ii)        Under New Retirement Benefits.
            General Provident Fund contribution and 50% commutation of Gross Pension and payment of pension on monthly basis.
(b)        Employees whose services are less than 25 years.
(i)         Under Old Retirement Benefits.
            Provident Fund own and Bank's contribution and Gratuity @ one month's Basic Pay for each completed year of service.
(ii)        Under New Retirement Benefits.
            General Provident Fund contribution. Although, such employees are not entitled to pensionary benefits, it has been decided, as a special case and without creating any precedent to allow them compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% Commutation of Gross Pension as a full and final settlement.
(c)        Leave Encashment subject to a maximum of 180 days.
(d)        Post retirement medical facilities as admissible under the Bank's rules, or an amount equivalent to two months pay for every year for a total period of 10 years, at the option of the employee.
            Post retirement benefits (other than medical facilities) as admissible under the rules.
The above entitlements were, however, subject to exercise of option by the employees and the cutoff date for exercise of option was fixed upto 22-11-1997. It was also explained that no option will be entertained after the expiry of the cutoff date and option once exercised shall not be revocable. It was also left to the discretion of the management to accept or reject an option exercised by an employee or it may defer the acceptance of the option or may accept option with such modifications as deemed appropriate, keeping in view the interest of the Bank.
7.  During the course of arguments, we have been informed that about 2000 employees of different ranks opted to exercise the option, out of which about 1400 plus options were accepted by the Bank and the employees whose options were accepted by the Bank were paid their emoluments according to their entitlement as provided in the Scheme, by calculating the length of service of each employee and that without any objection and reservations, the amount so calculated as entitlement was paid by the Bank and accepted by the employees, who opted in favour of the Scheme.
8.  It appears from the record that somewhere in June, 2004, after about more than six years, the respondent-employees filed appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal against the Circular No. 9 (the Scheme), claiming that they had been deprived of their pensionary benefits/rights; however, in view of decision rendered by this Court in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 6021), the Service Tribunal put-off its hand from the case of the respondent-employees as their appeals became abated in view of the judgment supra; but they were, however, directed to take recourse to the competent forum, if so advised, which they followed by filing of Writ Petition No. 1684 of 2006 in the High Court of Sindh, Karachi. The Division Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated 7-12-2010 allowed the Writ Petition of the respondents with direction to the Bank to pay to the respondents commutation of their gross-pension, irrespective of the Scheme.
9.  Feeling aggrieved of the impugned judgment dated 7-12-2010, the Bank (appellant) filed Civil Petition No. 295 of 2011, which came up for hearing before Bench of this Court, headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan, when leave to appeal was granted on 12-7-2011. Operative para of the order is reproduced hereinbelow for convenience:--
"2. Leave to appeal is granted, inter alia, to examine that under the "Voluntary Golden Handshake Scheme" the respondents, who have served the petitioner Bank for a period of less than 25 years and more than 10 years on having opted the said Scheme were paid compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% commutation of Gross Pension, as full and final settlement, as a "Special Case" without creating any precedent, can still claim that they are entitled for the payment of pension on monthly basis."
10.  The summery of arguments that has emerged out of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant-Bank is be given as under:--
(a)        That the impugned judgment of the learned High Court is contrary to the principles as laid down by this Court in the case of State Bank of Pakistan v. Khyber Zaman and others [2004 PLC (CS) 1213].
(b)        That the learned High Court has erred in law and failed to appreciate that the Scheme constituted full and final acceptance of pensionary benefits/entitlement of the respondents.
(c)        That the impugned judgment suffers from misinterpretation of Regulations, 1980 and State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as Staff Regulations, 1993).
(d)        That the High Court has embarked upon the matter, which was either a past and closed transaction or was barred by limitation being hit by the doctrine of laches.
(e)        That the assumption of Constitutional jurisdiction in the subject matter by the learned High Court was uncalled for and was illegal because the services of the respondents-employees are not governed by the statutory rules.
11.  Learned counsel after formulating the synopsis of his arguments has argued that the impugned judgment is based on complete misreading and misapplication of the Regulations, 1980 and Staff Regulations, 1993.
According to him the service and pension Rules and the polices of the Central Government in no way are applicable to the respondent-employees of the Bank as their service and pension Rules are governed by the Regulations, 1980 and Staff Regulations, 1993 where the latter Regulations have overriding effect to the former.
He has argued that the circular issued by the appellant-Bank or the policy introduced and implemented subsequent to acceptance of the Scheme by the respondent-employees have no application to the case of the respondent-employees, therefore, in absence of any fresh legal entitlement, they could not claim any financial benefit, which are not applicable retrospectively but prospectively to the cases of those employees who are or would be in service at the time when any subsequent scheme or incentive or policy is introduced by the appellant-Bank.
He has submitted that service rules and staff regulations of the appellant-Bank are not statutory in nature, therefore, on the strength of decision rendered by this Court in Muhammad Idrees v. Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 2007 SC 681) and in State Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Aslam Khan (Civil Appeals Nos. 976-1000 of 2009), the jurisdiction assumed by the learned High Court was in contravention of the law laid down by this Court in the above cited judgments.
Learned counsel has further argued that in view of above cited judgment, when it is a matter between employer and employee whose services are not governed by the statutory Rules, their relationship would be that of master and servant, therefore, it would be beyond the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
The learned counsel has placed more emphasis on his submission that the learned High Court has completely misinterpreted and erroneously applied the Regulations, 1980 which are to be read in conjunction and in consonance with the Staff Regulations, 1993. He has referred to para-4 of the Regulations, 1980 wherein `pension' has been defined as:--
"an officer who retires after completing not less than ten years of total qualifying service shall be entitled to a gross pension."
According to him this entitlement to gross pension is in respect of such employee who retires after completing service of ten years or above and it would not be applicable to an employee who separates himself from the appellant-Bank on acceptance of the Scheme, which Scheme was voluntary one and was subject to exercise of option.
According to the learned counsel, it was not the employer who has removed the employees i.e. the respondents but the respondent-employees have opted for exit from the appellant- Bank on the basis of terms and conditions as spelt out in the Scheme, therefore, such employees could not be brought within the purview of para-4 of the Regulations, 1980, which refers to retirement of an employee and not to an employee who opts to leave the appellant-Bank on acceptance of the Scheme.
Learned counsel has also referred to the definition of the word `retirement' as provided in Regulations, 1980 which reads as under: --
"2(i). `retirement' means retirement of an officer under the State Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Regulations and includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal."
His submission is that an officer who retires in accordance with Staff Regulations, 1993 may fulfils the criteria as given under the paragraph of `pension' shall be eligible to receive gross pension. According to the learned counsel the definition of the word `retirement' under Regulations, 1980 also states that `termination of service other than dismissal'. In his view the acceptance of the Scheme, which was also voluntary to opt cannot be termed as termination of service but it was a voluntary withdrawal by the respondents.
The learned counsel on the strength of his above submissions has also referred to para-19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993, which reads as under:--
"19. (i) An officer or an Executive shall retire from service:
(a)        on such date after he has completed twenty five years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement benefits as the Government may, in the interest of the Bank and for reasons to be recorded in writing in each case direct; or
(b)        in any other case, on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age.
(ii)        An employee in Clerical and Non-Clerical cadre shall retire on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age.
(iii)       The Governor may, on the request of an employee allow him to retire on any day after the completion of 25 years of service in the Bank.
The learned counsel has also objected to the findings recorded by the learned High Court in the impugned judgment, where it has been held that "voluntary exit of an employee from the SBP through VGHS is a termination of service, and is therefore, a retirement from service" According to the learned counsel such interpretation and conclusion drawn by the learned High Court is entirely erroneous and misconceived because the term `termination' cannot be read in isolation nor is independent to Staff Regulations, 1993. He has added that if more than ten years service is taken as base for qualifying period for pension and the word `termination', as used in the definition of `retirement', is given wider meaning and scope, it would tantamount to frustrate the very object of introducing the Scheme. He has elaborated his submission by giving an example that such wider interpretation shall adversely affect the very purpose of introducing the Scheme. He has given an example that a DMG officer after having served for ten years period, on attaining the age of 35 years can say that he is entitled to be retired with pension for rest of his life. According to learned counsel if such interpretation is allowed to prevail, then a person who joins service at the age of 20/21 years, on reaching the age of 31/32 years can quit from service by taking advantage of the term `retirement' making him entitled to receive gross-pension whereas he shall be still young person of 31/32 years age and he can switchover to another job, receiving salary of new assignment, leaving behind the financial burden on its previous employer, which in fact, in the opinion of the learned counsel, is a burden placed on the shoulders of present and future generation, left by the previous generation.
Learned counsel has further argued that because of irrational and illogical meanings, which have been assigned to the words `termination of service' to amount `retirement' by the learned High Court, the very object of the Scheme has been frustrated. According to him only two situations have been enumerated in the Staff Regulations, 1993 i.e. either retirement on the basis of completion of 25 years of service or on reaching the age of 60 years.
Learned counsel has also argued that the Scheme itself had made it crystal clear that the employees have been divided into two categories i.e. those who have completed 25 years of service and secondly those whose service is less than 25 years; in case of first category, the employees are held entitled to GP Fund contribution and 50% commutation of gross-pension and payment of pension on monthly basis, which would mean that they would get 50% commutation of the gross pension as well as they would also be entitled to obtain payment of pension on monthly basis because they became entitled to monthly pension having served for 25 years in the appellant-Bank; whereas the employees whose service is less than 25 years have been clearly placed in second category of the Scheme where there is no reference whatsoever for payment of pension to them under the pre-existing system since they had not retired. The learned counsel has referred to the Scheme itself wherein clause (b)(ii) clearly provides that "General Provident Fund Contribution; although such employees are not entitled to pension benefits, it has been decided, as a special case and without creating any precedent to allow them compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% commutation of gross-pension as a full and final settlement" (emphasis provided).
The learned counsel has also raised objection to the placing reliance by the learned Division Bench of the High Court upon the case of State Bank of Pakistan v. Khyber Zaman [2004 PLC (CS) 1213] as according to him in this cited case, the dispute before the Court was over the grant of Benevolent Fund Grant at enhanced rate. In his view, by means of the impugned judgment, the learned High Court has made the respondent-employees entitled to double benefit i.e. held them entitled to payment under the Scheme and now payment of pension under para-4 of the Regulations, 1980. The learned counsel also referred to paras 4, 5 and 10 of the cited judgment at pages 1220 and 1223, where it has been concluded by this Court that "it is not understandable how any deletion, amendment, addition or insertion can be made by us in GHSS especially when it is free from any ambiguity and does not call for scholarly interpretation; no where it has been mentioned in the computer print that an employee of the State Bank of Pakistan who opts for GHSS would be entitled to get double benefit available in the existing rules and that of the GHSS" (emphasis provided). It was finally concluded that "how the respondents can be allowed to approbate and reprobate after the acceptance of GHSS in toto without any objection".
The learned counsel has also submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment by placing reliance on the Scheme introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan Banking Services Corporation in the year 2003 with title "Special Early Retirement Package for Engineers on Engineering side and for Clerical & Non-Clerical Staff of all sides", which had allowed 100% commutation for those employees who opted for said Scheme and who had rendered ten years or more service. According to the learned counsel, such application of subsequent scheme to the case of the present respondents was illegal for the reason that this Scheme was introduced by the State Bank of Pakistan Banking Services Corporation (Bank), which is a separate legal entity i.e. a statutory body set up under a different enactment and not by the appellant-Bank for its employees and also that the said Scheme was introduced several years after the retirement of the respondent-employees, therefore, this Scheme at all was not relevant.
The next submission of the learned counsel is that the very language of the Scheme suggests that it was a voluntary Scheme and no employee was under any obligation to accept it. He has added that all employees were given sufficient and reasonable time of four weeks to consider the Scheme and if it was beneficial to them, they may opt for it; therefore, there could be element of coercion or duress.
Learned counsel further submits that the respondent-employees had approached the learned High Court (a forum, in his opinion, not available to them) for redressal of their grievance after about a period of six years or more because they for the first time filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal in January, 2004 against the Circular No. 9 i.e. the Scheme, therefore, their petition was badly hit by the doctrine of laches.
The learned counsel has finally argued that it is established principle of law that a Writ Petition would not be maintainable if the petitioner had adequate alternate remedy available to him; in his view, since the services of the respondent-employees were not regulated under any statutory rules and their terms and conditions were controlled on the principle of master and servant; therefore, only a Civil Court could have jurisdiction for redressal of grievance of the respondents, if any.
While concluding his submissions, the learned counsel has reiterated that in the Scheme itself, it is clearly noted that an employee accepting the Scheme shall not be entitled to pension and in the Scheme itself the word `compensation' has been used instead of the word `pension', apart from mentioning that it shall be `full and final' settlement between the employees and employer.
12.  At the converse, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employees while relying upon the impugned judgment, whereby they were allowed relief as claimed for being petitioners before the High Court, fully supports the impugned judgment. His submission is that the respondents have been discriminated vis-a-vis similarly placed employees of the appellant-Bank, therefore, their right as protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as `the Constitution') stands violated.
His submits that irrespective of what was held out at the time of introduction of the Scheme and as contained therein was not adhered to by the appellant-Bank's authorities but on the contrary the same was not acted upon rather violated. He has added that under the Scheme itself, it was provided that an employee, who accepts the Scheme and opts for it, shall be entitled to benefits under the Scheme which was in addition to other retirement benefits (emphasis provided).
The learned counsel has argued that the retirement benefits were the entitlement of the respondent-employees, which could not have been denied and the respondent-employees in fact have favoured the appellant-Bank by exercising the option by acceptance of the Scheme whereby the financial burdens for future was reduced. According to the learned counsel the exit of the respondent-employees from the appellant-bank thus has created room for new entrant.
The learned counsel on the one hand has argued that there is violation of rights of the respondents under Article 25 of the Constitution but on the other hand he stresses that even later on the appellant-Bank has been introducing voluntary retirement schemes whereunder the employees who had completed ten years of service with the Bank were held entitled to full pensionary benefits, which have been denied to the respondents.
The learned counsel has also referred to various other voluntary retirement schemes, both from public and private sectors including the one introduced by the Federal Government, whereunder the employees, who have completed ten years of service and have opted for early retirement, are held entitled to receive full pension besides the benefits of the Scheme.
He has also contended that the status of the respondent-employees has been admitted by the appellant-Bank to be their retired employees as is abundantly clear from the certificate issued in their favour from time to time, where they have been recorded as retired employees of the Bank. He has also referred to respondents' official I.D. Cards issued by the Bank itself, where against the status of employees, the word `retired' has been recorded.
While giving upshots of his above submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that since the respondent-employees stand retired from the appellant-Bank after having putting in ten years or more service, they are entitled to receive pensionary benefits including the pension itself, which has been denied to them whereas under similar Scheme by appellant-Bank other employees who opted for early retirement have been extended the benefit of pensionary benefits i.e. they have been given pension.
While reply to the question of laches, it is argued by the learned counsel that the denial to pay pension to a retired employee is recurring cause of action and it remains alive until the demand of the employee, which in fact is his legal right, is not fulfilled.
In support of his above submission, he has argued that as benefit of pension continues till death of an employee and in some cases it devolves upon the widow of the deceased employee, thus it is a continuous right, therefore, no question of laches arises. The learned counsel while placing reliance upon Muhammad Masihuzzaman v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 825), Muhammad Ahmed v. Government of Sindh (1999 SCMR 255) and Muhammad Anwar Siddiqui v. Lahore Development Authority (2009 SCMR 177), has argued that doctrine of laches is not of universal application but dependent upon the facts of each case, therefore, the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-Bank that the claim of the respondent-employees is hit by the doctrine of laches is ill founded.
Finally as to the question of assumption of jurisdiction by the learned High Court in the matter, it is argued by the learned counsel that the respondent-employees were claiming a right under the Regulations, 1980, which were statutory in nature because until the year 1994, under Section 54 of the Act, 1956 the Rules and Regulations made by Board of Governors of the Bank require previous approval of the Federal Government and the Regulations, 1980 were made at the time when such approval was required, which condition was latter on omitted from Section 54 of the Act, 1956 through Act-II of 1994. His submission is that since the respondent-employees were subjected to the Regulations, 1980 which were having statutory force and since they were denied their legal right, therefore, they had rightly invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
13.  Sardar Asmatullah, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing for one of the respondents has adopted the arguments of Mr. Abdur Rahim Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court; however, he has added that he would like to make his submission on the question of laches, while also relying upon the cases of Muhammad Masihuzzaman (ibid), Muhammad Ahmed (ibid), S.A. Jamil v. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (2005 SCMR 126) and Muhammad Anwar Siddiqui (ibid).
Substance of the above judgments, as submitted by the learned counsel is that delay in approaching the legal forum though is relevant but it is not a universal rule that on account of delay/laches a person shall be deprived of or denied a vested right, particularly when a right claimed is recurring one. According to him, in the instant case, the respondents had approached the learned Federal Service Tribunal in the first instance and then filed a Constitutional Petition before the High Court at Karachi, claiming that they are entitled to pensionary benefits. According to the learned counsel, to receive pension by an employee who stands retired from service is his subsisting monthly right, which gives him cause of action, on denial, at the end of every month.
14.  Mr. Atif Hayat and Ms. Anjum Naz, Respondents Nos. 133 and 135, respectively, have appeared in-person and made their submissions. Respondent-Atif Hayat has argued that there is denial of equal treatment amongst the equals by the appellant-Bank because subsequent to the Scheme, to which he has opted while in service, many other Schemes of similar nature have been introduced by other Banks as well as by the Government Departments and also by the appellant-Bank itself wherein better terms and conditions for voluntary withdrawal from service have been extended to the employees including awarding them pensions on monthly basis; therefore, he and his co-employees, who opted for the Scheme are entitled to pension on monthly basis.
He has also referred to Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution and has further argued that it is responsibility of the employer that the respondent-employees shall be dealt with in accordance with law and when the principle of due process of law is invoked with regard to latter similar policies, any amount due against the employer had remained outstanding until the same is paid.
15.  We have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well as the respondent-employees (in-person) and have also carefully gone through the impugned judgment as well as the material submitted by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective submissions.
16.  It may be noted that the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh after hearing the parties counsel and while dealing with the question of assumption of jurisdiction by it has held that prior to enforcement of the Act-II of 1994, the words `subject to approval of the Federal Government' existed in sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Act, 1956, which empowers the Central Board to make Regulations but by the enforcement of the Act-II of 1994, approval of the Federal Government was no longer required. It is held that the Rules and Regulations framed by the Central Board of the appellant-Bank, after the above amendment of Section 54 of the Act, 1956 would no longer statutory but internal instructions of domestic Rules/Regulations, having no status of statutory Rules/Regulations. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on Principal, Cedet College, Kohat v. Muhammad Shoab Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170) and Zia Ghafoor Piracha v. Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (2004 SCMR 35). It is finally concluded by the learned High Court that since the Regulations, 1980 were framed prior to the enforcement of the Act-II of 1994, therefore, these Regulations shall have the force of statutory Rules/Regulations and as such Constitutional Petitions was maintainable.
17.  While meeting to the arguments of the counsel for the respondent (appellant herein) it was held by the learned Division Bench that in para-19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993, it has been provided that an officer or executive shall stand retired from service either on completion of 25 years qualifying service for pension or in any other case, on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age. Similarly, while reading para-19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993 with the Regulations, 1980, where the word `retirement' has been defined in Section 2(i) i.e. retirement means retirement of an officer under the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations and includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal, it is held by the learned High Court that the word `termination' is a genus of having relevant to dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, resignation, retirement etc. and thus termination of an employee can be brought about in many ways.
The learned High Court has also referred to dictionary meanings of the word `termination' from Judicial Dictionary by K.J. Aiyar 13th Edition, where while giving reference to five extracts from different judgments of the Indian Supreme Court and other jurisdiction, it has been defined as under:--
"Termination--of service. The decisions of Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India [1953 SCR 655, AIR 1953 SC 250] and Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1995) 1 SCR 26, AIR 1964 SC 369] clearly establish that termination of the services of a person employed by the Government does not amount in all cases to dismissal or removal from service. [Hartwell Prescott Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Government AIR 1957 SC 886 at 887].
            The essential element of termination is that as soon as the services of a person are terminated, all bonds right and liabilities are immediately snapped; there is no continuity of any right or benefit whatsoever after termination, except perhaps such rights and benefits are expressly provided by the statute. [Bholanath v. Union of India (1992) 19 ATC 188 at 196 (All)].
            The expression in ordinary parlance may include termination for misconduct; but in the light of rules and prevailing practice, the meaning of that word has come to be restricted to contractual termination unconnected with any idea of punishment for misconduct. [Devraj Urs v. General Manager Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (1970) 2 Mys LJ 496, 1971 Lab IC 469, AIR 1971 Mys 99 (106)].
It is, therefore, held by the learned Division Bench of the High Court that the term `termination' in context of relationship of `employer' and `employee', means to bring the service to an end by any mode whatsoever. While concluding on this issue, the learned Division Bench has also concluded that when the appellants (respondents herein) opted for the Scheme, it was a termination by contract between the employer and employee and in view of the specific definition of `retirement' provided in the Regulations, 1980 such a termination would be included in `retirement'.
The learned Division Bench then referred to a precedent case of United Bank Ltd. where retrenchment of 5000 officers were made and Golden Handshake benefits were also paid to them, which matter came up before this Court in the case of United Bank Limited v. Shamim Ahmed Khan (PLD 1999 SC 990), wherein retrenchment on the part of the Management was upheld but benefits as spelt out in the retrenchment scheme were allowed to the employees.
The learned Division Bench has also referred to another case i.e. Akram Zafaoor v. Federation of Pakistan (2000 SCMR 1232), wherein this Court has passed a consenting order with the following observation:-
"The grant of pensionary benefits shall be available to those petitioners who are found entitled in accordance with the Service Rules of the respondent bank in force at the time of termination of their service."
The learned Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, has held that there is a distinction between the UBL and the present Scheme and while again placing reliance on the findings that the termination would mean retirement, the respondents (appellants before the High Court) who have completed not less than ten years of total qualifying service in the appellant Bank were held entitled to the pensionary benefits.
18.  Now coming towards the submissions made by the parties' counsel. Both the sides have not only referred to or relied upon the Regulations, 1980 and the Staff Regulations, 1993; therefore, we intend to refer to the relevant provisions of the Regulations relevant for disposal of instant appeals.
Both these Regulations have been made by the Central Board of the appellant-Bank exercising power conferred by Section 54 of the Act, 1956. Section 2 of the Regulations, 1980 provides definition to different words used in the Regulations. The word `retirement' is defined as under:--
"2(i). `retirement' means retirement of an officer under the State Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Regulations, and includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal."
Similarly Section 19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993 defines the word `retirement' as under:--
"19.(i) An officer or an Executive shall retire from service:--
(a)        on such date after he has completed twenty five years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement benefits as the Government may, in the interest of the Bank and for reasons to be recorded in writing in each case direct; or
(b)        in any other case, on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age.
(ii)        An employee in Clerical and Non-Clerical cadre shall retire on the completion of the sixtieth year of his age.
(iii)       The Governor may, on the request of an employee allow him to retire on any day after the completion of 25 years of service in the Bank."
Before we dilate upon the above provisions, presently we would like to discuss the Scheme itself because the claim of the respondent-employees is based on the Scheme and application of Regulations, 1980 and the Staff Regulations, 1993. According to the Scheme the staff and officers, who will opt for the Scheme, shall be entitled to retirement benefits available under the existing Rules and Regulations. It is also stated that in addition to normal retirement benefits, the appellant-Bank will provide the following financial and benefit package under the Scheme to the employees--
 (i)        three months basic pay for each completed years of service or one and a half months basic pay for each remaining months of service, which ever is less, however, subject to a maximum of 90 months basic pay.
(ii)        Benevolent Fund Grant equivalent to 10 years to be paid in lump sum in advance at the time of settlement of dues, as a final payment as per entitlement.
The Scheme elaborates further normal retirement benefits, which will be available to the employees, for which, the employees were divided into two groups; first group comprises of the employees, who have completed 25 years of service or more; and the second group of those employees, whose service tenure is less than 25 years. Admittedly the present respondents fall in second category as they have not completed 25 years service; in case of this category, under the old/new retirement benefits, the employees were held entitled as under:--
 (i)        Under Old Retirement Benefits.
            Provident Fund own and Bank's contribution and Gratuity @ one month's Basic Pay for each completed year of service.
(ii)        Under New Retirement Benefits.
            General Provident Fund contribution. Although, such employees are not entitled to pensionary benefits, it has been decided, as a special case and without creating any precedent to allow them compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% Commutation of Gross Pension as a full and final settlement.
19.  If the arguments and the logic advanced by the learned counsel for respondent-employees is accepted and allowed to succeed, in our considered view, it would tantamount to annulling the very object and purpose of introduction of the Scheme, as highlighted in the initial part of this judgment i.e. the Scheme was introduced for restructuring of the system and to streamline the working of the Bank and also to reduce the redundancy. There was at one stage of time opined by the appellant-Bank that let there be a surplus pool for such staff, which had become redundant or was no longer required but such idea was dropped and instead the Scheme was introduced. The very heading of the Scheme suggest that it was a voluntary Scheme and was not imposed upon the employees; no one was compelled or was under any pressure, duress or coercion to must opt for the Scheme; so much so that about four weeks time was allowed to the employees to ponder over the Scheme and before they exercise their option for Scheme, they were circulated a printout copy, showing the approximate benefit which was being extended to an employee to prepare himself to accept and avail the package or not.
20.  The argument was that the respondent-employees are entitled to pension on the strength of similarly placed employees of other different organization like United Bank Ltd. or under Circular No. 5, dated 21-4-2003 issued by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP Banking Services Corporation (Bank) or Downsizing of the Federal Ministries/Divisions, Attached Departments/Officers Public Sector Corporations etc. where in some cases, pension was granted/allowed to employees whose service tenure was upto 10 years. Suffice it to say that the terms and conditions of the present Scheme and other Schemes cited above are totally different, therefore, it cannot be argued that similarly placed employees in the appellant-Bank or other institutions were given pension but the respondent-employees were denied.
21.  Misconception appears to be for the reason that the word `retirement' as defined in the Regulations, 1980 includes the `termination'. These two words have been read together by the respondent-employees and they are interpreting these words generally to the effect that since by virtue of exercise of option of acceptance of the Scheme, their services are terminated and they stand retired, therefore, they are entitled to retirement benefit which includes pension.
The above wrong assumption can be clarified from the definition of the word `retirement given in the Regulations, 1980 read with para-19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993; according to the definition of the word `retirement', given in the Regulations, 1980, `retirement' includes termination of service for any reason other than dismissal, but such definition is to be read with the Staff Regulations, 1993, which Regulations specifically deal with the employees of the appellant-Bank, providing the criteria and entitlement of an Officer or an Executive or an employee either, Clerical or Non-Clerical; according to the Staff Regulations, 1993 `retirement' means that an officer or an Executive shall retire from service on such date after he has completed twenty five years qualifying service for pension or in any other case, on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years; similarly an employee in Clerical and Non-clerical cadre shall retire on the completion of 60 years of his age. So in this manner, para 19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993 controls the definition of `retirement' as given in the Regulations, 1980 because the word `retirement', as per the Regulations, 1980, means retirement of an officer under the Staff Regulations, 1993; meaning thereby that the regular retirement of an employee of the appellant-Bank is either after he completes 25 years of service or he attains the age of 60 years. The entitlement to pension at the age of 60 years has been explained in the preceding paras of this judgment through an example but at the cost of repetition, it is again stated that may be a person joins the Bank at the age of 48 years but when he becomes of 60 years of age, he shall stand retire under para-19 of the Staff Regulations, 1993; now because he would be retiring in terms of para-19, therefore, he would be entitled to such pensionary benefits as would be permissible either under old or new retirement benefits.
22.  It appears that when the Scheme was being drafted, each word used therein was made very clear in the Scheme itself like in para 2(b)(ii) under the Heading `under new retirement benefits', it was specifically stated in respect of employees who had less than 25 years of service that `although, such employees are not entitled to pensionary benefits, it has been decided, as a special case and without creating any precedent to allow them compensation towards pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% Commutation of Gross Pension as a full and final settlement (emphasis provided). Therefore, it was clearly stated that such employees otherwise were not entitled to pension but as a special case and on the basis of exercise of their option to opt for the Scheme, they were being compensated towards the pensionary benefits and that such compensation shall be full and final settlement. (emphasis provided).
23.  Since the respondent-employees could not point out that fraud was committed to them or they were deceived by the Bank, nor there is any material to infer that any duress or coercion was used against them rather they were allowed four weeks time alongwith printout of the approximate emoluments they would be receiving on exercise of option and because the Scheme itself states that the option once exercised will not be revocable under any circumstance, the respondent-employees cannot claim nor they can be held entitled to the benefit of pension.
24.  From the tenor of the drafted petition filed before the High Court of Sindh, Karachi and what has been argued before us by the learned counsel for the respondents, much stress has been placed on the application of Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan by arguing that the respondent-employees have been meted out in discriminatory manner and thus the Bank has failed to perform its Constitutional obligations.
While making reference to different stances, the learned counsel for the respondent-employees has referred to Special Early Retirement Package for Engineers on Engineering side and for Clerical and Non-Clerical Staff of all sides, which is Circular No. 5 dated 24-4-2003, wherein special early retirement package given to the employees of the Bank was said to be much more beneficial. He has also referred to a letter issued by the Finance Division, Government of Pakistan dated 30.11.1977 and argue that under such letter as well, the respondent-employees of the appellant-Bank were placed in a better position vis-a-viz, the retirement benefits with a better rate and the scales for pension. Learned counsel has also referred to a letter dated 25-1-1982 issued by the State Bank of Pakistan Central Directorate whereunder the available retirement benefits have been given by making comparison to old retirement benefits and the new retirement benefits. He submits that immediately after the implementation of the Scheme, the State Bank of Pakistan through Personal Department Circular No. 12, dated 29.11.1997 introduced Revised Salary Structure followed by a Memorandum No. 15 of 1998 to the Central Board Pension and Commutation Policy, whereunder an employee who has rendered 10 years of service became entitled to pension. According to the learned counsel on this score alone, the respondent-employees have been discriminated by denying their right to receive pension.
25.  At this stage, we will refer back to the Scheme itself which, inter alia, contends that the employees, who opted for the Scheme shall be entitled to retirement benefits available under the existing Rules and Regulations and in addition to normal retirement benefits, the appellant-Bank will provide them another package, which has been spelt out in the Scheme and has been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. No doubt that as per the subsequent Schemes, the employees of the appellant-Bank and the other institutions, who have rendered, 10 years or more service have been held entitled to monthly pension, calculated and determined on the basis of last pay drawn and commuted with the percentage on the basis of any further one year service but such pension benefits would be available only under the Regulation and the law governing the services of the employees. The Scheme itself makes it very clear that the employees have been bifurcated in to two categories; in category-I are the employees, who have completed 25 years of service, whereas in category-II are the employees who have rendered less than 25 years service.
Had it been the case that the respondent-employees had not opted for the Scheme as was introduced by the appellant-Bank and had claimed pension on the basis of rendering more than 10 years service, they would have been entitled to such pension as calculated and determined in view of the Pension and Gratuity Rules/Regulations but that would be a regular retirement under the Regulations.
Similarly where pension has been held to be the entitlement of an employee, who has put in 25 years of service, would mean that in case of employee retiring in due course, either on completion of 25 years of service or on attaining the age of superannuation. The respondent-employees are mixing up their withdrawal/exit from the appellant-Bank, which was not either under the Regulations, 1980 or the Staff Regulations, 1993 but was independent of two Regulations and their cases are to be totally governed within the parameters and scope of the Scheme, which was voluntary and to which they opted for, after they were made fully aware of the Consequences including that such an option once exercised shall be irrevocable and that whatever they may receive shall be settlement of their dues as a full and final payment as per their entitlement.
26.  No discrimination can be claimed viz. employees who were not similarly placed as against the present respondents. Discrimination can be claimed amongst equals if differently treated; if certain employees of the bank who subsequent to the Scheme had retired on the basis of another Scheme or early retirement package etc. would be in a different category as against the present respondents. If within those employees, who were similarly placed with them and who had similarly exercised their option to quit the Bank on the basis of the Scheme or if any employee of the same status, as they were, is given more benefits or pension, on then the respondents can claim discrimination; therefore, in absence of that, the respondents have failed to make out a case of discrimination.
27.  It appears that while exercising option under the Scheme, some of the employees may have completed 25 years of service, therefore, they were held entitled to receive pension as it was clearly mentioned in para-2(a)(ii) of the Scheme, which provides that a person having completed 25 years of service or more, amongst other retirement benefits, shall be entitled to gross pension and payment of pension on monthly basis. As regards the case of the respondents, since they were falling in the category of the employees, whose rendered service is less than 25 years, as given in para-2(b)(ii) of the Scheme, such employees are not entitled to pensionary benefits but without creating any precedent, they would be given compensation towards the pensionary benefits equivalent to 50% commutation of gross pension as a full and final settlement (emphasis provided).
28.  Since the respondent-employees have not retired from service of the appellant-Bank by application of the Regulations, 1980 nor under the Staff Regulations, 1993 but they have left the service of the appellant-Bank at their own by exercising their own right of option by accepting the Scheme, therefore, their cases are squarely governed and controlled under the terms and conditions as was clearly spelt out in the Scheme itself. As no reference can be made as to how and against whom the respondents were differently treated in a discriminatory manner, we have failed to understand as to how there was any violation of Article 25 of the Constitution.
29.  We have also taken notice of the fact that not all the employees but some of them had approached this Court, who had also opted under the same Scheme but had asked for re-fixation of their pension on the basis of revised pay scales in Khyber Zaman v. State Bank of Pakistan (2005 SCMR 235) and State Bank of Pakistan v. Mumtaz Sultana (2010 SCMR 421), and no question of discrimination was raised before this Court nor the question of entitlement to pension on the basis of 10 years service or more was raised. It is well settled law that party once approaching the Court for seeking relief shall seek all the relief to which it thinks is entitled to and if such relief, even if available but not asked for, cannot be claimed by filing a subsequent legal proceedings as it would fall within the mischief of constructive res judicata. On this ground as well the respondents were not entitled to any relief as it has been handed down to them through the impugned judgment.
30.  Very vehemently objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-Bank that the respondent-employees are guilty of laches and the learned Division Bench of the High Court has not embarked upon this issue.
Laches is a doctrine whereunder a party which may have a right, which  was  otherwise  enforceable,  loses  such  right  to the extent of its enforcement if it is found by the Court of a law that its case is hit by the doctrine of laches/limitation. Right remains with the party but it cannot enforce it. The limitation is examined by the Limitation Act or by special laws which have inbuilt provisions for seeking relief against any grievance within the time specified under the law and if party aggrieved do not approach the appropriate forum within the stipulated period/time, the grievance though remains but it cannot be redressed because if on one hand there was a right with a party which he could have enforced against the other but because of principle of limitation/laches, same right then vests/accrues in favour of the opposite party.
It is settled principle of our jurisprudence as well that delay defeats equity and that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent. In the case of Jawad Mir Muhammadi v. Haroon Mirza (PLD 2007 SC 472), a full Bench of this Court has held that laches per se is not a bar to the Constitutional jurisdiction and question of delay in filing would have to be examined with reference to the facts of each case; question of delay/laches in filing Constitutional petition has to be given serious consideration and unless a satisfactory and plausible explanation is forthcoming for delay in filing Constitutional petition, the same cannot be overlooked or ignored subject to facts and circumstances of each case.
In this very case reference has also been made to words of Lord Camden L.C. from the judgment of Smith v. Clay (1767) 3 Bro. C.C. 639n at 640n wherein it has been observed that "a Court of equity has always refused its aid to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time; nothing can call forth this Court into activity, but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, where these are wanting the Court is passive, and does nothing". Cited judgment also refers to a book titled Snell's Equity by John Meghee 13th Edition, wherein at page. 35 it has been observed that "the doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine; where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these lapse of time and delay are most material".
In Member (S&R)/Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Ashfaque Ali (PLD 2003 SC 132), this Court has held that "writ jurisdiction is undoubtedly discretionary and extraordinary in which may not be invoked by a party who demonstrates a style of slackness and laxity on his part ................. law is well-settled that a party guilty of gross negligence and laches is not entitled to the equitable relief."
In S.A. Jameel v. Secretary to the Govt. of the Punjab (2005 SCMR 126), this Court while addressing the question of laches has observed that "there is marked distinction between delay in filing of a legal proceeding within the period specified under the provisions of Limitation Act, 1908 and undue time consumed by a party in filing of Constitutional petition, for which no statutory period is prescribed under the law; in the former case, delay of each day is to be explained by furnishing sufficient cause for enlargement of time and condonation of delay within the contemplation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act whereas in the later case lapse of time or the question of laches has to be examined on equitable principles for the reason that the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction is always discretionary with the Court and the relief; so granted is always in the nature of equitable relief in case if the Court finds that the party invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court is guilty of contumacious lethargy, inaction, laxity or gross negligence in the prosecution or a cause for enforcement of a right, the Court would be justified in non-suiting such person on the premise of laches" (emphasis provided). Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rana Bhagwandas (as he then was), also relied upon the following para of Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner (1987 SCMR 1119):--
"There is absolutely no justification to equate laches with statutory bar of limitation. While the former operates as a bar in equity, the latter operates as a legal bar to the grant of remedy. Thus, in the former, all the dictates of justice and equity and balance of legitimate rights are to be weighed, in the latter, subject to statutory relaxations in this behalf; nothing is left to the discretion of the Court. It is a harsh law. Thus, passage of time per se brings the statute of limitation in operation, but the bar of laches does not deny the grant of right or slice the remedy unless the grant of relief in addition to being delayed, must also perpetuate injustice to another party. It is also in this very context that the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act will be on different harder considerations than those in a case of laches. For, example, while it is essential to explain and condone the delay of each day vis-a-vis statutory limitation, there is no such strict requirement in cases of laches."
The doctrine of laches was also under discussion and dealt with by Privy Council in the judgment reported as John Objobo Agbeyegbe v. Festus Makene Ikomi (PLD 1953 PC 19) where the Lord Oaksey quoted the following para from Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Company (1878 LR 3 AC at page 1279):--
"In Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Hurd (LR 5 PC 239) it is said:
`The doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where, by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case if an argument against relief, which otherwise not amounting to a bar in any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."
In the instant case doctrine of laches will have double force against the respondent-employees because in the first instance they could not prove or show the infringement of any right as held by us in the preceding paras hereinabove and secondly because they are guilty of laches in approaching the legal forum in for redressal of their grievance, if at all they had a legal and genuine grievance.
31.  Finally, we must refer to the conduct of the respondent-employees in the instant case. Most of them willingly opted for the Scheme, coupled with the fact that they were given four weeks time to ponder over it and were supplied the printout of their approximate entitlement, to which they accepted without any objection and received the amount as determined against their individual entitlement; thereafter, they remained silent with no objection for more than six years as the Scheme was acted upon in the 1997 but they for the first time approached the Service Tribunal in the year 2004, which by itself was a sufficient ground to non-suit them.
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed, consequently, the impugned judgment dated 7-12-2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi is set aside. No order as to costs.
 (R.A.) Appeal accepted

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